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This dissertation examines the way that twentieth-century Modernist poet T. S. 
Eliot stages the production and reproduction of human subjectivity in his work.  It places 
him in context of other thinkers of the period (poets, novelists, social theorists) to better 
understand both their reflections on self-construction and his own. Specifically, this study 
examines how Eliot deconstructs the inner/outer binary that his contemporaries use when 
theorizing the self. In doing so, it positions itself against those critics who argue that Eliot 
exclusively emphasizes interiority (or the experience of inwardness) as such. Inverting 
these typical claims, this study argues that Eliot privileges exteriority (i.e., the 
externalized objectification of self), and it claims that from his earliest poetry, Eliot 
dramatizes individuals as opaque surfaces lacking depth. However, this dissertation also 
claims that Eliot portrays a process whereby individuals become aware of their own self-
objectification, the realization of which proves ironically, dialectically generative of an 
experience of interiority, however tenuous or transitory. My hope in this work is to 
demonstrate Eliot’s difference from his contemporaries as well as to suggest how his 
work parallels certain later theorizations of the self. I also hope to advance a view of Eliot 
as a dialectical thinker and to trace an alternative genealogy for one branch of 
Modernism.    
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A Poet of Interiority?  
In Tracing T.S. Eliot’s Spirit, A. David Moody argues that Eliot’s The Waste 
Land “essentially” dramatizes the poet’s own personal “landscape of inward desolation” 
(116). By staging his emotional impressions and experiences through the poem’s various 
images, scenes, and personages, Eliot is able to “work out a set of personal feelings” that 
would otherwise remain unexamined (115). Indeed, in expressing those feelings, Moody 
believes Eliot in fact attempts to transfigure them, “to recover feeling through lyrical 
expression of the ‘dead’ state of being” (115-16). For Moody, at least in The Waste Land, 
Eliot is a poet of interiority, a poet who seeks to express inner states in outward form.  
In her biography of T.S. Eliot, Lyndall Gordon makes a similar point, writing that 
The Waste Land functions for Eliot as a “guarded mode of confession” (149). Like 
Moody, Gordon argues that one of Eliot’s aims in writing The Waste Land was to effect a 
transformation in himself, as a “knight will traverse a waste in his quest for grace” (156). 
For Gordon though, almost all of Eliot’s poetry can be seen in this way, as thinly 
disguised autobiography and emotional self-exploration. Eliot’s poetry provides a 
creative, though “guarded,” means of channeling outward inward experience. Ash-
Wednesday, for instance, is really about the poet’s complex, unresolved feelings for 
Emily Hale (237). Similarly, Four Quartet’s East Coker really masks Eliot’s “recoil” 
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from sexuality (347). Both of these thinkers, however, take as axiomatic an 
uncomplicated view both of the relation between poet and poem as well as of the nature 
of subjectivity itself. That is to say, in their discussion of Eliot, both Moody and Gordon 
assume an unambiguously transparent relation between speaker and text (i.e., the speaker 
experiences a feeling, then converts that feeling into text) as well as a stable notion of 
interiority as such. For these two critics, Eliot confesses himself in his work, expresses in 
concrete form the concrete contents of his inward experience of being, and in so doing 
dramatizes a structurally stable notion of subjectivity (i.e., that subjectivity as such can 
exist as a definitively defined object of representation).        
Moody and Gordon are not alone in affirming Eliot as a poet who privileges 
inwardness. Indeed, a good number of critics have taken T.S. Eliot as a poet whose work 
emphasizes interiority. They have assumed that the experiences dramatized in his poetry, 
from “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” through Four Quartets, as well as in his 
plays, maps out an inner landscape of struggle, anxiety, or guilt. In Poets of Reality, for 
example, J. Hillis Miller argues that Eliot sees “authentic” poetry as “the expression of 
the artist’s personality” (149), that poets draw up from the depths emotive “psychic 
material” which they then linguistically “embody” in poems (152). This “psychic 
material” belongs to a subterranean version of the self which exists in tension with the 
“wakeful ego” of everyday life (152). “[A]uthentic poetry,” Miller goes on to say, gives 
voice to this “deep-buried self,” provides it with “an objective existence” in the surface 
content of language (152). Indeed, Miller sees this as Eliot’s root conceptualization of 
poetry: that poetry’s purpose is to provide vent for those “deeper, unnamed feelings 
 
 
3 
 
which form the substratum of our being” (152). Poetry draws forth what would otherwise 
remain unarticulated, “brings surface and depths together and gives a man possession of 
his true self” (152). Poetry thus helps provide individuals with a sense of psychic 
coherency, for in articulating their authentic being (i.e., suppressed, unarticulated emotive 
states), they also integrate it into their conscious awareness of self. In this, Miller 
maintains, Eliot shares much with Matthew Arnold. Both poets emphasize the “hidden 
self” or “buried life” (153). As Miller sees it, both poets affirm the existence of a core, 
authentic, though almost inexpressible inner self that exists in and for itself. Poetry 
becomes the means by which the poet attempts to render communicable the inner 
experience of authentic selfhood. Poetry, that is, serves as a means both for making sense 
of the self to oneself (i.e., articulating inwardness for the sake of a kind of redemptive 
clarification) and of making sense of oneself for others.  
And yet, Miller argues, “Eliot’s individualistic theory of poetry does not in 
practice achieve the goals he sets for it” (155). What remains predominate, particularly in 
the early poetry, is the existential experience of disjunction, alienation, inner discord. The 
early poetry is a poetry of mental and emotional isolation. Individuals in the poems 
remained walled off within themselves, monads cut off from connection with others or 
from any mode of substantive self-understanding or psychological self-integration. For 
Miller, Eliot’s early poetry constructs a universe of solipsistically isolated individuals, 
even though, Miller confesses, the seeds of “escape” from such a state remain present 
(155). Though largely uninterested in biography, Miller, like Moody and Gordon, still 
sees Eliot’s poetry predominately as the subjective expression of the poet’s emotive 
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states, however disguised or displaced. Like Moody and Gordon, he also argues for an 
Eliot who affirms belief in substantive core self, no matter how solipsistically isolated it 
may appear to be.     
Although Jewel Spears Brooker notes that Miller has perhaps more than anyone 
else “popularize[d]” the notion of Eliot as a solipsist (Mastery 193), Robert Langbaum 
has surely contributed significantly to this view as well. In The Mysteries of Identity, in a 
discussion of Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” Langbaum argues that 
“Prufrock’s sensuous apprehension reveals . . . a buried libidinal self that he cannot make 
operative in the social world, cannot reconcile with the constructed self seen by ‘The eyes 
that fix you in a formulated phrase’” (86). Just as Miller suggests that Eliot affirms in his 
poetry a subterranean self that exists below the inauthentic social self, so, too, does 
Langbaum suggest that Prufrock possesses an inner self that remains hidden, “buried” 
beneath the crustations of the ordinary self. Consciousness is thus “bifurcated,” internally 
split between two modes of self, one of which (the inner) remains privileged over the 
other (87).  
And again, like Miller, Langbaum draws a connection between Eliot and Arnold, 
in which he discusses the ways in which both poets map out the constitutive disjunctions 
and inner antagonisms characteristic of the post-romantic “bifurcated” self (87). Both 
poets, Langbaum holds, see a nearly unbridgeable gap between the conscious, social, 
quotidian self and the buried self which exists beyond the conscious self’s reach. But 
whereas for Arnold the hidden self remains a personally unique experience, for Eliot, the 
buried self proves “less individual” and more a product of a culturally pervading, shared 
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“unconscious racial memory” (88). Langbaum argues that the personages in Eliot’s 
poems “in spite of themselves . . . liv[e] their buried life; but they do this through racial 
as well as personal memory, through unconsciously making rituals even when they think 
they have abolished all rituals” (89). It is for this reason, Langbaum feels, that Eliot 
famously praises James Joyce’s “mythical method” in Ulysses, for Joyce’s novel 
illustrates individuals’ unconscious participation in socio-mythic forms which work at a 
fundamental level to structure those individuals’ lived experience (89). Like Miller, 
Langbaum marks a distinction between an outer (inauthentic) and inner (authentic) self. 
And although Langbaum’s inner self remains more impersonal (and thus less individual) 
than Miller’s, the presence of the binary remains nevertheless uncontested. Indeed, 
Langbaum further explores the disjunction between interiority and exteriority in his 
discussion of the The Waste Land, in which he argues that the poem dramatizes 
individuals who experience themselves as monadic interiorities wholly cut off from one 
another. Individuals, he argues, feel themselves locked within “prison-house[s] of self,” 
even as the poem otherwise suggests (through the “mythic method”) that these 
individuals “generate . . . an archetypal identity” which potentially “delivers them” from 
this state (113-14). At the level of the conscious self, individuals remain walled off, while 
at the same time, an unconscious self continues to participate in a transpersonal, 
ritualized reality.  
Like Moody and Gordon, Miller and Langbaum provide touchstone instances of 
one rather commonplace way of viewing Eliot’s portrayal of self. At the heart of their 
critique lies the argument that Eliot posits and privileges a substantive, stable, core self 
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and that this self remains largely inaccessible. Kathleen O’Dwyer perhaps provides the 
clearest articulation of this position, arguing specifically that Eliot posits an “inner life” 
to his characters, a life that “remains hidden, not just from others, but also from 
[themselves]” (329). She claims that his poetry is characterized by “despair and disguise, 
alienation and anxiety,” and in doing so she suggests the existence of an inner, authentic, 
core self who experiences an outer, objective, othered reality which the individual finds 
threatening and disorienting (333). O’Dwyer argues that the “self” in Eliot’s poetry “has 
been buried beneath ‘deliberate disguises” (333). Indeed, she makes the rather standard 
claim that the “modernist self” possesses a “fractured variety” of “disparate 
personalities,” and that in a poem like The Waste Land, these personalities “merge to 
express the multi-layered enigma of the modern consciousness” (330). And yet this 
fractured self, she argues, merely disguises the true “reality of the self” buried beneath 
surface discontinuities (333).   
Significantly, each of these critics implicitly propounds a view of Eliot’s poetry 
grounded in a set of binaries that provides the coordinates for their own analyses. In 
various ways, mind/body, depth/surface, self/society, self/other all function as orienting 
dualistic oppositions that inform their work. When Miller argues that Eliot advances a 
monadic view of individuals, or Langbaum emphasizes the “prisonhouse[s] of self” 
which Eliot constructs, or when Gordon argues that Eliot “tended to separate body and 
soul” (403), or, in The Matrix of Modernism, Sanford Schwartz argues that “the 
opposition between ‘surfaces’ and ‘depths’ is central” to Eliot’s work (155), each critic 
relies on a set of assumptions which privileges inwardness or emphasizes a kind of cut 
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between surface and depth (e.g., body and soul) that constricts their analyses and 
misrepresents the complexities of Eliot’s thought. 
Admittedly, in a number of essays from both early and late in his career, Eliot 
himself seems to have emphasized inwardness as the root source of poetry, and stressed, 
too, a disjunction between a private, inviolable, core self and some superficial social 
persona. In “The Social Function of Poetry,” for instance, he explicitly emphasizes poetry 
as a “vehicle of feeling,” arguing that poetry “has primarily to do with the expression of 
feeling and emotion” (OPP 8). Although he made this observation in 1943, it echoes 
reflections he made in 1919’s “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” wherein he suggests 
that “emotions and feelings” serve as the “elements” which poets fuse into poems (SP 
41). But in other essays, he goes further than this. In the late lecture “The Three Voices of 
Poetry” (from 1953), Eliot writes that in writing their poems, poets grapple with some 
“unknown, dark psychic material” within themselves, an “octopus or angel with which 
[they] struggle” (110). And in the closing lines of his 1933 Norton Lectures, The Use of 
Poetry and the Use of Criticism, he writes, poetry “may make us from time to time a little 
more aware of the deeper, unnamed feelings which form the substratum of our being, to 
which we rarely penetrate; for our lives are mostly a constant evasion of ourselves, and 
an evasion of the visible and sensible world” (149). Taken together, passages such as 
these point to an Eliot who, at least in his critical writings, affirms the binary modes of 
thought attributed to him by critics such as Moody, Miller, or O’Dwyer. For Eliot here, 
poetry serves to articulate previously unarticulated (and perhaps unknown) emotive states 
of being. It functions as a means for organizing and expressing individuals’ previously 
 
 
8 
 
unexpressed but nonetheless authentically felt emotional experience. And of course, Eliot 
seems implicitly here to suggest the existence of a gap between one’s conscious 
experience of oneself and a deeper “substratum” that marks the individual’s authentic 
kernel of being. Indeed, the fact that he implies such a gap suggests as well his belief that 
individuals indeed possess some authentic kernel of being (from which they can be 
alienated and to which they can be reintegrated via the articulating mediation of poetry).  
And yet this view of Eliot omits much, flattening his thought and ignoring the 
complexities of his position. At the very least, critics who point to this version of Eliot 
should recall Eliot’s stated commitment to a poetics of impersonality (articulated 
famously in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” and less famously in other essays, such 
as 1920’s “Modern Tendencies in Poetry”), in which the “I” is devalued in favor of an 
impersonalized rendering of the human subject’s shifting emotional states. Eliot sought to 
distance himself from the romantic emphasis on the centralized ego-self, indeed, 
challenging the very existence of such a self, as in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” 
when he expresses his doubts about “metaphysical theory of the substantial unity of the 
soul” (42). He goes on in that essay to explain “that the poet has, not a ‘personality’ to 
express, but a particular medium, which is only a medium and not a personality, in which 
impressions and experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected ways [sic]” (SP 42). 
The poet, he suggests, views his feelings dispassionately as elements to be combined and 
recombined in the construction of a poem. As he writes in “Modern Tendencies,” the poet 
“is not particularly interested in [his feelings] because they are his . . . it is only as he is 
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able to regard these feelings as existing apart from him . . . that he can work them into 
art” (214).  
At first glance, such a view would seem to construct a binary between an 
observing, analytical consciousness and the feeling, inner creature of self that the mind 
then analyzes. Yet on closer inspection, Eliot’s view of impersonality also works to 
undercut the notion of an inward self: it renders that self mechanistic, suggests it exists 
only as some Lockean or Humean complex of feelings that arise by virtue of an 
encounter with an external stimulus (i.e., those “impression and experiences”). In other 
words, the self as suggested here is not some central, ethereal entity (a “substantial unity 
of the soul”), but rather a product of individuals’ engaged immersion within their 
physical and social worlds. The notion of impersonality can thus be seen as a means by 
which Eliot effaces the line between the inward self and its exteriorized expression, 
thereby blurring any disjunction between them. Thus, to simply state, as Schwartz does 
for instance, that “the opposition between ‘surfaces’ and ‘depths’ is central” for Eliot is to 
underestimate the nuances of Eliot’s position, for it is precisely the opposition between 
surface and depth that the notion of impersonality helps to dissolve.  
In contrast with the critical positions examined above, this dissertation aims to 
challenge the notion of an opposition in Eliot’s work between surface and depth as well 
as the prioritization of interiority as such. Indeed, I intend in this project to reveal the 
ways in which Eliot is not at all a binary thinker, an argument made, too, by scholars such 
as Jewel Spears Brooker and Jeffrey Perl, although I want to make this argument in a way 
that acknowledges certain tensions in his critical, philosophical, and aesthetic 
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formulations. For Eliot indeed is preoccupied with the tension between surface and depth 
(or interiority and exteriority), but not in the way many of his critics conceptualize it. I 
want first to reverse the binary critics such as Schwartz and Gordon, O’Dwyer and 
Langbaum propose, and then ultimately to argue that Eliot, paradoxically, dissolves the 
binary by exposing the dialectical interplay between surface and depth that he feels in 
fact constitutes it. This in turn will lead to a different understanding of Eliot’s view of 
human interiority (of its nature, construction, and perpetuation) than the one these critics 
propose, and will help, too, to complicate those models of modernism which 
overemphasize interiority as such, or even, as we will see, human exteriority.  
Moreover, in contributing to a view of Eliot as a dialectical thinker, this study will 
suggest an alternative genealogy for one strand of modernism, one which grows out of 
German Idealist philosophy towards a kind of radical epistemological skepticism more 
suggestive of postmodern than modernist thought. As such, although this work’s central 
focus lies only on a single author, it clearly has far-reaching implications for our 
understanding of modernism in general. Indeed, in keeping with the scope of this project, 
I intend not only to discuss Eliot, but to draw on his modernist contemporaries for context 
and contrast.    
 
Eliot the Dialectician 
In The Life of the Mind, Hannah Arendt proposes a “reversal of the metaphysical 
hierarchy” which privileges interiority over exteriority. She argues “that the relevant and 
the meaningful in this world . . . [are] located precisely on the surface,” rather than in the 
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depths (27). She argues, too, that “soul experiences are body-bound,” and that the “soul” 
is in fact “anchored” in the body (33). In making her argument, she challenges the 
Cartesian perception that undergirds much modern Western intellectual thought. Eliot in 
part performs the same methodological procedure in his work. In both his early and late 
poetry as well as in his plays, Eliot repeatedly emphasizes the exteriority of the body and 
how individuals appear as opaque, self-enclosed surfaces to one another. Bodies function 
as boundary points, as markers of human finitude and isolation. Indeed, from his earliest 
to his latest work, Eliot collapses the gap between surface and depth, in fact renders depth 
as surface—externalizing the experience of inwardness such that interiority as such loses 
any positive content. Inwardness, one might say, exists only as written on the body itself.  
In the “Unreal City” passage of part I of The Waste Land, for example, Eliot 
writes of a ghostlike “crowd” that “flow[s] over London Bridge.” Within this crowd, 
individuals remain wholly self-absorbed, their eyes “fixed . . . before [their] feet,” not on 
one another or the road ahead (62). Each individual seems flattened, emptied of life; 
indeed, with “short and infrequent” sighs, even breathing seems to come with difficulty, 
as if they lack even the substantive depth of bodily materiality (i.e., sheer lung capacity) 
(62). Such a description suggests constriction and an experience of overwhelming, 
consuming exhaustion; it also suggests self-enclosure and isolation. Most importantly, 
such an image renders inward experience palpable. The unit of figuration here remains 
the body itself. Its enclosed, bounded, externalized surface provides the template for 
conveying inward experience. Indeed, the poem makes no distinction between an 
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individual’s inner state and the outward expression of that state: interiority and exteriority 
converge.  
And yet there exists here a tension, for in his work Eliot does more than portray 
bodies as sealed, inaccessible surfaces whose various features align with what observers 
perceive as inner content. Rather, he also presents bodies as unstable, penetrable, subject 
to dismemberment and disintegration, particularly in his later poetry and plays. Inasmuch 
as surfaces cohere (or inasmuch as individuals perceive themselves as cohering), Eliot 
suggests they also tend towards fragmentation or incoherence. Interiority and exteriority 
may converge in a way that privileges the external, but what remains external proves 
tenuous. In short, while emphasizing the substantiality of surfaces, Eliot also emphasizes 
their insubstantiality. In Ash Wednesday, for instance, the speaker relates the experience 
of his own self-dismemberment. As the poem opens, he dispassionately recounts how he 
has been consumed by “three white leopards,” who have “fed to satiety” upon him (91). 
Eliot presents a body here that lacks coherence, lacks the boundedness of form that 
transforms the “crowd” in The Waste Land into a group of isolate individuals. Rather, the 
body here proves permeable, broken, fragmented. It opens up into the formless abyss of 
its own incoherence.   
Indeed, even as early as “Prufrock,” Eliot stages this kind of experience. Consider 
the image of Prufrock as an insect pierced and “pinned” to a wall (14). Prufrock translates 
what he perceives as the judging social gaze of others into an image of both self-
objectification and bodily violation. Their gaze penetrates his bodily integrity, shatters 
any sense of private inviolability. He experiences himself as subject to a kind of 
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dismemberment, experiences their piercing gaze as a marker of his own self-
insubstantiality. The closed form of the body thus gives way to an image of the body’s 
own incoherence. Although Eliot inverts the surface/depth binary, thus prioritizing the 
external over the internal, surfaces nonetheless remain prone to disintegration or rupture. 
For Eliot, then, built into his model of individuals as embodied surfaces lies an 
antagonism suggestive of some deeper dialectical movement. How might we understand 
this movement?  
In “Parrot’s Eye: A Portrait by Manet and Two by T.S. Eliot,” Francis Dickey 
also sees Eliot as inverting the surface/depth binary, although for different reasons than 
those proposed and explored here. In an analysis of two of Eliot’s early poems, “On a 
Portrait” and “Portrait of a Lady,” Dickey argues that Eliot sees “the very idea of 
inwardness as itself an imitation or reflection” (114). Individuals possess no interiority of 
consequence; rather, they mimic (or “parrot”) the persona expected of them given their 
particular cultural location and embeddedness. Individuals “mirror,” Dickey argues, 
“what others have already said or done” (114). The male speaker in “Portrait of a Lady,” 
for instance, sees himself by the end of the poem as merely enacting a performance. He 
models the reactions expected of him, and comes to the stark realization that he is nothing 
but the modeling of those reactions (135). Indeed, Dickey suggests that Eliot’s emphasis 
on this mode of exteriority extends all the way to the end of his career, where, in plays 
such as The Confidential Clerk and The Elder Statesman, characters “lack interiority 
except to the extent that they are conscious of themselves as playing prescribed roles” 
(135). As she reads Eliot, then, individuals exist only insofar as they “parrot” some social 
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or cultural discourse. Their identities are inscribed on the surface. And she is certainly 
right insofar as she affirms Eliot’s privileging of surfaces and suspicion of interiority, but 
Dickey refuses to take seriously individuals’ own awareness of this process of 
exteriorization. She neglects to meaningfully consider the ways in which Eliot’s 
characters sometimes (though of course not always) betray an active consciousness of the 
ways that they mirror others, and thus she overlooks the new inner space created in the 
act of such awareness. In so doing, she also overlooks the deeply dialectical process 
embedded in Eliot’s dramatizations.  
Significantly, Eliot often presents individuals whom he dramatizes as consciously 
experiencing their own self-exteriorization (e.g., the speaker in “Portrait of a Lady,” 
Prufrock, the speaker in “Ash Wednesday”). That is to say, although he inverts the 
surface/depth binary so that individuals come to (seem to) lack any authentic inner space 
(since those inner spaces have been, as it were, emptied out onto the surface), he 
nonetheless suggests that individuals sometimes remain aware of the process or 
experience of exteriorization. This self-awareness sets in motion a certain dialectical 
movement between the “self” presented as a surface and the emergence of a mode of 
interiority rooted in the individual’s awareness of her or his own sheer externality—i.e., 
interiority seems paradoxically rooted in the individual’s reflection on their exteriority in 
a kind of Lacanian mirror-stage process. In essence, Eliot suggests that to encounter 
oneself as a surface externalizes individuals to themselves (renders them visible to 
themselves); individuals are created, as it were, in the very act of reflection. 
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But Eliot suggests that the dialectical process extends beyond this initial 
movement, for the sense of interiority ironically granted by becoming aware of one’s 
exteriorization proves at best unstable and at worse illusory. Recall the susceptibility of 
Eliot’s bodies to disintegration. In the reflection (of oneself) one coheres, gathers together 
into a surface, into a singular unified appearance. And to become aware of that reflection 
is to achieve a self-consciousness experienced as an inward reality. But to encounter 
oneself as sheer surface paradoxically ruptures the very experience of unified depth or 
interiority such an encounter reflexively works to produce. Individuals find themselves 
displaced from themselves; what they once experienced as inward they find now 
objectively externalized, an encounter experienced as a kind of self-rupturing. Still, this 
inner-dissolution, this self-fragmentation back into superficial, transitory surface-
coherency itself serves as the first step towards reestablishing a (new) sense of interiority. 
Individuals experience themselves experiencing themselves, and in the process a new 
space of inwardness emerges, which in turn remains subject to further flattening 
objectification. Thus an endless play between surface and depth emerges, a continual 
dialectic between coherency and fragmentation, exteriority and interiority. For Eliot, 
“self” proves never stable or static, but an ongoing dialectical construction.  
In short, then, this dissertation will argue that Eliot privileges surfaces, rendering 
them both coherent and prone to dissolution; that individuals at times become aware of 
their own exteriorization, see themselves reflected back as unified yet flattened surfaces; 
that through an awareness of this process of outward objectification, individuals 
paradoxically reconstitute a sense of interiority; but that this reconstituted sense of 
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interiority remains unstable, itself subject to disintegration in further experiences of self-
objectification. Thus, for Eliot, self proves neither stable nor substantive, but rather a 
product of the dialectical friction generated by the interplay between surface and (a sense 
of) depth. Still, while this basic pattern persists throughout his body of work (both in his 
late and early poetry, in his plays, as well as in his criticism and philosophical 
theorizations), there nonetheless exist differences in emphasis and valuation over the 
course of his career.  
His early work sees this process of exteriorization and dialectical cohesion and 
disintegration in predominately negative terms. He portrays individuals who experience 
themselves largely as flattened, wooden surfaces, opaque both to themselves and to 
others. The emotional resonance of such portrayals tends towards a kind of muted horror, 
as individuals find themselves cut off from one another as well as from any sense of 
authentic interiority within themselves. Consider again Eliot’s portrayal of Prufrock, 
whose experience of isolation and self-denigration culminates in the image of his own 
drowning. At the same time, this feeling of muted horror is compounded by Eliot’s 
portrayal of a countervailing tendency emphasizing individuals’ abject vulnerability. The 
speakers in his early poetry sense a capacity for disintegration latent within themselves. 
They sense that the feeling of cohesive interiority which structures their sense of self 
proves tenuous and ungrounded. Yet as Eliot’s career progresses, the dramatizations of 
these two centripetal and centrifugal processes accrue ever more complicated meaning, 
until in Four Quartets, Eliot provides a positive formulation of these constitutive tensions 
(i.e., through the image and formulation of incarnational embodiment).   
 
 
17 
 
Taken as a whole, then, Eliot’s work reveals a pervasive preoccupation with the 
tension between the external and the internal. His work reveals an attempt to think 
through the contours of personhood through the scaffold of a binary that he both rejects 
and re-appropriates in a more complicated, nuanced form. However, Eliot’s interests in 
this topic are not unique to him. As I will discuss in a later chapter, Eliot’s literary 
contemporaries, from T.E. Hulme and Ezra Pound to Wyndham Lewis and William 
Carlos Williams, also emphasize concrete exteriority in much of their work. True art, for 
these writers, emphasizes only objects’ surfaces; all else remains all too susceptible to the 
easy deceptions of (so-called) romantic sentimentality. Lewis’ Frederick Tarr states it 
most explicitly when he argues that “good art must have no inside”: the “armoured hide 
of the hippopotamus, the shell of the tortoise, feathers and machinery” all “approach 
nearer to art” than does the “naked pulsing and moving . . . soft inside of life” (Tarr 265).  
Still, Eliot’s project differs markedly from that of his fellow writers. Whereas 
exteriority for other writers often translates into an emphasis on stasis or on various 
essentialisms, for Eliot, externality suggests a generative dynamism that lies at the core of 
his conceptualization of subjectivity. Perhaps the chief difference between Eliot and his 
fellow artists lies in Eliot’s familiarity with then contemporary philosophy and social 
theory. Like the artists of the period, late nineteenth and early twentieth-century social 
theorists and philosophers were also probing the tension between surface and depth, 
although their aims and methodologies differed widely. And like many artists, these 
social thinkers and philosophers turned away from (or at least challenged and 
complicated) early nineteenth-century romantic models of self—models of self which, 
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oftentimes following Rousseau, emphasized interiority as the authentic, knowable source 
of human subjectivity. From Henri Bergson to Emile Durkheim, social thinkers and 
philosophers asked questions regarding the source of the self, and for many thinkers, that 
source proved external to the individual. In order to better understand Eliot’s project—
both its difference and significance—I want to first contextualize it within the intellectual 
milieu that provides the coordinates of his thought. Without this understanding, it 
becomes difficult to determine the extent of Eliot’s project and impossible to grasp his 
place in literary and intellectual history.  
Chapter Two, then, will explore the philosophical matrix out of which Eliot’s own 
conceptual categories concerning self or interiority emerge. In doing so, I’ll also examine 
the ways in which Eliot’s philosophical contemporaries rely on the interior/exterior 
binary. In addition to Durkheim, this chapter will feature concise studies of theorists such 
as Sir James Frazer and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, as well as speculative philosophers such as 
Henri Bergson and F.H. Bradley, whose use of the interior/exterior binary differs from 
that of cultural anthropologists such as Durkheim.   
 Also in this chapter, I will briefly sketch out some of the literary sources for 
Eliot’s thought, again focusing on the way these sources speak to the tension between 
interiority and exteriority. I will argue that in contrast to the social theorists Eliot draws 
on (who largely privilege exteriority), the poets and novelists that populate Eliot’s 
background almost invariably privilege inwardness. As a poet, Eliot works in a literary 
tradition whose concerns often include questions concerning the self, interiority, or 
authenticity. For instance, nineteenth-century figures such as Matthew Arnold, Robert 
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Browning, George Eliot, and Walter Pater each, in different ways, grapple directly with 
the question of inwardness or the nature and source of the self. For Arnold there is the 
hidden self, for Browning, the diseased self. George Eliot sees human interiority as a 
mappable, intelligible domain transparent to explanatory discourse, while Pater sees each 
individual separated by a “thick wall of personality” (119). Eliot both builds on and 
challenges writers such as these, as well as other influential figures (for him) such as 
Blake and Swinburne. Indeed, Eliot’s anti-romanticism is in part a resistance not only to 
romantic and late-romantic poetics (which he sees as overly verbal, abstract, sentimental, 
etc.) but to the mode of personhood romantic poetry, particularly in its mid and late 
Victorian instantiation, implicitly propounds, a notion which I will explore in the 
following chapter.  
In Chapter Three, I will turn to Eliot’s prose writings in order to trace out how 
Eliot specifically responds to his philosophical and literary contemporaries and forebears. 
For instance, in Eliot’s Harvard and Oxford graduate essays, as well as in a number of 
book reviews from early in his career, Eliot directly engages with the philosophers and 
social theorists whose views proliferated during the early twentieth century. I will argue 
that Eliot affirms what many of these thinkers assert regarding the relation between 
individuals and their social matrices. Indeed, Eliot himself points to Durkheim as a 
crucial figure here. For instance, in a 1916 review of Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms 
of the Religious Life: A Study in Religious Sociology, Eliot affirms Durkheim as the 
“leader of a school of thought” whose work has influenced social theorists such as “Lévy-
Bruhl . . . Jane Harrison, [F.M.] Cornford, and Mr. A.B. Cook” (Complete 420). He goes 
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on to praise Durkheim’s originality, and asserts that his study “is one of the most 
fascinating, of books on the subject of religion which have been published during the 
present century [sic]” (423). I will claim that Eliot understands Durkheim’s project as one 
that deemphasizes the personal in favor of the interpersonal or even impersonal, and that 
this view permeates Eliot’s own theories of self. Conversely, as noted above, I’ll also 
claim that when Eliot grapples with his immediate poetic forebears (i.e., romantic and 
mid and late Victorian writers) he criticizes what he feels to be their overemphasis on 
individualism and subjective experience.               
In this third chapter, I will go on to show how Eliot’s prose writings (critical 
reflections, aesthetic formulations, philosophical speculations) inform and reflect on his 
project as a poet. Specifically, I will argue here that what remains implicit in Eliot’s 
poetry regarding the relation between individuals and their socio-cultural contexts (i.e., 
between the inner self and the outer world) becomes explicit in his philosophy and 
criticism. Indeed, in his dissertation on Bradley, Eliot argues specifically that “the ‘self . . 
. seems to depend upon a world which in turn depends upon it, and nowhere . . . can we 
find anything original or ultimate” (Knowledge and Experience 146), which is to say that 
individuals possess no core, hidden, authentic interiority, but rather only gain a sense of 
interiority through their constitutive dialectical encounters with exteriorized objects in the 
outer world. Brooker, too, notes the dialectical impulse underlying Eliot’s thinking: “The 
movement of his mind,” she suggests, “involving first surrender, then mastery, and 
finally transcendence,” is a “pattern” rooted in “Hegelian and Marxist dialectic,” which 
Eliot has appropriated and transformed (Mastery 3). This underlying dialectic inherited 
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from nineteenth-century continental philosophy not only informs Eliot’s philosophical 
position, but his aesthetic theorizations as well. When, in “Tradition and the Individual 
Talent,” for instance, Eliot famously argues that poets have no meaning except in relation 
to a larger, more comprehensive tradition, he essentially propounds a belief in the 
dialectical interplay between individuals and the social structures and forces within which 
they find themselves situated. Out of this view of poets emerges not only his well-known 
and well-discussed theory of impersonality but also a particular view of history or 
tradition, as Brooker, too, acknowledges (3).  
I’ll go on to argue in this section that Eliot’s notions of the objective correlative 
and the unity of sensibility prove possible only within the horizon of a dialectical mode 
of thought. Both of these speculative concepts rely on the collapse between the distance 
between surface and depth. Objective correlatives demonstrate a constitutive link 
between inner emotional experience and external, empirical objects; while the concept of 
unified sensibility suggests the degree to which thought and feeling overlap, thought 
being grounded in the skin, so to speak, of language. In this section, I will discuss not 
only Eliot’s dissertation and critical theories, but also his later social writings, as well as 
numerous, scattered prose pieces published in various journals of the time.     
In Chapter Four, I’ll turn to Eliot’s poetry, focusing primarily on his early work 
up through The Waste Land. I’ll begin my discussion at the beginning, so to speak, and 
examine Eliot’s early poem “Convictions (Curtain Raiser),” written around 1910 but 
published only in 1996, in Inventions of the March Hare. In this poem, Eliot first 
introduces the notion of individuals as purely exteriorized surfaces through the image of 
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the “marionette,” which he develops through the course of the poem. Among other 
poems, I will also examine “Mandarins,” “Goldfish,” and “Suite Clownesque,” three 
more early poems, the second of which also employs the marionette trope, a metaphor 
which in fact figures in a number of Eliot’s early poems. Following Francis Dickey, I will 
also examine “On a Portrait” and “Portrait of a Lady.” Each of these six poems, in some 
way, reverses the surface/depth binary according to which surface is de-prioritized in 
favor of inwardness. Rather, in these poems, Eliot emphasizes exteriority. He flattens 
individuals into wooden, static surfaces, seeing them as, literally, wooden puppets—
marionettes.  
However, by the time we reach “Portrait of a Lady,” Eliot introduces a secondary 
movement. The speaker in that poem seems to become aware of the process of 
exteriorization, and in that realization, initiates a dialectical movement which introduces 
into Eliot’s model of self a notion of interiority, however tenuous or insubstantial. In the 
second half of this chapter, I will turn to “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” and The 
Waste Land in order to explore further this emerging sense of dialectic that informs 
Eliot’s dramatization of his speakers and of the personages that populate his early poetry. 
Indeed, I will point to “Prufrock” as perhaps the paradigmatic text here in that Eliot 
stages in the poem not only Prufrock’s (self-aware) experience of self-
objectification/exteriorization but also his sense of a tendency towards self-dissolution or 
disintegration. Prufrock feels himself relationally constituted in the gaze of others, 
objectified by the gaze, and yet torn apart or pierced by it as well. That is to say, he 
experiences his own self-objectification and instantiation as a unified, singular, bounded 
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form, which then produces an experience of interiority (i.e., he experiences himself 
experiencing, which proves generative of an experience of inwardness), yet which 
nevertheless is felt simultaneously as a self-splintering, an assault on Prufrock’s sense of 
self-unity or coherency.  
Chapter Five will continue this exploration into the modes of exteriorization 
functioning in Eliot’s work, but will turn to his later poetry, from the late 1920s to the 
1940s. In this chapter I will examine “Ash Wednesday,” Sweeney Agonistes, and Four 
Quartets, and will argue that each emphasizes the experience of disintegration, 
dismemberment, and dissolution in contrast to surface coherency or unity. In other words, 
whereas Eliot emphasizes wooden exteriority in much of his early poetry, his later work 
stresses the fracturing of such exteriority, its splintering into incoherency. In this sense, 
Eliot’s later work carries forward the work begun in “Prufrock” by amplifying and 
complicating it. Eliot renders individuals into highly vulnerable creatures, whose 
inwardness, as such, consists in the experience of themselves as surfaces subject to 
exposure and fragmentation.  
However, in these later poems, Eliot connects the feeling of dissolution with a 
sense of self-overcoming. For the later Eliot, there is a sense that individuals need self-
dissolution in order to advance to higher modes of self-integration, however tenuous or 
temporary. As such, the emotional valence of these later poems shifts from the negative 
to the positive. In part, one might link this procedural movement to Eliot’s conversion to 
Christianity in 1927, a point that exactly parallels this slight shift in his poetics. While 
this point proves cogent, one might also point out that this constitutive antagonistic 
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tension (between the self and the self’s own self-overcoming through dissolution) only 
reproduces the dialectical procedure apparent in his early pre-conversion work as well, 
albeit with a slightly different emphasis. The informing pattern here remains the same. 
This chapter will culminate in a discussion of Four Quartets, in which Eliot offers the 
image of incarnational embodiment, a way of conceiving bodies in flux that maintains the 
dialectical tension between the centripetal and centrifugal forces that work upon 
individuals.  
Finally, in Chapter Six, I will place Eliot in context of his modernist 
contemporaries by moving into a discussion of the ways in which they varyingly 
construct the inner/outer binary in their own work. Indeed, I intend to suggest that 
concern with this binary extends far beyond Eliot, informing modernist representational 
strategies in general. Thus, turning away from Eliot, I will provide brief readings of 
novelists such as Joseph Conrad, Virginia Woolf, and Wyndham Lewis, as well as poets 
such as William Carlos Williams, Gertrude Stein, and Ezra Pound. I will argue that many 
of these writers (ironically imitating their Victorian forebears) privilege interiority over 
exteriority, though in variant and often oppositional ways. I will place Conrad, for 
example, in opposition to novelists such as Woolf and D.H. Lawrence, for both of whom 
I will argue an inner self remains a varyingly complex though nonetheless substantive 
entity, the self existing in itself, as it were. Woolf, for instance, offers several ways of 
conceptualizing interiority over the course of her work, but each relies on a definitive 
notion of self as a category with positive content (i.e., self exists as such, however 
malleable it may be). In contrast, Conrad (I argue) denies self originary content, seeing 
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self only as an abstract conceptual category lacking substantiality in itself. Both privilege 
inwardness and subjective modes of consciousness, but Conrad sees interiority as a blank 
abyss onto which outer forms/identities are grafted.  
Conversely, in this chapter I will also explore how many of Eliot’s 
contemporaries prioritize exteriority over interiority, examining (among others) Ezra 
Pound, Wyndham Lewis, and William Carlos Williams. Although these authors differ 
from one another in various ways, each nonetheless emphasizes concrete material reality. 
Objects exist as ends in themselves, rather than as necessary analogues for inner moods 
or states of consciousness. They possess, too, a self-sufficiency that defines them as 
particularized objects located within an array of objects, rather than as objects mutually 
constituted in dialectical relations with one another. Moreover, each of these authors 
variously posits a transparent relation between the knower and the known (i.e., perceivers 
perceive objects in their supposed self-transparent, self-substantial, singular reality). As 
Williams Carlos Williams argues in Spring and All, “There is a constant barrier between 
the reader and his consciousness of immediate contact with the world,” which (implicitly) 
poetry can bridge (88). He affirms that he “puts down” nothing in his work “which is not 
intended as of a piece with the ‘nature’ which Shakespeare mentions,” and goes on to 
define nature as “the common thing which is anonymously about us” (101). Williams, 
that is, not only sees the external world of material objects as simply and transparently 
given, but implicitly separates the act of perception from that which it perceives (i.e., the 
knower from the known). In doing so, he erects a subject/object binary which privileges 
the external as self-substantial and self-sustaining, independent from any mediating gaze. 
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In short, in this chapter, in the same broad sense that Frank Kermode differentiates 
between what he terms paleo- and neo-modernisms in his essay “The Modern,” I, too, 
will differentiate broadly between those modernists who privilege interiority and those 
who privilege exteriority, all the while acknowledging the various nuances and 
inconsistencies their positions entail.  
Ultimately, in this dissertation, I hope to offer a way of conceptualizing Eliot’s 
work that assumes continuities over the course of his career as well as variations in 
emphasis and practice. As noted above, I intend to challenge readings of Eliot that see 
him predominately as a poet of interiority, and I hope to expand on the work of those 
(such as Francis Dickey) who see Eliot as emphasizing exteriority. Also, given Eliot’s 
provocative epistemological skepticism and dialectical conceptualization of the nature of 
human selfhood, my hope is to advance Eliot as a poet and thinker whose views on 
human nature prove far more radical and indeed postmodern than many critics 
acknowledge, and I seek, too, to offer a way of more clearly differentiating him from his 
modernist contemporaries. Finally, I seek to place Eliot within a tradition of thought that 
broadens our understanding of his location within the modern intellectual landscape. I 
seek to show that Eliot is far more our contemporary than he may seem, though not for 
the reasons typically given (e.g., Eliot as a poet of modern malaise, existential angst, or 
the breakdown of communal values), but rather because Eliot’s thought arises out of the 
same Hegelian matrix that provides postmodernity with many of its own orienting 
conceptual categories. In this specific sense, Eliot is not at all a reactionary thinker: for in 
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fact his resistance to and deconstruction of binary modes of thought has proven markedly 
prescient, anticipating many of our current theoretical presuppositions
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CHAPTER II 
CONSTRUCTING A POET: 
PHILOSOPHICAL AND LITERARY CONTEXTS 
 
Donald Childs points out that ever since Eliot pointed to Jessie Weston’s From 
Ritual to Romance and James Frazer’s The Golden Bough in his notes to The Waste Land 
that critics have sought to trace the connections between Eliot’s aesthetic project as a poet 
and the anthropological theories of his intellectual contemporaries (20).1 Certainly, Eliot 
was an informed student of modern social science, as his work in Josiah Royce’s 1913-14 
graduate seminar and his later numerous reviews of anthropological studies reveal. 
Indeed, the fact that he continued to think and write on these issues, even after he 
formally abandoned philosophy in 1917 in favor of his career as a poet, demonstrates his 
ongoing interest in the field. As will be discussed in Chapter Three, Eliot’s familiarity 
extended not only to Frazer and Weston, but also to social theorists such as Lucien Lévy-
Bruhl and Émile Durkheim, as well as speculative philosophers like Henri Bergson and 
F.H. Bradley. Along with a few other figures (e.g., Weston, Jane Harrison, F.M. 
Cornford), these thinkers provided Eliot with the conceptual coordinates of his own 
                                                          
1 Of course, years later, in “The Frontiers of Criticism” (1956), Eliot confesses that he fears his “notes 
stimulated the wrong kind of interest among the seekers of sources,” that though “it was just . . . that I 
should pay my tribute to the work of Miss Jessie Weston . . . I regret having sent so many enquirers off on a 
wild goose chase after Tarot cards and the Holy Grail” (On Poetry 121-22). Still, in the very next passage 
of the essay, he goes on to argue that such explanations of his work (i.e., those that examine source 
material), though partial, “may be a necessary preparation for understanding” (122), a significant 
admission, given the depth of his own familiarity with anthropologists and other social theorists. 
 
 
29 
 
social/anthropological positions. Whether he situated himself alongside or against them, 
these thinkers equipped him with the terminological and theoretical apparatus that 
necessarily informed his own reflections on the formation of individuals and their relation 
to the social order. Eliot’s musings on and dramatizations of the tensions between 
interiority and exteriority in his poetry and criticism in part respond to or extend these 
thinkers’ own speculations, and thus it becomes crucial to review a sampling of their 
positions, however briefly, in order to better understand Eliot’s own. Most importantly, 
consciously or not, each of these figures employs the surface/depth binary in their own 
thinking about the relationship between individuals and their social matrices. 
Consequently, to better understand Eliot’s treatment of this binary requires an 
understanding their own.  
Thus, this chapter will in part trace out the various ways in which Eliot’s 
intellectual precursors deploy the inner/outer binary in their thinking. Each of these 
authors attempts to theorize or dramatize a particular understanding of human 
subjectivity and its relation to its social context. Each operates during a period when 
largely normative conceptualizations of this relation have come into question, as altered 
cultural, social, and economic conditions undermined previous certitudes. In a sense, the 
self as such has come into question. Is it an autonomous entity, complete in itself, or does 
its inner structure derive from social determinants? Is it objectively knowable, or does it 
defy conceptual delineation? What is the relation between the self and other selves or its 
cultural environment? How does the self develop or come to an awareness of itself as a 
self among others? These authors seek to resolve these questions by implicitly or 
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explicitly placing the self in oppositional relation to its social matrix, and privileging 
either the self in itself (i.e., as autonomously constituted) or its social determinants. In 
other words, they privilege either the internal (the self) or the external (the social). I want 
to map out their varying positions (as I read them,) so as to better demonstrate in Chapter 
Three how Eliot synthesizes and transcends their diverse formulations in his own work. 
For even as Eliot draws upon the same essential inner/outer distinction that characterizes 
their projects, he rejects their binary, oppositional logic in favor of a dialectical 
understanding of the relation between interiority and exteriority. 
The first section of the chapter will follow how anthropologists grappled with this 
binary, moving generally from a discussion of those theorists who privileged exteriority 
to those who stressed interiority. Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, for instance, uniformly 
emphasize exteriority in their theories of human and cultural development. Both 
emphasize the way individual consciousness reduces to its social determinants (i.e., the 
way the internal reduces to the external). Frazer, on the other hand, preserves both poles 
of the binary, emphasizing rather the tension between the two terms rather than 
privileging one over the other. In contrast to these three thinkers, Jane Harrison 
prioritizes interiority over exteriority, in a sense synthesizing the work of Durkheim and 
Bergson in order to formulate her own distinctive notions. Accordingly, following an 
exploration of Harrison’s ideas, I will transition into a discussion of philosophers 
Bergson and Bradley, and argue that whereas Bergson emphatically stresses interiority, 
Bradley deconstructs the binary altogether.   
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Of course, as a poet, Eliot remains as interested in literary thought and practice as 
in anthropological and philosophical speculation. But just as social scientists and 
philosophers implicitly employ the inner/outer binary in their work, so, too, do novelists, 
poets, and critics. Consequently, following a discussion of social theorists and 
philosophers, I will move into a discussion of Eliot’s Victorian precursors, demonstrating 
the nuances of their positions regarding this binary. For instance, I will show how Robert 
Browning dramatizes in his poetry a model of human subjectivity predicated on a 
radically interiorized notion of self. Browning, I argue, defines self as utterly enclosed 
within its own limited and limiting experience of itself, and that consequently individuals 
ultimately prove unintelligible to one another. Conversely, George Eliot offers a model of 
self that emphasizes transparency and external human relationality. She suggests that the 
self is a rational self, embedded in an external social context which provides the 
structuring matrix for self-experience and identity. In this, she aligns with later 
anthropological thought. Following a discussion of these two opposed writers, I will turn 
to an exploration of the ways in which Matthew Arnold and Walter Pater conceive the 
relation between the two terms of the binary, and will suggest that, like Browning, both 
largely privilege a radically inwardly-oriented notion of self. Arnold famously suggests a 
bifurcated model of subjectivity, for example, in which he privileges an inward, hidden 
self over an externally oriented superficial persona. Similarly, Pater stresses the extent to 
which individuals, trapped in the sphere of their own self-experience, remain barred from 
one another.  
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Each of these four culturally pivotal figures reveals a slightly different treatment 
of the inner/outer binary, though (with the exception of George Eliot) they each generally 
privilege interiority over exteriority, thus differentiating themselves as thinkers from 
influential anthropologists such as Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, or even Frazer. Taken 
together, these various theorists, philosophers, and literary thinkers each help provide a 
sense of the ways the inner/outer binary manifests in nineteenth-century thought, and thus 
help demonstrate the mode of binary thinking out of which Eliot’s own thought emerges 
and which he proceeds to challenge. For, as I will argue, Eliot reconceptualizes the 
relation between the poles of the binary, placing them in dialectical rather than 
oppositional relation to one another.           
 
Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, and the Anthropological Privileging of Exteriority    
Many critics view Émile Durkheim as one of the most significant and influential 
social theorists of the early twentieth century. In Theories of Primitive Religion, for 
example, E.E. Evans-Pritchard argues that Durkheim is “perhaps the greatest figure in the 
history of modern sociology” (53). And Eliot himself argues in a 1916 review of 
Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life that it “is one of the most 
fascinating, of books on the subject of religion which have been published during the 
present century [sic]” (3).2 However, although remembered today as the “founding 
father” of sociology and as one of the founders of modern anthropology (and ethnology) 
(Hinkle 336; Throop 367), Durkheim began his career as a philosopher, studying 
                                                          
2 First published in 1912 as Les forms élémentaires de la vie religieuse (Evans-Pritchard 123).   
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alongside future luminaries such as Henri Bergson (Cladis x). Durkheim’s background in 
philosophy granted him a broad perspective on which to draw while formulating his 
sociological theories. Even as late as The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (his last 
published book), he frames his argument by positioning it in opposition to Humean 
empiricist and Kantian a priori rationalist traditions, arguing the insufficiency of both for 
describing socio-cultural religious practices (15-16).   
Durkheim’s opposition to these two traditions is grounded in part in his particular 
view of the individual as well as the nature of the relationship between individuals and 
society. For Durkheim, both empiricists and rationalists ground reality in the individual’s 
own mental being. For empiricists, individuals’ conceptualization of reality arises out of 
the sense data they perceive as they move through their worlds. The “categories of 
understanding” by which they interpret their world take shape out of the “bits and pieces” 
of perception and experience that accrue over time (Durkheim 15). Individuals, that is, 
“forge [the] construction” of their own “categories of understanding,” and in so doing, 
prove the authors of their own individual, separate realities, a view which “verges on 
irrationalism,” Durkheim maintains (15, 16). In contrast, rationalists (like Kant) maintain 
that the “categories of understanding” remain “logically prior to” experience (15). 
Individuals are preconditioned to perceive their worlds in a particular way, according to a 
particular set of innate ideas, as Descartes would have put it. Experience is thus 
universalized, as is human subjectivity, resulting in a gap between the rationalist notion 
of human individuality and the great wealth of ethnographic variety which research into 
human societies reveals. As Mark Cladis notes in his introduction to The Elementary 
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Forms of Religious Life, “Apriorism [simply] cannot account for the variety of worlds” 
that individuals in different societies inhabit (xxv).     
What is most significant here is that empiricists and rationalists both privilege the 
individual over society or culture as the source of meaning and coherency. Both locate 
meaning inside the individual. Empiricists argue that experience precedes any ordered 
understanding of the world, and that it is the individual who then orders that experience 
into a coherent reality via some innate mental synthetizing capacity. Similarly, for 
rationalists, individuals as individuals possess within themselves the conceptual 
categories that provide the coordinates for organizing experience. They encounter reality 
as already ordered according to a set of categories inherent to mental life as such. That is 
to say, both empiricists and rationalists prioritize interiority over exteriority, despite the 
differences in their emphasis, a view that in many ways has proved characteristic of the 
Western philosophical tradition since Descartes (arguably the first modern rationalist).  
For Durkheim, however, individuals’ experience of reality is always mediated 
through “collective [cultural] representations” (330). Indeed, he argues that the external 
world individuals subjectively encounter is in fact “inside society” (and thus outside the 
individual) (337). Durkheim here suggests that individuals possess no unmediated, self-
authenticating inner space. Rather, they experience their reality only as mediated through 
an exteriorized framework (i.e., society). Inwardness is thus the process of internalizing 
what is external to the individual, and consciousness is never singular, but always 
refracted through some “collective consciousness” (340). In this specific sense, for 
 
 
35 
 
Durkheim, what individuals experience as personally internal to them proves in fact 
objectively “impersonal” (342).  
Even “logical thought” derives from social structures, he argues: “Solely because 
society exists, there also exists—outside of individual sensations and images—a whole 
system of representations. . . . Through them, men understand one another, intellects can 
intermingle” (331, 332). Individuals, he suggests, can only interact through a shared 
system of collective representations. Indeed, those shared representations provide the 
framework not only for communication between individuals but also for each 
individual’s particularized grasp of reality. Cladis summarizes Durkheim’s position here: 
“What might seem to be innate, universal [Kantian] categories of human thought such as 
time, space, class, number, cause, substance, and personhood are in fact culturally 
specific categories, whose medium is language” (xxv). In what seems a nearly Marxist 
insight, individuals for Durkheim remain thoroughly determined by their locations within 
a given social formation. In short, reality (whether social, physical, or metaphysical) is 
always a collective, socially constituted reality.   
In making this argument, Durkheim turns from those models of self that would 
privilege internal states over external (i.e., away from rationalists like Kant or Descartes 
or empiricists like Hume or Locke) and towards a model that emphasizes the primacy of 
external socio-cultural contexts. Durkheim’s views here are not unique to him, but are 
reflective of a set of underlying assumptions common to many social theorists of the 
period. From Marx to Freud, social theorists strove to decenter the individual, either 
dissolving the very notion of an authentic kernel of self that preexists its social 
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instantiation (as in Marx) or displacing the self by locating its energies in agencies alien 
to or outside of its immediate self-perception (as in Freud’s particular notion of the 
personal unconscious or Jung’s notion of the collective unconscious).  
Although less well known outside the history of thought than some of his 
contemporaries, Lucian Lévy-Bruhl, too, participates in this general project. Like 
Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl began his career as a philosopher, and indeed, as Evans-Pritchard 
notes, he always “remained more of the philosopher pure and simple” than an 
anthropologist (78). Accordingly, his interests remained rooted in the functioning of 
“primitive systems of thought rather than in primitive institutions” (79). Ideas interested 
him more so than behavior, particularly how they inform and determine social behavior 
and cultural practices. Reflecting on Lévy-Bruhl’s methodology, Evans-Pritchard argues 
that “one might as legitimately begin a study of social life by analysis of ways of thought 
as of ways of behavior” (78). But this understates Lévy-Bruhl’s position in that it creates 
a false equivalence between “ways of thought” and “ways of behavior,” since for Lévy-
Bruhl “ways of thought” prove more fundamental than “ways of behavior.” As with 
Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl believes that collective cultural representations precede the 
behaviors that instantiate them. Ideas provide the structural matrix out of which social 
behavior emerges. As William Skaff argues, both Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl “postulate 
the existence of collective representations in order to explain how customs and beliefs in 
primitive societies endure beyond the lifetime of their individual members” (62-63). For 
both thinkers, societies remain permeated by a dense weave of self-perpetuating shared 
images, cultural references, categories of thought, and socio-symbolic structures which 
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direct behavior and action. A difference between the two theorists, though (as Skaff notes 
as well), is that whereas Durkheim often remains macroscopically focused at the level of 
a culture’s social collective consciousness, Lévy-Bruhl focuses on the intersection 
between that collective consciousness and the individual mind informed by it (Skaff 63).     
Indeed, Lévy-Bruhl’s focus on the individual “primitive” mind and how it 
processes social and physical reality (in contradistinction, say, to the modern mind) 
marks a fundamental difference not only between his work and Durkheim’s but between 
other anthropologists of the period as well, such as Frazer and E.B. Tylor, members of 
the so-called “English school of anthropology” (Segal 25). In fact, Lévy-Bruhl positions 
himself directly against this “English school,” arguing that a fundamental gap exists 
between the modern mind and the pre-modern mind, despite the claims of theorists like 
Frazer or Tylor that “primitive” social groups “think like moderns, just less rigorously” 
(Segal 25).3 Not only do pre-modern societies structure themselves differently than 
modern ones, but the orienting conceptual categories that organize their perceptions of 
reality differ as well. “Primitive” individuals simply do not perceive the same horizon of 
meanings and significations that moderns do. Reality itself operates according to a 
different set of conceptual criteria. Accordingly, anthropologists err when they believe 
that they can understand the “primitive” mind (and the social practices and processes that 
it actuates) by assuming it to be merely a less sophisticated version of the modern mind, 
asking essentially the same questions about reality, perceiving it according to the same 
                                                          
3 Segal goes on to argue that “for Tylor and Frazer primitives perceive the same world as moderns but 
simply conceive of it differently” (26).  
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set of categories. For Lévy-Bruhl, the differences between primitive and modern 
structures of thought and meaning remain simply too pronounced to assume any reliable 
equivalence between them. As Evans-Pritchard notes, for Lévy-Bruhl, “The mentality of 
the individual is derived from the collective representations of his society, which are 
obligatory for him; and these representations are the functions of institutions. 
Consequently, certain types of representations, and therefore certain ways of thinking, 
belong to certain types of social structure” (79). Different societies, that is, will possess 
incommensurately different ways of perceiving and relating to their worlds.  
In making this argument, Lévy-Bruhl draws a very clear distinction between 
primitive and modern modes of thinking, a distinction Eliot will take note of, as will be 
discussed in the following chapter. In How Natives Think,4 Lévy-Buhl argues not only 
that the “collective representations of primitives . . . differ very profoundly from 
[modern] ideas or concepts,” but that primitive thought lacks the “logical character” of 
modern thought (37). It is “mystic,” he argues, in that the primitive mind interjects 
agency into perceived objects. The primitive individual, he claims, “has an image of [an] 
object in his mind, and thinks it real, but also has some hope or fear connected with it, 
that some definite influence emanates from it, or is exercised upon it” (37-38). This 
mystical “influence” remains a fundamental aspect of the cultural collective 
representations of primitive societies (38).  
                                                          
4 Originally published in 1910 as Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures (Evans-Pritchard 
126).  
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But more than this, Lévy-Bruhl argues that “the mentality of primitives may be 
called prelogical with as good reason as it may be termed mystic,” and that indeed 
“[t]hese are two aspects of the same fundamental quality, rather than two distinct 
characteristics” (78). Crucially, Lévy-Bruhl claims that by prelogical he does not mean a 
stage of thought preparatory to logical thought. Such thought is neither “antilogical” nor 
“alogical” (78). Rather, by prelogical he means merely that such thought “does not bind 
itself down, as [modern] thought does, to avoiding contradiction” (78). “In the collective 
representations of primitive mentality,” he argues, “objects, beings, phenomena can be, 
though in a way incomprehensible to us, both themselves and something other than 
themselves” (76). The modern mind perceives as an ontological contradiction or a 
category error, what for the primitive mind conceptually coheres. In making this 
argument, he seeks to protect primitive groups from the charge of “mental weakness” or 
“naïve application[s] of the principle of causality” (76). He urges his readers to “abandon 
the attempt to refer their mental activity to an inferior activity of our own” (76). Instead, 
he urges them to understand primitive thought as an expression of a view of reality in 
which individuals sympathetically participate in the objects of apprehension, what he 
calls the “law of participation” (76). And indeed this notion (of the participatory relation 
between individuals and perceived objects) constitutes the key feature of primitive 
cultural-social collective representations (76).                  
Just as Durkheim affirms social reality as the determinate matrix for individual 
subjective identity, so, too, does Lévy-Bruhl. Both identify the individual as the product 
of collective forces of cultural representation. Both thinkers, too, privilege the external 
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over the internal, indeed, root the internal in the external, and thus relieve the internal of 
any determinate content. Lévy-Bruhl’s fundamental difference is that he makes a clear 
distinction between modern and pre-modern modes of social reality, a distinction perhaps 
suggested by Durkheim’s argument, though not explicitly formulated. A cut or gap exists 
that divides the two cultural formations from one another, rendering them 
incommensurate.  
 
Frazer’s Oppositional Ontology     
Against both Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl stands English anthropologist Sir James 
Frazer, who posits a constitutive opposition between normative, universal human needs 
and desires and a thoroughly externalized hostile natural world (i.e., that world which 
exists outside human control). Like Durkheim, Frazer was an immensely influential early 
anthropologist. His most important work, The Golden Bough, was first published in a 
two-volume edition in 1890, but subsequent editions featured the addition of further 
volumes, three by 1900, twelve by 1915 (including the index), with a final volume added 
in 1936 (Fraser xl). In 1922, Frazer published an abridged copy, intended to condense his 
arguments into a more accessible format (Fraser xl). Frazer’s work thus spans a 
considerable number of years and versions, its first edition well preceding Durkheim’s 
1912 The Elementary Forms of Religious Life or Lévy-Bruhl’s 1910 How Natives Think, 
and stands as a high-water mark for a particular mode of anthropology that Durkheim and 
Lévy-Bruhl would both implicitly and explicitly reject.  
Frazer was a classical nineteenth-century anthropological evolutionist, who 
believed that all human societies possess at root the same conceptual logic and categories 
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of experience. Human beings and societies remain essentially, structurally identical to 
one another, differing only in their particular, individual location on a common, fixed 
scale of cultural and social development.5 For evolutionists like Frazer, human society 
proceeds through an “inevitable progression from Savagery through Barbarism to 
Civilization” (Voget 944). As Fred Voget argues, using Darwinian evolutionary 
biological and geological analogies, anthropological evolutionists “arrang[ed] the 
institutions of mankind along a mental coordinate—from the least to the most reasoned.” 
In so doing, “a chronological chart of man’s intellectual history could be plotted and 
‘index’ institutions could be assigned to natural stages, quite like the geological and life 
charts used by students of the earth and of life forms” (945). That is to say, as an 
evolutionist, Frazer universalizes human experience and modes of social organization, 
suggesting that the only difference between social groups and their cultural practices lies 
in their relative position upon a normative developmental axis.  
Specifically, in The Golden Bough, Frazer argues that all human societies 
progress through three distinct though sometimes overlapping stages: the magical, the 
religious, and the scientific. In the 1915 third edition, Frazer writes, for instance, that the 
belief in magic that predominates in early societies “represents a ruder and earlier phase 
of the human mind, through which all the races of mankind have passed or are passing on 
their way to religion and science” (55). The “Age of Magic,” that is, precedes the “Age of 
Religion,” which in turn anticipates the fully enlightened Age of Science characteristic of 
                                                          
5 The Golden Bough, as Robert Ackerman explains, was “both the culmination and the swan song of old-
style evolutionary anthropology” (46). Even as Frazer continued to produce new volumes of his study, new 
thinkers increasingly questioned his methodology and theoretical assumptions. 
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modernity, although some atavistic tendencies remain among “the ignorant and 
superstitious classes” (55). Magic, he maintains, is merely an ignorant, uninformed 
application of the same general assumptions regarding physical reality that science holds. 
Beneath both lies the same “faith, implicit but real and firm, in the order and uniformity 
of nature” (45). For both, physical reality consists of an intelligible weave of externalized 
impersonal forces which human beings can both comprehend and master. Both represent 
means by which individuals and societies attempt to control or manipulate their social 
and physical worlds. “The fatal flaw of magic,” however, “lies not in its general 
assumption of a sequence of events determined by law, but in its total misconception of 
the nature of the particular laws which govern that sequence” (45-46). Magic, thus, 
proves but the “bastard sister of science,” and remains “necessarily false and barren; for 
were it ever to become true and fruitful,” he argues, “it would no longer be magic but 
science” (46).  
Only when a given society’s “shrewder intelligences” realize the ineffectiveness 
of magical incantations and ritual formulas do they move on to the religious phase, in 
which belief in an impersonal world of physical forces gives way to belief in a world 
constituted by and mediated through the intervention of powerful spiritual agencies (55). 
Instead of attempting to effect control of their environments through magic, societies now 
attempt to do so through propitiation. For Frazer, this represents a mode of progress in 
that it demonstrates a particular society’s attempt to find a “truer theory of nature and a 
more fruitful method of turning her resources to account” (55). In this sense, the move 
from magic to religion (from incantation to propitiation) illustrates Frazer’s belief in the 
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underlying cognitive uniformity of human societies. The very scientific methodology 
characteristic of Western, modern, enlightened thought (i.e., trial by hypothesis and 
experiment) characterizes, too, primitive thought. The logic of causality remains 
conceptually consistent throughout each of the stages. Human beings (their cognitive 
structures, categories of experience) remain the same no matter their stage of cultural 
development. For Frazer the evolutionist, in contradistinction to Durkheim and Lévy-
Bruhl, all that divides societies (or individuals) is time and experience, and more 
connects primitive and modern society than divides them, a notion Eliot dwells on as 
well. But this implies, too, an oppositional relation between individuals (and the social 
groups to which they belong) and the natural environment itself. That is, Frazer posits a 
hostile, external world against which individuals struggle in predictable and 
developmentally progressive patterns. Indeed, the struggle itself helps propel the 
evolution of cultural forms and human thought. As individuals discover ever more 
effective means for controlling their environments, so, too, do they advance up the scale 
of social organization and intellectual development.   
For example, The Golden Bough is most known for its extended examination of 
the social and cultural function of the priest-king in archaic societies, as well as its 
treatment of the notion of “sympathetic magic” in relation to this figure (24). For Frazer, 
the priest-king provides the mechanism by which certain ancient societies (mistakenly, he 
feels) attempted to effect change in their physical worlds. In the very first chapter of the 
very first edition (1890) of The Golden Bough (and reproduced with variations in 
subsequent editions), Frazer lays forth his thesis, pointing to the fate of the priest-king of 
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Nemi (a lake near Rome) as his foundational example. This priest figure served in a 
grove dedicated to the goddess Diana, at the center of which stood a sacred tree, which he 
sought to protect. The priest, also referred to as a king, bore his title by virtue of having 
slain the previous priest-king, and in turn, would himself be slain by his eventual 
replacement. Frazer notes that this ritual drama seemed an anomalous barbarism in the 
otherwise “polished Italian society” of imperial Rome, and he sees it, ultimately, as an 
atavistic remnant of a less civilized period (12). The Golden Bough serves as Frazer’s 
attempt to explain this strange cultural remnant, and he turns to comparative cultural 
analysis in order to do so. “[I]f we can shew,” he asserts, “that a barbarous custom, like 
that of the priesthood of Nemi, has existed elsewhere,” then “we” can prove that certain 
universal motives work to produce culturally homologous social practices (12).  
He argues, ultimately, that the ritual death of the priest-king served as the means 
by which primitive societies sought to exert control over their physical environments. 
After a long cultural evolutionary process, these societies came to equate their kings with 
the powers of nature and its fecundity, and they saw these kings as possessing a 
“controlling influence over the general course of nature” (216-17). “Naturally,” he writes, 
“the life and health of such a god-man are matters of anxious concern to the people 
whose welfare and even existence are bound up with his” (217). Since this king cannot be 
allowed to grow old or sick, because doing so would threaten the very course of nature, 
he must be slain and replaced while still healthy and virile. As Frazer puts it: “To guard 
against these catastrophes it is necessary to put the king to death while he is still in the 
full bloom of his divine manhood, in order that his sacred life, transmitted in unabated 
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force to his successor, may renew its youth, and thus by successive transmissions through 
a perpetual line of vigorous incarnations may remain eternally fresh and young” (679). 
Thus, relying on the notion of sympathetic magic, ancient peoples equated the physical 
power of the priest-king with the physical processes of the natural world. To slay the king 
before he grew old or weak was to preserve the king’s power and thus a society’s control 
over their physical worlds (e.g., the rain on their fields, the germination of their crops, 
and the strength of their harvests). 
On the one hand, Frazer characterizes primitive societies as harmoniously 
integrated with their physical realities. These early cultures would seem to have 
understood themselves as participants in a natural order, which they could manipulate 
and master via magical ritual. But Frazer also argues that primitive peoples simply 
deluded themselves into perceiving a sympathetic integration between human social 
realities and brute physical nature. For the nineteenth-century Frazer, the world remains 
always external to the individual. It is an object of manipulation: magic, like science, at 
root functions only as an instrument of power over a world construed as other. Thus, 
Frazer pits human societies and individuals against an external, hostile world which must 
be subdued or modified. Like Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, then, Frazer posits a binary that 
places the external (of nature) over the internal (of particular cultures or individuals). But 
unlike them, the binary he constructs remains stable, whereas they invert it so that the 
external itself functions as the privileged term: the external determining the internal. For 
Frazer, the two exist in hostile opposition. Indeed, as suggested above, the antagonism 
between the two terms serves as the engine that propels cultural evolution (i.e., the effort 
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to master the physical world leads societies to ever higher levels of cultural development, 
as they move through empirical observations to abandon magic for religion and religion 
for science). Moreover, unlike Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, Frazer seems largely 
uninterested in the relation between society and the particular individuals that compose it 
(or whom it composes, as Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl would argue), focusing rather on the 
supposed purpose and structural function of ritual within societies from within a horizon 
of assumptions that sees the primitive as simply an uninformed modern.6  
Later generations of anthropologists would reject Frazer’s comparative 
methodology as well as many of his core assumptions. As Robert Ackerman points out, 
as Frazer continued work on The Golden Bough, a “theoretical reorientation” took place 
which began to render Frazer obsolete even as he reached the peak of his influence (45-
46). Frazer, for instance, “lifted out of [their] physical and social contexts” cultural and 
social practices in a way that the social sciences increasingly discouraged (46). Also, his 
particular emphasis on comparative analysis privileged sameness at the expense of 
difference, masking the distinctions between cultures and thereby distorting social 
theorists’ understanding of them. In his empirical quest to accumulate as many cultural 
anecdotes as possible in order to confirm his central hypothesis, he neglected to examine 
the particular emotional or psychological needs that varied social practices and cultural 
rituals served. Perhaps most importantly, younger anthropologists, especially those 
influenced by Durkheim, began to reject his particular evolutionary model of human 
                                                          
6 Indeed, as will be discussed below, one of Eliot’s difficulties with Frazer lies precisely in Frazer’s 
presumption to fathom the purposes of ancient ritual and religious practices.  
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social and cultural development, in which the “Age of Magic” leads always and 
inevitably through the “Age of Magic” to the “Age of Science” (46, 64).  
 
Jane Harrison and the Inward Turn  
Frazer’s influence remained pronounced, even if only as a figure against which 
others struggled. So-called Cambridge Ritualists such as Jane Harrison, F.M Cornford, 
and Gilbert Murray were among Frazer’s most notable inheritors, although they were also 
among those who rejected his static evolutionism. They introduced new theoretical 
notions to anthropology derived from the studies of speculative philosophers and 
psychologists such as Freud, Henri Bergson, and Jung, as well as Durkheim, Nietzsche, 
and William James (Ackerman 64; Phillips 465). Both Ackerman and K.J. Philips note 
that Jane Harrison was the center of this deeply collaborative group, particularly since her 
particular views of the relation between myth, ritual, and society seemed to have 
solidified first, and her knowledge of Greek social and cultural practices exceeded that of 
her fellow Ritualists (Philips 466).  
Like Frazer, Harrison affirmed a form of social evolutionism, though with 
qualifications. Although she believed, as Camille Barnard-Cogno puts it, in the 
“existence of an evolutionary process in which a mythological way of thought changed 
progressively into a historical one” (668), she nonetheless rejected Frazer’s notion of 
some antecedent magical stage, in which individuals sought to control their worlds 
through a form of primitive science. Instead, in texts such as Themis: A Study of the 
Social Origins of Greek Religion (1912) and Ancient Art and Ritual (1913), she argued 
that the original purpose of ritual (and its derivative, myth) was socio-psychological: it 
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provided societies with a formalized framework for integrating individuals into social 
institutions, and in doing so satisfied some universal emotional and psychological need in 
individuals for integration which manifests itself across cultures. Indeed, as Robert Segal 
notes, Harrison affirmed that rituals, at least at first, served a purely “initiatory” function, 
while the notion of the divine emerged only out of the “euphoria produced by the ritual” 
(71). But this means, though, that the universal need for integration reflects a deeper, 
more essentialized level of human self-experience. That is to say, in suggesting that 
individuals require initiation into sociocultural structures, Harrison subtly affirms the 
existence of an interior psychological or emotive reality (i.e., some concrete inner 
essence) which preexists its socially determined instantiation.     
Still, in her work, Harrison often emphasizes the stabilizing, communally shared 
exterior social forms that provide the structure, context, and significance for individual 
experiences. In Themis, for example, Harrison observes of certain tribal rites that they 
enable individuals to feel as if they “belong to something bigger, more potent, more 
lasting, than [their] own individual existence” (19). Through ritual, she claims, 
individuals can experience themselves as “part of the stream of the totemic life, one with 
the generations before and yet to come” (19).7 Of course, for Harrison, as socially 
initiatory ritual practices continued over time, communities came to associate ritual 
experience with experience of the divine, eventually grafting onto ritual practices the 
fertility-rite function that Frazer explores in his work (71). They began to abstract from 
                                                          
7 In particular, she notes that the “ceremonies that accompany each successive stage of life” remain “one 
and all Rites de Passage, ceremonies of transition, of going out from the old and going in to the new” (20). 
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ceremonial rites other meanings, despite the origin of ritual in “social custom” rather than 
in some trans-historical “religious instinct” (28). In part following Durkheim (whose 
influence she admits in her introduction to Themis [ix]), Harrison ultimately claims that 
“Not only does [a] god reflect the thoughts, social conditions, morality and the like [of a 
given group], but in its origin his substance when analysed turns out to be . . . nothing but 
the representation, the utterance, the emphasis of these imaginations, these emotions, 
arising out of particular social conditions” (28). For Harrison, then, as for Durkheim, 
religion as such and its representative external forms arise out of particular collectively 
shared social and cultural practices. And yet, as noted above, these shared social forms 
themselves function only as a mechanism for satisfying autonomously experienced, 
innate, individual needs. 
Harrison and her collaborators go on affirm the link between these ancient 
religious practices and the emergence of ritual drama. However, in the same way that she 
suggests an underlining inwardness in effect gives rise to and takes definitive shape 
within socio-religious structures, so, too, does she affirm that beneath ancient Greek 
drama an essential ritual pattern continues to exist, despite the gradual disappearance of 
any ostensibly religious or ceremonial associations. Indeed, in Themis, Harrison includes 
Gilbert Murray’s “Excursus on the Ritual Forms Preserved in Greek Tragedy,” which 
identifies six stages of ritual submerged beneath Greek drama’s surface.8 As Harry C. 
Payne points out in his discussion of the Cambridge Ritualists, the persistence of this 
                                                          
8 In From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation, F.M. Cornford comments 
that he has “had the great advantage of going over all the main points [of Themis] with the author,” and has 
“adopted many of her conclusions” (ix). He notes, too, that he has “carri[ed] on the same principles of 
interpretation” that Harrison uses in Themis in his own study (ix).  
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ritual form into drama “implied that the ritual pattern spoke to continuing social and 
psychological emotions which remained even when the old agricultural magic had faded” 
(186). Inner realities persist despite shifting external forms.  
In the same sense, that is, that socially embedded, collectivized ritual appealed to 
individuals prior to the emergence of any distinct set of mythological or religious 
narratives, so, too, does it continue to appeal to individuals once those narratives have 
lost the energy of their initial formulations. For Harrison, what ultimately underlies the 
appeal of ritual is its ability to channel inner human emotion into outward socially shared 
collective forms. In Ancient Art and Ritual, for example, she argues that at the root of 
both ritual and art lies the “desire . . . to utter, to give out a strongly felt emotion or desire 
by representing, by making or doing, or enriching the object or act desired” (26). 
Emotion underlies ritual form, provides its generative impulse, even though it requires 
social sanction through ritual form itself.9 It is not an individual’s “private and personal 
emotions that tend to become ritual,” Harrison affirms, “but those that are public, felt and 
expressed officially, that is, by the whole tribe or community” (49). Such a formulation 
also demonstrates her distance from Frazer, since for Harrison ritual serves an 
“emotional, not an altogether practical end” (44). (Recall that for Frazer, so-called 
primitives employed ritual magic pseudo-scientifically for the pragmatic purpose of 
achieving control over their environments.)   
                                                          
9 “A meal digested alone is certainly no rite,” Harrison agues, but a “meal eaten in common, under the 
influence of a common emotion, may, and often does, tend to become a rite” (Ancient 36).  
 
 
51 
 
In short, like Frazer, Durkheim, and Lévy-Bruhl, Harrison (and the other 
Cambridge Ritualists), worked to invert the standard, popular, nineteenth-century 
bourgeois understanding of the relation between individuals and their society (rooted 
partly in the empiricism of figures like Hume and the rationalism of figures like Kant, as 
noted above). Individuals, she claims, find meaning and coherence only within the 
context of their own social conditions. Ritual provides a means for integrating individuals 
into the social body, and does so in part by constructing a shared framework for 
channeling individual and group emotional experience. It renders such emotion culturally 
coherent in that it integrates it into a common social matrix. But there is a difference here 
between Harrison’s project and that of her predecessors. Whereas Durkheim and Lévy-
Bruhl, for instance, seem to suggest that every facet of individuals’ conscious being 
remains predetermined by a given culture’s predominate collective representations, 
Harrison seems to suggest that individuals possess an authentic inner space that exists 
independently of the social order and which must be brought into some kind alignment 
with it. Ritual, recall, serves an initiatory purpose for Harrison. That is to say, beneath the 
crust of social forms exists a substratum of emotional life which persists outside of social 
determinates.  
This logic of locating the truth of an external phenomenon by uncovering the truth 
of its inner structure runs throughout her work. The core assumption, for instance, of her 
Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion, is that a “lower chthonic stratum” exists 
beneath “the main outlines of Greek religious thought” (31). And of course, as has been 
discussed above, one of the core arguments of Themis is that beneath the surface of 
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dramatic art lies a ritual pattern which stretches back into the prehistory of religious 
practice: ritual serves as the inward form of drama’s outward expression. Harrison 
affirms the existence of an informing interiority—the notion that hidden structures 
determine outward forms. And yet, she agrees, too, with Durkheim (and Lévy-Bruhl), for 
whom individuals derive their own (inner) meanings out of the communally shared rituals 
and collective cultural representations that provide the fundamental conceptual 
coordinates of their worlds (i.e., the external remains primary; from it derives the 
internal). Thus a tension exists in Harrison’s work in which the external and the internal 
interpenetrate one another in complex and productive ways. In her thinking, each informs 
the other, even though ultimately she appears to privilege the internal, in that externalities 
inevitably reduce to some hidden interiorized logic.   
One source for Harrison’s difference with Durkheim may be traced to her reliance 
on Henri Bergson, a figure who influenced not only Harrison, but an entire generation of 
philosophers and poets, including Eliot. Indeed, G. William Barnard notes that “no 
philosopher was more admired and respected in his own time than Bergson was at the 
turn of the twentieth century” (44). In Themis, Harrison is quite explicit about Bergson’s 
influence on her. She confesses that she owes an “indirect but profound” debt to Bergson, 
and that reading Bergson led her to believe that “Dionysos, with every other mystery-
god, was an instinctive attempt to express what Professor Bergson calls durée [or 
duration], that life which is one, indivisible and yet ceaselessly changing” (viii). In 
contrast to these mystery gods stand the Olympian deities, whom Harrison sees as late 
abstractions, the product of “analysis, of reflection and intelligence” (xii). They do not 
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represent the unmediated flux of consciousness (as does, say, Dionysus), but remain 
rather concretized, partitioned elements of experience abstracted from the instinctive 
apprehension of reality. After reading Bergson, she claims that she came to realize that 
“Primitive religion was not, as I had drifted into thinking, a tissue of errors leading to 
mistaken conduct [as Frazer had thought]; rather it was a web of practices emphasizing 
particular parts of life, issuing necessarily in representations and ultimately dying out into 
abstract conceptions” (viii). That is, Bergson led Harrison to believe that primitive ritual 
and religion were expressions of a fundamental substratum of human psychic life as 
embodied in various social forms.  
 
Henri Bergson and the Primacy of Interiority    
Bergson, of course, was a speculative philosopher rather than an anthropologist. 
Yet just as Durkheim, Frazer, or Harrison variously employ the inner/outer binary in their 
work, so, too, does Bergson. However, unlike these figures, Bergson unambiguously 
emphasizes interiority as the foundational element of human experience. Indeed, as Harry 
C. Payne notes, Bergson and Durkheim were seen as “intellectual enemies” in early 
twentieth-century Paris (188), an observation Harrison makes as well in Themis (xiii). 
Unlike Durkheim, for whom external social frameworks determine internal identities, 
Bergson preserves an autonomous space for authentic inner experience. In his 
“Introduction to Metaphysics” from The Creative Mind,10 Bergson affirms the existence 
                                                          
10 The Creative Mind was first published as La Pensée et le mouvant in 1934, but “Introduction to 
Metaphysics” first appeared as an article in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale in 1903 (Bergson, 
Creative 222).  
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of a “self which endures” beneath and beyond its social instantiations (162). He sees the 
human person as a kind of sphere. The surface of the sphere consists of physical 
perceptions, associative memories, “tendencies, motor habits,” as well as “a crowd of 
virtual actions more or less solidly bound to those perceptions and . . . memories” (163). 
Beneath this crust, however, he locates a center, which constitutes “what is the most 
uniformly, the most constantly and durably myself” (163).  
This self, abstracted from its social and cultural contexts, consists of a “succession 
of states,” a continual flux of moments of consciousness which shift gradually one into 
the other (163). As Barnard glosses it, for Bergson, “our consciousness is an inner life 
that is ceaselessly changing—an inner world in which one state of consciousness 
seamlessly flows into the next” (45). Bergson terms this perpetual state of flux, this self-
sustaining, unbroken flow of consciousness “durée,” and it resists both division into 
discrete parts as well as conceptual abstraction or notational representation. He 
understands durée as a self-integrated/self-integrating whole, incapable of division into 
temporal segments (i.e., seconds, minutes, hours). It exists whole and in itself, an 
unending, unceasing, indivisible current of consciousness.11 For Bergson, durée 
constitutes individuals’ experience of their unbroken, authentic, inner selves, but it 
remains an experience achievable only by bracketing that self from the social world 
which otherwise contextualizes it.  
                                                          
11 Compare with William James’ notion of the “steam of consciousness,” first elaborated in Chapter XI of 
Psychology (1892).    
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Bergson goes on to emphasize the gap between “our superficial psychic life” (i.e., 
the socially inflected ego self) and this “deep-seated self which ponders and decides, 
which heats and blazes up” (Time and Free Will 125). For Bergson, as Barnard observes 
as well [49], when individuals over-identify with their social and cultural instantiations 
then “we live outside ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but our own 
ghost . . . we live for the external world rather than for ourselves; we speak rather than 
think; we ‘are acted’ rather than act ourselves” (ibid 231). Even though, as Bergson 
admits, the “deeper self forms one and the same person with the superficial ego,” a 
qualitative gulf nonetheless stretches between the two existential states (ibid 125). They 
cannot overlap in that the surface social self necessarily relies upon categories and 
concepts in order to construct a navigable world, whereas the deep inner self exists 
beyond (or beneath) such categorizing states of consciousness. In Time and Free Will,12 
Bergson states quite explicitly that in the process of perceiving a world external to the 
individual, a “second self is formed which obscures the first, a self whose existence is 
made up of distinct moments, whose states are separated from one another and easily 
expressed in words” (138). This “second self” functions as an instrument through which 
the authentic self can negotiate with a world it encounters as deeply other, and yet it 
remains an incomplete expression of the individual’s totality. As Sanford Schwartz points 
out, Bergson sees the intellect as a tool for “serv[ing] our practical interests, but only at 
the expense of real duration” (28).  
                                                          
12 First published in 1889 as Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (Bergson, Time v).   
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Thus, for Bergson, there exists an essential self, a buried self, which exists at a 
more fundamental, pre-social level of human experience, precisely the notion which 
influenced Jane Harrison in her study of Greek ritual and religion. In making his 
arguments, Bergson sought to protect a particular notion of human selfhood from the 
positivist materialism of his day, which held that individuals act only according to 
physical and social determinates. He sought to preserve the concepts of self-authenticity 
and free will from a mechanistic science he felt misrepresented human experience. 
Perhaps most of all, he resisted any “mechanical conception of the self,” as he phrases it 
in Time and Free Will (171). As Richard Lehan rightly argues, Bergson resisted the 
Enlightenment ideological tradition that “gave priority to a mechanical reality” which 
reduces life’s complexity to the measureable, the empirical, the conceptual (47). He 
resisted science’s tendency to divide and compartmentalize a reality which he viewed as 
incapable of such reductivist analysis. Psychology, for instance, “like the other sciences . 
. . resolves the self . . . into sensations, feelings, images, etc. which it studies separately” 
(169). It fragments the self into isolate, constituent parts which it subjects to analysis, 
“substitutes for the self a series of elements” abstracted from the individual’s composite 
self-experience (169). Even in philosophy, he argues, both empiricism and rationalism 
conflate the rich subjective texture characteristic of inner life with the concepts employed 
to analyze that inner life. Both, he argues, “take . . . partial notions for real parts” 
(“Introduction” 172). Both “remain . . . powerless to reach the personality” (ibid 173). 
Mechanistic science thus distorts the reality of human existential experience, and it does 
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so by confusing analytically derived concepts with the reality those concepts purportedly 
describe.  
Indeed, for Bergson, mechanistic science not only distorts individuals’ perception 
of their own authentic interior existence, but their perception of the external world as 
well. Objects do not in fact exist for us (as we subjectively perceive them) as fixed, 
unchanging objects. Rather, they accrue shades of difference over time, such that, like 
individuals, objects defy their own objectified, abstracted, static appearance. “Every day I 
perceive the same houses,” Bergson explains, “and as I know that they are the same 
objects, I always call them the same name and I also fancy that they always look the same 
to me” (Time 129). But this feeling, Bergson claims, proves inexact. Over time, these 
houses experience an “inexpressible change”: “It seems that these objects, continually 
perceived by me and constantly impressing themselves on my mind, have ended by 
borrowing from me something of my own conscious existence: like myself they have 
lived, and like myself they have grown old” (130). These objects (houses) have 
undergone an unending series of alterations. More often than not, however, individuals 
do not recognize the subtle transformation constitutive of objects in the world, nor the 
shift in impressions that those objects correspondingly make on us.  
In fact, and here Bergson completes his reversal of the inner/outer binary, not 
only do objects undergo subtle objective material transformation, but they undergo 
constant subjective transformation as well. No object ever presents itself twice as the 
same object to any perceiver. As Schwartz glosses Bergson here, “A rose is a rose, but its 
scent is never the same” (24). For Bergson, objects remain bound by the shifting 
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memories and associations individuals attach to them each time they encounter them. 
One smells a rose, for instance, and, as Bergson puts it, “immediately confused 
recollections of childhood” come to mind (Time 161). But the rose does not exactly 
summon the memories. Rather, individuals “breathe them in with the very scent” (161). 
Memory proves coterminous with the experience of the rose. The two prove inseparable. 
Consequently, the rose has as many scents as it does smellers. “To others,” Bergson 
reflects, “it will smell differently” (161). A biologist, say, would isolate the rose from this 
subjective experience, would preserve “only the objective aspect,” but the subjective, 
“personal element” remains just as vital for the individual’s phenomenological perception 
of the rose (161). Thus, as Schwartz correctly notes, “in ‘real duration’ the consciousness 
of an object is suffused with the inner life of a particular individual” (25). At the level of 
the deepest self, the physical world remains experientially saturated with individuals’ 
(constantly shifting) emotions, memories, associations, values (all of which permeate one 
another as well) (22). Indeed, the phenomenological world remains inseparable from 
these subjective elements.  
For Bergson, then, in the end, material reality itself is in fact marked through and 
through by the individual’s subjective experience of it. Durée does not limit itself to the 
dark recesses of inner life, but stretches out, too, over perceptible physical reality. The 
internal and external overlap for Bergson, and although he never denies the independent 
reality of the external world (as subjective idealists/radical empiricists like George 
Berkeley do), he clearly privileges interiority over exteriority, grounding individuals’ 
deepest existential experience of their realities in the self itself, rather than in physical or 
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social reality. In so doing, he positions himself against social theorists like Durkheim and 
Lévy-Bruhl, placing himself instead in a tradition of thought that maintains the primacy 
of the individual’s subjective self-experience. 
 
F.H. Bradley’s Deconstruction of the Inner/Outer Binary  
Bergson’s influence on early twentieth-century intellectual thought and literary 
practice was profound, although it began to wane after World War I. In fact, Richard 
Lehan goes so far as to argue that “it was Bergson who created a systematic, rigorous 
philosophy that became the foundation for modernism” (47). Even William James, under 
whom Eliot studied while an undergraduate at Harvard, wrote that had he not read 
Bergson, he would “probably still be blackening endless pages of paper privately, in the 
hope of making ends meet that were never to meet” (Pluralistic Universe 726). Bergson 
made him “bold,” he claims, gave him a means for overcoming the conceptual logic and 
abstract reasoning that characterized nineteenth-century philosophy, particularly in its 
Kantian and Hegelian modes, and thus freed him to develop his pragmatist (anti-) 
philosophy. Without Bergson, he confesses, he would “never have ventured to urge [his] 
views” on what he felt to be an “ultra-critical audience” (214).  
What James most admired about Bergson was in fact what he also admired about 
the English philosopher F.H. Bradley, on whom Eliot wrote his 1916 Harvard doctoral 
dissertation. Like Bergson, Bradley, too, launches an assault on the post-Enlightenment 
philosophical project, particularly its English utilitarian and positivist versions as 
developed by thinkers like John Stuart Mill (Sorenson 5). As James noted in a 1910 essay 
on the two figures, both Bradley and Bergson argue against the notion that “feelings, 
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aboriginally discontinuous, are woven into continuity by the various synthetic concepts 
which the intellect supplies” (“Bradley” 29). Both, that is, argue strenuously against 
conflating ideas with lived, human (emotional and experiential) realities. Individuals’ 
actual existential, phenomenological experience of themselves and their worlds resists 
any conceptual reduction whatsoever. Although a useful tool, conceptual thinking 
provides an always incomplete representation of reality, never corresponding with reality 
in itself. Both agree this far, and both point to a deeper level of phenomenal existence that 
persists beneath conceptual, categorized social, physical, and psychological reality (durée 
for Bergson, “immediate experience” for Bradley).13  
But Bradley in fact goes further than Bergson here. James points out not only 
Bradley’s belief in the insufficiency of ideas, but that Bradley believes conceptual 
knowledge ultimately renders reality “less and less comprehensible” rather than more: 
“activity becomes inconstruable, relation contradictory, change inadmissible, personality 
unintelligible, time, space, and causation impossible—nothing survives the Bradleyan 
wreck” (30, emphasis added). What this means, though, is that Bradley no longer sees the 
conceptual distinction between subjects and objects as ontologically or epistemologically 
valid. All distinctions between the inner and outer remain merely contingent 
constructions. In this sense, Bradley distinguishes himself not only from Durkheim and 
Lévy-Bruhl, but also from Jane Harrison and Bergson. Each of these figures privileges 
one side of the inner/outer binary. Bradley, on the other hand, dissolves it altogether.        
                                                          
13 Again, compare with James’ own notion of “stream of consciousness.”  
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Bradley offers his core argument in Appearance and Reality, the very text Eliot 
later focuses on in his dissertation. In it, Bradley embarks on a demolition of philosophy 
and science’s attempts to abstract from reality stable concepts by which to render reality 
comprehensible. For Bradley, no entity or quality exists in itself, but only in relation with 
other entities or qualities. So to speak of isolate objects misrepresents the nature of 
phenomenal reality. As with Bergson, Bradley also argues that reality resists partitioning 
into discrete, non-relation units. But he goes much further, for this initial critique hardly 
threatens to undermine metaphysical certainty in the intelligibility of physical or mental 
objects. Bradley suggests that to claim that objects exist in relation simply presupposes 
the existence of stable, intelligible objects which can exist in relation to one another. 
Objects that supposedly exist only in relation thus exist, too, in themselves abstracted 
from relations, which for Bradley represents a clear logical contradiction. In other words, 
for Bradley, entities (or qualities) can never be extracted as entities from relations with 
other entities. Entities (as conceptualized as such) lack substantive meaning; they remain 
“convenient fictions,” as Schwartz paraphrases it (33). But so, too, does the relation 
between them remain a convenient fiction, since no discrete object exists which can enter 
into or issue from a relation with another object. “The conclusion to which I am brought,” 
Bradley confesses at the close of his discussion, “is that a relational way of thought—any 
one that moves by the machinery of terms and relations—must give appearance, and not 
truth” (33). Conceptual thinking, he argues, “is a makeshift, a device, a mere practical 
compromise, most necessary, but in the end most indefensible” (33).  
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For Bradley, then, conceptual thought permits only a provisional representation of 
reality. In itself reality resists knowing (i.e., analytical intelligibility). In making this 
argument, Bradley reveals his radical epistemological skepticism. He critiques any mode 
of knowledge that relies upon abstractions, and in the process undermines any scientific 
or philosophic claims to certainty (Skaff 31). William Skaff suggests that Bradley’s 
“epistemological nihilism” was so thorough as “to sweep away the philosophical 
assumptions of the entire nineteenth century” (11). But Bradley was also a philosophical 
idealist, at least in a limited sense. In asserting the impossibility of knowledge, Bradley 
also asserts that what knowledge individuals do possess of the world remains only a 
particular construction of it. For individual observers, the world exists according to the 
conceptual schema applied to it. It remains a product of the mind, aligning itself to the 
mind’s categories of experience and conceptual abstractions. As Skaff glosses it, for 
Bradley, “‘Appearance,’ the world as we know it, is ‘Reality’ decomposed, separated by 
the mind into objects and persons, space and time; because the world is thus created by 
the mind, Reality is said to consist of ideas” (12). All entities, no matter how material 
(objects, individuals) or experiential (space, time), remain conceptual fictions, 
constructions extrapolated by the mind from the undifferentiated influx of sensations and 
perceptions. As concepts, interiority and exteriority (or subject and object) thus lose 
definitive meaning, each term proving merely an artificial mental construction.  
However, beneath this conceptual screen lies what Bradley terms “immediate 
experience,” a concept that on the surface bears resemblances with both Bergson’s 
inwardly-oriented notion of durée as well as with James’ idea of the “stream of 
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consciousness.” For Bradley, “immediate experience” constitutes the individual’s most 
fundamental encounter with the phenomenal world, an encounter that by definition 
precedes any subsequent intellectual analysis of either the world itself or the perceiver. 
But the notion of immediate experience presupposes the unity of perceived and perceiver 
(world and mind/object and subject), and as such reveals Bradley’s inherent resistance to 
the dualism characteristic of most Western philosophical positions since at least 
Descartes. As Bradley notes in Essays on Truth and Reality, “We . . . have experience in 
which there is no distinction between my awareness and that of which it is aware. There 
is an immediate feeling, a knowing and being in one, with which knowledge begins” 
(159-160). The world, that is, presents its essential truth only when encountered 
immediately—i.e., only when left un-interpreted by the mind’s mediating faculties. And 
even when the mind erects its interpretive frameworks in order to render the encounter 
intelligible, the memory of the pre-conceptual experience “nevertheless remains 
throughout as the present foundation of my known world” (159-160). As Jewel Spears 
Brooker glosses it, immediate experience “is a knowing and feeling and being in one 
prior to the development of logical or temporal or spatial categories” (Mastery 184). For 
Bradley, it marks the original and primary experience of an undifferentiated, all-
encompassing totality, however transient (Mastery 185). This totality Bradley terms the 
Absolute, and in so doing reveals his debt to Hegel.14  
                                                          
14 Bradley’s notion of totality derives from Hegel’s, although they differ widely in the particulars. For 
Bradley the Absolute remains undifferentiated, unified, unchanging; it lacks any inner contradictions. For 
Hegel, however, the Absolute in fact evolves over time due to latent tensions whose antagonistic friction 
provides the engine of its development.   
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While Bradley does not deny the realm of appearances, he claims that the 
tensions, antagonisms, and contradictions inherent to appearance resolve themselves in 
the encompassing totality of the Absolute. But Bradley’s Absolute does not exactly 
transcend appearance. Rather the totality of appearances in themselves proves 
constitutive of the Absolute. As Frederick Copleston puts it, the Absolute “is not an 
additional entity lying behind” appearances, but rather their cumulative, “harmonized” 
unity (207). Indeed, Bradley goes on to identify the Absolute with experience itself, since 
the perception of appearance, he argues, arises only out of experiential encounters: “I can 
myself conceive of nothing else than the experienced. Anything, in no sense felt or 
perceived, becomes to me quite unmeaning” (Appearance 145). Because appearances, 
then, remain linked to experiential perceivers, Bradley goes on to argue that  “[b]eing and 
reality are, in brief, one thing with sentience; they can neither be opposed to, nor even in 
the end, distinguished from it” (146). In essence, then, experience is reality, and the 
totality of experience equivalent to that totality termed the Absolute: for the “Absolute is 
one system, and . . . its contents are nothing but sentient experience” (146-47).  
In short, in making this argument, Bradley identifies the objective, external world 
with the perceiving mind itself. He identifies the external with the internal. The world of 
appearances exists only so far as does the sentient awareness of it. Consequently, Bradley 
does not so much prioritize inwardness at the expense of appearance as he does dissolve 
the binary altogether. Appearance and the experience of it coexist in the Absolute. Both 
presuppose the other, and resist isolation as discrete notions existent only in themselves. 
Bradley reveals himself here as an idealist in the traditional Hegelian sense, i.e., as an 
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Absolute Idealist, who synthesizes manifest multiplicity into a “higher unity” 
(Appearance 499). Like Hegel, Bradley also conceives the Absolute as spirit, though 
unlike Hegel, he does not necessarily attribute independent subjective awareness to it. 
Rather, for Bradley, “[s]pirit is a unity of the manifold in which the externality of the 
manifold has utterly ceased” (498). It is the synthesis of experience and appearance, the 
place in which they find experiential, phenomenological unity. Still, at root, Bradley’s 
metaphysical model of reality posits the primacy of sentience. And to privilege sentience 
is ultimately to privilege a sensing, feeling, perceiving self, though crucially, this “self” 
consists neither of an inside nor an outside, but rather precedes both.  
Bradley’s intellectual preoccupations mirror those of many of his contemporaries, 
even though their conclusions varied. Despite the complexities of their positions or the 
subtle (and sometimes profound) differences between them, Bradley, Bergson, and 
Harrison each more or less deemphasize the primacy of external realities. The self (or the 
experience of self) emerges for these figures as the foundational element of their 
philosophical and anthropological speculations. We might dwell on other figures here, 
but these three serve to illustrate a certain theoretical orientation of the period that stands 
in relative contrast to that of thinkers such as Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, or Frazer. For 
whereas the former group broadly privilege some notion of self (whether as monadic 
entity or as the Absolute itself), the latter prioritize social forms and cultural practices. 
Together, these six figures provide a generalized but nonetheless useful map for 
distinguishing some of the intellectual fault lines characteristic of the period. And, as 
noted earlier, each of these figures deeply influenced Eliot’s thought and poetics. Their 
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reflections on the tension between internal and external realities necessarily directed 
Eliot’s own reflections. And their respective views of the self necessarily informed the 
development of his own ideas on the self. But of course, Eliot was primarily a poet, 
despite his forays into social theory and speculative philosophy. As such, it would be 
useful to supplement this digression into Eliot’s influences with a brief reconstruction of 
the ways in which Eliot’s immediate English poetic precursors also treated this subject, 
particularly since Eliot, at least in his early critical essays, vehemently distanced himself 
from them.  
 
The Victorian Foregrounding of Inwardness 
Eliot and his modernist contemporaries quite famously disparaged their Victorian 
forebears. Pound, for instance, notably criticized the supposed “emotional slither” of 
Victorian and late Romantic verse (“A Retrospect” 262). And Eliot, writing of 
Swinburne, in whom the Victorian poetic tradition arguably “culminates” (Christ 143), 
suggests that for Swinburne, “emotion is never particular, never in direct line of vision, 
never focused” (“Swinburne” 283). Indeed, he goes on to argue that for Swinburne “the 
object has ceased to exist, because the meaning is merely the hallucination of meaning, 
because language, uprooted, has adapted itself to an independent life of atmospheric 
nourishment” (285). In contrast, modernists such as Eliot and Pound argued in their 
writings for a poetics of exactitude, concreteness, specificity of emotion and of the object 
intended to suggest that emotion. As is well known, they sought a kind of scientific 
precision regarding the production of poems, the poet serving only as a kind of “catalyst,” 
as Eliot famously puts it in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (41).  
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But Eliot also responded to a particular notion and portrayal of the self in 
Victorian thought and art, for just as social theorists and speculative philosophers were 
reimaging the self, so, too, were the poets and novelists of the period. The general 
assumption of the Enlightenment, at least in its Cartesian version, was that the self in 
itself remained the one indubitable element of experiential reality. Thus, Enlightenment 
thought privileged interiority as such, but in doing so came, too, to affirm a gap between 
a knowing, perceiving, feeling inwardness and an externalized, concrete, objective outer 
world of material entities and quantified relations (Hall 20; Lavine 99). As Robert 
Solomon argues, for Descartes to privilege a singular, solitary, thinking mind clearly 
marks “a move towards subjectivity and the self” (5). And despite the empiricists’ 
opposition to his rationalist arguments, their “emphases on experience and introspective 
reflection, on the nature of the identity of the self, and on the importance of the first-
person standpoint” merely reinforced Descartes’ own assumptions regarding the self and 
prioritization of interiority (5). A universalized self emerges out of both rationalist and 
empiricist philosophies, perhaps culminating in Kant’s transcendental idealism, where 
universal categories of experience (i.e., shared notions of space, time, causality, etc.) 
provide an a priori template for human cognition and perception of the material world, no 
matter cultural or social contexts (Solomon 11).  
The so-called Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment itself only reinforced its 
presuppositions, in that the Romantic elevation of the inner self and of the self’s 
experiences became a predominant cultural mode for producing and circulating this 
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particular notion of the self.15 Nancy Armstrong ties this process to the emergence of the 
English novel, and argues that where “Enlightenment philosophy left off . . . fiction took 
over” (4). Armstrong argues, too, that “the history of the modern subject” and the 
“history of the novel” coincide; each grows out of the other, as the novel provides a 
means by which this notion of the self can reproduce and disseminate itself (3). But the 
same also holds for the poetry and the literary criticism of the period. Each of these three 
genres (fiction, poetry, and criticism) reproduces certain core assumptions and values 
intrinsic to romantic or post- Enlightenment thought. Each ultimately emphasizes 
interiority over exteriority, i.e., each emphasizes the individuals’ inner phenomenological 
experience of the self as experienced in itself as well as the world as experienced by that 
self. Despite the many differences between them, Robert Browning, George Eliot, 
Matthew Arnold, and Walter Pater each serve as exemplar figures for demonstrating the 
ways in which nineteenth-century poets, novelists, and critics approached the inner/outer 
binary. Each emphasizes the individual, and with the qualified exception of George Eliot, 
each sets up a binary that unambiguously privileges the inward over the outward. In this, 
of course, these paradigmatic nineteenth-century authors align much more readily with 
Bergson and his treatment of the inner/outer binary than with Durkheim or Lévy-Bruhl.16  
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Solomon argues that “[s]o far as the transcendental pretense was concerned, Enlightenment and 
romanticism turned out to be more alike than opposed” (12).  
16 It makes sense, then, that Eliot would reject both Victorian subjectivism as well as Bergson’s notion of 
durée. Chapter Three will discuss Eliot’s views here more explicitly.  
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Robert Browning and George Eliot  
One of the leading poetic innovations of the Victorian period was the dramatic 
monologue. As a poetic form (one which Eliot himself famously adopted17), the dramatic 
monologue lends itself to an explicit exploration of interiority, since it dramatizes 
particular kinds of self and of self-understanding. As Robert Langbaum emphasizes, as a 
form, the dramatic monologue foregrounds the significance of individuals’ unique inner 
experience of self (Poetry 78). It foregrounds and draws readers’ attention to interiority 
as such, and in the process affirms or reiterates interiority as the primary category of 
human experience (i.e., that this notion of self comes to mediate how individuals relate to 
themselves and to others). In this, it merely reproduces the Enlightenment and Romantic 
elevation and celebration of interiority. But what begins to emerge in late Romantic and 
Victorian poetry is less a celebration of the Enlightenment and Romantic notion of the 
universalized self than a lament for or even caricature of it. In Robert Browning’s 
dramatic monologues, for instance, Browning often presents eccentric, manipulative, or 
even tortured individuals trapped in the circuitous logic of their own singular, isolate 
identities. The self that emerges in Browning’s monologues seems rather more diseased 
than the rational, lucid, enlightened self posited by Kantian or Cartesian metaphysics. 
Indeed, the utterly inwardly-oriented self Browning constructs challenges even 
the reliably intelligible and rational self of, say, Austen, Gaskell, or even Dickens. But his 
                                                          
17 Robert Langbaum argues that the “dramatic monologue is proportionately as important in Eliot’s work as 
in Browning’s, Eliot having contributed more to the development of the form than any poet since 
Browning. Certainly Prufrock, Portrait of a Lady, Gerontion, Journey of the Magi, A Song for Simeon, and 
Marina do as much credit to the dramatic monologue as anything of Browning’s; while in The Waste Land 
Eliot has opened new possibilities for the form by constructing a kind of collage of dramatic monologues as 
perceived by Tiresias, whose dramatic monologue the poem is” (“Dramatic” 24-25). 
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representation of interiority especially contrasts with his late contemporary George Eliot, 
for whom a study of individuals’ “habits,” “ideas,” and “motives” can reveal “real 
knowledge” of them (“Natural” 112). For George Eliot, individuals remain essentially 
transparent to one another, wholly knowable in the fullness of their humanity. This 
intelligibility, rendered through a study of individuals’ (outer) actions and (inner) beliefs, 
constitutes the grounds of that sympathy for the other which Eliot feels art at its best 
elicits in readers. “Art is the nearest thing to life,” she argues in “The Natural History of 
German Life,” “it is a mode of amplifying experience and extending our contact with our 
fellow men beyond the bounds of our personal lot” (110). Art, then, should create 
sympathetic bonds between individuals, and consequently it should create bonds within 
communities as a whole. In making this argument, Eliot perpetuates the Enlightenment 
assumptions regarding universalized subjectivity. Individuals are knowable because they 
share knowable frames of reference (i.e., shared values, metaphysical intuitions, belief 
structures). They are knowable, that is, because at root (as James Frazer will argue 
decades later), they are the same. The inner structures that constitute their subjective self-
experience possess a uniformity which universalizes a particular notion of self grounded 
in a particular notion of interiority. 
Browning, however, challenges many of these presuppositions. In his dramatic 
monologues he often presents idiosyncratic, semi-deranged (and occasionally totally 
deranged), fragmented ego-selves.18 In doing so, he also suggests the degree to which 
                                                          
18 Langbaum notes that Browning and Tennyson “probably” “conceived [the dramatic monologue] as a 
reaction against the romantic confessional mode” (“Dramatic” 26).   
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communities themselves remain fractured, splintered by consciousnesses who remain 
opaque to one another, either due to deliberate deceitfulness or unfathomable 
irrationalities (the latter of which is a more problematic concern for any notion of 
universalized subjectivity). J. Hillis Miller speaks of the “psychological oddnessess” of 
Browning’s characters, but surely this is an understatement (“Browning” 392). The 
speaker, for instance, in “Porphyria’s Lover” utterly resists comprehension. The 
unnerving, incongruous combination of tenderness and madness that dictates his 
murderous actions reveals a persona with whom no sympathy is possible. The speaker 
shocks readers out of sympathy, alienates them (and himself) in the act of revealing 
himself to them. Langbaum argues that despite himself, the speaker in this poem reveals 
“what still remains a rationally understandable motive” (“Dramatic” 34). But this holds 
only if one accepts the illogical premises that underlie the speaker’s conflation of love 
with possession and murder. Browning undercuts the bond of sympathetic understanding 
that would link individuals together in order to reveal some radical, monstrous otherness 
that defies intelligibility.  
In “Soliloquy in a Spanish Cloister,” Browning dramatizes a similar (though less 
disturbing and more comical) scenario. The speaker’s irrational attitude in the poem 
towards Brother Lawrence isolates him, and thus isolates him from the larger community, 
indeed, suggests a lack of community, since the speaker’s own hypocrisy undercuts the 
trust in the other necessary for community. It suggests, too, the degree to which the 
speaker remains confined to the seclusion of his own hostile thoughts and impulses, 
prisoner of his own self-isolating narcissism. For Browning here, the self reduces to a 
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singular, insular sphere, connected to the external world of others only through the 
antagonistic friction of bewildered encounters. Similar arguments might be made about 
the characters presented in “My Last Duchess,” “Caliban upon Setebos,” or even “Childe 
Roland to the Dark Tower Came.” In a sense, each of the characters in these poems serve 
as critiques of the celebration of the stable, lucid, universalized self characteristic of the 
high Enlightenment.19 Indeed, Miller makes the point that Browning himself “suffered 
much from a sense of the inaccessibility of other persons” (403). For Browning, Miller 
claims, the other remains always “unreachable,” an unfathomable blank whose motives 
and ideas (to appropriate George Eliot’s terms) remain inescapably obscure (403). For 
Browning, inwardness predominates to such an extent that the self closes in on itself as if 
it were a kind of black hole.   
Thus, fundamental differences exist between Browning and George Eliot’s 
presentations of the inner/outer binary. For Browning, experience reduces to the small 
sphere of the individual’s narcissistically enclosed self. The self’s primary experience is 
of the self itself, rather than of others. Indeed, when individuals encounter others, they do 
so antagonistically and absent any true knowledge of the other’s inner experience. For 
George Eliot, however, the individual remains sympathetically connected to others, and 
thus turned outwards, however much she, too, emphasizes (the importance of) individual 
experience. In a sense, then, George Eliot’s view of the self aligns more closely with that 
                                                          
19 Ironically, Langbaum calls the dramatic monologue an expression of “empiricism in literature”: “the 
dramatic monologue takes toward its material the literary equivalent of the scientific attitude—the 
equivalent being, where men and women are the subject of investigation, the historicizing and 
psychologizing of judgement” (“Dramatic” 34). While certainly an empirical, investigatory quality exists in 
the dramatic monologue, Langbaum overlooks the way in which Browning turns the form against the 
rationalizing, categorizing, empirical mind through the dramatization of characters who defy intelligibility.  
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of later thinkers such as Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl (in contrast to, say, Bergson or 
Harrison, for whom an essential, inner self proves primary). She privileges community as 
a source of meaning in the individual’s life. She argues that “local conditions” matter just 
as much for understanding individuals as do “their maxims and habits,” and as such she 
acknowledges that inwardness depends upon the external inasmuch as (for her) it depends 
upon preexistent internal tendencies and energies (“Natural” 112). As George Levine 
rightly argues, for Eliot, external details given through a nuanced account of the novel’s 
social environment “reverberate with significance” for the characters, in fact constituting 
their sense of themselves and position in the world (9).20 In making these arguments, 
Eliot far more endorses Enlightenment assumptions regarding the intelligibility of the self 
(and consequently society) than does Browning, indeed, grounds the very possibility of 
community in those assumptions. As Terry Eagleton suggests, for Eliot, “lack of 
sympathy springs from lack of knowledge” and to “understand all is to forgive all” (165). 
Intelligibility proves thus a precondition for sympathy, and sympathy the precondition for 
harmonious social intercourse. Thus, whereas Browning emphasizes the ultimate 
unintelligibility of the inwardly-oriented self, George Eliot suggests the exact opposite, a 
self open to knowing and to sympathetic communion with others. However, despite these 
fundamental differences, both nonetheless focus on the self as a self and on the 
experiences of particular individuals, and in doing so implicitly emphasize the centrality 
of interiority, however differently construed.   
                                                          
20 Levine goes on to argue that “George Eliot’s realism extends from the external world to the world of 
individual consciousness—like [Henry] James and the psychological novelists who followed, she threw the 
action inside; the question of consciousness, of who is perceiving the external fact and under what 
conditions, becomes for her an indispensable aspect of the realist project” (9).    
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Matthew Arnold and Walter Pater   
In contrast to both these figures stands Matthew Arnold, whose particular 
conception of inwardness (characterized by an emphasis on a “buried” self) would prove 
in certain ways more influential on the early T.S. Eliot than either Browning or George 
Eliot, neither of whom Eliot directly grapples with in his critical work. In their 
exploration and dramatization of interiority, both Browning and George Eliot posit a 
notion of the self in which the self remains essentially internally unified. For Browning 
that unity derives from his presentation of the self as an undivided, incomprehensible 
blank. Individuals in his monologues may appear deceitful and duplicitous, but they 
remain uniformly (and irrationally) so. The same largely holds for George Eliot’s 
characters as well. They may experience conflict, self-doubt, and regret (as with 
Gwendolyn Harleth, say, in Daniel Deronda), but they possess an internal consistency as 
stable, epistemologically transparent characters. They may undergo development as the 
novel progresses, but they move only from one state of preliminary self-consistency into 
another, final, more mature state of wholeness and (often, though certainly not always) 
communal integration (consider, for instance, figures such as Silas Marner or Daniel 
Deronda). The inward remains constitutively uniform and structurally cohesive.  
Arnold, on the other hand, introduces the notion of a split internal to the 
experience of interiority, and thus internal to the experience of self. He divides the self 
into two conflicted and conflicting halves. He splinters the self, introduces a gap between 
what he posits as a public, social self and a suppressed, yet more authentic, inner self. 
That is to say, he introduces a gap between the self as it experiences itself encountering 
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the external material and social world (and abstracting an identity for itself from that 
encounter) and the self as it phenomenologically encounters itself in its own supposed 
essence. In “The Scholar-Gipsy” for example, he famously erects a contrast between the 
“strange disease of modern life, / With its sick hurry, its divided aims, / Its heads 
o’ertaxed, [and] its palsied hearts” with the Scholar-Gipsy’s pure, “clear aims” and 
“undiverted” sense of self (303). The Scholar-Gipsy avoids the “sick fatigue” and 
“languid doubt” characteristic of contemporary social life, and lives more closely aligned 
with the authentic impulses of his own inner being. In so doing, he experiences, as well, a 
closer connection with the natural world, a harmony of inner and outer realities which 
contrasts with the speaker’s own sense of alienation (from himself, his world, from 
others). And of course, the difference that the speaker in the poem draws between himself 
and the Scholar-Gipsy ultimately serves to dramatize an internal split that the speaker 
feels characterizes his own disillusioned, post-Romantic self-experience. 
Arnold’s “The Buried Life” also draws out these same themes, but does so much 
more directly, as the title itself indicates. As in “The Scholar-Gipsy, in “The Buried 
Life,” too, Arnold laments the “distractions” which press in on individuals, and diverts 
them from some originary self-experience (“well-nigh chang[ing] [their] own identity,” 
he writes [297]). Yet Arnold speaks as well of how these “distractions” paradoxically, 
dialectically give rise to a counter impulse in individuals, in which they experience 
nostalgic desire for that primordial self from which they now feel alienated. “But often,” 
he writes, “in the world’s most crowded streets” and “in the din of strife, / There rises an 
unspeakable desire, / After the knowledge of our buried life; / A thirst to spend our fire 
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and restless force / In tracking out our true, original course” (297). Two selves emerge, he 
suggests, one outwardly-oriented (social, constructed, and contingent), the other 
inwardly-oriented (essential, prior, and primary). Modernity splits the subject, introduces 
an inner division which comes to prove constitutive of the individual’s own sense of 
inwardness. The modern self is thus the self-alienated self, i.e., individuals’ experience of 
inwardness remains characterized by a sense of lack and loss. John Farrell speaks of 
Arnold’s “bleak estrangement from the external world (278), but Arnold suggests a bleak 
estrangement from the internal world as well. Indeed, Arnold complains that the “mass of 
men conceal / Their thoughts” and “live and move / Trick’d in disguises, alien to the rest 
/ Of men, and alien to themselves” (296, emphasis added). Though as always, against this 
artificiality, Arnold affirms that, however inaccessible, a “genuine self,” a “river of our 
life,” flows like a “buried stream” beneath individuals’ mask-encrusted surfaces, a rather 
Bergsonian formulation that anticipates Bergson by nearly half a century (297).21  
 Moreover, like Browning in his dramatic monologues, Arnold also affirms a 
notion of interiority in which individuals remains essentially, constitutively estranged 
from other selves. Individuals remain enclosed within the self-delimiting confines of their 
own internal self-experience. The gap individuals experience internal to themselves is 
mirrored by the gaps that divide individuals from one another. In “To Marguerite—
                                                          
21 Like Tennyson in In Memoriam, Arnold responds in his poetry and prose to mid-Victorian intellectual 
developments in disciplines such as geology, pre-Darwinian biology, and Biblical criticism, and thus his 
work functions as a kind of reactive intervention into then-contemporary social, scientific, and religious 
thought (implicitly in the case of his poetry, explicitly in his prose). In poems like “The Scholar-Gipsy” and 
“The Buried Life,” Arnold deliberately grapples with the effects of modernity on individuals’ existential, 
inner self-experience. His “Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse” also explores the effects of contemporary 
thought on the modern self. In it, he laments, “Wandering between two worlds, one dead, / The other 
powerless to be born, / With nowhere yet to rest my head” (308).  
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Continued,” for instance, he expresses dismay over the “echoing straits” that divide 
individuals from one another, and laments that “We mortal millions live alone” (267, 
emphasis in original). But like George Eliot, Arnold also affirms the way in which 
individuals internalize the external conditions of social life. That is to say, paradoxically, 
the social produces the estrangement characteristic of the Arnoldian self. In a sense, 
Arnold preemptively appropriates Marx and Engels’ famous dictum in The German 
Ideology that consciousness derives from material conditions (42). Arnoldian interiority 
(alienated, isolated, and monadic) is a product of the material conditions that encompass 
it. The external gives rise to a particular instantiation of the internal, one in which, 
paradoxically, the internal experiences itself as alienated from the external. And yet, 
Arnold’s continued affirmation of some non-contingent, non-conditioned buried self 
produces a tension in this formulation which remains absent from the materialist view of 
the self.  
 Arnold, Browning, and George Eliot each serve as exemplary figures for 
demonstrating a particular conception of the self and of the relation of the internal to the 
external in the nineteenth-century English literary/cultural imagination. Each models 
slightly different yet nonetheless influential notions of the self, and each, too, ultimately 
privileges the internal over the external, although with variations on emphasis. For 
Browning and Arnold the experience of interiority remains problematized by opacity, 
isolation, and alienation, each particularly modern concerns; whereas for George Eliot, 
the inner self remains essentially the intelligible, universalized self of Enlightenment 
philosophy. Walter Pater bridges both positions, developing a distinct notion of 
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interiority in his criticism that would come to influence a number of later writers (e.g., 
Oscar Wilde, Virginia Woolf, D.H. Lawrence, W.B. Yeats, and even T.S. Eliot, however 
ambiguously).  
Drawing on a number of speculative traditions (from the pre-Socratics to more 
contemporary philosophers such as Hume and Kant),22 Pater posits a notion of interiority 
as radically conditioned by a perpetual experiential flux. In the (in)famous Conclusion to 
his Studies in the History of the Renaissance (1873), for example, Pater constructs a self 
who remains both constitutively permeable as well as almost solipsistically self-enclosed; 
a self wholly determined by externalized forces (and the influx of external sensations and 
perceptions), as well as a self walled off within its own phenomenological self-
experience. Pater argues that the self remains a product of the material forces and 
elements that constitute the ontological fabric of the universe. In a sense, individuals are 
literally woven from these forces and materials; they exist as flame-like nodes, dynamic 
vortices that draw into themselves the elements of their own self-continuance. “What is 
the whole physical life,” he asks, “but a combination of natural elements to which science 
gives their names?” (118). “Our physical life is a perpetual motion” of these forces, he 
continues, a “design in a web” (118). And he concludes: “This at least of flame-like our 
life has, that it is but the concurrence, renewed from moment to moment of forces parting 
sooner or later on their ways” (118). Pater posits here a self radically material (and 
                                                          
22 For a full discussion of Pater’s philosophical influences, see Billie Andrew Inman’s “The Intellectual 
Context of Walter Pater’s Conclusion” (1981) and F.C. McGrath’s The Sensible Spirit: Walter Pater and 
the Modernist Paradigm (1986).    
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externally-oriented) in its essence, a view which he admits is not unique to him, but has 
become the general “tendency of modern thought” (118).23  
Echoing Hume, Pater goes on to suggest that the perceiving self of inner 
experience also remains constitutively determined by material conditions. Not only the 
body but the mind, too, exists in part as a product of the weave of interrelated, though 
transitory forces. The mind consists of those elements that press upon it and which it 
registers, and the reality it perceives only exists for the mind in the passing moment in 
which it perceives it. In a Treatise of Human Nature, Hume famously declares that “when 
I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular 
perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade . . . I never can catch myself at any time 
without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception” (300).24 And 
Pater, too, makes a similar claim (although with a slight shift in emphasis from the self 
itself to the impression the self receives), when he affirms how “impressions unstable, 
flickering, inconsistent . . . burn and are extinguished with our consciousness of them” 
(119). That is to say, the world manifests itself to human consciousness only as 
impressions on that consciousness. But as the world itself is an evanescent maelstrom, so, 
too, consciousness remains unstable. As Pater puts it, the “inward world of thought and 
                                                          
23 Indeed, in the epigraph of the Conclusion, he quotes a passage from Plato’s Cratylus on the Greek 
philosopher Heraclitus, who represents perhaps the oldest intellectual influence that Pater integrates into his 
thinking: “Heraclitus says ‘All things are in motion and nothing at rest’” (118). 
24 Compare, too, with John Locke, for whom not only does all knowledge derives from sensory experience, 
but that the self (or “soul”) itself only comes to exist when furnished with such experience. In An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, Locke writes,  “No ideas but from sensation or reflection, evident, if 
we observe children I see no reason therefore to believe, that the soul thinks before the senses have 
furnished it with ideas to think on” (38).   
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feeling” depends for its substance upon the “drift of momentary acts of sight and passion 
and thought” (118).25  
But here Pater parts from the Humean model. For whereas Hume suggests that 
selves lack an essential core or discernable boundary point that would demarcate the 
inner from the outer, Pater suggests that in fact the self remains isolated in itself in the 
very act of perception; it remains constitutively oriented towards its own inward 
experience. Supposedly stable, concrete objects in fact dissolve into a series of 
insubstantial, transient impressions, impressions which only register in the mind of a 
singular perceiving subject and which constitute that subject’s complete experience of 
reality. The “whole scope of observation,” Pater affirms, “is dwarfed to the narrow 
chamber of the individual mind” (119). In a radically epistemologically skeptical 
assertion, Pater argues not only that the mind knows nothing but the impressions it 
receives, but that it distorts those impressions as it receives them so that the object in 
itself remains essentially inaccessible: “Experience, already reduced to a swarm of 
impressions, is ringed round for each one of us by that thick wall of personality through 
which no real voice has ever pierced on its way to us, or from us to that which we can 
only conjecture to be without” (119). In a near Kantian formulation, Pater here asserts 
that individuals remain bounded by their own perceptual apparatus, and can neither 
                                                          
25 Compare this and other of Pater’s statements here with Woolf’s well-known passage in “Modern Fiction” 
(1919, revised in 1925 for The Common Reader). Woolf writes: “Look within and life, it seems, is very far 
from being ‘like this’. Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. The mind receives a 
myriad impressions—trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel. From all sides 
they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms; and as they fall, as they shape themselves into 
Monday or Tuesday, the accent falls different from of old . . . . Life is not a series of gig lamps 
symmetrically arranged; life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the 
beginning of consciousness to the end” (9).  
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receive impressions from objects (or other persons) as they exist in themselves or 
communicate to others the authentic essence of their own phenomenological, existential 
self-reality. “Every one of those impressions,” he argues, “is the impression of the 
individual in his isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a 
world” (119).  
Indeed, Pater goes even further, and argues that in their utter brevity these 
impressions lose what little objective reality they still possess, thus abandoning the mind 
to the depths of its own completely self-relating, absolute negativity. The self thins into 
its own subjectively aware, self-persisting absence. It vanishes into its own blank 
interiority. For Pater, “what is real in our life fines itself down,” “experience dwindles 
down,” and all that remains is the “single moment, gone while we try to apprehend it” 
(119). Note that the “we” remains, even as the moment vanishes. He concludes: “It is 
with the movement, the passage and dissolution of impressions, images, sensations, that 
analysis leaves off,—that continual vanishing away, that strange perpetual weaving and 
unweaving of ourselves” (119). At first affirming a purely material, atomistic conception 
of the self, Pater here not only introduces a gap between the perceiving self and the 
perceived world (since the world exists for the individual only as mediated through that 
individual’s perceptual apparatus), but dissolves both into substanceless flux, leaving 
only the waiting, subjective void of pure interiority to register the accumulating moments.  
Thus, like Arnold, Browning, and George Eliot, Pater, too, privileges interiority. 
But he offers a model far more radical than any they provide. Like Arnold and Browning, 
he maintains that individuals remain essentially cut off from one another, severed “by 
 
 
82 
 
that thick wall of personality” which distorts not only perception but human relations. Yet 
like George Eliot, he admits, too, the extent to which consciousness remains determined 
by its encounter with the external world. However distorted, the objects of an 
externalized reality provide the content for subjective experience.26 Significantly, Pater 
would seem to offer a vision of a universalized self consonant with George Eliot’s own, 
in that he suggests that subjectivity itself possess a formally stable (and thus intelligible) 
structure, no matter the particular individuals’ cultural, social, or historical contextual 
position. They differ in that Eliot assumes individuals remain transparently present to one 
another. Individuals present themselves to one another as potentially knowable, self-
coherent, objects of knowledge. For Pater the epistemological skeptic, however, selves 
remain ringed round by that deep opacity of subjective perception which blinds them 
from adequately grasping the other’s supposed essence. Only the individual’s own 
experiential impressions remain, the task then becoming, as Pater puts it in the Preface, 
“to know one’s impression as it really is” (3). In employing this phrasing, Pater also 
places distance between himself and Arnold, for whom the task of the critic was to “see 
the object as in itself it really is,” to quote Pater’s paraphrase of Arnold (3).  
Taken together, these four representative figures (Arnold, Browning, George 
Eliot, Pater) help provide a rough map of the different ways in which the nineteenth- 
century literary/cultural mind conceptualized the self.27 But crucially, in developing their 
various notion of the self, each of these figures, too, relies upon an inner/outer binary to 
                                                          
26 Again, compare with Hume or Locke’s formulations here.  
27 Other writers might be added to this list: Tennyson, Swinburne, Ruskin, Barrett Browning, Dickens, the 
Brontës: each of these writers also implicitly offers a theory of the self, but the four discussed here remain 
particularly representative of the period.   
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construct a conceptually stable model of human interiority, just as do the social and 
philosophical thinkers of the period. Indeed, between these writers and theorists a number 
of parallels exist. Arnold’s notion of the buried self, for instance, bears some relation to 
Bergson’s notion of durée. Pater’s epistemological skepticism and Browning’s 
questioning of the applicability of Enlightenment rationality for adequately grasping 
human subjectivity both resonate with aspects of Bradley’s own skeptical philosophical 
position. And George Eliot offers a notion of the universalized self that Frazer, too, 
would embrace. All of these figures, then, seem to participate in a shared cultural 
dialogue over the relation between interiority and exteriority (or between the self and its 
external environment), which in turn reflects the degree to which the self in itself had 
become a contested category during the period (as a result, one might add, of intellectual 
and technological developments, as well as urbanization and shifting modes of economic 
production—i.e., industrialization). It reflects, too, the anxiety unleashed by such 
indeterminacy.  
Of course, these questions had not been resolved by the time T.S. Eliot came to 
poetry, social theory, and philosophy. Directly or indirectly, Eliot grapples with each of 
these figures (or the views that they represent), challenging their assumptions and 
conclusions, synthesizing and sometimes distorting their positions, and occasionally 
appropriating their language for his own use. Although he often distances himself from 
these figures, he just as often reveals parallels between their thought and his own. Most 
importantly (for this project), Eliot integrates the same structural binary involving the 
tension between interiority and exteriority that each of these figures draws on in their 
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work. But in deploying this same binary, Eliot also transforms it, reveals its limitations, 
and attempts to dialectically transcend the conceptual deadlock this binary ultimately 
produces. In order to lay the foundation for a discussion of Eliot’s use of this binary in his 
poetry, Chapter Three will explore the ways in which Eliot directly responds in his 
critical and philosophical writings to these antecedent writers and theorists or to the ideas 
they embody. For in order to adequately understand Eliot’s own view of the relation of 
the individual to internal and external determinate conditionings, it proves necessary first 
to understand Eliot’s own particularized reading of this binary in the work of his 
immediate intellectual contemporaries and predecessors.  
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CHAPTER III 
A RADICAL SKEPTIC: ELIOT’S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTI-DUALISM 
 
In the Conclusion to his 1916 dissertation on F.H. Bradley, Eliot makes a number 
of summary statements that encapsulate his intellectual views at the time, but which also 
become the foundational premises of his later critical thought.28 In a statement that 
affirms his radical epistemological skepticism, for example, he claims that “Any assertion 
about the world . . . will inevitably be an interpretation” of the world, rather than a 
reflection of some fundamental, incontestable Truth (165). Every attempt to “define an 
experience,” he continues, only substitutes the definition itself for the experience (167). 
In other words, for Eliot, the “world is a construction,” an arrangement of definitional 
propositions intended (falsely) to represent the “world” as it is in itself. Yet Truth, as 
such, resists articulation, because the objects of experience (from which knowledge of 
Truth supposedly derives) always dissolve upon extended analysis into the background of 
a seemingly infinite series of relations and irreconcilable perspectives.29 Indeed, on the 
last page of his dissertation, Eliot argues that “‘objective’ truth is a relative truth: all that 
we [ultimately] care about is how it works; it makes no difference whether a thing really 
is green or blue, so long as everyone behaves toward it on the belief that it is green or 
                                                          
28 Jane Mallinson argues, for example, that Eliot’s “work as a poet and critic can be seen as a protracted 
exploration of his engagement with [Bradley’s] work” (1).  
29 Jewel Spears Brooker rightly notes that “the ghost of Hegel hovers here” over Eliot’s formulations (189). 
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blue” (169). As Jane Mallinson puts it in her study of Eliot’s work on Bradley, “point[s] 
of view can only offer a relative truth which is [merely] an interpretation of reality” (19). 
What ultimately underlies each of these radical propositions, I claim, is a 
particular view of the relation between subject and object, the knower and the known, the 
inner and the outer. As Eliot explains in the Conclusion, the “more closely one 
scrutinizes the ‘external world’, and the more eagerly and positively one plucks at it, the 
less there is to see and touch” (153-54). The external world collapses under the weight of 
its own conceptual edifice. The “world” as analyzed in itself remains only a construction, 
he suggests. But for Eliot the dialectician, such a collapse does not necessitate endorsing 
some version of Berkeleyan subjective idealism or existential solipsism.30 Rather, for 
Eliot, the external and internal remain inextricably intertwined; each entails and implies 
the other in a complex constitutive dialectical process. As Mallinson rightly observes, for 
Eliot, “the existence of the subject is dependent upon its experiencing an object,” even as 
“the existence of the object is equally dependent upon its unity in feeling . . . with the 
subject” (12).31  
                                                          
30 Later on in the Chapter, Eliot claims that “It is not true that we deny the existence of an external world, 
for anyone who pursues this path of inquiry will come to the conclusion that this question is ultimately 
meaningless” (157)  
31 Immediately after claiming the apparent insubstantiality of the external, objective world, Eliot goes on to 
argue that the “mental resolves into a curious and intricate [material, objectified] mechanism, and the 
physical reveals itself as a mental construct. If you will find the mechanical anywhere, you will find it in 
the workings of mind; and to inspect living mind, you must look nowhere but in the world outside” (154).31 
In a kind of Hegelian coincidence of opposites, the (supposedly immaterial) mind manifests as a material 
organ of determinate functionality, whereas the (supposedly concrete, material, objectified) world 
manifests only as an idealized construction of the mind. The mind, it seems, constructs a world out of a 
world that already contains the mind. Thus the internal and the external paradoxically interpenetrate one 
another, blur together. Simplistic subject/object dualities dissolve. 
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Indeed, Eliot goes on to argue in the Conclusion that the self itself remains only 
an object-construction, just as external and externalized as any other 
(phenomenologically) intended object. As William Skaff puts it, for Eliot and Bradley, 
“distinctions [such] as ‘self’ or ‘soul’ in contrast to ‘the world’ are ideas merely, 
intellectual constructions of the mind, and thus not real” (12). And as Eliot himself puts 
it, “There is a relation between the object [or world] and the self: a relation which is 
theoretical and not merely actual, in the sense that the self as a term capable of relation 
with other terms is a construction” (155). The self, he suggests, is not “merely actual,” 
but a contingent proposition, embedded within a particular relational framework. In other 
words, when understood within the context of subject/object relations, the self finds itself 
already implicitly objectified through its conceptualized relation as a subject to an object. 
Objects, that is, imply objectified (and objectifying) observers. Thus, Eliot argues in his 
Conclusion that a theory of objects necessarily implies a theory of self (i.e., particular 
epistemologies imply particular notions of subjectivity).  
In Mastery and Escape, Brooker rightly affirms that Eliot’s dissertation 
essentially “centers on an inquiry into the self” and the self’s relation to that which it 
perceives “outside itself” (192). And certainly, as an examination of the “Experience and 
the Objects of Knowledge in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley,”32 the dissertation as a 
whole remains concerned fundamentally with the relation between perceiving individuals 
and the perceived external world. Interiority and exteriority, surface and depth, subject 
                                                          
32 This was the dissertation’s original title. On publication in 1964, Eliot simplified the title to Knowledge 
and Experience in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley.    
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and object: these thus remain the orienting conceptual categories that structure Eliot’s 
reflections in the dissertation. And significantly, as this project argues, this underlying 
conceptual framework informs nearly all of his work, both early and late, both poetry and 
prose. Of course, as suggested in the previous chapter, Eliot comes to these conclusions 
only after grappling with the ideas of his intellectual and literary precursors and 
contemporaries. Indeed, his ideas emerge out of theirs, his conceptual terminology 
derives from their own, a point he readily acknowledges in regards to Bradley in the 
Conclusion of his dissertation (153).  
But Eliot builds on his precursors. And his conclusions in his dissertation offer an 
important statement of his intuitions regarding the relation between interiority and 
exteriority, and thus provide as well, an important early statement of his views that can 
help make sense of the ways he responds to the philosophers, social theorists, novelists 
and poets who together provide the intellectual and literary context out of which his ideas 
emerge. However, more immediately, the conclusions he draws in the dissertation help 
make sense of the particular way he responds to and interprets his philosophical 
contemporaries and forebears, especially since he grapples in it with them in their own 
language. And since Eliot’s philosophical views conceptually underpin his later work (as 
this project contends), to understand his reading of certain contemporary philosophical 
questions is to provide the foundation for understanding his critical reflections on other 
(non-philosophical) thinkers and writers as well.  
In short, this chapter will explore Eliot’s response to his intellectual and literary 
precursors and will argue that he rejects their reliance on inner/outer distinctions as 
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overly simplistic (i.e., as insufficiently representative of reality). I argue that rather than 
endorsing the view of those who privilege one term of the binary over the other, Eliot (in 
part following Bradley) offers a view of the relationship between interiority and 
exteriority that sees the two terms as thoroughly mutually constitutive. Interiority and 
exteriority dialectically interpenetrate one another, such that neither term obtains priority 
over the other. Each constitutes the other, relies upon the other for conceptual coherence. 
In essence, he seeks to reconceptualize the relationship between self and other, subject 
and object, inner and outer. This view contrasts starkly with that of critics such as A. 
David Moody, J. Hillis Miller, or Robert Langbaum, who argue that Eliot privileges 
interiority in his work. It also contrasts with those critics (such as Francis Dickey) who 
affirm that Eliot prioritizes exteriority. Rather, focusing in the first sections of this 
chapter on Eliot’s philosophical and anthropological work (specifically his emphasis on 
subject/object relations) and in the last section on his literary criticism, I hope to show 
how Eliot seeks to transcend both poles of the binary.  
Ultimately, my intention in this chapter is to marshal evidence to demonstrate 
how Eliot’s early work reveals a remarkably sustained argument in favor of a dialectical 
relation between interiority and exteriority. I want to note that this chapter draws upon a 
number of Eliot’s graduate papers that until recently have proven difficult to access. 
Consequently, very little work has yet been done on these early documents. In light of 
this newly available material (now published in The Complete Prose of T.S. Eliot), this 
dissertation hopes to offer a more comprehensive and nuanced account of Eliot’s 
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philosophical work, and therefore of the relation between his philosophical thought and 
his poetry.         
 
Eliot and Philosophy 
While an undergraduate at Harvard, Eliot expressed little interest in formal 
philosophical study, focusing predominately, as James Miller points out, on language and 
literature courses. In his first year, for instance, he took classes in Greek Literature, 
German Grammar and Prose, and English Literature, a varied pattern of course work that 
would continue throughout his three years of undergraduate studies (from 1906 to 1909) 
(79-80). Although in his second year as an undergraduate, he did take George 
Santayana’s Modern Philosophy course (along with one other philosophy class), Eliot’s 
true introduction to philosophy and social thought came only during his first year of 
graduate work (1909-1910), in courses such as Santayana’s Philosophy of History and, 
perhaps more importantly, Irving Babbitt’s Literary Criticism in France, with Special 
Reference to the Nineteenth Century (Miller 80).33 As Herbert Howarth points out, “of all 
the courses of the year,” Babbitt’s proved the “most powerfully formative” for Eliot 
(127). Indeed, Babbitt’s course in French criticism covered much more than the title 
suggests. Eliot himself remarks that Babbitt’s lectures “had a great deal to do with 
Aristotle, Longinus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus; they touched frequently upon 
Buddhism, Confucius, Rousseau, and contemporary political and religious movements” 
                                                          
33 Eliot reports in an August 4, 1920 letter to Sydney Schiff that he “never liked Santayana,” and felt that 
“his philosophy was a dressing up of himself rather than an interest in things” (Letters Vol. I 395). Manju 
Jain, too, makes the point that Eliot always felt “ambivalent” towards Santayana, “to say the least” (41).  
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(Manchester 102). Significantly, Eliot’s exposure to Babbitt’s particular critique of 
modernity, as well as his criticisms of Rousseau and the mode of romanticism he 
inspired, influenced Eliot’s own views on these subjects, a point Eliot admits as late as 
1929, when he confesses that he first began his career “as a disciple of Mr. Babbitt” 
(“Second Thoughts” 393).34 Even Eliot’s decision to study Indian philosophy and 
languages while pursuing his doctorate in contemporary Western philosophy probably 
stems from Babbitt’s influence and suggestions (Jain 39).  
Still, Eliot’s 1909-1910 coursework in philosophy remained a peripheral interest, 
which would only gain intellectual priority for him following his 1910-1911 year abroad 
in France.35 For it was in Paris, while Eliot was attending classes at the Sorbonne and 
contemplating “giving up English and trying to settle down and scrape along in Paris and 
gradually write French” (qtd in Jain 51), that he also attended Henri Bergson’s weekly 
lectures, which would effect that short-lived conversion in him of which he speaks much 
later in 1948’s Sermon Preached in Magdalene College Chapel.36 Manju Jain notes that 
from the beginning of his career, Eliot’s “creative and philosophical interests” always 
“reinforced each other,” and he rightly points to an early 1905 poem Eliot wrote for the 
Smith Academy Record as evidence (61).37 But by 1911, when he returned to Harvard 
                                                          
34 Although Eliot also reveals the degree to which his thought has now come to diverge from Babbitt’s 
(“Second Thoughts” 401). See, too, Eliot’s critique of Babbitt in “The Humanism of Irving Babbitt.”   
35 Jain notes “that Babbitt’s influence was one of the forces that sent him to France” (51), a point James 
Miller makes as well (117).  
36 “My only conversion,” he confesses in the Sermon, “by the deliberate influence of any individual, was a 
temporary conversion to Bergsonism” (qtd in Miller 141). 
37 In 1905’s “A Lyric,” Eliot writes, “If time and space, as Sages say, / Are things which cannot be, / The 
sun which does not feel decay / No greater is than we” (61). Other early poems, too, speak to this 
convergence of interests, notably “Spleen” (a poem which clearly anticipates “Prufrock”), which concludes, 
“And Life, a little bald and gray, / Languid fastidious, and bland, / Waits, hat and gloves in hand . . . On the 
doorstep of the Absolute” (Complete Poems 603). 
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from France, Eliot had decided to pursue philosophy (almost) exclusively, intending to 
prepare himself for a career as an academic philosopher (61). And it was at Harvard, 
while attending courses such as Josiah Royce’s seminar on “Scientific Methods” that 
Eliot began formally grappling with late nineteenth and early twentieth-century French 
and English social theorists such as Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, and Jane Harrison, an 
engagement that would continue well beyond his graduate work (Smith v).  
It was also at Harvard that Eliot would first discover F.H. Bradley, on whom he 
would go on to write his doctoral dissertation. And it was here, too, that he grappled at 
length in multiple seminar papers with Immanuel Kant, an intellectual encounter that 
helps inform and further contextualize his (Bradleyan) epistemological skepticism. 
Indeed, after Harvard, as is well-known, Eliot would continue on briefly to Marburg and 
then to Oxford in 1914 in order to continue his philosophy work, where he would go on 
to study Aristotle with “Bradley’s closest disciple,” Harold Joachim, while writing his 
dissertation (Shusterman 32). Each of these varied figures (i.e., Bergson, Durkheim, 
Bradley, etc.) influenced Eliot’s own aesthetic, critical, and philosophical positions, and 
shaped as well Eliot’s notion of the formative relations between individuals and their 
social and ideological environments. But it was Eliot’s encounter with Henri Bergson in 
Paris that I would suggest first stimulated him to reflect on the relation between 
internality and externality through the lens and language of philosophical analysis.   
 
Henri Bergson: An Early Infatuation 
When Eliot arrived in Paris in 1910, Bergson was at the height of his fame. In 
1896, Bergson had published Matter and Memory, which William James compared in 
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importance with Berkeley’s 1710 Principles of Human Knowledge and Kant’s 1781 
Critique of Pure Reason (Pearson 15). Indeed, for James, Bergson’s book inaugurated a 
second epistemological Copernican Revolution, comparable in significance with the 
epistemological revolution Kant himself inaugurated more than a century earlier (15). In 
1907, Bergson would go on to publish Creative Evolution (translated into English in 
1911), which Keith Pearson calls “one of the first great books on systems (open and 
closed, natural and artificial)” (26). And in 1928, in confirmation of his standing, he 
received the Nobel Prize for Literature. During his tenure in Paris, Eliot attended 
Bergson’s series of weekly lectures delivered at the Collège de France, and, according to 
his own admission, was deeply impressed. In his intense “enthusiasm,” he even 
convinced his mother to attend a course of lectures on Bergson’s Creative Evolution, a 
point she made later in a January 18, 1916 letter to Bertrand Russell (Childs 51; Eliot, 
Letters Vol. I 130). Indeed, for Christmas in 1912, Eliot presented her with Bergson’s The 
Introduction to a New Philosophy, which Childs notes was the “first English translation 
of the article later translated by Hulme and popularized as An Introduction to 
Metaphysics” (51). Philip Le Brun makes the point that Eliot was so impressed by 
Bergson that all his subsequent thought and work bear Bergson’s mark (even despite 
Eliot’s later protestations against him). Without this initial exposure to Bergson, Le Brun 
argues, “Eliot’s major formulations about poetry—about tradition, the associated 
sensibility of the artist, and the work of art as objective correlative—would have been 
quite different from what they are” (10). In fact, the effect was almost immediate. As 
John Mayer notes, “Rhapsody on a Windy Night,” written in March of 1911 while Eliot 
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was still attending Bergson’s lectures, clearly reflects traces of Eliot’s encounter with 
Bergson, as, too, does the sonnet, “He said: The universe is very clear,” written in the 
same month (76-80).38   
Still, despite Eliot’s initial enthusiasm for Bergson, he began quickly to distance 
himself from the philosopher, and by December of 1913 delivered a critique of Bergson 
to the Harvard Philosophy Club referred to as “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism,” a 
paper that will be discussed in more detail below. Between Eliot’s embrace of 
Bergsonism and his repudiation of it, however, stands Babbitt’s November 1912 critique 
of Bergson in The Nation as well as Bertrand Russell’s July 1912 critique in The Monist. 
As discussed above, Babbitt’s influence on the early Eliot was pronounced, affecting 
certain of his social and political views, the direction of his studies, even his decision to 
study in France. So for Babbitt to criticize Bergson’s views would certainly have had 
some effect on Eliot, however difficult to trace. In his essay on Bergson, Babbitt makes 
the point that Bergson’s resistance to conceptual thought merely recapitulates the 
romantic emphasis on inner feeling and intuition common throughout the nineteenth 
century. Like Carlyle, for instance, who struggled against those who would “convert the 
world ‘into a huge, dead, immeasurable steam-engine,” Bergson, too, struggles against 
utilitarian, conceptual intellectualism, instead positing the truth of intuitional durée (453). 
German romantic figures such as Goethe also anticipate Bergson, Babbitt notes, in that 
they “warn against the over-intellectualizing of science,” stressing instead the importance 
of intuitional perceptual faculties (453).  
                                                          
38 Donald Childs also calls “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” a “thoroughly Bergsonian poem” (62).  
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Most significantly, though, Babbitt links Bergson directly to Rousseau (whom he 
fiercely opposed), arguing that Bergson “is plainly a Rousseauistic primitivist” for whom 
our “vision of reality” comes from “looking downward and backward instead of forward 
and up” (453). “The opposition he establishes,” Babbitt argues, “between concepts and 
percepts, between intellect and intuition, is nothing but Rousseau’s old opposition 
between thought and feeling, the head and the heart” (453). That is to say, for Babbitt, 
Bergson (like Rousseau) places too much emphasis on inwardness; indeed, constructs a 
notion of self predicated on the gap between a conceptually fabricated (and thus 
inauthentic and false) exteriority and an inward, ultimately self-absorbed “general 
emotional expansiveness” (455). In The Early T.S. Eliot and Western Philosophy, M. A. 
R. Habib argues that “Babbitt’s main objection to romanticism is its fostering of 
‘anarchic individualism’ and evasion of moral responsibility” (17). To turn inwards is to 
turn away from the outward-oriented contemplation of one’s moral obligations to others. 
Indeed, against Bergson, Babbitt argues that the intellect in fact helps to generate 
significant and useful “sharp distinctions” which individuals may then put “into the 
service of the character and will” (453). For Babbitt, then, intellectual abstraction and 
analysis serves as a tool for directing the individual outward and into the field of social 
action.39 
                                                          
39 Although Babbitt was politically conservative, some of his critiques against Bergson bear a leftist 
orientation. For instance, he critiques Bergson of offering a palliative philosophy that masks social and 
economic relations: “[For Bergson, a] man, we are to believe, may devote all his mental energy to the stock 
market, and yet be numbered with the sages, if only he succeeds in his odd moments in immersing himself 
in la durée réelle and listening, in M. Bergson’s phrase, to the ‘continuous melody of his inner life’” (455).   
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Russell’s influence over Eliot was also pronounced, although perhaps less lasting, 
as Richard Shusterman notes (“Eliot” 38). Eliot was familiar with Russell’s work, having 
studied Principia Mathematica at least by the fall of 1913, when he took Josiah Royce’s 
seminar in scientific methodology.40 And indeed, the following semester, in the spring of 
1914, Eliot took Russell’s course in symbolic logic, and worked, too, as an Assistant 
Lecturer for Russell’s advanced logic class (Smith 5). So Eliot was certainly familiar with 
Russell and his thought by this point in time. Still, it proves difficult to determine how 
familiar Eliot may have been with Russell’s 1912 critique, despite Donald Child’s 
conclusion in From Philosophy to Poetry that Eliot “received his anti-Bergsonian 
impulse from” him (51).41 In his essay on Bergson, Russell argues that Bergson “as a rule 
does not give reasons for his opinions, but relies on their inherent attractiveness, and on 
the charm of an excellent style” (332). For Russell, Bergson’s claims remain largely 
unsubstantiated (and thus unintellectual) and depend for their force on Bergson’s skillful 
use of language. Russell goes on to argue that true philosophers (as Russell defines them) 
concern themselves with “calm and careful thought,” and that, in contrast, Bergson’s 
arguments involve the “passion and noise of violent motion” (333). When real 
philosophers look beneath Bergson’s “restless view of the world,” they find “no reason 
whatever for accepting” his purely “imaginative epic” (333, 334). 
                                                          
40 Russell co-authored the Principia with Alfred North Whitehead, and its three volumes were published in 
1910, 1912, and 1913, respectively. See Costello’s notebooks for passing mention of the Principia in 
Royce’s course.  
41 Eliot makes no mention, for instance, of Russell or Babbitt’s views on Bergson in his letters from this 
period. 
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Shusterman points out that Russell, as a logical atomist, was concerned primarily 
with analytically exposing “logical confusions and conceptual unclarities,” a project he 
extends to his treatment of Bergson (Philosophy 22). For Russell, Bergson’s philosophy 
rests upon confused and peculiarly defined notions of space, motion, and time (334, 338, 
342).42 More importantly, Russell condemns Bergson for misunderstanding and 
misrepresenting subject/object relations—indeed, he concludes his essay with a vigorous 
discussion of Bergson’s (mis)use of these terms. He argues that Bergson, wrongly 
following certain schools of idealist philosophy, blurs together these two notions (subject 
and object), in order to offer a non-dualist model of mind on which his entire theoretical 
edifice rests (345). But for Russell, subject and object remain ontologically distinct and 
self-coherent concepts that utterly resist conflation, which means that for Russell, to 
reject Bergson’s “identification” of subject and object is also to reject the philosophy 
which emerges out of it (346). Significantly, then, Russell’s core critique relies upon 
affirming the distinction between inwardness and outwardness, depth and surface, subject 
and object. He resists Bergson’s attempts to reduce the external to the internal (as Russell 
reads him). For Russell the mathematician and abstract logician, as with Babbitt, Bergson 
remains a philosopher entranced with interiority at the expense of concrete, objective 
materiality.43  
 
                                                          
42 “Bergson’s whole condemnation of the intellect rests,” Russell argues, “upon a personal idiosyncrasy 
mistaken for a necessity of thought, I mean the idiosyncrasy of visualizing successions as spread out on a 
line” (337). 
43 Some months later, in January 1914, Karin Costelloe responded in The Monist to Russell’s critique of 
Bergson, defending Bergson against Russell’s “caricature” of him (145). 
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Eliot’s Rejection of Bergson’s Model of Subject/Object Relations 
In the spring of 1914, Eliot delivered a paper to the Harvard Philosophy Club 
provisionally entitled, “The Relationship between Politics and Metaphysics.” In that 
paper, which largely involves an extended analysis of Walter Lippmann’s A Preface to 
Politics, Eliot examines and compares Bergsonism with Pragmatism. In this discussion of 
Bergson, Eliot echoes Russell in arguing that the force of Bergson’s philosophy derives 
more from its delivery than its content. “By the seduction of his style,” Eliot asserts, “we 
come to believe that the Bergsonian world is the only world, and that we have been living 
among shadows. [But] [i]t is not so. Bergson is the sweet Siren of adventurous 
philosophes” (99). For Eliot, Bergson is a belated romantic, promulgating a “‘personal’ 
view of life” rooted merely in private feeling and individual vision, as M.A.R. Habib puts 
it (55).44 As Eliot reads him (echoing both Russell and Babbitt), Bergson overstresses 
emotion and feeling at the expense of rigorous and systematic thought; overstresses, too, 
the phenomenological experience of interiority over the action-oriented demands of 
concrete, external social existence. Bergson, Eliot argues, “emphasises the reality of a 
fluid psychological world of aspect and nuance, where purposes and intentions are 
replaced by pure feeling” (99). Such a world, he continues, contrasts starkly with the 
“world of social values” individuals pragmatically encounter and negotiate (99). Thus, by 
invariably subordinating the external to the internal, Bergson’s philosophy represents an 
                                                          
44 Habib goes on to argue that “Eliot’s reaction against Bergson was in turn part of his own broader 
rejection of romanticism, especially of the notion of personality” (55).  
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“escape from reality as we know it in ordinary experience,” rather than any meaningful 
clarification of it (100).   
While this critique does not explicitly focus on Bergson’s conceptualization of 
subjectivity, it nonetheless relies on the distinction between the internal and the external 
characteristic of that conceptualization. It orients his reading of Bergson and provides the 
basis for rejecting him, a rejection more clearly and systematically demonstrated in an 
even earlier paper, also delivered to the Harvard Philosophy Club, entitled “A Draft of a 
Paper on Bergson.”45 This slightly earlier paper, delivered in December of 1913, marks 
Eliot’s first sustained critique of Bergson (Complete 67).46 And as with the later paper, 
Eliot’s criticisms of Bergson here, too, center on what Eliot feels to be Bergson’s 
overemphasis on interiority and consequent neglect of certain metaphysical problems 
which such an overemphasis generates. In essence, Eliot engages in this paper in what 
Habib calls an “assault on Bergson’s dualism,” specifically focusing on the “question of 
whether relations are internal or external” (47).  
Indeed, from the beginning of his discussion, Eliot demonstrates his concern with 
this binary, arguing that the inconsistencies in Bergson’s philosophy stems from 
Bergson’s subject-oriented philosophical idealism, the same idealism, in fact, for which 
Russell, too, criticizes Bergson (67). As Eliot reads him, Bergson argues that all external 
relations and divisions remain a product of the analytically oriented intellect. Glossing 
                                                          
45 The Complete Prose has subsequently titled this paper “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism.”   
46 M.A.R. Habib treats this essay at length in The Early T.S. Eliot and Western Philosophy. See Chapter 
Three of Habib’s study, entitled “Bergson Resartus and T.S. Eliot’s Manuscript” (39-60). See, too, Paul 
Douglass’ Bergson, Eliot, and American Literature for further (although less elaborate) treatment of this 
early paper (59-64).    
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Bergson, Eliot notes that the mind (for Bergson) “abstracts from the physical world 
particular characters, and thus constitutes external relations” (70). That is to say, the mind 
actively imposes on the undifferentiated flux of object impressions order, relation, and 
spatial multiplicity.  
Space itself, for example, as a property of reality, remains merely a provisional 
construct posited by the mind as a conceptual “substratum for [conceiving] extrinsic 
relations” (70). The mind projects space in order to help itself conceptualize objects as 
well as the interactions between them. As Habib puts it in his discussion of this paper, for 
Bergson, the “externality of relation represented by space occurs within an overall 
framework of internal relations” (49, emphasis in original). But this means that the mind 
is primary, and space secondary; the external quite literally reduces to the internal (the 
mind). But in making this claim, Bergson implies certain parallels between his own 
thought and Berkeley’s, particularly in relation to their respective conceptions of space 
and spatiality, as Eliot notes (70). Bergson, though, attempts to distance himself from 
Berkeleyan subjective idealism by affirming the existence of an objective order beyond 
the mind’s mental constructs of that order. For instance, he tries to argue, as Eliot points 
out, that space is not an “illusion” but rather an “appearance” (70). But such distinctions 
remain too fine for Eliot, who continues to affirm that Bergson remains, at root, a 
Berkeleyan idealist, for whom “any extrinsic relation given by analysis, will be simply 
the reflection of intellect; and the result of analysis of such relations is to give only the 
indications of the possible activities of intelligence” (71).  
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Still, Eliot acknowledges that Bergson senses a tension within his own 
formulations, and that he seeks a definitive means by which to distinguish internal from 
external realities. His solution, Eliot argues, is to offer a model of the “genesis of 
consciousness” predicated on a notion of perpetual inner movement which itself mirrors 
the perpetual outer movement of the objective, material order (72). That is, as Eliot reads 
him, Bergson ultimately attempts to reduce all of phenomenal reality to motion and 
maintains that this incessant flux in some deep sense mirrors the flow of consciousness of 
durée, although both (material reality and consciousness) remain distinct (75, 76). 
Bergson seeks to affirm that exact parallels exist between the external world and the 
internal, and that these parallels effect a shared resonance between the two poles of the 
binary. In this way, via a kind of modified dualism, Bergson again attempts to escape the 
trap of Berkeleyan idealism.   
But Eliot sees Bergson’s notion of motion as problematic. Firstly, in arguing his 
theory of motion, Bergson employs the instruments of scientific logic and demonstration, 
yet in doing so, inadvertently undermines his own claims. For on the one hand Bergson 
rejects as insufficiently accurate the conceptual language and methodological apparatus 
of science, while on the other, he relies upon these instruments to make his argument 
about the relationship between physical and mental realties (i.e., that both at root remain 
grounded in a structurally homologous undifferentiated flux). “[I]n making this appeal to 
science,” Eliot argues, “he seems to me to throw up his case against science. Return to 
the immediate, he says; science gives only abstractions. But when science gives motion, 
he accepts it” (76-77). In other words, Bergson’s theory of matter remains rooted in the 
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mind’s conceptualizing, idealizing activity; a deep irony, given that, for Bergson, 
conceptual, analytical thought only provides insufficient, incomplete, distorted 
representations of (physical or metaphysical) reality.  
Secondly, when Bergson elsewhere claims that to perceive an object is to “be 
identical with that object” (thus implying a more nuanced view of subject/object relations 
in that the reality of both subject and object remain preserved even as they experientially 
overlap), Eliot asks, but “how can our perception be identical with the object, which, in 
itself, is pure motion? Where again, is the reality—in the consciousness or in that which 
is perceived? Where is the one reality to subsume both of these, and can we or can we not 
know it?” (77). That is, if objects as such (static, substantive, self-persisting) dissolve into 
pure substance-less motion, and if consciousness, too, consists of pure, uninterrupted 
flux, then how can these two realities ever coincide? What substantively exists that can 
coincide? Instead, contra Bergson, Eliot argues that change must be “relative to a 
consciousness which distinguishes within the stream elements which it can—if only to 
the slightest extent—contrast; and contrast seems to me to that extent externalisation” 
(79-80).  
For Eliot, then, just as for Russell, Bergson’s error lies in his faulty view of 
subject/object relations. In constructing this binary, Bergson deemphasizes the reality of 
external objects, and in so doing provides a distorted understanding of the relation 
between interiority and externality. The external disappears into the internal, rather than 
existing in generative tension with it. In short, as I read him, Eliot suggests Bergson 
focuses too much on the inward, consequently collapsing the subject in on itself, severing 
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it from its externalizing contexts and conditions, and thus misrepresenting its dialectical, 
relational essence.  
 
Beyond Bergson 
Eliot’s concern with subject/object relations extends far beyond his work on 
Bergson. Indeed, as I will demonstrate, Eliot’s interest in this binary permeates his 
philosophical work, from his earliest graduate essays to his dissertation on Bradley. In 
spring of 1913, for instance (and thus nearly a year before his “Inconsistencies in 
Bergson’s Idealism”), Eliot wrote several essays on Kant for his course in Kantian 
philosophy.47 In the first of this series of papers, “Report on the Kantian Categories,” 
Eliot is already thinking through the subject/object binary as it manifests in Kant’s work, 
observing (with Kant) that “we can know neither an object nor our own ideas, nor the 
world, except as phenomena; and our knowledge is itself a phenomenon—as known” 
(35). For Eliot, Kant’s value lies in the way his methodology lends itself to pragmatic 
knowledge of the world (its “methodological . . . not literal, value”) (35). Observers know 
the world only as it appears to them (via innate categories of experience), and yet despite 
this skeptical presupposition, the knowledge gained nonetheless retains its value for its 
“practical use and practical validity” (37).  
In the second of his essays on Kant, “Report on the Relation of Kant’s Criticism 
to Agnosticism” (from the same term), Eliot makes the point that “in order to know, we 
must begin with faith, that is to say, the conception of an external relation, a real which is 
                                                          
47 Eliot wrote this paper, along with two others, for Philosophy 15: The Kantian Philosophy, taught by 
Professor Charles Montague Bakewell (Complete 29).  
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‘outside of ourselves,’ and just that which possesses this externality to the highest degree 
is the world of [objects]” (44). In other words, for Eliot (building on Kant’s distinction 
between noumenal and phenomenal realities), the relation between subject and object is 
defined by the subject’s faith in the object’s existence (or in a world of “external 
relations” in which such objects may have existence). Individuals presuppose an 
objective world, and in the act of perception (ordered by cognitive categories of 
experience), find the objects they have already presupposed as possible. But this means, 
too, that what individuals perceive remains rooted in their internal presuppositions. Thus, 
in this sense, the external world of material objects remains in part the product of an 
internal phenomenon. As Eliot puts it, knowledge “is only knowledge at all when ‘taken 
internally’” (44). Objects and objectivity exists, but only (tautologically) insofar as 
individuals presuppose them to exist.  
In the third of these three Kantian essays, “Report on the Ethics of Kant’s 
Critique of Practical Reason,” Eliot continues to emphasize this subject/object 
distinction, arguing here that how subjects perceive objects remains dependent upon 
contextual, pragmatic considerations. The “distinction between one type of object of 
attention and another,” he argues, “though real, is only practical, and . . . there is, in fact, 
an infinite gradation of objects, from the best known object of direct perception, to the 
least known object in untried theories” (50). That is to say, the reality of particular 
objects depends upon the particular set of purposes that coordinate the act of perception. 
But Eliot goes further, and claims that objects, “considered from an external point of 
view” remain “simply part of an organic complex, and you cannot say, except from a 
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practical point of view . . . whether it [the object] ‘exists’ or not” (50). Objects exist as 
such only within certain sets of relations, but for Eliot these relations remain ultimately 
indeterminable, shifting—even the act of investigation itself “changes the relation” (50). 
Seen from the outside (“an external point of view”), objects withdraw or dissolve into 
their relations with other phenomenon. Perception itself draws them out, but only within 
certain contextualized, purpose-oriented parameters. As Jeffrey Perl puts it in his 
discussion of these early essays, for Eliot, “‘existence’ or ‘reality’ is a quality attributed 
to certain terms within a shared context of discourse, and that, in relation to this context, 
‘knowledge’ is also and only a term” (70).  
Other papers from this period reiterate and extend Eliot’s views on the relation 
between subject and object, perceiver and perceived, internal and external. Most 
significantly, in “Degrees of Reality,” also written in the spring of 1913, Eliot again 
revisits this binary, here denying “any absolute distinction between perception, image and 
judgment, between real and unreal, between real and ideal, or between true and false, or 
between truth and fact” (57). He affirms, however, that objects “as such are real” and do 
exist, but that, again, they possess only “degrees of reality” for individual observers (57). 
Crucially, what grants objects their objecthood (and degree of reality), Eliot argues, is 
their ability to function as a “point of attention” for a perceiving consciousness (58).48 In 
                                                          
48 As Eliot puts it in the Conclusion to his dissertation, “The objecthood of an object . . . is the fact that we 
intend it as an object: it is the attending that makes the object” (158). But for Eliot, individuals remain in 
relation to and in tension with the objects they intend, for the “objects are constantly shifting, and new 
transpositions of objectivity and feeling constantly developing” (155). And of course, as Eliot freely 
admits, “if there were no object[s] we could not attend” to them as objects (158). The mind draws into 
focus the objects of its perception, but these objects remain unstable, their “reality” (as objects) ever subject 
to alternative perceptions of and feelings towards them.  
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making this argument, Eliot explicitly links objectivity to intentionality. But this means, 
he continues, that “the subjective is also objective,” for it, too, “is capable of being the 
intended object of attention” (58, emphasis added). Thus, for Eliot (as early as 1913), the 
internal as such remains subject to externalization, since the internal may also serve as an 
object of attention. When individuals turn the intending gaze onto themselves (or others), 
there, too, they find a distinct, delineable, and isolate object. Thus the internal gives way 
to the external, itself proves subject to externalization, insofar as it remains subject to an 
intending gaze.  
Eliot wrote each of these essays while in the midst of his reversal on Bergson, 
who also, as seen above, remained deeply concerned with the relation between subject 
and object, interiority and exteriority. For Eliot, the relation between the internal and 
external as detailed in these early essays proves incompatible with his reading of 
Bergson’s views on this relation. Whereas Bergson dissolved the external into the 
internal (by suggesting that the internal constructs the external reality it perceives), Eliot 
understands the relation between these terms as mediated through acts of attention. More 
than a year later, in the fall of 1914, Eliot again makes this point, arguing in “Objects: 
Content, Objectivity, and Existence” that an object “is anything upon which attention 
may be directed” (165). And that when an object “pass[es] out of consciousness, it ceases 
to be [an] object,” and “resumes the place in the whole from which it [was] isolated” 
(166). In making these claims, Eliot reveals a deep consonance between his views and 
Kant’s (whom he had studied in the spring of 1913, as noted above), in that he, too, 
develops a skeptical view of empirically experienced objective reality. Objects exist as 
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objects so long as individuals continue to perceive them as such. Knowledge of objects 
remains limited to knowledge of them in context of their appearances to an observer. As 
Eliot notes in “On Objects,” “the object is identical with the point of view” (167). 
Individuals, he contends, do not perceive objects in themselves; rather, when the point of 
view alters, the object itself alters (167). Thus, already by 1913, Eliot argues explicitly 
for a model of reality in which inner and outer realities remain deeply intertwined, each 
dialectically dependent upon the other, yet neither reducible to the other.  
 
Appropriating Bradley  
Eliot’s almost unrelenting focus on the subject/object binary, I claim, reaches its 
most philosophically developed articulation in his dissertation on Bradley, whose very 
title, Experience and Objects of Knowledge in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley, indicates 
Eliot’s continued interest in this topic. As Eliot notes in the dissertation’s first chapter, his 
goal is not to “cover the whole field of epistemology,” but rather to examine the very 
particular relationship between perceivers and the perceived, or between “mental 
activity” and external objects, as he puts it in the conclusion (15, 153). Indeed, Bradley 
offered Eliot a concisely formulated view of the relation between the internal and 
external that Eliot came largely to endorse, even noting in the dissertation that his 
conclusions “are in substantial agreement with [Bradley’s] Appearance and Reality” 
(153).49 In contrast to Bergson, who deprioritized the external in favor of an emphasis on 
undifferentiated internal states of consciousness, Bradley stresses the ultimate dialectical 
                                                          
49 He also notes, however, that he “reject[s] certain theories, logical and psychological, which appear in 
[Bradley’s] Principles and elsewhere” (153).  
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identity of the inner and the outer, a position Eliot fully affirms, and goes on to examine 
in the very first chapter of his dissertation, “On Our Knowledge of Immediate 
Experience”.  
For Eliot, I argue, Bradley’s notion of immediate experience proved particularly 
useful in helping him to articulate his own developing views regarding the relation 
between interiority and exteriority. Indeed, as he notes at the beginning of this first 
chapter, the “doctrine of ‘immediate experience’ [is] the starting point of knowledge,” 
since it provides the framework for understanding the mutually constitutive dialectical 
relation between subjects and objects (15). Following Bradley, for Eliot, immediate 
experience (or “feeling,” which Eliot notes functions as a synonymous term) refers to that 
state in which subject and object remain undifferentiated from one another, in which the 
oppositional binary that traditionally characterizes their relation to one another has yet to 
appear (15). Quoting Bradley, Eliot affirms that immediate experience “means for me, 
first, the general condition before distinctions and relations have been developed, and 
where as yet neither any subject nor object exists” (16). Both remain fused within a single 
experiential moment, neither existing apart from the other, but combined in a 
fundamental, pre-conceptual unity. Consequently, for Eliot, as for Bradley, neither 
subjects nor objects reduce to their opposing poles in the binary. Neither term achieves 
priority over the other. Rather, each arises simultaneously out of the other. Indeed, Eliot 
makes a related point in 1914’s “Objects: Real, Unreal, Ideal, and Imaginary,” in which 
he argues that “in becoming aware that [an object] is an object, I become aware that I am 
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a subject, and its objectivity is relative to a subject” (169).50 Each term (subject and 
object) implies the other, each finds its meaning only in context of the other, and at the 
moment of immediate experience, each exists only in simultaneous union with the other.  
For Eliot, Bradley’s model of immediate experience remains distinct from all 
other contemporary models of the subject/object relation (16). In contrast to Bergson (for 
example), Bradley does not oppose the internal to the external, or privilege the internal as 
the authentic site of knowledge, nor does he posit the existence of a reality in which 
distinct, static objects exist as entities in and for themselves. As Eliot reads him, Bradley 
resists the notion of a concrete, external reality which individuals passively perceive (as a 
camera might). Immediate experience is not an experience of the objective world in itself, 
nor the experience of an inner self understood as some authentic self-contained, self-
authorizing essence. Immediate experience “is not ‘sense-data’ or sensations,” Eliot 
claims, nor is it a “stream of feeling which, as merely felt, is an attribute of the subject 
side only and must in some way be ‘related’ to the external world” (16). Yet at the same 
time, Eliot goes on to argue that immediate experience and “ideal construction” (i.e., the 
conceptual world of meanings and relations that the mind constructs out of its 
experiences) remain essentially intertwined (18). Although immediate experience 
certainly precedes conceptual abstraction, no knowledge of the experience remains 
available unless it undergoes analytical conceptualization. As Eliot puts it, “no actual 
experience could be merely immediate, for if it were we should certainly know nothing 
                                                          
50 Written after he discovered Bradley, but before he began work on his dissertation.   
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about it,” but this means, too, that “the line between the experience, or the given, and the 
constructed can nowhere be clearly drawn” (18).  
Still, for Eliot, intellectual abstractions falsify the impressions of immediate 
experience, and the notion of subject and object (of self and other, inner and outer) 
remains always a distortion (i.e., a theory) of a more fundamental reality. “We have no 
right,” Eliot concludes, “except in the most provisional way, to speak of my experience, 
since the I is a construction out of experience, an abstraction from it; and the thats, the 
browns and hards and flats, are equally ideal constructions from experience, as ideal as 
atoms” (19). For of course, beneath the constructions lies pure experience, which in itself 
remains indivisible. Brooker rightly argues that for both Bradley and Eliot, “the world is 
one . . . reality is one, [and] that dualism always leads to self-contradiction” (Mastery 
178). Thus, experience itself proves primary, subsuming both subjects and objects. 
Consequently, Eliot (again following Bradley), affirms a model of subject/object relations 
which denies precedence to either subject or object. Not only does he dissolve the two 
terms into one another, but he argues that even when the terms gain conceptual 
distinctness they remain deeply intertwined, each dialectically dependent on the other for 
meaning. Rather than placing the terms in metaphysical opposition to one another, Eliot 
argues that each term achieves conceptual coherence only when seen in relation to the 
other. As emphasized above, the external implies the internal just as much as the internal 
implies the external.51  
                                                          
51 Brooker goes on to note that Eliot’s dissertation only “springs to life when it is understood in the context 
of the revolt against dualism” (Mastery 178).  
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What I am ultimately arguing here is that Eliot’s fascination with Bergson, his 
graduate papers, as well as his work on Bradley not only point to a sustained interest in 
the relation between the internal and the external, but to a particular view of this relation 
which remained fairly consistent over the course of a number of years. His rejection of 
Bergson, grounded partly in Kant and partly in Bradley, stems from his particular view of 
the internal/external binary which he ultimately felt to be incompatible with Bergson’s 
own. Of course, Eliot’s reliance on other philosophers’ articulations should not mark him 
as a derivative thinker. As others note, his views also developed out of his own 
dispositional epistemological skepticism. Robert Langbaum, for instance, claims that 
“Bradley confirmed for Eliot a view of the self he had [probably] already arrived at on his 
own” (108). William Skaff makes a similar point when he argues, too, that Eliot found in 
Bradley’s work “philosophical confirmation of his suspicion that not only religious 
doctrines but also scientific theories must depend simply upon faith for endorsement 
when they make ultimate assertions about the nature of reality”—assertions that imply a 
certain understanding of the relation between subjects and objects as well as a certain 
view about the objective validity of truth propositions (16). Eliot, then, was already 
inclined towards the Bradleyan view prior to his exposure to Bradley, although his 
absorption in Bradley (and others, such as Kant) no doubt helped clarify his thinking. Of 
course, as I will argue below, this view of the relation between interiority and exteriority 
informs not only his philosophical speculations but his intellectual endeavors as a poet, a 
critic, and a social theorist as well. Indeed, Eliot’s reading of late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century anthropology and early social theory also reflects this theme in his 
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work, particularly in that his views on the social sciences develops in part out of his 
philosophical positions.52           
 
Eliot and Social Theory  
During a nearly ten year period between 1916 (while still working on his 
dissertation) and 1924, Eliot wrote a large number of reviews of various social science 
works, ranging from Stanley Cook’s The Study of Religions in 1917, to Durkheim’s The 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life in 1916, to W.O.E. Oesterley’s The Sacred Dance: A 
Study in Comparative Folklore in 1923, and to W.J. Perry’s The Growth of a Civilization 
in 1924. These articles appeared in a variety of journals, such as The International 
Journal of Ethics, The Monist, and The New Statesman, among others, and reveal not 
only Eliot’s competence as a reviewer (i.e., his grasp of the material under review, as 
well as an understanding of the wider critical conversation within which these writers 
work), but a particular viewpoint which orients his responses and sharpens his 
commentary.  
In his 1917 review of Cook’s The Study of Religions, for example, Eliot praises 
Cook’s interpretive restraint, his disinclination to engage in over-speculative totalizing 
theorizations regarding the nature, purpose, and socio-cultural evolution of religion. “Mr. 
Cook warns very wisely,” Eliot remarks, “against arguing from the part to the whole, 
against constructing a hypothetical system into which every [persisting religious practice 
                                                          
52 Brooker correctly argues that “Eliot’s PhD dissertation on Bradley’s epistemology helps to clarify the 
intellectual framework for most of his other writings, even those completed before he began his 
dissertation” (Mastery 17). 
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and form] must fit” (562). In contrast, in 1916, in his review of Wilhelm Wundt’s 
Elements of Folk Psychology: Outlines of a Psychological History of the Development of 
Mankind,” Eliot critiques Wundt’s subordination of fact to interpretation, his tendency to 
arrange data to fit a preconceived interpretive model. “For Wundt,” Eliot suggests, “the 
conception of humanity appears to be in reality only a way of rounding up the various 
societies which he discusses”—that is, only a means for arranging his data (508). As Eliot 
reads him, Wundt focuses only on the “external features of development” and ignores 
social and cultural experience as felt from the inside (508). In so doing, Eliot argues, 
Wundt incompletely represents the very phenomena he seeks to explicate.  
In both of these examples, Eliot reveals a distrust for theory and systems. Indeed, 
in his 1916 Monist review of Durkheim’s Elementary Forms, Eliot comments that 
Durkheim’s anthropological theory, in contrast with his contemporaries, “is the best 
because it is the nearest thing to being no theory at all” (670). For Eliot, even at its best, 
theory misrepresents or in some sense always distorts what it purports to explain.53 Even 
eight years later, in a 1924 review of W.J. Perry’s The Growth of a Civilization, Eliot 
remains sensitive to the way in which Perry orders his “material into a single edifice” 
(536).54 What Eliot rejects is the notion of system-building itself, as if intellectual 
constructs could transparently correspond to an ontologically grounded, self-sustaining, 
self-contained external reality (i.e., disconnected from any observer).  
                                                          
53 As Perl notes, for Eliot, the “philosopher’s vice is linguistic: the typical theorist is ‘deceived by his own 
metaphors.’ He treats verbal abstractions . . . and figures of speech . . . as though they referred to objective 
phenomena” (71).  
54 Admittedly, in this article, Eliot seems less critical of Perry’s system-building than in the early articles. In 
fact, he seems intrigued by Perry’s hypothesis that all world civilizations stemmed from Egypt. 
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This sensitivity to and suspicion of schemas in part stems from Eliot’s graduate 
work in philosophy. His critique of over-simplistic renderings of subject/object relations 
(as discussed above) implies a general critique of the project of objectification itself, and 
suggests the need for “epistemological humility,” as Donald Childs puts it in his 
reflections on Eliot’s dissertation (85). What are the objects of study if those objects 
remain relationally contingent and thus subjectively unstable? How does one isolate 
objects as objects and then arrange them into a sequence of ordered facts when their 
status as objects remains provisional and when the act of observation itself alters or 
distorts the objects so observed? As Eliot remarks in 1914’s graduate essay “Objects: 
Real, Unreal, Ideal, and Imaginary,” “the element in the experience which we shall credit 
to the side of the subject, and that which we may accredit to the object, remains 
undetermined and subject to indefinite revision at the hands of circumstance” (172). That 
is to say, objects retain an indeterminacy which renders systems constructed out of them 
(either via deductive or inductive means) ultimately indefinite and unstable.  
But Eliot’s suspicion of schemas stems not only from his particular 
epistemological position, but also from his extended engagement with then-contemporary 
competing anthropological systems. For in addition to his philosophical coursework of 
the period, Eliot also enrolled in Josiah Royce’s 1913/1914 seminar in “Scientific 
Methods” (or “Comparative Methodology”) at Harvard (Costello v, 189). It is in Royce’s 
seminar that Eliot first (formally) engages with late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century social theorists and anthropologists. In his most important paper from this 
seminar, “The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual,” Eliot explores the differences between 
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“definition” and “interpretation,” and the implication for this distinction for 
understanding anthropological and sociological theories regarding the origin, 
development, purpose, and nature of religion, ritual, and myth.55 Drawing heavily on this 
paper, I want to argue that Eliot utterly rejects the subject/object (or inner/outer) binary 
that anthropologists implicitly erect when constructing their (often opposed) systems. 
Indeed, I want to suggest that Eliot’s critique of the social theories he encounters centers 
precisely on what he feels to be their faulty reliance on this defunct binary. If his critique 
of Bergson, say, dwells on Bergson’s overemphasis on interiority, then his critique of 
social theorists centers on their epistemological certitude, their unquestioned faith in their 
own supposedly subjective neutral positions, and their zealous pursuit of overly simplistic 
attempts to objectify sociocultural forms and practices. Ultimately, Eliot’s work on social 
theory reveals the same pervasive concern with the relation between interiority and 
exteriority that he exhibits in his philosophical work.  
 
Fact or Interpretation?   
In his notes for Royce’s course (taken in 1913, but only published in 1963), Harry 
Costello summarizes Eliot’s core concerns as presented in his seminar paper, “The 
Interpretation of Primitive Ritual”: “In comparative religion . . . how far is it description 
and . . . how far interpretation? Can you treat religion as a form of social behavior, and 
what is behavior? Primitive mind’s interpretation of its behavior is part of its behavior 
                                                          
55 A number of critics have written on Eliot’s anthropological views, with particular reference to his work 
Josiah Royce’s seminar. See, for instance, Piers Gray’s T.S. Eliot’s Intellectual and Poetic Development 
1909-1922 (108-142); William Harmon’s “T.S. Eliot, Anthropologist and Primitive”; William Skaff’s The 
Philosophy of T.S. Eliot (59-72), and Manju Jain’s T.S. Eliot and American Philosophy (112-158). See also 
Harry Costello’s Josiah Royce’s Seminar, 1913-1914 (edited by Grover Smith).   
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and interpretation of an early behavior” (72-73). The problem for Eliot, Costello’s 
comments suggest, lies in the dialectical deadlock generated by the very act of 
objectification. “The question to be kept in mind,” Eliot reflects in his paper, “is: what 
part is fact and what part interpretation” (107). To what extent is the act of accounting for 
a set of phenomenon an objective description of the “facts,” to what extent is it an 
interpretation of those “facts,” and to what extent are the “facts” themselves a product of 
interpretation? That is to say, to what degree does the internal (i.e., point of view, 
perspective) interpose itself on the external?  
In his 1916 dissertation, Eliot argues that a fact “is a point of attention which has 
only one aspect, or which can be treated under one aspect. A fact, then, is an ideal 
construction, and has its existence within a more or less variable sphere of practical or 
scientific interest” (60). It is an idea, and ideas, as George Whiteside puts it in his 
discussion of Eliot’s dissertation, remain merely “aspects of objects” and “aspects of 
selves” (407). Similarly, in “The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual,” Eliot defines “fact” 
as “a point of attention which has only one aspect or [can be treated] under a certain 
definite aspect which places it in a system” (108). For Eliot, facts themselves remain 
contingent, constructed, relational intellectual artifacts, as dependent upon the perceiving 
mind and its concerns as upon the phenomena under consideration. Piers Gray notes that 
for Eliot, anthropological “facts” reflect “particular definitions of religion, and such 
definitions are never more than historical interpretations” grounded in individual 
perspectives (109). But this slightly overstates Eliot’s position, for he is not an idealist. 
For Eliot, objectivity and subjectivity converge; indeed, each remains rooted in the other. 
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Facts arise out of particular points of view (“attention”), grounded in a particular 
perspectival context, and yet nonetheless retain their objective status as perceived 
elements of a given reality. As he notes in his dissertation, facts “contain an internal 
judging and an external recognizing of the validity of the judgment” (60).  
Yet Eliot’s concerns in “The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual” extend beyond 
this digression on the truth-status of facts. In the paper, he enters into a discussion of the 
claims of contemporary social theorists, analyzing those claims through the lens of his 
own Bradleyan-informed epistemological skepticism. He aligns himself against earlier 
theorists such as Max Müller (1823-1900), in whose work “scientific definition is 
confused with philosophic interpretation” (106). He also rejects the views of those such 
as E.B. Tylor (1832-1917), who argues that “religion is a practical, though imperfect or 
mistaken, adaptation to environment, [a] more or less consciously rational inventing of 
theories to account for experience” (107). Tylor’s position reflects a view of ancient 
peoples that sees no essential difference between their categories of experience and 
modes of world-organization and that of Western, urbanized moderns. Earlier peoples 
sought rational explanations of the world just as do modern thinkers. Religion, ritual, 
animist spirituality, and myth each function as proto-scientific accounts of a supposedly 
purely objective, manifestly external, physical reality. Perhaps more important for Eliot’s 
immediate purposes, Tylor ascribes to pre-modern sociocultural formations certain 
motives and valuations which he infers from the “facts.” But Eliot dismisses Tylor’s 
project, and comments that Tylor merely “give[s] an hypothesis which owes its 
vraisemblance to the fact that we feel that this is what we should do were we in the 
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savage’s place” (107). It is of Tylor’s work that Eliot asks, “what part is fact and what 
part interpretation?” (107). What part objectively describes patently present phenomena 
and what part distorts that phenomena? Indeed, for Eliot, the line between these two 
positions blurs; subject and object converge. In a sense, there is only the distortion.                         
Eliot points, too, in this paper to Jane Harrison’s work on ritual, and while 
admiring her erudition, complains that for her “‘fact’ melts into interpretation, and 
interpretation into metaphysics” (113).56 While there certainly exists, he admits, “an 
external order in ritual and creed and in artistic and literary expression” (which Harrison 
traces), and while the “process” of development of this order remains intelligible, the 
“purpose” remains elusive (113). For Eliot, “‘purpose in process is simply an 
interpretation, not a description” (118). And as Eliot reads her, Harrison intends not only 
to describe process, but to impute purpose, which for Eliot remains epistemologically 
problematic. He accuses James Frazer, too, of the same intellectual error. Although he 
refers to Frazer as comparative anthropology’s “greatest master,” and although he 
believes that Frazer has “done more to make manifest the similarities and identities 
underlying the customs of races very remote in every way from each other,” he feels 
nonetheless that Frazer confuses description with interpretation. Reflecting on Frazer’s 
notion of sympathetic magic (i.e., that early peoples engaged in certain ritual activities in 
order to generate certain correlative physical effects), Eliot argues that “[n]o method, 
historical or comparative, will give results such as this. No comparison of custom will 
                                                          
56 William Skaff goes on to argue that “Eliot overlooked the theoretical impurities” in Harrison’s work, in 
order “to discover how relevant Harrison’s work was to his own preoccupations” (80).  
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give us any hint as to purpose, and purposes we cannot compare” (114). For Eliot, both 
Harrison and Frazer overextend themselves, and present a collection of “facts” distorted 
by their assumptions regarding purpose. To state it more baldly, the facts as Harrison and 
Frazer understand them exist only within the interpretive framework that Harrison and 
Frazer themselves erect. They introduce an “extraneous point of view,” as Skaff puts it, 
which imposes a constructed, artificial order on perceived cultural events (85).57 Again, 
the objective and subjective (the external and the internal) overlap, but here in a way that 
almost exclusively privileges the subjective.       
 However, Eliot goes on to complicate his own position here. Significantly, for 
Eliot, objective truth (i.e., individuals’ perception of externalized social or physical 
reality as it supposedly exists in itself) does in a sense exist, but not in the way Frazer, 
Harrison, Tylor or Müller would affirm. That is, despite questioning the truth-status of 
facts, despite asking to what extent “facts” can exist apart from individuals’ 
interpretations (or constructions) of them,58 Eliot nonetheless affirms that interpretations 
themselves possess the capacity to reveal certain kinds of truth. Again reflecting on Tylor 
and Müller, Eliot comments that he would “not . . . go so far as to say crassly that they 
are wrong” (108). Within the contexts of their formulations and assumptions, they indeed 
convey a particular version of truth—a perspective. But for Eliot, developments in social 
                                                          
57 As Eliot argues in 1914’s “The Validity of Artificial Distinction,” “when a philosopher pretends to 
emerge with some ‘positive result’ which can be formulated, which declares triumphantly that reality is this 
or that . . . then the philosopher is simply pulling out of his pocket what he put there himself” (191, 
emphasis added). 
58 In “The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual,” Eliot asks, “when have I a fact, or rather a type of fact, which 
can be sufficiently abstracted from (1) my individual (or irrelevant) interpretation of it and from (2) other 
types into which it may melt and elude me” (108). 
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theory are not “simply [movements] from error to truth,” but rather “a progress in the 
statement of the problem” (i.e., a shift in perspective) (109). “What seemed to one 
generation fact,” Eliot maintains, “is from the point of view of the next a rejected 
interpretation” (109). If others now see Tylor and Müller as “wrong,” it is not, as Gray 
points out, “because they are internally inconsistent, but because they follow from 
assumptions that can no longer be shared” (119-120). Facts depend upon subjective 
assumptions, and proof, as Eliot puts it, “can only be proof in relation to [those] 
assumptions” (109). As he puts it his paper “Description and Explanation” (also written 
for Royce’s seminar), “[a]ny stage of explanation, I believe, depends upon the 
maintenance of a particular point of view” (123). Thus, no interpretive explanation is 
“wholly true,” but neither is it “wholly wrong” (123). Explanations of the external world, 
while dependent upon internal idiosyncratic perspectives, assumptions, and frameworks, 
nonetheless do provide some sense of the reality of that external world. While the 
objective world remains in some sense a construct, it also retains its externality. As 
argued above, for Eliot, the external never fully reduces to the internal, nor the internal to 
the external. Rather, the two continue to exist in mutual, generative, dialectical tension.    
Thus, in rejecting the positions and methodologies of early sociologists like 
Müller and Tylor, as well as contemporary theorists such as Frazer and Harrison, Eliot (I 
argue) rejects a particular way of viewing the relationship between subjects and objects, 
the internal and the external. In his dissertation, Eliot remarks that “[t]heories of 
knowledge usually assume that there is one consistent real world, in which everything is 
real and equally real, and that it is our business to find it” (136). Such theories posit a 
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subject over against an object, pits the knower against the known. But, as Eliot puts it in 
his April, 1913 essay, “Report on the Relation of Kant’s Criticism to Agnosticism,” “If 
you contemplate knower and known from the outside, what you find is not simply 
knower and known, but a peculiar complex of existents, and knowledge fades into 
ontology” (44). The anthropologist’s error, like the overconfident epistemologist’s, 
involves the inability to perceive to what degree objective knowledge remains 
intertwined with particular subjective points of view. Seen “from the outside” (i.e., 
outside the knowledge framework in question), the knower and the known converge. 
Conceptual distinctions, objects of knowledge, causal relations arise only within the 
context of a particular perspective delineated within the suppositional constraints of a 
particular theoretical proposal.  
Eliot’s problem, then, with thinkers such as Harrison and Frazer (and the Tylorian 
cultural evolutionary school from which they ultimately descend), lies both in their 
methodology and in their conclusions. These thinkers (for Eliot) assume the existence of 
a set of sociocultural “facts,” which they can arrange into a sensible order which will then 
reveal the “truth” of a given social practice. As in Frazer, they assume a notion of 
universal cognition, where the same motivations and categories of experience guide both 
modern and pre-modern peoples, the difference between the two groups lying in the fact 
that moderns have attained their degree of apparent sophistication by improving on the 
“errors” of their predecessors. Eliot discounts such claims to knowledge, discounts any 
claim to know the intended originary inner purpose of an ancient ritual or religious 
practice.  
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Indeed, for Eliot, a theory cannot rest on an imputation of purpose, because 
purposes themselves as purposes (i.e., as the psychological motivation underlying a 
particular action) are already interpretations of the action they supposedly determine. 
That is to say, an individual’s purpose when engaging in an activity is itself already an 
interpretation of that activity. As Skaff puts it, “no interpretation of a ritual can ever 
account for its origin, because even the meaning that the participants may ascribe to their 
actions is in itself an interpretation” (85). Rather than psychological explanations of a 
given action, purposes prove to be historically contingent interpretations of those actions 
by the actors themselves. Eliot quotes Irving King here to clarify his point: “the 
interpretations by the people themselves are not of direct psychological value. They are 
facts, also, as we said above, that need explanation” (111, emphasis in original).59 So to 
explain an external action by an internal purpose explains nothing at all, for the internal 
purpose itself remains already an interpretation of the external action. As late as 1926, in 
a review of Charlotte Eliot’s “Savonarola,” Eliot reiterates this point, and argues that “the 
meaning of [a] series of acts is to the performers themselves an interpretation; the same 
ritual remaining practically unchanged may assume different meanings for different 
generations of performers; and the rite may even have originated before ‘meaning’ meant 
anything at all” (771-72). Thus, for anthropologists to attempt to affix some definitive 
                                                          
59 Years later, in 1923’s “The Beating of a Drum,” Eliot makes a similar point: “It is equally possible to 
assert that primitive man acted in a certain way and then found a reason for it. An unoccupied person, 
finding a drum, may be seized with a desire to beat it; but unless he is an imbecile he will be unable to 
continue beating it, and thereby satisfying a need . . . without finding a reason for so doing. The reason may 
be the long continued drought. The next generation or the next civilization will find a more plausible reason 
for beating a drum” (474).  
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explanation to a set of religious practices remains at best reductive and at worst delusive. 
It is to falsely subordinate the objective to the subjective, or the external to the internal.  
 
Eliot’s Critique of Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl 
In the “The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual,” Eliot clearly rejects the 
epistemological reductionism of the cultural evolutionists. However, not all 
anthropologists of the period were evolutionists. Some, such as Lévy-Bruhl and 
Durkheim rely on an alternate set of methodological strategies and theoretical 
presuppositions, which privilege the external (e.g., concrete social forms, cultural rituals) 
far more than the internal (e.g., projected or inferred inner purposes), and which 
accordingly require from Eliot a different mode of critique. Indeed, Eliot’s treatment of 
both these theorists remains more sympathetic than his treatment of the evolutionists, 
largely because of their increased focus on the external, and thus on “description” rather 
than “interpretation.” That is to say, as Eliot reads them, both Lévy-Bruhl and Durkheim 
refuse to reduce the (cultural, existential, social, metaphysical) gap between the present 
and the past or between one group of individuals and another. Consequently, they limit 
themselves more to describing social formations and practices rather than (strictly 
speaking) interpreting them.  
For example, although Eliot admits that he feels Lévy-Bruhl “draw[s] the 
distinction between primitive and civilised mental processes altogether too clearly” and 
that Lévy-Bruhl does not “make a long enough excursion into the theory of knowledge to 
question the ultimate adequacy of explanation altogether,” he nonetheless affirms Lévy-
Bruhl’s essential claim that some substantive gap separates the “primitive” from the 
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modern mind (110). Following Lévy-Bruhl, Eliot discounts any attempt to point to the 
modern mind (and its valuations and motivations) as a model by which to understand pre-
modern social and religious practices (110). Such attempts “involve a quite crude notion 
of causality and a very defective theory of knowledge,” Eliot claims, since (as Lévy-
Bruhl argues) no “uniformity of mind” exists by which to make this comparison (108). 
Modern and pre-modern peoples remain differently situated, their perspectives 
fundamentally incommensurate with one another. The difference remains “one not of 
degree but of kind,” as Manju Jain argues in his discussion of Royce’s seminar (122). 
The explanation one group may offer for a set of behaviors will not necessarily 
correspond with the explanation another group provides. As Eliot notes in his 1916 New 
Statesman review of Clement Webb’s Group Theories of Religion and the Individual, for 
Lévy-Bruhl, the “mind of the savage is not a different type; it is merely a mind . . . 
‘differently oriented’” (417). Indeed, even within the same group of natives, as Eliot 
notes in his review of “Savonarola,” variant explanations of cultural behavior often 
emerge over time, further complicating the interpretive process.  
Accordingly, Eliot found Lévy-Bruhl useful for helping to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of contemporary anthropological theorizations regarding the purpose of 
ancient religious ritual practices. The existence of multiple cultural perspectives on and 
interpretations of a given set of practices prohibits the over-simplistic explanations of 
these practices offered by theorists such as Frazer or Harrison. Nevertheless, he 
ultimately criticizes Lévy-Bruhl for inadvertently falling into the same trap of 
interpretation that entangles his opponents, a point Piers Gray makes as well (121-22). In 
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a footnote to his review of “Savonarola,” Eliot notes that Lévy-Bruhl “seems to me to fall 
into the same difficulty [as his opponents]. . . . He invents an elaborate ‘prelogism’ to 
account for the savage’s identification of himself with his totem, where it is not certain 
that the savage, except so far as he had mental processes similar to our own, had any 
mental process at all” (775). That is to say, almost despite himself, Lévy-Bruhl attempts 
to construct an explanatory theory to account for certain sociocultural practices, a 
theoretical intervention which Eliot of course rejects.  
While Eliot maintains certain reservations concerning Lévy-Bruhl’s views, he 
seems far more approving of Durkheim’s. Indeed, Jain rightly observes that Eliot 
dedicates the “central part” of “The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual” to Durkheim, 
rendering him the pivotal figure in his argument (123). As Eliot reads him, Durkheim 
refuses the typical interpretive errors characteristic of Lévy-Bruhl, Frazer, Harrison, etc., 
in large part by remaining sensitive to the degree to which the internal itself proves 
capable of objectification. That is to say, for Durkheim, individual purposes (whatever 
they might be) matter much less than the objectively external “collective representations” 
that necessarily inform those purposes. For Durkheim, Eliot argues, social forms exercise 
a constraining power over the individuals subjected to those forms. As such, to an extent, 
the inner lives of individuals within a given social group remain determined by the social 
practices and “collective representations” characteristic of that group. As Skaff notes in 
his discussion of Eliot and Durkheim, “[b]ecause our consciousness actually consists of 
[these] collective representations, they determine the very nature of our world” (60).  
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In this sense, the external exerts a determining force over the internal; it shapes, 
directs, and informs it. Because the internal here relies upon the external for its form and 
meaning, Eliot argues that it obtains an objective quality. It becomes, he affirms, a “social 
fact.”60 For both Durkheim and Eliot, these “facts” entail “the ways of acting, thinking, 
and feeling, external to the individual, which are endowed with a power of coercion by 
virtue of which they impose themselves upon the individual” (Eliot, “Interpretation” 
117).61 The external, that is, obtains a certain priority over the internal, exerts a 
determining influence on it. As these “facts” retain a satisfactory degree of objectivity, 
they become suitable data out of which anthropologists, then, can construct (less 
questionable) theories of the development of social forms and practices. As Eliot puts it, 
Durkheim “believes, in short, that the ‘facts’ of the social life obtain sufficient clearness 
and precision to be traced historically, and joined logically, without the interpolation at 
any time of [idiosyncratic] facts from the life of the individual” (110). Description 
supersedes inventive interpretation; facts replace speculation. Indeed, Perl points out that 
Eliot ultimately endorses a model of “dense description” that somewhat “resemble[s] the 
‘thick description’” later popularized by the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz 
(78).  
Still, Eliot expresses certain hesitations over Durkheim as well, and confesses his 
dissatisfaction with any treatment of religion (such as Durkheim’s) which defines it 
                                                          
60 Translating Durkheim, Eliot notes, “Any mode of action . . . fixed or not, which is susceptible of 
exercising on the individual an exterior constraint, is a social fact” (111).   
61 Eliot provides this quotation in the original French: “des manières d’agir, de penser et de sentir, 
extérieures à l’idividu, et qui sont douées d’un pouvoir de coercition en vertu duquel ils s’imposent à lui” 
(110). The editors of the Complete Prose provide the translation to this passage in their notes for Eliot’s 
essay.   
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“wholly . . . by external impression” (i.e., as merely mechanical “social behavior”) (111). 
Internal meanings continue to exist for individuals and provide the immediate 
experiential motivations for their actions, even if social scientists neglect such inner 
purposes. As Eliot argues, a complete description of a social phenomenon would 
necessarily include a description of its “inner meaning” in addition to its external form; it 
would recognize the ultimate inseparability of belief and behavior (112). Behavior alone, 
Eliot asserts, “is only a half-way stage,” for “[w]hat is a religious phenomenon,” he asks, 
“which has not a religious meaning for the participants?” (112). Meaning matters, Eliot 
affirms, even if that meaning remains inaccessible to scientific investigation; and it 
matters because the meanings individuals ascribe to their actions themselves function as 
facts in the context of a comprehensive description of a given social practice. “We must 
treat the subject in terms of social behavior,” Eliot exclaims, yet must also remain 
suspicious of descriptions which ignore inner experience (112). But for Eliot, that 
includes every contemporary description of religious practice. No “definition of religious 
behavior can be satisfactory,” he suggests, because such definitions remain merely 
externalized descriptions, and thus misrepresent the totality of the phenomenon they seek 
to define (115). For Eliot here, “meaning . . . hovers between the social and the 
individual,” between the external and the internal (112). Each implies the other, exerts a 
force on the other. From a certain point of view, the internal exists only as an expression 
of external forces. And yet the internal maintains its own vitality, its own determining 
“imaginative and emotive element[s]” (115). Thus, Eliot’s critique of Durkheim 
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ultimately aligns with his critique of the cultural evolutionists. Both neglect to 
acknowledge the complex dialectical interplay between the external and the internal.  
As Eliot reads them (I argue), anthropologists such as Frazer, Harrison, and to an 
extent Lévy-Bruhl place too much emphasis on the internal, inventing purposes that may 
or may not exist, and ignoring, too, the way purposes evolve over time and remain 
contextually dependent. Others (like Durkheim) overemphasize the external at the 
expense of the internal, utterly subsuming the one into the other.62 And while Eliot 
roughly aligns himself with Durkheim, he does so primarily because his “method has the 
singular merit of putting us on guard against itself” (115). As noted above, Eliot finds 
Durkheim’s theory the “best because it is the nearest to being no theory at all,” in that it 
attempts to limit itself to clearly observable social phenomena. Both Eliot and Durkheim 
prefer “social facts” to speculation, and interpretive restraint to invention. Both thinkers, 
too, place the internal and the external in tension with one another, and each affirms how 
impersonal social forces permeate human consciousness (despite Eliot’s sense that 
Durkheim overstates the dominance of the external). 
But Eliot resists Durkheim only to the extent that he feels that internal experience 
(i.e., individuals’ own experiential self-understanding of their behavior) should as far as 
possible enter into an objective description of that behavior. “Social facts” should not 
only consist of the ideological “collective consciousness” of a given group (which 
determines behavior), but should also include the phenomenological perspective of the 
                                                          
62 As Eliot comments in his second review of Webb’s Group Theories of Religion and the Individual (also 
1916), “Durkheim talks far too much about ‘society’; everything is ascribed to its influence” (431). 
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believing, practicing individual within the group. Again, for Eliot, meaning matters, for 
in emphasizing meaning, Eliot also emphasizes the connection between behavior and 
belief, between external determinates and the conditioned consciousness itself. That is to 
say, Eliot endorses Durkheim’s methodology, his desire to understand social behavior in 
terms of collective modes of thought and experience. But he goes further than Durkheim, 
and argues that a full description of a given social practice also necessitates a description 
of individuals’ interpretations of their own actions. Behavior and belief interpenetrate one 
another; conditioned behavior roots itself in conditioned selves who nonetheless find 
meaning in their collective behavior.  
Eliot’s position here remains remarkably consistent over the course of his career. 
For example, decades later, in Notes toward a Definition of Culture (1948), he makes the 
Durkheimian argument that “the culture of the individual cannot be isolated from that of 
the group, and that the culture of the group cannot be abstracted from that of the whole 
society” (96). Individuals remains inseparable from the group collective. Their sense of 
self (manifested through their behavior) remains informed by the values, perspectives, 
and ideological horizons of the groups to which they belong. Indeed, Eliot suggests that 
culture, which “includes all the characteristic activities and interests of a people,” utterly 
permeates individual consciousness (103-04).63 It constitutes individuals’ “whole way of 
life . . . from birth to the grave, from morning to night and even in sleep” (103, emphasis 
in original). Skaff argues rightly when he suggests that “Eliot’s contention in his later 
                                                          
63 Eliot goes on to provide an interesting list of these “characteristic activities and interests”: “Derby Day 
Henley Regatta, Cowes, the twelfth of August, a cup final, the dog races, the pin table, the dart board, 
Wensleydale cheese, boiled cabbage cut into sections, beetroot in vinegar, nineteenth century Gothic 
churches and the music of Elgar” (104).   
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writings that society should by nature embody the religion of its people unconsciously, 
beyond any deliberate and over religious profession or observance, is an application of 
Durkheim’s concept of the collective conscience” (61-62). The external thoroughly 
informs the internal, even as the internal expresses itself in the external. Easy binary 
distinctions cease to have meaning, as the line between the two polarities blurs. 
“[B]ehavior,” as Eliot goes on to argue, “is also belief, and . . . even the most conscious 
and developed of us live also at the level on which belief and behavior cannot be 
distinguished” (104).  
Furthermore, Eliot emphasizes in Notes the essential impersonality of personal 
behavior, since it remains externally grounded in culture (i.e., in group and collective 
consciousness). Social practices, mental categories, and ideological presuppositions form 
the framework that underpins individual action and belief. As Eliot puts it, culture “can 
never be wholly conscious—there is always more to it than we are conscious of; and it 
cannot be planned because it is also the unconscious background of all our planning” 
(170). It constitutes the horizon of possible meanings for individuals embedded within a 
particular cultural context. It delimits identities and individuals’ subjective experience of 
their worlds. Yet again, Eliot demonstrates his ongoing debt to Durkheim. But he also 
emphasizes the way in which individuals experience these impersonal forces as 
personally self-constitutive. Behavior is belief, Eliot affirms; it is that which individuals 
experience as most intimately their own. “[T]o understand the culture,” he argues, “is to 
understand the people,” because culture, he claims, “is lived” (113, emphasis in original).  
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Thus, again, as in his philosophical thought, Eliot offers a model of the 
relationship between interiority and exteriority that evades the simplistic reduction of 
either term to the other. His emphasis remains on the constructive tension between the 
two terms, and on the insufficiency of either viewed in isolation from the other when 
attempting to provide a comprehensive description of sociocultural phenomena. Taken 
together, Eliot’s philosophical speculations (i.e., his Bradleyan epistemology) and his 
social sciences critique point directly to a specific notion of human subjectivity which 
Eliot goes on to dramatize in his poetry and drama. To affirm with Bradley that the “self . 
. . seems to depend upon a world which in turn depends upon it, and [that] nowhere . . . 
can we find anything original or ultimate” is to affirm a deeply dialectical notion of the 
self (Knowledge and Experience 146). And to view individuals as constitutively cultural 
creatures who nevertheless “live” their cultural embeddedness as an intimate extension of 
their subjective experience is also to affirm a notion of the self in which the self “depends 
upon a world which in turn depends upon it.” For Eliot, behavior without belief remains a 
meaningless description of external phenomenon. The meaning of the external depends 
upon the meaning attributed to it by the internal, deliberating consciousness. The two 
remain inextricably, dialectical, constitutively interlinked.  
Of course, Eliot turned away from formal philosophical and sociological inquiry 
in order to pursue his literary interests. As a poet and critic, Eliot immersed himself 
deeply in the work of his literary precursors, redefining the canon according to his own 
criteria in reviews and essays that span the breadth of his career. But in the same way that 
his work in philosophy and anthropology/sociology remained consistently informed by an 
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underlying, evidentially preexistent interest in the relation between interiority and 
exteriority, so, too, his literary views remained informed by this interest as well. To 
understand Eliot as a poet means to understand him not only as a philosopher and social 
theorist, but also as a critic. And to better understand the particular way in which Eliot 
dramatizes human subjectivity in his poetry requires understanding how he views the 
representation of subjectivity in the work of his literary predecessors.    
 
Eliot on the Nineteenth-Century Literary Tradition 
Eliot famously repudiated his Victorian and Romantic forebears in much of his 
early critical writing. Regarding Swinburne, for example, Eliot again and again 
comments on the ornate excessiveness of language found in his poetry. In 1918’s 
“Euripides and Professor Murray,” for instance, Eliot comments on the “fluid haze” of 
Swinburne’s work (48), an assessment he reiterates in 1922’s “John Dryden,” in which he 
comments that Swinburne uses “words [that] are all suggestions and no denotation” 
(273). In “Swinburne as Poet” (1920), Eliot again reflects on the “amazing number of 
words” Swinburne employs, and argues that his language (and the emotions that that 
language intends to dramatize) remains excessively “diffuse” (282). For Swinburne, he 
continues, “meaning is merely the hallucination of meaning, because language, uprooted, 
has adapted itself to an independent life of atmospheric nourishment” (285). That is to 
say, for Eliot, Swinburne’s work lacks specificity, clarity, or particularity. His language 
remains overly suggestive (“diffuse”), at the expense of concrete meaning or determinant 
reference. Swinburne’s poetry appears overindulgent, absorbed in the intricacies of its 
own locutions and linguistic elaborations. Atmosphere triumphs over precision.  
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 Around the same time that Eliot develops these critiques of Swinburne, he offers a 
similar analysis of Blake. In 1920’s “William Blake,” Eliot admits that Blake possessed a 
“capacity for considerable understanding of human nature,” and that he exhibited a 
“remarkable and original sense of language and the music of language” (279). But these 
capacities came, too, with the more questionable “gift of hallucinated vision” (279). Had 
Blake’s strengths, Eliot argues, “been controlled by a respect for impersonal reason, for 
common sense, for the objectivity of science, it would have been better for him” (279). 
What Blake “required” (yet “lacked”), Eliot felt, “was a framework of accepted and 
traditional ideas which would have prevented him from indulging in a philosophy of his 
own, and concentrated his attention upon the problems of the poet” (279-80). As with 
Swinburne, Blake’s work appears indulgent, self-entranced, excessively captivated by its 
own revelatory vision. It lacks grounding within a wider (literary) tradition. And it 
requires connection to that tradition in order to acquire greater cultural relevancy as well 
as aesthetic and conceptual coherency. Indeed, Eliot goes on to note, the same 
“[c]onfusion of thought, emotion, and vision” that Blake’s work exhibits “is what we 
[also] find in such a work as [Nietzsche’s] Also Sprach Zarathrustra” (280). Both authors 
lack a “framework” that can provide conceptual (and emotional) order to their systems, 
and consequently, both authors produce work that remains eccentric, unintegrated, or 
disconnected from contemporary cultural currents. 
 In both of these instances (i.e., in his comments on Swinburne and on Blake), 
Eliot affirms the importance of specificity in language and the necessity of tempering 
poetic vision by contextually relating that vision to a preexisting, comprehensive 
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(literary, philosophical, and religious) cultural tradition. As Eliot reads him, Swinburne 
privileges inexact, effusive, atmospheric language over concrete signification in his texts. 
Similarly, Blake’s inventive imaginings outpaces his capacity to meaningfully 
communicate them or the ideas they signify, since he refuses to ground them within any 
wider tradition (which would lend them resonance and greater intelligibility). For Eliot, 
then, Swinburne’s “hallucination of meaning” and Blake’s “hallucinated vision” both 
signify excesses on the part of the authors which ultimately mars their work, no matter 
their native talents. They each exhibit an idiosyncratic aesthetic grounded in the 
inarticulate privacy of personal vision. Each, that is, overemphasizes the internal at the 
expense of the external; each privileges the individual over relational interconnections 
with others.  
 Indeed, Eliot’s core critique of the romantics and their Victorian heirs centers 
precisely on what he feels is their overemphasis on internal states and elevation of a 
notion of the subject that posits individuals as self-contained, self-sustaining concrete 
unities—what he calls in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” the “metaphysical theory 
of the substantial unity of the soul” (42).64 Carol Christ rightly notes that Eliot believes 
that the “emphasis which Romanticism places upon the individual imagination alienates 
the writer from tradition,” but this is because for Eliot it suggests a false model of 
selfhood (8). And as he make abundantly clear in his graduate work, Eliot disputes any 
metaphysical theory that asserts a monadic understanding of human subjectivity. For 
                                                          
64 In T.S. Eliot’s Romantic Dilemma, Eugenia M. Gunner argues that Eliot, following Irving Babbitt views 
romanticism as the “historical origin of the modern world’s spiritual decadence and disorientation” (23). 
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Eliot, as discussed above, the “self” is a construct (not a substance in itself), and emerges 
only in the encounter with other selves as well as with the objects it posits in the world. 
As he argues in his dissertation, “the self depends . . . upon other selves; it is not given as 
a direct experience, but is an interpretation of experience by interaction with other selves” 
(146). The romantic Platonizes the self, elevates it such that it becomes a thing-in-itself, 
an object in the world, yet somehow transcending that world. And in fetishizing the self, 
the romantic fetishizes the self’s inner experiences, either overemphasizing feeling at the 
expense of the intellect or the intellect at the expense of feeling. As he suggests in his 
“Syllabus of a Course of Six Lectures on Modern French Literature” (1916), 
“Romanticism stands for excess in any direction. It splits up into two directions: escape 
from the world of fact, and devotion to brute fact” (471, emphasis in original). 
Perhaps under the influence of Babbitt, Eliot points to Jean Jacques Rousseau as 
the paradigmatic figure here, the progenitor of all romantic excess. In the same lecture 
notes in which he defines romanticism, he also suggests that the “germs of all these 
[romantic] tendencies are found in Rousseau” (471). Rousseau, Eliot goes on to claim, 
privileged “the personal and individual above the typical,” emphasized “feeling rather 
than thought,” and stressed “Humanitarianism: [i.e.,] belief in the fundamental goodness 
of human nature.” He deprioritized “form in art” in favor of the “glorification of 
spontaneity,” and his “great faults” included “[i]ntense egotism” and “[i]nsincerity” 
(471). And he concludes that the “two great currents of the nineteenth century—vague 
emotionalism and the apotheosis of science (realism) alike spring from Rousseau” (471). 
That is to say, for Eliot, Rousseau marks the advent of an obsession with a flawed notion 
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of the self, grounded in an uncritical overemphasis on interiority and idiosyncratic 
subjective experience. As Eliot reads him, Rousseau posits a concrete, substantive self 
whose essential “fundamental goodness” validates that self’s inner experience of itself. 
This notion of the self leads to a kind of narcissistic “egotism” in which feeling as such 
triumphs over the intellect and originality triumphs over inherited traditional social (or 
aesthetic) forms. In the end, mood trumps precision (in language or thought) and 
“spontaneity” trumps tradition. And of course, these twin complaints form the basis of 
Eliot’s assessment of Swinburne and Blake. His critique of both figures stems from the 
condemnation of excess which he extends to all the romantics and their (supposed) 
Victorian imitators. Swinburne’s inarticulate effusions and Blake’s inventive speculations 
exemplify the “vague emotionalism” and “glorification of spontaneity” he ultimately 
roots in Rousseau.  
Significantly, Eliot’s critique of the vague and imprecise language, excessive 
emotionalism, and idiosyncratic originality of romantic and Victorian writers corresponds 
precisely with many of the philosophical critiques he was making during this same period 
(i.e., 1914-1920). His reflections as a critic, that is, echo his concerns with description, 
precision, coherency, and contextuality that he also expresses in his philosophical work. 
For example, again and again, Eliot (as seen in his Harvard and Oxford papers) condemns 
the inexact or confused thinking of his intellectual contemporaries. As observed above, in 
his graduate work, he condemns Frazer and Harrison for their speculative confusions 
(i.e., that they impute purposes to events without valid cause). Around the same time, in 
1914’s “The Relationship between Politics and Metaphysics,” he criticizes William 
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James’ work by suggesting that his “philosophical writings constitute an emotional 
attitude more than a body of dogma” (90). And in the same paper, he goes on to denigrate 
the supposedly intellectually rigorous “neo-realistic movement” as nothing more than a 
“spontaneous outburst of feeling, a song without words” (90). And of course, his entire 
critique of Bergson (as delineated in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism”) rests on his 
contention that Bergson’s philosophy remains intellectually confused, and that whatever 
power it possesses derives from the emotional “seductiveness” of Bergson’s prose style 
(“Relationship” 99). Indeed, in his 1916 New Statesmen review of Webb’s Group 
Theories, he goes so far as to complain that “Bergsonism” has become a kind of 
contemporary intellectual “infection,” an infection he then specifically goes on to align in 
the review with “romanticism” (417).  
Moreover, Eliot repeatedly emphasizes in his Harvard work the extent to which 
meaning and coherency depend precisely on the contexts within which such concepts 
operate. Sociocultural theories, for example, depend upon the particular framework 
theorists construct in order to make sense of the phenomena they perceive. As discussed 
above, sociologists’ view of social reality remains dependent upon their own individual 
point of view. Their particular perspective informs the meaning they perceive in the 
social practices they observe. As Jeffrey Perl puts it, “what [the theorist] does not see is 
that . . . knowledge of truth and reality is available only in the context from which [the 
theorist] has plucked those terms and within which they have their meaning” (70). Recall 
here Eliot’s claim in 1914’s “The Validity of Artificial Distinctions” that when the 
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philosopher (or anthropologist) constructs a theory to explain a particular phenomenon, 
she or he is “simply pulling out of his pocket what he put there himself” (191).  
Still, as also suggested earlier, for Eliot, these individual theories come together to 
collectively contribute to a greater sense of the truth of an event or social practice (as 
contexts and perspectives proliferate). Stronger descriptions result from an accumulation 
of points of view, and events themselves accrue meaning only within the context of set of 
perspectives. For instance, in “Finite Centres and Points of View” (also 1914), Eliot 
argues that “it is only in a world of social intercourse that objects can come into being 
and maintain their existence” (174). The objects of study, he claims, remain “in a sense 
essentially public” (174). “On the one hand,” he suggests, the object of attention “seems 
to be merely the converging of various points of view, and on the other, the points of 
view seem to be nothing but differently coloured sectors of the same object” (174). 
Objects (like the self) exist within a relational and perspectival totality. For an individual 
to offer her or his isolated view of an object as the only (true) view is thus to misrepresent 
or distort the object of perception. Indeed, all views, for Eliot, prove provisional and 
subject to constant revision; they remain ad hoc constructions operative only within 
particular conceptual, perspectival frameworks. Thus to critique Swinburne and Blake for 
idiosyncratic excesses, for operating outside of normative literary culture (as with Blake) 
or for developing an ornate, unrestrained, atmospheric, and conceptually imprecise verse 
style (as with Swinburne), is for Eliot to extend his philosophical project into literary 
criticism.  
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Indeed, Eliot’s most famous critical statement, in “Tradition and the Individual 
Talent” (1919), exactly echoes his philosophical views regarding relational contextuality, 
a point Jewel Spears Brooker makes as well (Mastery 182-83).65 “No poet, no artist of 
any art,” Eliot argues, “has his complete meaning alone. His significance, his 
appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists” (38). The part 
remains an aspect of the whole, derives its meaning from its relation to the “ideal order” 
to which it inextricably belongs (38). The “existing monuments” of the tradition provide 
the generative matrix out of which the artist’s particular vision emerges and against 
which posterity measures her or his contributions. As Eliot puts it, “[y]ou cannot value 
[the artist] alone; you must set him, for contrast and comparison, among the dead” (38). 
And yet, significantly, Eliot goes on to argue that the relation between poet and the 
preexisting “ideal order” remains profoundly dialectical. The artist, that is, affects the 
existing tradition inasmuch as the tradition necessarily informs the artist: “The necessity 
that he shall conform, that he shall cohere, is not onesided; what happens when a new 
work of art is created is something that happens simultaneously to all the works of art 
which preceded it” (38). Each depends upon the other for meaning; each possesses 
meaning, that is, only within the terms of its relation to the other. Their relationality is 
mutually constitutive. For Eliot, the “new” retroactively, as it were, reconstitutes the past, 
introduces a comprehensive reordering as well as a revaluing of the tradition. “The 
existing order is complete before the new work arrives,” Eliot reflects, but “for order to 
                                                          
65 Brooker notes that “Eliot describes the relation between artists within the tradition as well as between the 
tradition and individual artists. By doing so, he provides a textbook example of the doctrines of the 
internality of relations and the systematic nature of the whole,” concepts drawn from Bradley (182-83).  
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persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so 
slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the 
whole are readjusted” (38).    
For Eliot the critic, then, as for Eliot the philosopher, singularity in itself remains 
conceptually illogical. The individual (poet, person, theory) lacks definitive conceptual 
meaning because it lacks the contextual coordinates constitutive of that meaning. But the 
context, too, remains fluid, as it remains dependent upon the singular (though 
interrelated) elements constitutive of that context. The poet, that is, remains a product of 
the tradition inasmuch as the tradition remains a product of the poet. As Eliot notes years 
later in his 1926 Introduction to Charlotte Eliot’s Savonarola, “the past is in perpetual 
flux,” because the past remains a product of the interpretations hoisted upon it by the 
present generation (771).66 The two remain in perpetual dialectical tension, each in 
certain ways determining the other. And this tension recapitulates the dialectical tension 
between interiority and exteriority Eliot traces throughout his philosophical work, and 
which provides the conceptual foundation upon which he erects his critique against 
romantic and Victorian writers in general. Contextuality involves the external material 
and conceptual conditions that provide the structuring frameworks for interpreting the 
individual elements within a contextual field. The individual, on the other hand, functions 
as an element internal to that context, determined and informed by it. 
                                                          
66 A historical novel, for instance, remains “much more a document on its own time than on the time 
portrayed” (771). Pointing to George Eliot’s Romola, Eliot notes that “[b]y comparing the period described 
in [the novel] as we know that period, with George Eliot’s interpretation of it, we can supplement our 
knowledge (which is itself an interpretation and relative) of the mind and of the epoch of George Eliot” 
(771). That is to say, Romola says far more about George Eliot’s period than it does about the historical 
period which it proceeds to document. 
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In fact, Eliot’s key critique against Matthew Arnold, a significant figure for him, 
concerns exactly this tension between conditioning external contexts and the degree to 
which the individual remains determined by those contexts. In his essay on “The Modern 
Mind” in 1933’s The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, Eliot argues that Arnold 
sought “to preserve emotions without the beliefs with which their history has been 
involved” (127). Arnold, that is, sought to dissociate certain feelings from the contexts 
that gave rise to them. Perceiving the “Sea of Faith” withdrawing (as he puts it in “Dover 
Beach”), Arnold sought to preserve the sense of transcendent meaning, purpose, and 
order Faith engenders by transferring the functions of religion (as he sees it) to poetry. 
But Eliot suggests that absent the enframing traditions that give context for and meaning 
to the experience of the transcendent (or of the sense of human significance derived from 
the experience), Arnold’s project ultimately collapses, degenerating into the decadent 
celebration of art for art’s sake, a “doctrine” Eliot sees as “mistaken” and as a “hopeless 
admission of irresponsibility” (145, 17).  
For Eliot, the Victorian Arnold follows in the tradition of Rousseau and his 
romantic heirs, in that he privileges feeling over thought and atmosphere over precision. 
Nostalgia permeates Arnold’s work at the expense of intellectual rigor and systemic 
coherency. Arnold “ventured into departments of thought,” Eliot argues, “for which his 
mind was ill-equipped” (97). “In philosophy and theology,” for instance, Arnold “was an 
undergraduate,” and in religion, he was a “Philistine” (97).67 Thus, he submits Arnold to 
                                                          
67 As Maud Ellmann more forcefully puts it, for Eliot, Arnold (but also Bergson) “supplanted true religion 
with a glittering sham” (48).  
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the same critique he brings against Swinburne, Blake, and social scientists and 
philosophers such as Frazer, Harrison, and Bergson. Indeed, in “The Modern Mind,” 
Eliot specifically argues that Arnold “lacked the mental discipline, the passion for 
exactness in the use of words and for consistency and continuity of reasoning, which 
distinguishes the philosopher” (114). Like Swinburne, Arnold’s language remains 
diffuse. Like Frazer and Harrison, he lacks the “mental discipline” that would put him on 
guard against his own over-theorizing. And like Bergson, his thinking lacks “consistency 
and continuity.” Recall Eliot’s chief complaints against Bergson: that he prioritized 
individual intuition over comprehension and that his theories remained intellectually 
confused. Arnold, too, “confuses words and meanings” and his criticism, like his poetry, 
remained too focused on himself, “too reflective, too ruminative” (114). Arnold, that is, 
remains far too self-absorbed, far too obsessed with his own inner states; a self-concern 
which overshadows his thought, prevents it from “ris[ing] ever to the first rank” (114). 
Indeed, as Maud Ellmann argues, for Eliot, the “poet who supplants the priest, the sound 
that overwhelms the sense, the art that feeds on the declining faith: these parasites 
eventually destroy the [very] values that they poach upon” (49).     
And yet, for Eliot, Arnold remained one of the preeminent figures of the Victorian 
period. Indeed, his “critical method” and “assumptions” set the “tone” for the second half 
of the nineteenth century, to which figures such as Walter Pater, Arthur Symons, George 
Saintsbury, and even I.A. Richards all “bear witness” (115). As he notes in his essay on 
Arnold in The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, Arnold remains a “representative 
figure” and proof that a “man’s theory of the place of poetry is not independent of his 
 
 
143 
 
views of life in general” (112). Arnold demonstrates for Eliot the extent to which what 
individuals desire (emotionally, spiritually) can permeate how they interpret and 
construct their realities. And for Arnold, this involved “confusing poetry and morals in 
the attempt to find a substitute for religious faith” (108-09). It involves, essentially, 
overemphasizing reflection and introspection, the typical habit of romantic thought since 
Rousseau (as Eliot argues). Indeed, in “The Metaphysical Poets,” Eliot famously declares 
that Tennyson and Browning, like Arnold, remain merely “reflective poet[s]” (64). They 
“ruminated” in their verse, implicitly privileging a notion of the self as self-enclosed, 
imprisoned in thought and isolating self-reflection (65). But what Tennyson and 
Browning expand upon in their dramatic monologues (as inheritors of the ruminating 
romantic tradition of Wordsworth, Keats, and Shelley), Arnold in a sense perfects.  
Arnold then, for Eliot, remained both a “representative” and influential figure. As 
Edward Lobb notes in T.S. Eliot and the Romantic Critical Tradition, he was a “symbol” 
of all the “tendencies in Victorian thought which Eliot most disliked” (76). Indeed, in his 
1930 essay “Arnold and Pater,” Eliot traces a lineage that leads directly from Arnold to 
the (so-called) decadent poets of the 1890s, with Walter Pater as the transitional, pivotal 
figure. In fact, Eliot goes so far as to say that Arnold “father[ed]” Pater’s very “view of 
life” (349). In substituting “Culture in the place of religion,” Arnold left “Culture” an 
empty term which “each man . . . interpret[s] as he pleases” (351). Pater took up Arnold’s 
substitutionary project, elevating “Culture” as the privileged site for individuals’ 
existentially transcendent experiences, which as Eliot rightly points out is not so much a 
theory of aesthetics as it is of ethics, for “it is concerned not with art [per se] but with 
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life” (354). Accordingly, Pater was less an aesthete for Eliot than a moralist, but he was a 
moralist who valued experiential feeling or sensation above all other life experiences, a 
position Eliot condemns as both intellectually insufficient and morally “irresponsible” 
(356). Recapitulating his argument against Arnold, Eliot asserts that Pater was “incapable 
of sustained reasoning,” and that “he could not take philosophy or theology seriously,” 
despite Pater’s clearly philosophically informed aesthetics and epistemology (354-55).68 
He remained overly concerned with inner sensations, and his emphasis on these 
sensations, on the effect of a work of art on the viewer’s individual consciousness, 
overshadowed any critical interest in the external artifact as a cultural object in itself, 
situated within a particular sociohistorical context. Impression trumped critical reflection, 
and this, Eliot claims, in part helped “propagate some [of the] confusion between life and 
art” which perhaps contributed to the “untidy lives” of some of the poets of the 1890s 
(356). 
 For Eliot, ultimately, Pater’s chief limitation is that he overemphasizes inward 
experience, privileging subjective experience over all other forms of knowledge. But of 
course, this remains Eliot’s chief complaint against nearly all the English poets and critics 
of the nineteenth century. The objections he raises against Pater remain nearly identical to 
the objections he raises against Arnold, Swinburne, Blake, Tennyson, and Browning 
(among others). And they remain similar to the critiques that he raises against his 
                                                          
68 Carol Christ notes the ironic similarities between some of Pater and Eliot’s aesthetic positions: for both 
critics, “[l]iterature composes unique formulas for experience which affect a sensitive but passive perceiver 
in a determined way. Eliot, like Pater, achieves a universality for private experience by depending upon 
sensation as the experience art offers. Objects implicitly contain the power of evoking particular 
sensations” (82-83).  
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philosophical opponents as well. Each in some way overemphasizes feeling at the 
expense of thought (consider again his charges against Rousseau or Bergson). Each 
deprioritizes the external, dissolves it into a series of subjective impressions (as with 
Swinburne or Pater). And each misunderstands the dialectical relation between the 
individual and the collective, the inner and the outer, the original and the traditional (as 
with Blake and Arnold, Tennyson and Browning, or Bergson and Harrison). For Eliot, 
context matters, because only context provides the coordinates by which the particular 
acquires meaning. But understanding context requires rigorous intellectual reflection, a 
sensitivity to the comprehensive material and historical conditions that inform individual 
objects and persons.  
As a poet, Eliot rarely discusses (in essays specifically devoted to them) 
nineteenth-century novelists, whose concerns with the intersection between individuals 
and their social matrices might more closely parallel his own. He omits any 
comprehensive discussion of George Eliot, for instance, a writer whose concern for 
exploring the dialectical tensions between individuals and their environments certainly 
overlaps with Eliot’s own aesthetic and philosophical interests, and a writer, too, whom 
Eliot confesses is “representative of [her] age” (along with Dickens and Thackeray) 
(“Syllabus” 479). Like Eliot, she emphasizes the balance between the internal and the 
external in her work (i.e., between psychology and sociology). She also strives to 
dissolve the typical tension (as Eliot would see it) between feeling and thought prevalent 
in the writing of her romantic predecessors. In her novels, for instance, she elicits 
emotional responses in her readers through a deliberately considered presentation of her 
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characters’ socially-embedded lives. The dissociation of sensibility Eliot laments in so 
much of Western literary and philosophical tradition seems largely absent from George 
Eliot’s work.  
Interestingly, when Eliot does comment on George Eliot, he seems divided over 
her. In a letter to his mother (Feb. 6, 1918), Eliot admits that he “cannot endure George 
Eliot” (219). A month later, however, on March 4th, he affirms that he “was surprised” to 
find himself “enjoy[ing]” her work, although he quickly qualifies the assertion, noting 
that “there is a great deal of endless prosing, and I think my memory of pleasure is based 
chiefly on one story—Amos Barton—which struck me as far and away ahead of the rest” 
(221). Indeed, in an April 1, 1918 letter to Eleanor Hinkley, he expands on this thought, 
and suggests that “George Eliot had a great talent, and wrote one great story, Amos 
Barton, [but] went steadily downhill afterwards. Her best stunt was just this exact realism 
of country life, as good in its way as anything in Russian, [but] she thought her business 
was philosophic tragedy.” Romola, Eliot concludes, “is the most inartistic novel I have 
ever read” (227-28). Significantly, when he praises George Eliot here, it is for her 
consummate realism, for her sustained focus on the external world and the social texture 
of community existence. But at the same time, he condemns her for her “endless 
prosing,” an inexact phrase, but perhaps implying a critique of George Eliot’s excessive 
authorial interventions into her own novels. Such interventions, T.S. Eliot would argue, 
introduce into a presentation of rural life a theory of that life, and thus a perspective 
which would subordinate observed experience beneath a particular (and entirely 
contingent) interpretive rubric.    
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As he explains in his reflections on sociological methodology (discussed above), 
Eliot values description above explanation, and the more comprehensive the description 
the better. Theory—interpretation—merely hoists upon observed events the idiosyncratic 
perspective of the individual observer. Theory remains partial, incomplete, even a 
distortion of observed phenomenon. The essence of an object lies in its relation to a 
context, even as the context derives its meaning from the way that it enframes particular 
objects. As Eliot notes in 1918’s “The Hawthorne Aspect,” George Eliot’s “genuine” 
strength lies in her “visual realism,” in the materially concrete manner in which she 
constructs social reality in her work (again, particularly in “Amos Barton”) (739). In 
other words, for Eliot, at her best, George Eliot excels precisely in representing social 
context, in presenting the frame that provides her characters with meaning, purpose, and 
perspective. Implicitly, then, Eliot praises Eliot for her methodology, as if she were an 
anthropologist (a Durkheim or Lévy-Bruhl) documenting the social existence of a given 
group of individuals. And his criticism of her remains the same criticism he levies against 
such anthropologists as well: her “prosy” interventions. Thus, as with his critique of 
romantic and Victorian poets and critics, Eliot’s assessment of Eliot remains thoroughly 
informed by his context-oriented, subject/object, relational philosophy, and further 
demonstrates the degree to which this perspective thoroughly permeated his thinking, 
even in his private letters.  
As a philosopher, so as a critic, Eliot repeatedly emphasizes the constitutive 
relation between interiority and exteriority. He consistently resists efforts to resolve the 
tension between these two terms by subordinating one to the other. To appropriate his 
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own language from his essay “The Metaphysical Poets” (1921), Eliot resists the 
dissociation of the inner from the outer, and seeks to affirm their essential, relational, and 
mutually constitutive unity. For Eliot, the Romantics and Victorians err by placing too 
much emphasis on internal states, sundered from contextualizing conditions. As with 
Blake, they overemphasize originality and the idiosyncrasy of private vision. They ignore 
determining contexts and informing traditions, and in doing so minimize their capacity to 
represent objects (whether individuals, situations, or feelings) in their ontological 
fullness.  
Indeed, when Eliot famously introduces his notion of the objective correlative in 
“Hamlet” (1919), he argues precisely that “a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events . 
. . shall be the formula of [a] particular emotion, such that when the external facts, which 
must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked” (48, 
emphasis in original). That is to say, the external renders apparent the internal, even as 
the internal finds its definitive expression in the external. The relation between the two 
terms remains reciprocal, each constitutively reliant upon the other for intelligibility. 
Because of this, Eliot privileges linguistic exactitude, and correspondingly criticizes the 
emotionally diffuse, hazy atmospherics of a Swinburne, whose verse (as Eliot reads it) 
lacks emotional and conceptual clarity. In contrast, when he praises George Eliot, he does 
so precisely for her “exact realism,” for her capacity to render “country life” in all its 
particular detail. And since for T.S. Eliot, the external necessarily correlates with the 
internal, to represent one implies the sufficient representation of the other. Exact 
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representations of social reality (“thick descriptions,” to again quote Perl’s reference to 
Clifford Geetz), that is, translate into representations of subjective experience.   
Thus, the same preoccupations Eliot revealed as a graduate student in philosophy 
emerge in his criticism as well. Although his philosophical formulations regarding the 
relation between interiority and exteriority (knower and known, self and other, subject 
and object) in his graduate essays and dissertation remain more conceptually robust than 
in his critical work, these earlier formulations nonetheless utterly permeate Eliot’s 
aesthetics. The notion that the poles of this binary remain indissoluble and that in fact the 
two opposed terms emerge simultaneously each out of the other informs the content of 
his critique of Western writers since Rousseau. For Eliot, the individual self is not an 
isolated, self-defining, self-authenticating, trans-contextual entity. It exists neither as a 
monad nor as a preexistent, substantive essence. The self is not sufficient unto itself, but 
rather exists only as a conceptual construct situated within a matrix of contending, 
conditioning external forces. When writers attempt to construe the self as a definitive, 
transcendent essence, they distort and misrepresent the self and its relations to its social 
reality. Significantly, in the same way that Eliot continues to emphasize the irreducible 
relation between the internal and external in his philosophical and critical work, so, too, 
does he repeatedly explore the tension between these two notions in his poetry. Indeed, 
from the beginning of his career as a poet until his final work as a dramatist, Eliot 
continually examines the constitutive relations between subject and object, interiority and 
exteriority, self and other. Even in his earliest poems, before his encounter with Bradley, 
Eliot is already working from these assumptions, at least in nascent form. Chapter Four 
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will explore Eliot’s early poetry up through The Waste Land, and discuss the ways in 
which this central binary undergirds his representation of individuals and their social 
environments.    
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CHAPTER IV 
THE DISRUPTIVE GAZE: EXTERIORITY AND  
INTERIORITY FROM THE EARLY POEMS TO THE WASTE LAND 
 
In Mastery and Escape, Jewel Spears Brooker notes that Four Quartets, in many 
ways, “reads like [F.H.] Bradley versified” (187). She suggests that the poem dramatizes 
certain Bradleyan philosophical concepts, particular his notions of “immediate” and 
“transcendent” experience, as well as his general critique of conceptual thought and 
analysis (187-88). Brooker’s underlying argument, of course, is that Eliot remained a 
poet deeply informed by his philosophical concerns and influences, a claim William 
Skaff makes as well, although more forcefully. Indeed, he begins his study, The 
Philosophy of T.S. Eliot, by claiming that Eliot “is the first poet since Coleridge to have 
constructed a comprehensive philosophical system out of eclectic sources and then to 
have allowed those ideas to determine the nature of his verse and his principles of literary 
criticism” (3).69 To claim that Eliot’s philosophical views constitute a coherent 
philosophical system perhaps reaches too far, but they certainly reflect a comprehensive 
concern with the epistemological problem of knowledge. As I argued in Chapter Three, 
throughout his philosophical work, Eliot remains consistently focused on the question of 
how knowers know what they know (i.e., how knowers know “reality”), and thus with the 
                                                          
69 Skaff goes so far as to conclude that Eliot’s philosophy influenced “even the conduct of his personal life” 
(3).  
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question of the relation between subject and object, self and other, or inner and outer. As 
Skaff rightly intimates, such interests dictate the thematic concerns of his poetry as well. 
Of course, as Eliot himself remarks in “Dante” (The Sacred Wood, 1920), the 
philosopher and the poet perform different tasks, which “cannot be carried on at the same 
time” (95). Whereas the philosopher attempts to “deal with ideas in themselves,” the poet 
attempts to “realize” them in verse (95). But this does not mean, Eliot stresses, that poetry 
as such cannot be philosophical. “The poet can deal with philosophic ideas,” he suggests, 
“not as matter for argument, but as matter for inspection” (95). He continues: “poetry can 
be penetrated by a philosophic idea, it can deal with this idea when it has reached the 
point of immediate acceptance, when it has become almost a physical modification” (95). 
And in the case of Dante, he argues, it is indeed impossible to separate out the 
philosophical (or theological) from the poetic (95). But the same applies to Eliot as well. 
For critics like Donald Childs, for instance, “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” remains a 
profoundly Bergsonian poem (53),70 while for Brooker, “Gerontion” remains 
fundamentally Bradleyan (Mastery 82). Other poems, too, from the same early period 
(circa 1918), employ overt philosophical language or themes, such as “Mr. Eliot’s 
Sunday Morning Service” and “Whispers of Immortality.”  
Significantly, even the poetry Eliot wrote prior to his exposure to Bradley (or 
Bergson) reflects a pronounced concern with philosophical ideas, however obliquely or 
ironically treated. In 1910’s “First Debate between the Body and Soul,” for example, 
                                                          
70 Childs argues that “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” “is in many ways dogmatically Bergsonian, but it is not 
about Bergson. This philosophy in ‘Rhapsody’ is a matter not of presenting ideas but of realizing them” 
(53).  
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Eliot refers to the “pure Idea” and the “Absolute,” clearly indicating some familiarity 
(however ironized) with Hegelian or neo-Hegelian thought. In “Goldfish” (also 1910), 
Eliot refers (again ironically) to “eternal truths,” “problems of the soul,” and of 
“Philosophy [drunk] through a paper straw.” And in “Spleen” (yet again 1910), Eliot 
alludes to the “Absolute,” drawing here on a specifically philosophical vocabulary in 
reference to God (i.e., God as the abstract God of the philosophers, rather than an 
anthropomorphized personality). From his earliest poetry, then, all the way to Four 
Quartets, Eliot reveals an abiding interest in philosophical ideas and terminology, 
varyingly incorporating these elements into his work in sometimes subtle, sometimes 
ironic, and sometimes explicit ways.  
However, Eliot does more than simply satirize metaphysical systems or 
terminology in his poetry. Rather, his work reveals (or dramatizes) his own metaphysical 
preoccupations and speculations. For in the same way that his chief philosophical 
concern in his graduate work involves the relation between interiority and exteriority (or 
subject and object), so, too, does this remain a chief concern in his poetry as well, both 
early and late. This chapter will explore the way in which Eliot dramatizes the inner/outer 
binary in his early poetry, from his first unpublished poems all the way to The Waste 
Land. Of course, an exploration of the relation between the internal and the external 
necessarily entails, too, a discussion of human subjectivity. For Eliot’s particular 
representation of these two binary terms suggests a view of the self in which (for his 
unpublished work, especially) the internal reduces to the external, and the external to the 
internal. That is to say, Eliot collapses the space between these two poles, leaves no 
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substantive gap between them. At first, I argue, he appears to privilege the external over 
the internal, since to reduce the internal to the external and the external to the internal is 
necessarily to flatten both into an objective appearance—a surface. And yet, as his work 
progresses, Eliot offers ever more complicated construals of this basic model, so that by 
the time he reaches “Prufrock” (and especially The Waste Land), a model of self emerges 
predicated upon the (re)development of a gap between the internal and external. 
Interiority as such develops out of an individual’s experience of reflexive self-
externalization, an experience however, which paradoxically suggests the ultimate 
identity of the inner and the outer (in that the two terms remain dialectically mutually 
constitutive). Thus, even as he introduces a gap between the two terms, he (re)collapses 
it, thereby not only inverting the binary but in the end dissolving it.    
 
Eliot the Laforguian? 
In T.S. Eliot’s Silent Voices, John Mayer notes that Eliot’s discovery of the 
nineteenth-century French poet Jules Laforgue in December of 1908 “changed him into 
the poet we know” (39).71 Prior to his reading of Laforgue, Eliot’s poetry (what there was 
of it) lacked identity and direction. Poems such as “[A Lyric],” “A Fable for Feasters” 
and “At Graduation” (all published in 1905 in The Smith Academy Record), remain 
stylistically and thematically unremarkable and derivative, which should not surprise, of 
course, given his very young age at the time. Indeed, in the 1937 essay “Byron,” Eliot 
                                                          
71 As is well-known, Eliot came to Laforgue through Arthur Symons’ 1899 The Symbolist Movement in 
Literature. For a brief overview, see James Miller’s T.S. Eliot: The Making of an American Poet (99-104). 
See, too, David Rosen (“T.S. Eliot and the Lost Youth of Modern Poetry”), who notes that Eliot’s 
encounter with Symons “is surely the clearest line of demarcation between Eliot’s Harvard and high school 
styles” (479).  
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himself admits to what degree these earliest poems, especially “A Fable for Feasters,” 
remained overly influenced by his romantic precursors. Byron was his “first boyhood 
enthusiasm,” he confesses, and influenced him to write in these early poems “in the 
manner of Don Juan, tinged with that disillusion and cynicism only possible at the age of 
sixteen” (On Poetry 223).72 Yet, by 1908, with his discovery of Laforgue, Eliot’s poetic 
project began to take on new purpose and direction, and he began to forcefully cast aside 
previous poetic models. Mayer argues that Laforgue “attracted Eliot for personal reasons; 
there was a fundamental psychic affinity” that drew him to the French poet’s work and to 
the “Laforguian turn of mind” (39, 40). And he goes on to point his readers to Eliot’s 
own reflections on Laforgue’s influence in On Poetry and Poets (in his 1940 essay, 
“Yeats”), where Eliot writes that young poets will “look for masters” who will help them 
discover the “consciousness” of what they “want to say” as well as the “kind of poetry 
that is in [them] to write” (295).73  
But Mayer claims that Eliot “experienced a kind of total identification with 
Laforgue’s way of thinking,” that he “touched Eliot elementally” (40). “Laforgue the 
man,” Mayer argues, “reached to the core of Eliot’s being” (40). While Laforgue 
certainly proved of monumental influence to Eliot, a point Eliot himself makes, Mayer 
nevertheless overstates the nature of that influence.74 In 1950’s “What Dante Means to 
                                                          
72 James Miller argues that Eliot placed the setting of “A Fable for Feasters” purposefully in a monastery in 
order to “shield from the view of his teachers and parents his poetic model, Byron’s Don Juan” (37).   
73 Eliot affirms here, too, that the “kind of poetry that I needed, to teach me the use of my own voice, did 
not exist in English at all; it was only to be found in French” (295). 
74 Here is how Ronald Schuchard puts it: “In Laforgue . . . Eliot experienced a shock of recognition: here 
was a poet with a seemingly similar temperament, a poet experiencing similar difficulties and desires, a 
poet whose voice was more intiate and less intimidating than Baudelaire’s” (70).  
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Me,” for instance, Eliot reflects on Laforgue’s impact on him, confessing “that he was the 
first to teach me how to speak, to teach me the poetic possibilities of my own idiom of 
speech” (126). Eliot notes, too, that in Laforgue he found a “temperament akin” to his 
own, and found as well a “form of expression” in his work which provided “ a clue to the 
discovery” of his (Eliot’s) “own form” (126). That is to say, Eliot found in Laforgue (his 
style, his temperament) an authorizing model. Through him, Eliot found the way to begin 
articulating his own vision. But Mayer’s claim overstates Eliot’s relation to his French 
precursor, in that it blurs Eliot’s distinct concerns with Laforgue’s. It risks reducing Eliot 
to Laforgue, as if Eliot were merely an English version of the French original.75 For just 
as Eliot’s philosophical views did not find their origin in Bradley, but only their 
“confirm[ation]” (Langbaum 108), so, too, did Eliot’s “way of thinking” not find its 
origin in Laforgue, but only the validation of its mode of expression.   
Like the bulk of Eliot’s poetry, Laforgue’s poems often focus on the city 
(“whoring Paris,” as he puts it in “The First Night”) and its milling denizens (Selected 
16). As Wallace Fowlie argues, Laforgue dramatizes human life—indeed the “earth” 
itself—“as some abysmal mediocrity,” and yet “always ends by parodying his own 
anguish” (87). Indeed, this parodic or ironic impulse is perhaps what most distinguishes 
his work, an impulse that takes on added force as Laforgue develops the character (or 
persona) of the clown Pierrot (Fowlie 88). And it is this Laforguian irony, Fowlie 
                                                          
75 Schuchard notes that Eliot’s earliest 1908 poems (such as “Nocturne,” “Humouresque,” “Spleen,” and 
“Suite Clownesque”) have generally “been . . . dismissed as slight, derivate detritus of Eliot’s attempts to 
master Laforgue’s symbolist techniques” (76).  
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reflects, which Eliot goes on to appropriate for his own project (89).76  And yet, as 
suggested above, Laforgue only enabled Eliot to speak in a certain way. He gave Eliot a 
language with which to begin articulating his own distinctive vision (as well as certain 
tropes to draw on—the pathetic clown-figure, for instance). Significantly, key differences 
exist between the two poets. Despite his irony, Laforgue remains manifestly a “poet of 
interiority,” who privileges the inner landscape of subjective response. He offers a 
Cartesian conception of subjectivity, in which individuals remain constitutively severed 
from the objective world of perception. His speakers are observers, who look out on the 
world, find it baffling, inscrutable, or indifferent, and who remain marked by a sense of 
their own self-delimiting inwardness.  
In Laforgue’s “The First Night,” for instance, the speaker “meditate[s] at [his] 
window,” separated from the city evening which he observes (16). Yet through the 
repeated use of the first person possessive pronoun (“My cat,” “my window”) as well as 
through the act of positing himself as an actor in his own drama (“I imagine myself 
within the cemetery”), he reinforces his own inner subjective position (16).  In “The 
Impossible,” too, his speaker reflects on “pilgrims of pale solitudes” among “distant 
worlds,” thus suggesting a model of the self characterized by isolation and finitude (and 
thus also implicitly emphasizing the inward while at the same time opposing that sense of 
inwardness against an outer, alien cosmos) (15). And in “Apotheosis,” the speaker 
ponders the “dismal isolation” of the stars and his/her own separation from the “universal 
                                                          
76 John Soldo affirms, too, that Eliot was most affected by Laforgue’s “wit,” by his attempt to “stamp out 
sentiment” in favor of a “detached, impersonal” poetic persona (141-42).  
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order” (9). In each of these instances, Laforgue portrays solitary observers, self-contained 
and self-constituted in their Cartesian isolation, gazing upon an objectified, exteriorized 
otherness, whether of the city or the “universal order.”77 Eliot, as I will argue, challenges 
this binary throughout his poetry.  
 
Inventions of the March Hare: Eliot and the Poetry of Exteriority  
Although Eliot’s early poems clearly remain indebted to Laforgue, as Mayer 
rightly notes, they nonetheless map out an understanding of the relationship between 
subjects and objects distinct to Eliot (a relationship he will go on to develop in his 
graduate work). Placing Eliot’s early work in context of Laforgue at the beginning of my 
discussion thus helps not only trace out the stylistic genealogy of his poetry, but (more 
importantly) helps illustrate Eliot’s underlying epistemological and anthropological 
assumptions.78 These assumptions emerge even in Eliot’s earliest work. For example, in 
Eliot’s ostensibly Laforguian 1909 “Convictions,” Eliot introduces the figure of the 
marionette, an image to which he will return repeatedly (implicitly and explicitly) in 
these early poems. He offers in this poem a series of vignettes, all of which serve to 
critique the Boston upper class and its social practices and posturings. He ironizes 
bourgeois courting rituals (the “Hero and heroine” who “Go picking paper roses), 
drawing room philosophizing (his “Paladins” who talk of “effect and cause”), and 
bourgeois femininity (the “lady with a fan” who “Cries to her waiting-maid”). He 
                                                          
77 All three of these poems come from Laforgue’s earliest volume of poetry, translated by William Jay 
Smith as Outcries of the Earth (Le Sanglot de la terre). Smith notes that Laforgue composed these poems 
between 1878 and 1881 (5).    
78 In a sense, Laforgue helps serve as a foil for better understanding Eliot’s own distinct philosophical 
preoccupations. 
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suggests that each of these individuals vapidly reproduces certain social conventions, 
such that any supposed authentic inner space reduces merely to inscribed social formulas. 
For the poem’s speaker, such individuals remain little more than puppet-figures: “My 
marionettes (or so they say) / Have these keen moments every day” (11). 
Thus, in “Convictions,”79 Eliot portrays characters lacking in depth or inwardness, 
existing only as exteriorized surfaces. He collapses the gap between interiority and 
exteriority, here privileging the exterior as the sole determining locus of identity. He 
suggests, too, that their “enthusiasm” is merely performative, a hollow display for some 
imagined “audience.” “The enthusiasm is intense,” he writes, “They see the outlines of 
the stage / Conceived upon a scale immense / And even in this later age / Await an 
audience open-mouthed” (11). They subject themselves to an imagined exteriorizing gaze 
which reduces them to objects intended solely for visual consumption. Nothing remains 
but the objectified performance, so much so, that the speaker feels he can assert a kind of 
imagined predicative control over their actions. They are his puppets (“my marionettes”), 
a possessive declaration with which the poem both opens and closes. They remain objects 
seemingly subject to his manipulative control, a figurative suggestion which only serves 
to amplify the poem’s insistence on the utter lack of inwardness displayed by these 
marionette-figures. Nor does the speaker himself offer an alternative model. As David 
Rosen notes, the narrative persona here “seems detached or estranged,” the “sense of a 
self . . . weak” (478). What the poem offers is an observing, objective/objectifying, 
                                                          
79 As David Rosen rightly suggests, even the title “Convictions” is thoroughly ironic (478).  
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ironizing gaze, itself without depth or substance. What remains, then, is a vision of 
subjectivity (inflected by class-critique) as inherently flat and mechanically performative.   
With variations, Eliot repeats this theme throughout much of his early 
“Laforguian” work. Again and again, he portrays consciousness as imitative and 
superficial, lacking in both depth and authenticity. No core essence of self emerges in 
these early poems; individuals all too often remain shells, reflective surfaces that merely 
repeat what they perceive in their social environments. Indeed, this general concern with 
exteriorization remains the overriding impulse. In “Interlude in London” (1911), for 
instance, the speaker describes himself as “hibernat[ing],” “Indifferent,” “apathetic,” and 
“Careless” (16). “We hibernate among the bricks,” he writes, “And live across the 
window panes / With marmalade and tea at six / Indifferent to what the wind does / 
Indifferent to sudden rains” (16). In this strikingly Prufrockian poem, he again dramatizes 
the sterility of social formalities and rituals. Subjectivity remains superficial, 
performative, and repetitive. The self (interiority) attenuates into an exteriorized parody 
of itself. The speaker himself (as a speaker) recedes behind the anonymity of the 
collective “We,” thus again revealing a “detached or estranged” and weakened self. Of 
course, the image of hibernation might suggest the latent possibility for the existence of 
sense of interiority (i.e., it exists, but sleeps), but the space as such remains a closed, 
negated space, lacking any positive content or sense of an openness to (self) experience. 
What remains is an experience of oneself merely as a surface, an object for others to 
perceive as an object (devoid of substantive depth).  
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Even a poem like “Silence,” which might otherwise seem to indicate a clear sense 
of interiority, in that the speaker experiences a concrete emotional state (fear), in the end 
privileges exteriority. Again like Prufrock, the speaker in this poem wanders “Along the 
city streets,” observing the “garrulous waves of life / Shrink and divide” (18). As in many 
of Laforgue’s poems, the speaker here witnesses city life as a detached observer, 
experiencing its impressions as an outsider of sorts. The city thus remains an external 
object, removed and detached from the roaming, disembodied “I” of the speaker. But the 
speaker here also confesses to a seemingly authentic emotional experience. He 
encounters a moment in the city when its bustle seems suddenly stilled, and he finds the 
moment terrifying: “This is the ultimate hour / When life is justified. / The seas of 
experience / That were so broad and deep, / Are suddenly still. / You may say what you 
will, / At such peace I am terrified. / There is nothing else beside” (18). In a surprising 
inversion, what he at first characterizes as the broadness and depth of city life ceases, and 
what might have turned into a moment of respite becomes instead its opposite. For it is a 
peace which seems inaccessible and alienating. It shuts the speaker out; he cannot 
penetrate or fully articulate its (deeper) meaning. The terror arises precisely from his 
experience of estrangement from city existence—the city flattens out, stills, motion and 
activity cease, its depth erodes into an occluded and occluding impenetrable surface.  
In his notes to this poem, Christopher Ricks points out the resonance between 
Eliot’s speaker’s terror and Pascal’s terror at the inscrutable “eternal silence” of the 
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universe’s “immense spaces” (126).80 Indeed, in the Pensées, Pascal goes on to reflect on 
the “small space I occupy and which I see swallowed up in the infinite immensity of 
spaces of which I know nothing and which know nothing of me” (19). The universe as 
such presents itself to the rationalist human mind as a vast cipher, an impenetrable blank 
which the individual confronts as an imposing externality.81 In “Silence,” the city’s 
sudden calm presents the speaker with a similar sense of an imposing externalized 
impenetrability. In contrast to this view, though, Lyndall Gordon sees this poem as 
exclusively autobiographical, arguing that Eliot relates here a sublime experience of 
mystical transcendence, what she calls “his first and perhaps most lucid description of the 
timeless moment” (23). She argues that the poem dramatizes an experience of “peace,” 
and that this moment would remain in Eliot’s memory over the course of his life “as a 
tantalizing reminder of an experience beyond his grasp” (24). For Gordon, then, the poem 
suggests a moment of profound spiritual penetration or insight, however inarticulately 
expressed (and thus the opposite of Rick’s view). But her reading suppresses the 
Pascalian terror the poem also conveys, and in doing so misrepresents the nature of the 
experience the poem relates. For the poem seems less about the penetration of some 
ineffable mystery than about its sheer impenetrability. The world reveals itself in the 
poem not as an object susceptible to rationalistic understanding or the experience of 
                                                          
80 In the Pensées, Pascal writes (in translation), “The eternal silence of these infinite spaces fills me with 
dread” (66). Ricks notes that Pater quoted this passage in The Renaissance, and that Eliot “marked it in his 
copy” (126).  
81 Pascal goes on to suggest that the individual remains just as inscrutable an object to rational inquiry as 
does the universe itself. “Yet this is the thing we understand least,” he argues, “man is to himself the great 
prodigy in nature, for he cannot conceive what body is, and still less what mind is, and least of all how a 
body can be joined to a mind. This is his supreme difficulty, and yet it is his very being” (65). That is to 
say, for Pascal here, human beings themselves remain objectively inscrutable.  
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mystical unity, but as a strange, alienating otherness. As Eliot ironically puts it in 1910’s 
“First Debate between the Body and Soul”: “life evaporates into a smile” (65). What 
might seem possessed of discernable, comprehensible depth “evaporates” into the 
experience of an unfathomable superficiality.  
Of course, individual portraitures dominate the early poetry much more than first-
person subjective mystical reflections, and these portraitures almost unvaryingly involve 
the “marionette” trope, whether explicitly or implicitly. In “Goldfish” (1910), for 
example, Eliot directly refers to the poem’s characters as “marionettes”: “And the waltzes 
turn, return, / Float and fall, / Like the cigarettes / Of our marionettes / Inconsequent, 
intolerable” (26). As in “Convictions,” the poem offers a critique of upper middle class 
social forms and practices, and suggests the essential vacuity of bourgeois consciousness. 
The poem’s characters’ actions remain hollow, empty, formalized (externalized) gestures. 
As they “turn” and “return,” they merely performatively repeat a series of ritualized 
social activities. As puppets (lacking depth or the capacity for reflection or deviation), 
they remain “inconsequent, intolerable.” Characterized only by their “Verandah customs” 
and “White flannel ceremonial[s]” (as he writes later in the poem), these individuals lack 
any sense of authentic interiority or even individual distinctiveness (28). 
Other poems, such as “Mandarins” (1910), indirectly evoke this marionette 
trope.82 Section I of the poem, for instance, portrays an unnamed man (amidst an equally 
anonymous crowd) who “stands and waits / Upon his own intrepid dignity; / With fixed 
regardless eyes— / Looking neither out nor in— / The centre of formalities” (19). The 
                                                          
82 For another explicit use of the “marionette” trope, see Eliot’s 1909 poem “Humouresque.” 
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poem provides a “hero” here who remains essentially a blank. He remains immobile, self-
enclosed, and unreadable. He looks “neither out nor in,” suggesting a certain vacuity, the 
absence of any substantive inner space. What he is, is only a “centre of formalities,” a 
shell of social performativity without reference to any inner content. Section II of the 
poem provides a similar portrait of “Two ladies of uncertain age” who likewise enact a 
socially prescribed script, as they drink their tea “With assured tranquility” and “approve 
/ The abstract sunset” (20). The poem provides no sense that these “ladies” contemplate 
the sunset in itself as a concrete (non-abstract) reality. Rather, using the notion of 
“sunset” as a verbal counter, they enact a social ritual, repeating a pre-established 
formalized routine (i.e., tea and disinterested remarks on a sanitized natural world that 
appears only to exist for the benefit of idle, weakly aesthetic reflections).  
Indeed, as with many of Charles Dickens’ characters, Eliot’s personages in these 
early poems remain defined almost entirely by their exterior traits, appearances, and 
prescribed social practices. “Suite Clownesque” (again 1910)83 explicitly makes this 
point. In the poem, Eliot presents the “comedian” focal character as a “self-embodied 
role, his soul / Concentrated in his vest and nose” (32). He is literally a performer, 
another kind of puppet, and apparently lacks any sense of identity outside of his given 
“self-embodied role,” a point Christopher Ricks makes, too, in his comments on the poem 
(165). He remains utterly a surface, his “soul” present only as exteriorized in his clothing 
                                                          
83 Eliot’s “comedian” figure echoes Laforgue’s Pierrot, as Ricks comments in his notes to the poem (162). 
But Laforgue’s Pierrot served, as John Mayer argues, as “a new and modern embodiment of the traditional 
French clown whose sophisticated and whimsical playfulness is a function of Laforgue’s personal need to 
defend himself from his own Romantic vulnerability” (44). Eliot’s comedian, on the other hand, possesses 
no such “sophisticated and whimsical playfulness.” He remains an object of critique, rather than self-
liberated expressiveness.     
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and body (his “vest and nose”). Even the poem’s description of his immediate physical 
and social environment suggests the degree to which his world remains defined 
exclusively in terms of performativity. The poem describes his world as if it were a kind 
of stage set, replete with “painted colonnades,” “terra cotta fawns,” “potted palms,” 
“lawns,” “cigarettes and serenades” (32). As with the man in Section I of “Mandarins” or 
the ladies in Section II, the “comedian” of “Suite Clownesque” suggests the degree to 
which individuals lack any substantively self-aware sense of inwardness. No gap exists 
between individuals’ exteriorized social performances (or even environments) and an 
inner self-consciousness capable of critically reflecting on that performance. Indeed, the 
poem scathingly and ironically reflects: “Here’s the comedian again / With broad 
dogmatic vest, and nose / Nose that interrogates the stars, / Impressive, sceptic, scarlet 
nose; / The most expressive, real of men” (32). The poem ironically suggests here, of 
course, that the “comedian” lacks any authentic expressiveness or substantive reality. He 
remains a façade, a shell, a reflected copy of other individuals who themselves remain 
reflected copies. All that remains is surface.  
This notion of exteriorization perhaps takes its most articulate form in 1909’s “On 
a Portrait,” first published in the Harvard Advocate (Miller 78). In the poem, the speaker 
describes (a portrait of) a woman who “stands at evening in the room alone” (Complete 
599). Yet in describing the woman, the speaker admits that her expression resists 
comprehension. Rather than appearing as a “tranquil goddess carved of stone,” whose 
facial expression would prove readily interpretable, she seems instead “evanescent” and 
“immaterial.” “Her dark eyes,” the speaker confesses, “keep their secrets hid from us,” 
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and she remains “Beyond the circle of our thought.” The woman remains closed to the 
speaker, an incomprehensible façade whose inner spaces elude detection. Yet in closing 
off access to the woman’s interiority and presenting her only as an inscrutable 
externalized object, the poem also implicitly calls into question interiority as such. The 
gazing eye only has access to surface realities. Interiority remains a supposition at best, 
and at worst, merely an internalization of externalized forms, falsely perceived as 
authentic (as in “Mandarins” or “Suite Clownesque”). Indeed, the poem’s final lines seem 
to suggest precisely this point by associatively linking the woman with a parrot: “The 
parrot on his bar, a silent spy, / Regards her with a patient curious eye” (599). Is the 
woman, too, a kind of parrot, an evasive mimic, whose elusiveness only indicates her 
essentially imitative subjectivity? Does the same hold for the speaker, too?   
As noted in the Introduction, Francis Dickey makes precisely this point in 
“Parrot’s Eye: A Portrait by Manet and Two by T.S. Eliot.” She sees both the woman in 
Eliot’s poem as well as the poet-speaker as human parrots.84 The woman is literally only 
a painting, an “aesthetic object,” a pure surface on which the speaker projects his own 
speculations regarding her supposed interiority (130). And of course, as a painting, she 
merely aesthetically mimics a certain social form and appearance. And inasmuch as the 
poem implicitly associates the parrot with the woman, it also associates it with the 
speaker, since the parrot’s gaze appears to replace the speaker’s gaze at the poem’s end 
(129). Is the speaker, Dickey asks, only parroting romantic clichés concerning interiority 
                                                          
84 While I largely concur with Dickey’s reading of “On a Portrait,” I disagree with her interpretation of 
“Portrait of a Lady,” a position which I will discuss in more detail below.  
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as he contemplates the woman’s portrait? Is his attempt to discern her authentic thoughts 
and emotions merely a derivative exercise? Dickey’s answer is yes, for the poem as she 
sees it ultimately “foreclose[es] the possibility of both inwardness and originality” for 
both characters (124). The woman remains an inscrutable façade, while the speaker 
“forgets himself in contemplation of an aesthetic object” (130). Indeed, Dickey rightly 
concludes that “the object of his absorption raises doubts about whether there is any inner 
space to enter—hers or his” (130). The “figure of the parrot,” she explains, “returns [the 
speaker] to the painting’s surface and to the imitative rather than expressive quality of his 
thoughts or interior speech” (130). In other words, Eliot’s poem suggests the extent to 
which interiority itself remains a kind of illusion. In suggesting that the experience of 
inwardness remains an illusory construction, the poem suggests, too, that individuals 
remain constituted by the very façades they present both to others and to themselves. 
Thus, as Dickey puts it, “Eliot’s conception of subjectivity emerges in this poem as both 
flat and theatrical (or dramatic)” (135), which is to say both superficial and imitative. As 
in “Convictions” or “Goldfish,” “Mandarins” or “Suite Clownesque,” Eliot again offers 
an image of the individual as a kind of marionette, a puppet devoid of any sense of 
substantive interiority, parroting instead inherited social (or literary) form. 
In each of these early poems, then, Eliot appears to invert the standard romantic 
privileging of interiority over exteriority. He suggests instead a model of self wherein the 
self appears almost exclusively socially constructed, over-determined by class and its 
corresponding social forms and rituals. Thus, the self exists only as the externalized 
reproduction of certain structuring social conditions. His early characters remain 
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depthless edifices, lacking in both self-awareness and individual distinctiveness. Each of 
his marionettes, in the end, remain thoroughly interchangeable with one another. Nothing 
differentiates them since each remains merely a superficial copy of certain socially 
prescribed identities. As Arthur Symons reflects in 1908’s The Symbolist Movement (the 
edition Eliot read),85 “Are we not all puppets, in a theatre of marionettes, in which the 
parts we play, the dresses we wear, the very emotion whose dominance gives its express 
form to our face, have all been chosen for us?” (154).86 Contra the romantic notion of an 
inner, authentic identity which constitutes individuals’ core self (as in Wordsworth, 
Arnold, or Pater), these early poems suggest that no such inner space exists. Even the 
speaker of these poems remains a distant and severely attenuated presence. He or she 
appears more a roaming, disembodied eye than a situated, centered, self-knowing and 
self-revealing voice delineated by some well-defined sense of inwardness.  
Again, in this, Eliot differentiates himself from precursors such as Laforgue, for 
whom the speaker’s inwardness remains a prominent element of his poetry, even when 
ironically rendered. As Symons suggests, even in his “parodies,” Laforgue’s “frivolity 
becomes an escape from the arrogance of . . . the world as it appears to the sober 
majority” (107). Indeed, he continues, Laforgue remains “terribly conscious of daily life, 
cannot omit . . . a single hour of the day; and his flight to the moon is in sheer 
desperation” (107). Or, as Mayer puts it, “Laforgue preferred the strategy of the persona 
to give voice to the range of his own feelings” (44). That is to say, Laforgue’s work 
                                                          
85 This is the second edition. Symons originally published his book in 1899.   
86 Symons writes this in his essay on Maeterlinck, immediately following the chapter on Laforgue. 
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emphasizes the existence of a gap between a clearly delineated inwardness and an 
external world the individual finds hostile, vapid, or artificial. Eliot, on the other hand, 
not only blurs the distinction between the inner and the outer (as he will do in his 
philosophical papers), but in the end suggests that the internal reduces to the external, 
such that the internal loses any sense of substantive self-consistency. Façade triumphs 
over supposed inner essence. Or, at the very least, Eliot confesses to a profound tension 
between the two polarities, which results in the end in the primacy of the external in these 
poems. 
This is not to suggest that these early poems merely map out an early version of 
Eliotesque “impersonality.” In deemphasizing interiority (whether the speaker’s or the 
characters’), these poems implicitly advance an epistemology and ontological thesis. 
They posit a particular notion of knowing and a particular notion of being according to 
which the external gains priority over the internal. Yes, these poems reflect a kind of 
“escape from emotion” and “personality,” as Eliot famously puts it in “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent” (43), but only in the sense of an “attack” on the “metaphysical theory 
of the substantial unity of the soul,” as he also puts it in that essay (42). That is to say, in 
deemphasizing the internal, these poems also suggest a certain model of subjectivity that 
runs counter to those models of subjectivity that predominated among Eliot’s literary 
precursors. These early poems already work to challenge normative notions of human 
being in a way that his philosophical and anthropological work will only extend. Eliot 
challenges notions of the “personal” or of “personality” in his poetry not necessarily in an 
effort to “hide himself,” as Maud Ellmann puts it her critique of Eliot in the Poetics of 
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Impersonality (15), but because he also perceived the epistemological complexity than 
characterized the relation between internality and externality. Critics like Grover Smith, 
who argue that impersonality functions for Eliot merely as a mask by which he 
“disguises” otherwise “ordinary romantic material,” inadvertently reduce Eliot’s work to 
some transparent exercise in emotional purgation and confession (28).87 And while a 
basis for this view certainly exists, these critics (i.e., Maud, Smith) neglect to take into 
account the intellectual consonance between his poetry, literary criticism, and his 
philosophical and anthropological work. For in fact, as discussed above, his philosophical 
work reveals a thinker deeply concerned about the relation between subjects and objects, 
and so, too, does his poetry. Of course, these earliest poems almost invariably privilege 
the exterior over the interior, simply reversing, then, the binary established by his literary 
predecessors, such as Arnold and Browning. Yet even in these early poems, Eliot begins 
to question such a simplistic inversion, suggesting that a more complicated relation exists 
between internality and externality than these marionette poems necessarily imply. 
Indeed, in “Portrait of a Lady,” written only a year after “On a Portrait,” Eliot moves 
beyond a mere reversal of the binary to suggest, instead, the way in which its two poles 
remain fundamentally mutually constitutively interrelated.                                
        
“Portrait of a Lady”: Another Marionette Poem?  
Recall Eliot’s reflections in 1914’s “Objects: Real, Unreal, Ideal and Imaginary” 
in which he asserts that “in becoming aware that [an object] is an object, I become aware 
                                                          
87 Consider, too, Lyndall Gordon, who grounds Eliot’s project exclusively in the language of “confessional 
urgency” (324). 
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that I am a subject, and its objectivity is relative to a subject” (169). In a very Hegelian 
formulation, Eliot suggests that subjects and objects exist only in terms of one another. 
Neither exists in isolation from the other; each roots itself constitutively in its relation 
with the other.88 To contemplate an object, then, is to implicitly situate oneself as a 
subject in relation to that object. And conversely, to assume subjectivity is implicitly to 
assume an objective reality distinct from one’s own subjective position which gives it 
coherence and definition. Objectification implies a subject for whom objects manifest as 
objects. Otherwise elements in the material (and metaphysical) world sink back into a 
spatially, temporally, or conceptually undifferentiated (because unperceived or 
undesignated) mass. As Eliot puts it, “For as [an object] passes out of our vision, it 
resumes its place in reality from which it was for the moment detached . . . it is in the end 
completely absorbed by its relations” (170). Only a subject can arrest an object and 
separate it (however momentarily and provisionally) from its continuity within its more 
ontologically comprehensive context. Indeed, in “Objects: Content, Objectivity, and 
Existence” (also 1914), Eliot affirms that an object “is anything upon which the attention 
may be directed” (165). The “real world,” he suggests, “is built up upon the moment of 
perception,” even if the “real and ideal, perception and cognition” all remain 
“abstractions, legitimate enough, but relative and unsubstantial” (166). In other words, 
                                                          
88 In his introductory study of Hegel, for instance, Peter Singer writes that for Hegel, “Self-consciousness . . 
. cannot exist in isolation. If consciousness is to form a proper picture of itself, it needs some contrast. It 
requires an object from which to differentiate itself. I can only become aware of myself if I am also aware 
of something that is not myself” (75). Or, as Hegel himself puts in the Phenomenology: “self-consciousness 
is the reflection out of the being of the world of sense and perception, and is essentially the return from 
otherness” (105, italics in original).  
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here, only four years after his earliest Laforguian poetry, Eliot clearly grapples with many 
of the same issues that inform his dramatizations of subject/object relations in his poetry.  
As argued above, Eliot largely emphasizes in these early poems the object side of 
the binary. His characters remain stick-figures, puppets, animate objects without an 
animating autonomy. They lack “soul,” as it were. They exist only as objects for the gaze 
of others, and in existing only for others lack existence in themselves (i.e., as self-
knowing consciousnesses aware of themselves as subjects). And yet, even as Eliot is 
writing poems that dramatize individuals as utterly externalized creatures, a counter-
movement emerges in his work which complicates this formulation. This counter-
movement becomes most initially manifest in Eliot’s 1910 “Portrait of a Lady,” first 
published in the journal Others (1915), and then again in 1917’s Prufrock and Other 
Observations89 (Miller 148-49).  
Francis Dickey reads “Portrait of a Lady” as further confirmation of her thesis 
that Eliot, almost without exception, is a poet of exteriority (a direct reversal of those 
such as Lyndall Gordon, J. Hillis Miller, or A. David Moody who affirm Eliot as a poet 
of interiority). Indeed, she claims that over the course of his career, from his earliest 
poetry to his verse dramas, Eliot more and more dramatizes individuals as “both flat and 
theatrical,” lacking any sense of interiority as they merely ape (or parrot) exterior, 
prescribed social identities (135). Dickey argues that “Portrait of a Lady” (along with 
“On a Portrait”) inaugurates this trend in Eliot’s work, since (for Dickey) Eliot’s poem 
                                                          
89 Even the title of this collection (Prufrock and Other Observations) is significant, in that it suggests a 
perceiving consciousness observing others as objects of study.  
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attempts to “represent the very idea of inwardness as itself an imitation or reflection” 
(114). That is to say, Dickey reads “Portrait of a Lady” as an argument affirming the 
illusory nature of interiority; that what individuals (potentially) perceive as an authentic 
inner space is in fact only an internalization of external social conditionings. Still, while 
she’s right to point out the way in which Eliot privileges exteriority in poems such as “On 
a Portrait” and (to an extent) “Portrait of a Lady,” she neglects to grasp the way in which 
he nevertheless goes on to complicate his own project.  
Of course, as with so many of Eliot’s early poems, “Portrait of a Lady” certainly 
portrays characters who appear to lack any discernable sense of inwardness, at least at 
first. Indeed, through the bulk of the poem, the speaker and the woman remain marionette 
figures, puppets who unreflectingly enact the social codes appropriate to their class 
position. Even as the poem opens, it presents a description of the setting which, as in 
“Suite Clownesque,” suggests the theater and its attendant scenery: “Among the smoke 
and fog of a December afternoon / You have the scene arrange itself—as it will seem to 
do— / With ‘I have saved this afternoon for you’; / And four wax candles in the darkened 
room, / Four rings of light upon the ceiling overhead, / An atmosphere of Juliet’s tomb / 
Prepared for all the things to be said, or left unsaid” (18). The poem sets the stage, as it 
were, for the marionette roles its actors will enact, and it does so in a way that renders the 
actors powerless participants. The scene “arrange[s] itself,” presents itself as a stage the 
actors passively occupy, constructs itself in a way that compels from the actors a certain 
kind of behavior. The “set” not only consists of “four wax candles in the darkened room,” 
but it consists, too, of language, of a set pattern of exchanges, conversational topics, 
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accepted responses, and tonal inflections (e.g., their talk of Chopin or of the subtle 
romanticized allusions to “velleities and carefully caught regrets”). Not only the candles, 
then, but the woman’s statement, “I have saved this afternoon or you,” constitutes the 
poem’s stage setting, as indeed do all of the echoes of past performances which work 
here as compulsory templates for potential future encounters. Thus the poem, from its 
very first lines, suggests the degree to which individuals necessarily conform to the 
material conditions that define their contexts. The physical and social environment itself 
compels a certain kind of puppet-like performativity.  
Indeed, the conversation that unfolds between the speaker and the woman merely 
repeats certain expected patterns, which alongside their predictable lines and posturings 
reflect the theatricality not only of the encounter itself but of their identities. Grover 
Smith notes that just as the “setting appears false and theatrical,” so, too, “does the bond 
of acquaintance” between these two individuals (11). Dickey extends this line of thought 
further, and correctly argues that in this poem Eliot “has seized on the problem of 
imitation and subsumed it into a larger thematic of theatricality, where the theatrical is 
defined as a kind of automatic behavior that does not express internal feeling” (130). And 
certainly, both of these characters exhibit “automatic behavior,” uttering stale lines about 
concerts, friendship, and the passing of time. The woman, for example, adopts a 
culturally inherited, upper class (and thus privileged with the leisure to brood), romantic 
attitude towards what she terms her “buried life” (obviously appropriated from Matthew 
Arnold’s poem, “The Buried Life”), as she expresses nostalgia over her passed youth. 
“Yet with these April sunsets,” she remarks, “that somehow recall / My buried life, and 
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Paris in the Spring, / I feel immeasurably at peace, and find the world / To be wonderful 
and youthful after all” (19). The speaker, on the other hand, predictably (but silently, only 
to himself) mocks the woman’s sentimental reflections, referring to her voice as an 
“insistent out-of-tune / . . . broken violin” (19). He adopts the cynical stance of the 
disaffected, culturally-privileged male, critiquing her performance while largely unaware 
that he, too, merely performs a role—both in his comments to her, which align with 
certain public codes of normative class behavior), but also in his negative reflections on 
her, which merely reinscribe a certain fin-de-siècle decadent cynicism and sense of ennui.   
In other words, both the speaker and the lady reduce to their performances. Each 
exists only as a surface, devoid of depth, self-awareness, or authenticity. Interestingly, in 
her study of “Portrait of a Lady,” M. Laurentia argues that the poem’s “central conflict” 
involves “male aggressiveness” and “female persistency,” which she further characterizes 
as an opposition between “the woman as she is” and “the man as he wishes himself to be” 
(410). She emphasizes precisely the gap that exists between the speaker’s public behavior 
towards the woman and his private resentment of her. “He wishes that he were strong and 
masterful,” Laurentia argues, and that he “might take some forceful means and free 
himself once for all from his slavery to the woman” (410). But he can neither free himself 
from her nor openly articulate his antipathy to her. He remains impotently confined to the 
role he feels condemned to play. Laurentia suggests implicitly, then, that in his muted 
hostility the speaker in fact expresses a degree of inner authenticity. He resents the 
persona he adopts towards the woman, yet feels powerless to abandon the act. He remains 
“somehow bound to the woman by a civilized code which he feels impelled to live up 
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to,” yet which at the same time he privately resists (411). Thus, the very gap opened up 
between the speaker’s resistance to the woman and the attitude he publically adopts 
towards her in fact authenticates the speaker’s originary sense of an autonomous self. For 
Laurentia, the speaker’s animosity stems from an inner space that remains intrinsically 
his own.   
While Eliot’s poem indeed offers a space for interiority (as I argue below), 
Laurentia misstates the reasons why. Certainly, the poem suggests the existence of a gap 
between the speaker’s behavior to the woman and his actual feelings. He first describes 
her room as “Juliet’s tomb,” for instance, immediately suggesting a negative view of the 
woman, and throughout the poem he repeatedly uses body language (notably smiles) to 
mask his actual feelings. After she reflects sentimentally on the transience of youth, he 
reflects to himself, “I smile, of course, / and go on drinking tea” (19). The “of course” 
proves crucial here, in that it suggests the speaker’s smug knowledge of his own 
performance. And yet, paradoxically, the supposed self-knowledge the speaker evinces 
here proves delusory, for in fact, he knows much less than he thinks he knows, either 
about himself or the woman. As suggested above, the speaker’s inner resentment of the 
woman itself remains a kind of act, a performance just as posed and scripted as his 
outward behavior. As Grover Smith suggests, the speaker is only a “young man[,] inept 
and supercilious” (9-10). His behavior towards the woman remains motivated largely by 
blind egotism, an unwillingness or inability to sympathize with this woman who 
nonetheless pleads for sympathy, however artificially romanticized her appeals. He 
remains “attuned” only to his own feelings, as Smith puts it, and condescending towards 
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hers (11). He apes the behavior appropriate for the occasion, and in acknowledging the 
apery, generates the illusion of interiority. But his reactions and expressions (both public 
and private) remain just as much a performance as the woman’s. He knows how to 
perform (“I keep my countenance, / I remain self-possessed”), but only because he knows 
nothing else. Indeed, as he admits to himself, “You will see me any morning in the park / 
Reading the comics and the sporting page” (20). He mimics certain socially inscribed 
routines just as much as the woman does.  
Dickey, too, makes the point that the speaker’s sense of interiority derives not 
from some authentic sense of self-awareness, but rather from the gap the speaker 
perceives between the woman’s comments and his own private reflections—in other 
words, from his hypocrisy. Yet as the poem itself makes clear by the end, the gap is in 
fact an illusion, for the woman fully understands the true state of their relationship, and 
when she makes this clear to the speaker, he experiences a kind of inner collapse: “My 
self-possession gutters; we are really in the dark” (21). Dickey sees this as precisely the 
moment where the speaker’s own artificiality becomes most manifest. “[H]is sense of 
having a private interior,” she argues, rests on the woman’s inability “to understand him,” 
and “the collapse is brought on by her correct recognition that he is not her friend” (135, 
emphasis in original). When the gap between them collapses, so, too, does the illusion of 
interiority. “He sees himself, suddenly, as if from the outside,” Dickey concludes, an 
experience which “reveals him as nothing but a surface onto which are copied (or 
mirrored) the appropriate facial expressions” (135). The woman’s revelation forces the 
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speaker to see himself performatively conditioned in the same way as he had previously 
regarded her.   
Both Laurentia and Dickey misread the poem’s treatment of interiority and 
exteriority, although from entirely different perspectives. Laurentia implicitly privileges a 
normative notion of interiority in her study, and never questions its status or stability as a 
concept, nor the way the poem potentially interrogates it. On the other hand, Dickey 
challenges the poem’s presentation of interiority, but does so only to reverse the binary, 
simply privileging, in the end, the external at the expense of the internal. She reads this 
poem in the tradition of the earlier “marionette” poems (pointing specifically to 
“Convictions”), without thinking through elements that definitively differentiate this 
poem from those earlier poems (131). Yet Eliot’s poem proves far more nuanced than 
these two readings suggest, and in fact, contra Dickey, marks a shift in his representation 
of the inner/outer binary. As discussed above, in the earlier poems, Eliot almost 
invariably privileges exteriority over interiority. The poems serve in part as critiques, 
satirizing the vapid social personas of the Boston upper class, and in part as informal 
anthropological sketches, dramatizing a certain conceptualization of human subjectivity. 
In “Portrait of a Lady,” however, Eliot initiates a shift in his representations of the self 
that will ramify throughout his work.  
 
The Emergence of the Interior 
Dickey rightly suggests that the poem largely dramatizes subjectivity as imitative 
and derivative. And yet I want to argue that the very moment that Dickey points to as 
evidence of the poem’s final exclusion of the possibility of interiority proves in fact the 
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very moment of its initial appearance. When the woman reveals to the speaker her 
knowledge of the true nature of their relationship and thus closes the gap the speaker had 
assumed divided them, she, as it were, holds a mirror up to the speaker, and forces him to 
see himself in a way that he had not before. “I have been wondering frequently of late,” 
she unexpectedly says to him, “Why we have not developed into friends” (21). His 
reaction is telling: “I feel like one who smiles, and turning shall remark / Suddenly, his 
expression in a glass” (21). The figure he employs to describe his experience proves 
significant. He sees himself reflected back to himself, encounters himself as a surface. He 
finds himself startled out of himself, out of his illusions regarding their relationship, and 
out of his rote performance. Dickey argues that the speaker discovers in this penetrating 
moment of self-reflection the realization of an essential inner lack. In the reflection, she 
suggests, he discovers the absence of any substantive inwardness. He perceives himself 
as a purely performative creature, and knowingly exclaims, “And I must borrow every 
changing shape / To find expression . . . dance, dance / Like a dancing bear, / Cry like a 
parrot, chatter like an ape” (21). He can find no “expression” that is itself not already a 
performance. All he can do is to “parrot” or “ape” existent social forms. And for Dickey, 
this parroting goes all the way down, so to speak. Nothing in the speaker escapes the 
imitative imperative.          
  But Dickey misses the point that in perceiving himself as a surface, the speaker 
perceives himself self-experiencing, thus reflexively generating the very inwardness that 
the realization itself would seem to foreclose. The moment he recognizes himself as 
merely performatively constituted, proves precisely the moment he escapes the confining 
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delineations of his social constitution. He sees himself reflected back to himself, 
perceives his own lack of depth. He can no longer sustain the initial illusion of interiority 
that had sustained his sense of control over his own dissimulative performance. In 
acknowledging her awareness of the state of their friendship, she, in a sense, penetrates 
his self-illusions, renders him transparent, exposes him to himself. In doing so, she causes 
him to experience his own self-objectification, and he finds the experience disorienting 
and disordering to his sense of self. She has robbed him of his self-complacency, and he 
recognizes now that he must “borrow every changing shape / To find expression.” In a 
sense, he is like a puppet who has just gained knowledge of himself as a puppet, yet all 
the while continues to remain a puppet. The shift remains subtle, but nonetheless crucial 
in that it suggests the possibility for further dialectical developments. Indeed, that the 
poem concludes with a question remains significant, in that it marks both his newly 
discovered self-uncertainty, but also the development of an inner space for the experience 
of uncertainty. “Should I have the right to smile,” he asks, a significant question given 
that throughout the poem his smiles have been paradoxically that which most marked his 
lack of depth (21). 
Thus, “Portrait of a Lady” marks a shift away from the predominant 
representation of subjectivity characteristic of Eliot’s earliest work. Rather than 
portraying individuals purely as marionettes, stick-figures lacking either depth or self-
consciousness, he initiates in this poem the beginnings of an alternate model. Confronted 
with his own reflection (via the woman), the speaker encounters himself as an object, 
sees himself, as it were, from the outside, and he finds the experience bewildering and 
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self-negating. His placidity shattered, what remains is a tenuous new self-perception, 
although highly undeveloped and largely unarticulated. Indeed, he experiences this new 
(sense of) self not as some more authentic inner version of himself that had previously 
been obscured, but rather as an experience of pure negation. Inner space, as it were, 
opens up, but only in the sense of an abyss opening up beneath a previously solid surface. 
Ending with a question, the poem suggests the speaker’s utter disorientation. He no 
longer knows “what to feel or if I understand / Or whether wise or foolish, tardy or too 
soon” (21). In a sense, the experience has thoroughly deconstructed him.  
To appropriate Eliot’s own language from “Objects: Real, Unreal, Ideal and 
Imaginary,” “in becoming aware” of himself as an object, the speaker in “Portrait of a 
Lady” becomes aware of himself as a subject, and also comes to realize that his 
objectivity is somehow relative to his status as a subject. The two terms intertwine, for in 
coming to perceive himself as an object, he comes, too, to a new perception of himself as 
a subject capable of objectification. The same dynamic that Eliot affirms in his 
philosophical work on subject/object relations thus characterizes (to an extent) the 
speaker’s experience in this poem, as it will come, too, to characterize the experience of 
speakers in a number of his later poems. Indeed, as Eliot was working on “Portrait,” he 
was also working on “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” a poem that also grapples 
with a speaker’s experience of self-objectification. But whereas the speaker in “Portrait” 
never quite moves beyond the disorienting effects of objectification and self-negation (he 
remains only a hollowed shell of a self by the end of the poem; “interiority” remains an 
abyss on whose edge he teeters), Prufrock incorporates the experience of objectification 
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into his very experience of self, thus modeling a notion of subject/object relations that 
aligns much more precisely with Eliot’s philosophical speculations.    
 
“Prufrock” and the Drama of Self-Emergence 
 Eliot composed an initial version of “Prufrock” in 1911, the year after his work 
on “Convictions,” “Mandarins,” “Goldfish,” and “Suite Clownesque,” although he notes 
in a March 8th, 1946 letter to John Pope that he began thinking of the poem “some time in 
1910,” thus placing it firmly within this Laforguian grouping.90 Indeed, these poems all 
share certain similarities. Each focuses on upper class Boston social life. Each presents 
individuals thoroughly circumscribed by their sociocultural contexts, confined to a 
narrow range of culturally ritualized behavior. And each offers portraits of individuals 
who exist only as inflected though their socially prescribed performances. Social identity, 
in other words, comes to mark the limits of identity as such: exteriority and interiority 
converge, as inwardness merely recapitulates outward appearance. But “Prufrock” 
complicates this formula, in that it introduces a figure who seems not only aware of the 
social script which delineates his identity (both public and private), but of the tension 
between that social script as publically enacted and privately experienced. Just as 
“Portrait of a Lady” opens up a gap between the internal and external, so, too, does 
“Prufrock,” but the latter extends its treatment of this gap in a way that more fully 
                                                          
90 In his notes to the poem, Christopher Ricks points us to this letter (176), which John Pope (the recipient) 
first published in his 1947 essay, “Prufrock and Raskolnikov again: A Letter from Eliot.” The full passage 
reads: “The poem of Prufrock was conceived some time in 1910. I think that when I went to Paris in the 
autumn of that year I had already written several fragments which were ultimately embodied in the poem, 
but I cannot at this distance remember which. I think that the passage beginning ‘I am not Prince Hamlet,’ a 
passage showing the influence of Laforgue, was one of these fragments which I took with me, but the poem 
was not completed until the summer of 1911” (Pope 319).  
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illustrates the mutually constitutive dialectical relationship between the two. In fact, in 
many ways, Eliot’s dramatization of subject/object relations in “Prufrock” precisely 
parallels the view of subject/object relations he promulgates in his philosophical work 
only two and three years later, in his essays on Kant and Bradley.   
A number of critics point to “Prufrock” as a poem that illustrates solely the 
enfeebling experience of a speaker claustrophobically self-enclosed. J. Hillis Miller, for 
instance, argues that the “reader is plunged with the first words [of the poem] into the 
spherical enclosure of Prufrock’s mind” (137). For Prufrock, Miller observes, 
“Everything exists because [he] thinks of it, and the bubble of his thought is never 
broken” (137). From Prufrock’s perspective, there is no escape from the “bubble” of self, 
and consequently the external world ceases to have objective reality for him. Carol T. 
Christ agrees, adding that “Prufrock constructs a monologue whose fictions insulate and 
preserve him in a solipsistic dream world, a chamber of the sea” (48). He invents the 
world he inhabits, she suggests, fictionally dramatizes himself as an actor in his own self-
narrative. Similarly, for Lyndall Gordon, Prufrock’s “life is [only] a succession of 
psychological states, memories, and roles,” and although he “longs to confide in 
someone, an admired woman,” he cannot, confined as he is to the torturous windings of 
his own insular consciousness (68). As Gordon seems to read it, “Prufrock” traces out an 
accumulation of inner states that in themselves lack connection with any objective, 
external world. Prufrock can experience nothing but his own inner world, nor can he 
relate that experience of inwardness to the outer realities of other consciousnesses. Thus, 
for each of these critics, Prufrock remains confined exclusively to the experience of his 
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own inner consciousness. He possesses no authentic (or verifiable) link to the external 
world. In fact, the external world that he grapples with in the poem proves more or less 
only a figment of his own self-absorbed (and absorbing) imaginative projections.  
For critics like these, then, “Prufrock” emerges as a poem intently focused on the 
problem of interiority. Indeed, for these thinkers, “Prufrock” dramatizes not merely the 
experience of interiority, but the experience of a solipsistically delineated interiority. No 
discernably objective relation exists between Prufrock’s sense of himself and the outer 
world. He simply finds himself thrown into a particular social and cultural environment 
which, yes, he finds bewildering, but which also, ultimately, remains dualistically 
uncoupled from Prufrock’s essential sense of inwardness. That is to say, for Miller, Carol 
Christ, and Gordon, Prufrock’s interiority remains an ontological “given,” a preexistent 
space in itself that finds itself in tension with an alien environment (also an ontological 
“given”) with which it can find no means to communicate. The self remains an 
essentialized “bubble” in conflict with an unintelligible externality that the self attempts 
to comprehend by projecting onto it its own inner, psychological content. Thus, these 
critics posit a dualistic relation between the inner and the outer that utterly severs the 
connection between the two. They construct a binary which they themselves then impose 
onto the poem, and proceed to argue (whether directly or only through implication) that 
the poem necessarily privileges the inward element over the outward.  
Of course, “Prufrock” undoubtedly focuses on interiority, and does so in a way 
that clearly demarcates this poem from much of Eliot’s work from the same period. 
Indeed, as a dramatic monologue, this poem serves as a vehicle for the expression of 
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inward states of consciousness. Miller makes this same point when he argues that the 
“poetry of the dramatic monologue collapses [the] realism [typical of novels] into the 
isolation of a single mind” (137). The dramatic form itself dictates the emphasis on 
internality, as it involves a single speaker speaking out of a particular psychological, 
intellectual, and emotional position. By definition, then, no other voice exists in the poem 
with which the speaker might engage. The result, as Miller observes, is the sensation of 
“an opaque sphere closed in on itself” (137). Tennyson or Robert Browning’s dramatic 
monologues effect this feeling (as Miller, too, notes), no less than do Eliot’s monologues 
(137). Moreover, that the dramatic monologue extracts an individual speaker as an 
individual from a particular social/cultural/historical context perhaps exacerbates the 
sensation of solipsistic self-enclosure. To emphasize the speaker’s own reflections at the 
expense of her or his dialectical immersion in a field of other voices necessarily, to some 
extent, distorts that voice—grants it an intensity or sense of isolation it might not 
otherwise possess if contextualized within a chorus of voices.  
However, to suggest that “Prufrock” dramatizes the experience of interiority (as it 
does) is not the same as to suggest that the poem posits a notion of the self characterized 
by its dualistic severance from the external world. The dramatization of interiority does 
not in itself imply the essentializing of interiority, which is what Miller, Carol Christ, and 
Gordon each in their different ways appear to claim. Rather, as I will argue below, Eliot 
offers a much more complex and nuanced portrayal of interiority, which places 
inwardness in direct dialectical relation with its external conditions. Indeed, “Prufrock” I 
will claim undermines any notion of an ontologically autonomous inwardness, and 
 
 
186 
 
suggests instead that interiority arises only in dialectical friction with certain perceived 
external realities. Conversely, those external realities, too, only take on concrete 
determinant existence with the emergence of a sense of inwardness. Both poles of the 
binary remain mutually and persistently implicated in one another, neither separate from 
the perceived reality of the other, an anti-dualistic position Eliot also affirms in his 
philosophical work and literary criticism. In staging inwardness in this manner, 
“Prufrock” marks a pronounced shift in Eliot’s dramatization of the human. Rather than 
representing human beings as utterly exteriorized puppet-figures, he now offers a more 
nuanced portrayal of the genesis and contours of human subjectivity, even though he goes 
on to further complicate this model in his later work (see Chapter Five).   
 
Dialectical Relations in “Prufrock”  
Significantly, the poem initially stresses Prufrock’s exteriority, his status as an 
object, rather than his inner experiential reality. Specifically, despite the differences that 
clearly separate it from much of Eliot’s other work from the period, “Prufrock” relies on 
many of the same marionette tropes as do these other poems, thus suggesting a degree of 
continuity with them, rather than divergence. Indeed, in certain ways, Prufrock himself 
remains a kind of puppet, formulaically performing according to a particular social script 
and participating in particular social rituals (afternoon “toast and tea,” for instance [14]). 
His thoughts and concerns remain those of his class position, and demonstrate to what 
extent the horizons of his consciousness remain circumscribed by his location in the 
social order. Utterly immersed in his own socially derived existence, he exclaims that he 
has “known them all already, known them all— / [Has] known the evenings, mornings, 
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afternoons” (14). His social existence, “measured out . . . with coffee spoons,” remains 
his only mode of self-experience, and thus marks the boundaries of his capacity for self-
knowledge (14). As with many of Eliot’s other early personages, Prufrock’s subjectivity 
remains largely performative, an enactment merely of certain social codes and behavior 
conventions. He simply reproduces the social and cultural forms expected of him, 
however haltingly. No interior space exists for him to withdraw to in order to escape the 
required performance. And it is in this sense that he remains a puppet, a woodened 
exterior lacking depth or substantive self-awareness. 
Indeed, the poem in fact foregrounds Prufrock’s actual physical body in a way 
that reinforces this marionette image. The poem’s opening lines, for instance, compare 
the evening (“spread out against the sky”) to a “patient etherised upon a table” (13). But 
of course, the comparison just as well applies to Prufrock himself, who throughout the 
poem betrays his own mode of paralysis. But in linking the image to Prufrock, the poem 
also suggests the extent to which Prufrock appears as an anesthetized body, an exterior 
form without depth or inner consciousness. From its opening lines, then, the poem 
presents its speaker as simply a physical surface, a body closed in around itself, precisely 
that “spherical enclosure” to which Miller refers in his discussion of the poem (although 
with an emphasis on the sphere itself, rather than to that which it encloses). Indeed, as the 
poem proceeds, Prufrock repeatedly draws attention to his own physicality, to the “bald 
spot in the middle of [his] hair,” for instance, or to his “thin” “arms and legs,” or his 
“morning coat” and “collar” that “mount firmly to the chin” (14). The poem, that is, 
presents Prufrock as a singularly physical figure, gangly, stiff, and thin—just like a 
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marionette. It foregrounds Prufrock’s body, and as such, emphasizes his exteriority (as 
opposed to his interiority).        
Thus the poem, at least at first, presents Prufrock as a figure utterly devoid of 
interiority, an essentially imitative personality—a puppet—who merely enacts the 
ritualized cultural conventions of upper class Boston social life. Yet, crucially, the poem 
goes on to dramatize Prufrock’s awareness of his status. And it is this awareness that then 
creates the gap between Prufrock’s socially inscribed persona and the recognition of 
himself as a persona. That is to say, to experience himself as a subject first requires 
experiencing himself as an object. As with the speaker in “Portrait of a Lady,” through 
the experience of his own self-objectification, he comes to experience himself as a 
subject subject to objectification. And, again like the speaker of “Portrait,” Prufrock only 
comes to experience himself as a subject via the objectification to which others subject 
him. In a pivotal passage in the poem, Prufrock reflects, “And I have known the eyes 
already, known them all— / The eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase, / And when I 
am formulated, sprawling on a pin, / . . .  / Then how should I begin / To spit out all the 
butt-ends of my days and ways?” (14-15). Prufrock’s experience of himself remains 
mediated, here, through the self-objectifying gaze of the other. He is (in his social 
instantiation) as these others perceive him to be. His identity remains that as constituted 
in their glance. Yet he “knows” the glance, understands its objectifying power, and feels 
himself overdetermined by it. It “formulates” him to himself no less than it formulates 
him for these others, yet he remains self-reflexively aware of himself as the object they 
have subjected to their formulations.  
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That is to say, figuratively pinned to a wall, he recognizes himself (a “sprawling” 
insect) as a subject capable of objectification. This insight opens up in him the subjective 
(and anxious) awareness of his own objectified status, and thus the creation of a self-
perceiving inwardness distinct from his object-status. Consequently, his sense of himself 
as a self emerges only when he finds himself construed as an object in the eyes of the 
other (indeed, in the passage, he focuses obsessively on others’ eyes). Because self-
experience (inwardness) requires self-objectification (exteriorization), each state remains 
dependent upon the other for its own felt phenomenological reality. To appropriate 
Eliot’s own language from his dissertation, “Everything, from one point of view, is 
subjective; and everything, from another point of view, is objective” (21-22). Or as he 
says elsewhere in the dissertation, “the self depends . . . upon other selves; it is not given 
as a direct experience, but is an interpretation of experience by interaction with other 
selves” (146).    
Much more so than “Portrait of a Lady,” “Prufrock” dramatizes the dialectical 
relation between subjectification (i.e., as here defined, the emergence of subjective self-
awareness) and objectification. Specifically, it presents the process of subjectification as 
emerging out of the subject’s sense of his or her own abject objectification. Whereas the 
speaker of “Portrait” remains, at the end of the poem, hovering on the edge of his own 
self-consciousness, “Prufrock” stages its speaker’s headlong plunge. His focus on his 
own body (its age and fragility) as well as his pervasive diffidence reflect the struggles of 
an individual utterly overwhelmed by the experience of himself as a self. “Shall I part my 
hair behind?” he asks, “Do I dare to eat a peach?” (16). “What is he?” he seems implicitly 
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to ask, but can come to no clear conclusion. But his questions reveal his awareness that 
his experience of self remains bound up in his own self-objectification, for in posing 
these questions, he implicitly seeks some definitive external confirmation of his own 
status as a self. He seeks, paradoxically, further self-objectification in order to stabilize 
the sense of self that emerges out of his initial perception of himself as an object.  
Thus, “Prufrock” introduces a dynamic yet highly unstable model of self 
predicated on the dialectical relationship between internality and externality. Contrary to 
those critics, then, who would suggest that “Prufrock” forwards an ontologically stable, 
essentialized notion of self, the poem in fact suggests precisely the opposite. The 
experience of inwardness emerges only in relation to the experience of exteriorization. In 
itself it lacks conceptual coherence. Consequently, “Prufrock” does not trace out an 
experience of solipsistic, existentialist isolation.91 Rather, it emphasizes to what extent 
individuals remain radically bound up with one another. As Eliot notes in “Objects: 
Content, Objectivity, and Existence” (written in 1914, and so exactly contemporaneous 
with “Prufrock”), “Solipsism is self-contradictory, because if A is to know only his own 
world, there must be another world to contrast it with: and there is none. If A knew only 
his own world, he would have to know that he knew only his own world” (168). 
Prufrock’s problem is that he knows precisely that his subjective “world” is not the only 
world, that other subjective centers press on him, objectify him, and in doing so, elicit in 
                                                          
91 Referring to the poem’s opening lines, in which Prufrock appears to address an interlocutor (“Let us go 
then, you and I”), Miller argues that the “you” here remains merely a dramatic device. Prufrock, as it were, 
addresses himself here, as if he were speaking to another. “No other mind is present to violate the integrity 
of Prufrock’s isolation,” Miller argues, “[h]e has split himself into two persons, and speaks to himself 
alone” (138).  
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him that self-recognition which awakens him to himself. With “Prufrock,” Eliot 
completes a turn in his poetry begun in “Portrait of a Lady,” in which he dramatizes in 
ever more sophisticated ways individuals’ experience of interiority. Whereas “Prufrock” 
finalizes this initial turn, The Waste Land deepens it, extends its expression through its 
presentation of a series of individuals who lack the capacity to recognize their own 
objectification, while at the same time infusing the poem with a self-cognizant 
consciousness (Tiresias) who draws attention to the process of objectification and the 
consequences for those who cannot recognize it.             
 
From “Prufrock” to The Waste Land  
 The Waste Land represents a distinct departure from much of Eliot’s earlier work, 
not only in size, but in conception and the radicalization of technique. Composed of a 
series of narratively disjointed scenes and lyric fragments as well as a bewildering 
succession of seemingly disconnected images, the poem privileges the experience of 
disjunction and disorientation. For many critics, the poem lacks the mode of coherency 
found, say, in “Portrait of a Lady” or “Prufrock,” both of which possess a clearly 
delineated central consciousness, a structurally stable narrative voice which speaks (or 
ruminates), and thereby provides the cohesion needed to unify otherwise ambiguous 
observations, apparent memories, and images. The Waste Land, on the other hand, would 
seem to sever the link between a coherent, pervasively present central narrative 
consciousness and the events of the poem. It offers instead a “kaleidoscopic confusion of 
themes, settings, structures, and of selves,” as Alireza Farahbakhsh puts it (71). Or, as 
Derek Traversi argues, it offers only a “world of fragments” which Eliot “set[s] out to 
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explore, because he had nothing else on which he could honestly build” (18). From this 
perspective, then, by its very form, The Waste Land already suggests a more complicated 
portrayal of the relationship between interiority and exteriority, because it blurs the 
boundaries between the two. The discernable, well-defined, singular speaker of “Portrait” 
and “Prufrock” dissolves into a multiplicity of indefinite voices, perspectives, 
perceptions, and encounters, whose exact relations with one another remain relatively 
indeterminate.  
Still, in its many vignettes, the poem clearly dramatizes the experiences of 
particular individuals disconnected from one another, isolated monads confined to their 
own limited modes of self-experience. That is, inasmuch as the poem dissolves the 
boundaries between the inward and the outward (by blurring the distinctions between 
voices, perspectives, etc.), it also offers a portrayal of individuals as radically self-
delineated. Indeed, the individuals it dramatizes lack any substantive sense of 
inwardness—they appear emptied out, hollowed shells devoid of any inner content. They 
lack self-awareness or introspection, even to the limited degree as that experienced by the 
speaker of “Portrait.” They exist only as passive, unresisting exteriorized objects. Thus, 
The Waste Land erects a certain tension between the inner and the outer unique to its own 
representational strategies. On the one hand, it dissolves distinctions between interiority 
and exteriority (by splintering and confusing perspectives, voices, etc.), and yet on the 
other, it emphasizes individuals’ profound monadic self-isolation and utter, unrelenting 
exteriorization. Indeed, in emphasizing such exteriorization, it recalls the particular 
portrayal of the inner/outer tension characteristic of Eliot’s marionette poems. As in these 
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earlier poems, the individuals in The Waste Land appear as puppet figures, possessing 
neither depth nor consciousness.  
And yet, as in “Prufrock” and “Portrait,” The Waste Land also dramatizes the 
experience of self-recognition, only it does so indirectly (yet nonetheless crucially) 
through the figure of Tiresias. Indeed, the poem positions Tiresias as both internal and 
external to its events, but does so in a way that suggests the constitutive interdependency 
of the two locations. What Tiresias witnesses (as external to himself), he also experiences 
(as internal to himself). Both experiences arise simultaneously. As in “Prufrock” or 
“Portrait,” subjectivity here requires objectification, even as objectification requires a 
self-externalizing, self-destabilizing gaze. In short, as I will argue, Tiresias provides the 
lens through which to read Eliot’s poem as an extension of his metaphysical project. 
Through Tiresias, Eliot critiques normative notions of interiority (i.e., as ontologically 
self-contained or self-consistent), revealing instead an understanding of interiority as 
dialectically grounded in its own reflexive self-externalization.    
 
The Waste Land and Interiority 
As with “Prufrock,” many critics read The Waste Land as a poem concerned 
exclusively with the experience and expression of interiority, although now 
autobiographically inflected. A. David Moody, for instance, argues that the poem 
“essentially” traces out the idiosyncratic “landscape of an inward desolation” (116). At 
root, he suggests, the poem explores “the burden of profound personal emotion” that 
Eliot struggled with during this period of his life. Lyndall Gordon makes the same point 
when she suggests that The Waste Land functions largely for Eliot as a “guarded mode of 
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confession” (149). But she goes further than Moody, and suggests that the poem maps an 
even more fundamental psychological dynamic. “For [Eliot] to experience the world as a 
waste,” she argues, “was a prerequisite to experiencing it in faith” (157). Indeed, she 
roots this linear model of spiritual development (i.e., the movement from despair to 
redemption) in Eliot’s own cultural ancestry. “This notion of pilgrimage from 
imperfection to perfection,” she claims, “was deeply rooted in Eliot’s family and their 
Puritan past” (157). However, in reading the poem in strictly biographical terms, both 
Moody and Gordon not only over-reduce it to its immediate sociohistorical context, but 
also promulgate certain assumptions about the relationship between texts and authors that 
in turn suggests a certain notion of the self which Eliot’s own work counters. That is to 
say, in reading the poem as a biographical allegory, both critics assume the poem 
unproblematically, transparently translates the inner contents of Eliot’s life into aesthetic 
form. Implicitly, then, they each posit a notion of interiority as a stable, self-contained 
repository of intelligible experiences which the poet can access and then convert into 
verse. They thus erect a binary between individuals’ inner life and the world of 
experience which they confront and then communicate to others.  
And yet, in his own philosophical speculations regarding subject/object relations, 
Eliot argues that no such radically polarized binary exists. Rather, interiority and 
exteriority (subject and object) remain constitutively interdependent. Each remains 
ontologically rooted in the other. No autonomous, self-contained, self-constituting inner 
space exists which simply absorbs outer experience before translating it into language. 
Such a Lockean or Cartesian notion of the self remains alien to Eliot’s anti-dualist 
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conceptualizations. Indeed, as Jewel Spears Brooker notes, Eliot’s dissertation, in which 
he formulates his most developed views on subject/object relations, only “springs to life 
when it is understood in the context of the revolt against dualism” (178). The work’s 
most fundamental “insight,” for Brooker, “is that the world is one, that reality is one, that 
dualism always leads to self-contradiction” (178).    
Nevertheless, other critics broadly concur with Moody and Gordon’s reading of 
Eliot’s poem, although they do not focus exclusively on the poem’s autobiographical 
elements. In T.S. Eliot’s Negative Way, for instance, Eloise Knapp Hay argues that The 
Waste Land is a “poem of radical doubt and negation, urging that every human desire be 
stilled except the desire for self-surrender, for restraint, and for peace” (48).92 The poem, 
that is, dramatizes emotional and spiritual dilemmas. It stages the individual’s own self-
struggle, a project necessarily inwardly focused. Similarly, in The Mystical Philosophy of 
T.S. Eliot, Fayek M. Ishak argues the poem maps the journey of a “devastated ego that 
seeks refuge in phantasmal ‘appearances’” (65). For Ishak, the poem presumes the 
existence of a constitutively singular ego that confronts a hostile, alienating social reality, 
from which it then “seeks refuge.” He goes on to argue that the poem highlights the 
“dangers of self-imprisonment and the possibility of attaining peace” (75). For Ishak, 
then, the poem expresses the inner spiritual lament and yearning of an individual quester, 
a point Grover Smith makes as well, when he suggests that the poem dramatizes a “quest 
through [a] private waste land, the poet’s quest through the poem” (98). Indeed, by the 
                                                          
92 Of course, she goes on to echo Moody and Gordon, arguing that the poem maps the “prisonhouse” of 
Eliot’s own life experience, that it reflects his own “personal, interior journey” (50). 
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end of the poem, for Smith, the quester “can expect, if not the joy of Ferdinand, then at 
any rate the liberation of Prospero” (98). Each of these critics sees the poem as a kind of 
quest-journey that a singular individual undertakes in order to gain some spiritual insight 
or sense of release. In this sense, their readings overlap with Gordon and Moody’s, for 
whom the poem serves to express Eliot’s personal spiritual and emotional journey. As 
such, they reproduce the monadic notion of self implicit in Gordon and Moody’s 
readings, a notion, again, which I argue Eliot strenuously disputes in both his 
philosophical work and in his poetry.      
 
Voiding the Interior 
Of course, as with “Prufrock,” The Waste Land obviously dramatizes individuals’ 
inner experience, although not in the way that these critics affirm (i.e., as an intelligible, 
ontologically autonomous “given”). For the above critics, the poem’s series of vignettes 
serve to illustrate (as a kind of objective correlative) the speaker-protagonist’s own sense 
of inner desolation (as Moody or Smith claim). They stage individual moments of 
disconnection, disillusion, and isolation which reinforce one another, collectively 
amplifying the putative speaker’s own self-experience. In essence, they function as case 
instances, exemplifying in miniature the speaker’s own interiorized crisis. But I want to 
argue that the poem’s many character portraits in fact undercut essentialized notions of 
interiority. I want to suggest that in these portraits the poem negates inwardness, portrays 
it only to suggest its absolute absence. It denies its characters interiority, by repeatedly 
dramatizing individuals who lack any substantive sense of inwardness. They exist solely 
on the surface, lacking the capacity to perceive themselves or others as persons capable 
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of possessing depth. Their behavior remains rote and mechanical, their relations 
characterized by mutual acts of objectification (and a corollary insensitivity to their own 
object-status). Consequently, their interactions remain exploitative and denigrating.  
For instance, in Part III (“The Fire Sermon”), in its dramatization of the encounter 
between the clerk and typist, the poem presents individuals who not only utterly objectify 
each other, but lack any self-reflective awareness of their objectification. They act 
without cognition—no gap exists between impulse and behavior. Like the marionettes 
from Eliot’s earlier work, they simply perform. Mechanically, the typist comes “home at 
teatime, clears her breakfast, lights / Her stove, and lays out food in tins” (68). The poem 
describes her in terms of her actions, rather than her feelings or thoughts. She acts, rather 
than reflects. It privileges, too, her immediate exterior environment: “Out of the window 
perilously spread, / Her drying combinations touched by the sun’s last rays, / On the 
divan are piled . . . / Stockings, slippers, camisoles, and stays” (68). If the poem invokes 
inwardness here, it does so only through its negation. She remains a blank for readers, 
characterized only by her mechanical behavior and by the material objects that share her 
space (those “stockings, slippers, camisoles,” etc.). Her existence is metonymic; she 
extends physically out into the objects around her. In a sense, they constitute her being. 
Indeed, the poem positions her as merely another object in the collection. Like them, she 
remains devoid of agency, awareness, or self-presence. She exists only as an object 
among objects.  
When her “lover” (the “young man carbuncular”) arrives, he “assaults her at 
once,” and while his advances remain “unreproved,” they also remain “undesired” (69, 
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68). She neither invites nor deters him, but simply submits to him. Of course, his “vanity 
requires no response,” and he “makes a welcome of [her] indifference,” using her as an 
object without concern for the reality of her person (68). Afterwards, he “[b]estows one 
final patronising kiss,” before “grop[ing] his way” down the “unlit” stairs (a trope 
suggestive of a return back into the darkness of his own self-absence, i.e., into that blank 
abyss of the absence of inwardness) (69). The poem describes the clerk in animalistic 
terms, as a creature blindly reduced to the limited sphere of his own bestial desires. 
Utterly lacking in self-awareness (or sympathetic awareness of others), he possesses no 
substantive interiority. Rather, he acts only upon impulse, seeing the typist not as a 
person, but as an instrument for use according to his own unarticulated purposes. Indeed, 
she hardly registers him, either. After he leaves, “her brain allows one half-formed 
thought to pass: / ‘Well now that’s done: and I’m glad it’s over’” (69). Incapable of 
sustained reflection, she simply “smooths her hair with automatic hand, / And puts a 
record on the gramophone” (69). Like the clerk, she behaves mechanically, 
“automatically,” remains confined only to superficial modes of self-experience.  
Thus, rather than depicting interiority, the poem presents the typist and the clerk 
as individuals utterly devoid of inwardness. Each exists solely on the surface, defined 
only by their actions and surroundings. They remain utterly immersed in their own 
unconscious activity, automatons unaware of themselves or of others as selves. 
Significantly, the poem repeatedly dramatizes this particular model of self. Indeed, in the 
final section of Part I (“The Burial of the Dead”), the poem offers its most succinct 
version of this view. In this section, the unnamed speaker reflects on the crowd of people 
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moving wraith-like over London Bridge. “Under the brown fog of a winter dawn,” he 
broodingly observes, “A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many, / I had not thought 
death had undone so many” (62). They lack substantiality, “flowing” over the bridge, 
rather than “walking.” They lack, too, individuality or presence; they move together as a 
crowd, indistinguishable from one another. Most significantly, they strike the speaker as 
ghosts, lifeless, immaterial, and purposeless. They appear devoid of volition, and 
therefore depth or reflection, manifesting themselves only in their spectral movements. 
They remain moving shapes (or shades) rather than persons, each apparently fully 
interchangeable with the other. The speaker goes on to observe that each of these 
individuals “fixe[s] his eyes” directly “before his feet,” suggesting that they remain 
oblivious to (or at least uninterested in) one other, their vision closed in upon their own 
limited movements. They appear to themselves, then, as they appear to the speaker, sheer 
external motion. Like the typist and the clerk, they possess no substantive interiority. 
They remain confined to their own surfaces, their self-experience delineated by their own 
superficiality. Like objects in space, they merely move. Like a Mobius strip, they consist 
only of their own surfaces.  
In this London Bridge passage, as in the encounter between the typist and the 
clerk, the poem again portrays human subjectivity as utterly void of interiority (thus 
privileging the exterior). Further examples abound. At the beginning of Part II (“A Game 
of Chess”), for instance, the woman and the man find one another incomprehensible 
blanks. She says to him, “Are you alive, or not? Is there nothing in your head?” (65). She 
remains haunted by the possibility that beneath his surfaces a vast emptiness lurks. He 
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appears to her a face without depth, a mask masking some inner nothingness. “What are 
your thinking of,” she repeatedly asks (65). The intensity and near hysteria of her 
incessant questioning betrays, too, the fear of her own inner lack. She consists only of the 
questions she continually poses. She dissipates into a constant stream of words that then 
constitutes the texture of her own self-experience. That is, she experiences herself only in 
terms of the questions she poses to the man, which effectively are questions she poses to 
herself as well. Indeed, as with the typist, the poem also identifies the woman here with 
the materiality of her own surroundings. At the beginning of the scene, before the man 
arrives (in an action that parallels the clerk), the poem positions the woman as an object 
in a room full of other objects (e.g., a “sevenbranched candelabra,” “jewels,” “vials of 
ivory and colored glass,” etc.). She dissolves into her surroundings, exists only as one 
object among others, just as she dissolves into the questions she poses to the man and by 
extension to herself.        
In each of these instances, The Waste Land essentially recapitulates the particular 
portrayal of individuals found in the Laforguian-era marionette poems. Like these earlier 
poems, The Waste Land in these vignettes emphasizes individuals’ sheer externality. It 
portrays individuals devoid of any sense of an inner life, who merely ape certain social 
and cultural conventions, and who treat one another as use-instruments. Individuals 
experience others only in terms of their object-status, as opaque shells substantively 
lacking any inner reality. They lack, too, any sense of that dialectical self-reflexivity out 
of which a sense of personal inwardness might emerge. And yet, unlike these earlier 
poems, The Waste Land goes on to challenge this model of self, although not in the 
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manner Moody or Gordon might affirm (i.e., that these “marionettes” merely dramatize 
an inner experience of spiritual or emotional numbness; that they function as objective 
correlatives that transparently communicate the experience of a substantive, ontologically 
stable inner self). Rather, as I will argue below, the poem introduces in its portrayal of 
Tiresias a dialectical procedure similar to (but not identical with) that which operates in 
both “Portrait” and “Prufrock.” That is, through Tiresias’ particular mode of relationality, 
the poem dramatizes interiority as the product of self-reflexive self-perception (as 
opposed to postulating an essentialist model). Tiresias perceives himself in the suffering 
of others, thus initiating through empathetic identification the self-externalization 
necessary for the development of interior self-experience (i.e., he experiences himself 
experiencing). The many individuals the poem portrays, then, function less as varied 
illustrations of the poet-protagonist’s emotional state, than as elements in a dialectic that 
calls interiority itself into being. Indeed, in offering multiple portraits, the poem suggests 
the radical comprehensiveness of dialectical relationality. For Tiresias never experiences 
self-externalization as a completed project, but as an ongoing, inexhaustible encounter 
with others he comes to identify with as himself.  
 
Tiresias and the Self-Externalizing Gaze 
In his notes to the poem, Eliot famously suggests that Tiresias functions as a 
“spectator” rather than a “character” properly immersed in the poem’s field of action, and 
that he “is . . . the most important personage in the poem, uniting all the rest” (78).93 He 
                                                          
93 Some critics resist granting Tiresias any privileged unifying position, emphasizing instead the utter 
fragmentary nature of the poem. See, for instance, Alireza Farahbakhsh’s “Eliot and Postmodern 
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goes on to note that “What Tiresias sees, in fact, is the substance of the poem” (78). 
Crucially, in explaining Tiresias, Eliot focuses on the act of seeing. He identifies Tiresias’ 
gaze as his defining feature, as that which grants him his privileged position. Both a 
character internal and external to the poem, he functions ultimately as a detached 
perspective who perceives and comprehends the events and experiences the poem 
dramatizes, and as such, grants the unity of a focal consciousness to the poem (a point a 
number of scholars note).94 Of course, Tiresias appears by name only during Part III, as 
the typist awaits the clerk. At the beginning of this scene, he reflects, “I Tiresias, old man 
with wrinkled dugs / Perceived the scene, and foretold the rest— / I too awaited the 
expected guest” (68). Outside the scene’s concrete action, a mere observer, he 
nonetheless participates in the event. He “foresuffer[s] all,” experiences himself the brute 
sterility of the encounter “[e]nacted on this same divan or bed” (69). Yet unlike the typist 
or clerk (or the crowd that flows over London Bridge in Part I, or the wealthy couple in 
Part II), he possesses the capacity for sustained reflection and self-articulation. He 
experiences and knows what he experiences; “though blind,” he “can see” (68). He 
brings a consciousness to these events that others lack. Indeed, as Eliot suggests in his 
notes, Tiresias functions as their consciousness, to an extent. Each of these characters’ 
experiences and perspectives (not just the typist and the clerk’s) meet together in him, 
and find articulation through his voice.  
                                                          
Selfhood,” or William Austin’s A Deconstruction of T.S. Eliot: The Fire and the Rose.  See, too, F.B. 
Pinion, who claims that “it seems an unconvincing ingenuity . . . to claim that Tiresias . . . is the ‘most 
important personage’ in the poem” (129). What these critics miss is the dialectic process that Tiresias 
dramatizes. His unitary function is procedural or structural, not necessarily narratological.   
94 See discussion of Grover Smith, Calvin Bedient, and Robert Langbaum below.   
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But understood structurally, Tiresias embodies a very particular procedure which 
parallels that advanced in Eliot’s philosophical speculations regarding subject/object 
relations. Tiresias’ self-reflexive cognition arises precisely out of his position as a 
detached observer. He experiences himself refracted through these other figures, 
encounters himself multiply in them; their experiences he perceives as his own, even as 
they remain unaware of him. Through others, he finds himself externalized to himself. 
They mirror him back to himself in a manner that renders palpable the experience of self-
objectification. The poem suggests, then, that in order to “see,” he must extract himself 
from the events he witnesses. Distance, Tiresias demonstrates, proves prerequisite to 
perception, both of the self and of the other. Perceiving himself in others (as others) 
draws him out of himself as an object to himself, in a sense doubles him (so that he is 
both himself and another). And it is precisely this self-objectifying mirroring process that 
gives rise to the self-reflexivity necessary to articulate the inner impressions of this outer 
experience. He both distances himself from those whom he observes and projects himself 
onto them. In doing so, he distancing himself from himself (doubles himself), thereby 
generating the conditions of possibility by which he might recognize himself as a self. 
That is, perceiving himself as othered to himself allows Tiresias to experience his own 
self-objectification. Thus, he extracts himself from these characters’ experience 
(objectifies them) only to better immerse himself in it (as an experiencing subject 
reflectively self-aware of the experience). They present him to himself in a manner which 
reveals him to himself as an object capable of subjective reflection. In a sense, he posits 
himself as them, so as to dialectically transmute their experience into his own self-
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articulation. To articulate himself through them, in a way, redeems their sordid 
experiences, because it provides them voice. He becomes the subject (i.e., inner self-
cognition) correlative to their objective condition.   
Tiresias, then, demonstrates the necessary and mutually constitutive relation 
between subject and object. Indeed, as noted above he recapitulates the dialectical 
procedure Eliot explores repeatedly in his philosophical work. As he says in his 
dissertation, for example, “there are the two sides, subject and object, neither of which is 
really stable, independent, the measure of the other. In order to consider how the one 
came to be as it is, we are forced to attribute an artificial absoluteness to the other” (22). 
Neither subject nor object ontologically subsist in their own self-essence, but rather rely 
on each other for provisional coherency and conceptual stability. No self, as such, exists, 
any more than does an object without its corresponding subjectively positioned perceiver. 
Tiresias serves precisely to demonstrate the artificiality of an absolutist conception of the 
subject-in-itself or the object-in-itself. Each pole of the binary draws its reality from its 
position in relation to its opposite. Tiresias’ self-awareness roots itself in his awareness of 
the condition of those persons he observes. In them, he observes himself, while at the 
same time preserving the distinctions between their subject positions and his own (the 
very difference, of course, which provides the engine for the poem’s dialectical 
operations).  
It is Tiresias’ particular relation to others, though, that also constitutes the core 
difference between the portrayal of this dialectical procedure in The Waste Land from its 
portrayal in “Portrait” or “Prufrock.” In the earlier two poems, the speaker comes to self-
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cognizance through the experience of forced self-objectification. The poem characterizes 
the encounter as a kind of violent self-awakening (e.g., as when the speaker in “Portrait” 
exclaims to himself, “My self-possession gutters; we are really in the dark” [21]). The 
speakers obtain a sense of their own inwardness only through the mediation of an 
intrusive, rupturing gaze. Objectification shocks them into self-presence, as it were. But 
no such sense of shock characterizes The Waste Land’s treatment of this dialectic. The 
gaze itself originates in Tiresias, and lacks the intrusiveness that marks its presence in the 
earlier poems. Indeed, the objects of Tiresias’ gaze remain unware of his presence. They 
remain unconscious of him (and of themselves), even as he subjects himself to their 
objectively portrayed lived experience.  
In effect, the mirroring function proceeds differently in The Waste Land than in 
“Prufrock” or “Portrait.” Tiresias is not recognized (and thus self-objectified) in the semi-
hostile gaze of other persons, but rather comes to his own self-recognition through the 
self-externalizing, self-positing of his own gaze in the lives of others. In a sense, then, the 
gaze is sympathetically inflected (i.e., he suffers with those he observes), and emanates 
from the very person reflexively transformed by that gaze. Tiresias’ subjective self-
awareness does not arise out of some intrusive act of self-objectification that renders him 
subjectively present to himself as an object (i.e., from an act that emanates from outside 
him). Rather, the self-reflexive act arises out of Tiresias’ own sympathizing gaze 
projected onto others who themselves remain unware of his presence. In this way, the 
poem paradoxically shifts its emphasis away from the self’s near hysterical experience of 
itself (as in “Prufrock”), and onto its dialectically sympathetic relationality with others. 
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For this reason, too, the poem deemphasizes Tiresias as a vocal presence in the poem, 
focusing instead on the multitude of other figures whose lives he sympathetically (indeed 
empathetically) enters. Their experience is his experience, for it is only through them that 
he comes into any awareness of himself.   
A number of critics emphasize Tiresias’ central position in the poem, but for 
reasons contrary to those explored above. Robert Langbaum, for instance, argues that the 
poem possesses a single quester (the unnamed speaker), who adopts in Part III the 
“Tiresias consciousness,” in order to better perceive the “underlying ancient pattern” that 
(unconsciously) informs the actions of each of the poem’s characters, and thus the 
“ancient pattern” by which the speaker-quester can himself find redemption (95). Indeed, 
for Langbaum, “we must understand all the characters as aspects or projections” not only 
of Tiresias, but of the quester (i.e., “projections of his consciousness”) (96). In this, the 
poem functions “essentially” as a “monodrama” (96). Insofar as each of the characters 
meet in Tiresias, he serves as an indicator of the way that each of the characters also 
meets in the speaker-quester. Grover Smith also points to Tiresias as a central figure, and 
in fact makes no distinction between Tiresias and the poem’s unifying focal 
consciousness. Discussing the poem’s opening stanzas, Smith notes that it is Tiresias 
himself who “has been content to let winter cover him ‘in forgetful snow, feeding / A 
little life with dried tubers’” (72). And it is Tiresias, at the end, as Fisher king, who 
shores fragments against his own ruin (98). “What his memories have dramatized,” 
Grover argues, “is his past effort to appease the gnawing of fleshly and spiritual desire. 
They have summed up the crucial experience that leave him unable to participate, 
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through his interior life, in the April renewal of earth” (98). And Calvin Bedient, in an 
argument that echoes not only Langbaum but Lyndall Gordon as well, claims that “all the 
voices in the poem [Tiresias included] are the performances of a single protagonist . . . 
nameless stand-in[s] for Eliot himself” (ix). 
Yet all of these critics possess the same deficiencies that characterize Moody and 
Gordon’s position (as delineated above). To unify the poem beneath the banner of a 
singular, stable, questing consciousness reduces the nuances of the poem’s treatment of 
the nature of human subjectivity. It suggests a solipsistic view of the individual, rather 
than a view that sees the individual as immersed in self-constitutive dialectical encounters 
with others. That is to say, these critics misunderstand the particular manner in which 
Eliot dramatizes the subject/object binary in the poem. Indeed, J. Hillis Miller points to 
the well-referenced quotation from F.H. Bradley that Eliot offers in his notes to the poem 
as evidence of the poem’s essential solipsistic impulse. Bradley writes, “My external 
sensations are no less private to my self than are my thoughts and feelings. In either case 
my experience falls within my own circle, a circle closed on the outside; and, with all its 
elements alike, every sphere is opaque to the others which surround it” (80). For Miller, 
this passage demonstrates the way in which “each mind in [all of] Eliot’s early poetry is 
isolated from all the others” (136). In Eliot’s poetry, Miller explains, “the self can never 
encounter anything other than itself” (136). No external world exists for the self to 
encounter, and against which it can define itself. Interiority is all. As Miller argues, “I am 
because I am everything” (136).  
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But as Jewel Spears Brooker notes, Bradley vehemently denied solipsism, even 
devoting an entire chapter to the subject in Appearance and Reality (193). And in his 
dissertation on Bradley, Eliot, too, devotes a chapter specifically intended to refute the 
possibility of solipsism. The passage Eliot includes in the notes to The Waste Land comes 
from Chapter XXIII of Appearance and Reality, on “Body and Soul.” Placed in its proper 
context, the passage refers only to individuals’ inability to fully articulate lived 
experience. In this section of the chapter, Bradley focuses on the nature and limits of 
communication, not self-consciousness. Significantly, and in contrast with Miller’s 
assertions, Bradley argues in an earlier chapter that “Self-consciousness, as distinct from 
self-feeling, implies a relation. It is the state where the self has become an object that 
stands before the mind” (109). Indeed, even more to the point, he argues that “We begin 
from the outside, but the distinguishing process becomes more inward, until it ends with 
deliberate and conscious introspection” (90). In other words, self-consciousness (interior 
self-experience) arises out of the encounter with an external otherness that re-presents (or 
objectifies) the self back to itself, precisely the procedure that Tiresias embodies.              
Thus, The Waste Land stands at the end of a trajectory begun in the Laforguian 
marionette poems, in which Eliot first offered a dramatization of individuals as utterly 
self-externalized. But it also recapitulates and extends the dialectical operation initiated in 
“Portrait” and “Prufrock,” in which the speakers first come to an awareness of their own 
self-externalization. In each of these poems (from “Convictions” to The Waste Land), 
Eliot consistently refuses to privilege interiority as an ontologically stable mode of 
subjectivity sufficient in itself. Individuals either remain confined to their own surface 
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features (i.e., their socially inscribed personas or set performances), or develop a sense of 
inwardness out of a self-reflexive realization of themselves as objects subject to 
objectification. In “Portrait” and “Prufrock,” the speakers encounter themselves as selves 
only through the process of (semi-) violent self-objectification. An intrusive, external 
gaze initiates the dialectic. In The Waste Land, on the other hand, self-objectification 
through identity with the other renders the self visible to itself. Tiresias perceives himself 
externalized in others’ experiences, an act of self-objectification which renders him 
present to himself through the experience of experiencing others as the self, an 
interiorized self-consciousness which he proves in the very act of articulating it. As in his 
philosophical work, Eliot thus portrays the subject/object binary in terms of the mutual 
interdependency of the two terms. Both interiority and exteriority (or depth and surface) 
imply one another. Neither exists in isolation from the other, but dialectically intertwine, 
such that only the experience of objectification (for instance) can reflexively give rise to 
the experience of interiority. And conversely, interiority as such implies the self-
conscious experience of oneself as an object.    
However, neither “Portrait,” “Prufrock,” nor The Waste Land dramatizes this 
dialectical relation between the inward and the outward as a positive experience. Each of 
these poems, in various ways, portrays the emergence of interiority as the end product of 
an agonizing process. As noted above, in both “Portrait” and “Prufrock,” self-
consciousness results from a near violent encounter with the objectifying gaze of the 
other. Moreover, the speakers’ own self-experience remains characterized by a near-
hysterical sense of disorientation and dislocation. And in The Waste Land, Tiresias’ self-
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experience comes inflected through the experience of self-suffering (as well as 
witnessing others suffer, especially since they remain incapable of acknowledging it). 
Moreover, these poems each appear to suggest that the sense of interiority generated 
through encounter with an external otherness itself then remains stably established (even 
if negatively experienced, as in “Prufrock”). While this fundamental dialectical relation 
between interiority and exteriority will remain unchanged over the course of Eliot’s 
career (whether in prose or poetry), the way he encodes the experience does alter. 
Chapter Five will discuss the ways in which Eliot alters the dramatization of this binary 
in his later work, from “Ash-Wednesday” to Four Quartets. Rather than portraying the 
subject/object relation negatively and as a final product, Eliot’s later work reveals a more 
positive view of the relation, while at the same time refusing closure to the process. That 
is to say, Eliot’s later work demonstrates how interiority remains inherently unstable, and 
yet how this instability itself offers the possibility for a self-transcendence which his later 
work will go on to affirm.  
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CHAPTER V 
DISSOLUTION AND CONSTITUTION IN  
SWEENEY AGONISTES, “ASH WEDNESDAY,” AND FOUR QUARTETS 
 
 In 1929’s “Dante,” Eliot writes of those in the inferno, that “the torment issues 
from the very nature of the damned themselves, expresses their essence; they writhe in 
the torment of their own perpetually perverted nature” (220). They remain closed in on 
themselves, he seems to suggest, twisted round their own distorted thoughts and desires. 
Their suffering stems from their own inability to distance themselves from themselves, to 
come to some self-reflective awareness that they remain the source of their own torment 
(that it “expresses their essence”). In other words, they lack self-knowledge, a lack that 
links them to many of the figures in Eliot’s own work, from “Convictions” through The 
Waste Land. (Recall those marionettes from the March Hare poems, or the ghostly crowd 
that “flows” over London Bridge in The Waste Land.) Significantly, in the same passage 
from “Dante,” Eliot contrasts the souls in the inferno with those in purgatory, and argues 
that for those in purgatory, “the torment of flame is deliberately and consciously 
accepted.” Those “in purgatory,” he continues, “suffer because they wish to suffer, for 
purgation” (220, emphasis in original).  In “their suffering,” he adds, “is hope” (220).  
The difference, then, between those in the inferno and those in purgatory perhaps 
lies in the difference between their respective states of reflexive self-awareness. Indeed, 
those in purgatory actively seek the “triumph of a new renunciation”; they seek to 
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unmake and then reconstitute themselves in an act of submission to a divine order which 
both exceeds and encompasses them (226). That is to say, Eliot appears to posit a model 
of dialectical renunciation in his study of Dante that parallels the model of selfhood he 
advances in his own theory and poetry. He suggests that damnation consists of 
individuals’ inability to experience themselves as objects to themselves. They remain 
perpetually confined (condemned) to their own insular sphere of subjective self-
experience. Conversely, those in purgatory come to some awareness, however limited, of 
themselves as objects acting in a world of other objects. Thus externalized to themselves, 
they seek to purge away the merely subjective (the limited, the insular) in order to 
achieve a higher, more complex or comprehensive state of refined selfhood. 
Significantly, this gap between these two states formally correlates to the shift in his 
poetics that takes place between “Convictions” and “Prufrock.” As I argued in Chapter 
Four, in his earliest poems, Eliot dramatizes individuals who lack any sense of self-
awareness. They exist only as depthless surfaces, confined to rote performances which 
they mechanically enact. Beginning in “Prufrock” (although gestured towards in 
“Portrait”), Eliot’s personages come to a nascent awareness of themselves as subjects 
capable of objectification. That is, they come to experience their own self-objectification.  
But in contrast to Dante’s vision, the emotional valence of Eliot’s earliest poems 
remains highly negative. Indeed, as the epigraph to “Prufrock” suggests, Eliot casts his 
speaker as one of the damned, rather than a soul working its way through purgatory. 
While the portrayal of the self-reflexive structure of subjectivity remains similar between 
the two poems (Purgatory and “Prufrock”), Eliot suggests that individuals do not 
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experience self-objectification as redemptive. However, by the time he reaches “Ash 
Wednesday,” Eliot has not only transformed a negative experience into a positive one, 
but further complicated his own dialectical procedure. For rather than emphasizing only 
the emergence of self-awareness through the experience of self-objectification, Eliot’s 
later work advances a third procedure, whereby the sense of self established through 
awareness of the self is itself subjected to further (self-negating) objectification. That is to 
say, individuals do not reflexively discover some deeper, ontologically stable self (as 
Matthew Arnold or Henri Bergson might argue), but rather encounter a self that itself 
remains subject to further de-constitution. Eliot denies the self an essential uniformity, 
and suggests rather that the self remains ever susceptible to further rupturing through 
further experiences of self-objectification. In essence, Eliot posits a purgative process, by 
which the self experiences its own perpetual self-emptying. And just as for Dante, 
purgation remains a positive experience, so, too, does it remain redemptive for Eliot.  
This chapter will trace in Eliot’s middle and late work the emergence of a new 
stage in his portrayal of the dialectical relation between interiority and exteriority. I will 
argue that Eliot moves beyond the emphasis on bounded, sealed surfaces as developed in 
his earliest March Hare poems as well as in The Waste Land, and that he complicates and 
extends the dialectic he first begins to explore in “Portrait” and “Prufrock.” I will argue 
that in poems (or verse dramas) such as Sweeney Agonistes, “Ash Wednesday,” and Four 
Quartets, Eliot portrays surfaces as constitutively unstable, permeable, and prone to 
disintegration and fragmentation. He emphasizes their abject vulnerability, or tendency 
towards perpetual decay. Since for Eliot, external surfaces necessarily represent inner 
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experience (as a kind of objective correlative), so then to represent the incoherence of the 
surface is to represent the incoherence of the interior. Whereas in “Portrait” and 
“Prufrock” reflexivity gave rise to a nascent (though tenuous) sense of semi-authentic 
inwardness, his later work undercuts this newly emergent sense of an inner self by 
suggesting its fundamental, constitutive instability. For even as the self manifests to itself 
through the process of its own self-externalization, the self which manifests remains 
vulnerable to further acts of self-sundering objectification. That is to say, Eliot portrays a 
notion of self characterized by the endless dialectical interrelation of the inward and the 
outward (the unending subjective experience of self-objectification).  
Each of these three texts (Sweeney Agonistes, “Ash Wednesday,” and Four 
Quartets) dramatizes this dialectical procedure, and each, too, portrays this process as a 
kind of self-redemptive purgative experience. Indeed, each builds incrementally upon the 
other, as Eliot’s purgative, self-deconstructive vision slowly develops. Sweeney largely 
retains the negative valance of his earlier poems, while at the same time emphasizing the 
instability of the body/self that the later two poems will further explore. “Ash 
Wednesday” initiates a tonal transformation, by which bodily (or self) disintegration 
comes to seem a necessary step in the further development of interiority. And in Four 
Quartets, through the image of incarnational embodiment, Eliot offers a vision of the self 
as poised between disintegration and continuance, between its own self-rupturing 
externalization and sense of internal self-perpetuation. Each of these works, then, reflects 
the ongoing presence of a dialectical operation that began to emerge in his poetry as early 
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as “Portrait,” and of an unending preoccupation with the relation between interiority and 
exteriority that dates from his earliest unpublished poetry.                              
 
From “Prufrock” to Sweeney Agonistes   
 As discussed in Chapter Four, in “Prufrock,” Eliot dramatizes the experience of 
self-objectification and the resultant, disorienting sense of inwardness that reflexively 
emerges. As noted then, Eliot draws attention to Prufrock’s own bodily materiality, to his 
concrete, self-bounded material form. Prufrock fixates, for instance, on his “morning 
coat” and on his “collar mount[ed] firmly to the chin.” He obsesses, too, over the 
“thin[ness]” of his “arms and legs” as well as the “bald spot in the middle of [his] hair” 
(14). In dwelling on his body in this way, he reveals the sense of self-enclosure and 
isolation that characterizes his immediate self-experience. His body marks the extent of 
his own self-experience, functions as an encircling, imprisoning sphere. But Prufrock’s 
focus on the body also reveals an anxiety over the solidity or coherence of that body. His 
descriptions of himself implicitly reflect a concern over his own self-attenuation. His 
“arms and legs” are literally “thin,” as is his hair. He confesses, too, “I grow old . . . I 
grow old,” suggesting a sense of permeating bodily weakening (16). But the text goes 
further. In a striking image, which anticipates some of the imagery of “Ash Wednesday,” 
Prufrock sees his “head (grown slightly bald) / brought in upon a platter” (15). He 
portrays his own self-dismembering, however briefly. Most significantly, though, when 
recounting those “eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase,” he likens himself to an insect 
pierced by a pin, “wriggling on the wall” (14). Prufrock experiences the gaze of the other 
not merely as an assault, but as an impaling. Their gaze ruptures his sense of self-totality. 
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Even as they “fix [him] in a formulated phrase” (and thereby externalize him to himself 
as an object subject to their gaze), they disrupt the tentative coherence established in the 
act of that objectification. “Prufrock,” then, portrays not only the process of self-
objectification, but reveals, too, the ultimate instability of the object generated through 
that process.  
 Thus, in “Prufrock,” Eliot emphasizes the lack of any ontologically intrinsic 
external coherence. Surfaces, the poem suggests, remain open, permeable, and 
contingent. The external itself (as a concept) remains the product of an externalizing, 
objectifying gaze, and thus remains vulnerable to further reconstitution within that gaze. 
As Eliot himself puts it in his dissertation, “We arrive at objects . . . by meaning objects; 
sensations organize themselves around a . . . point of attention and the world of feeling is 
transmogrified into a world of self and object” (137). But for Eliot, “objects are 
constantly shifting, and new transpositions of objectivity and feeling constantly 
developing” (155). Thus objects (as objects) remain inherently unstable, subject to 
perspectival alterations and new relations. When the self perceives itself as an object 
through the self-externalizing gaze of the other, the self, too, perceives itself as an object 
subject to further reconstitution. Prufrock, of course, senses this and responds with a 
degree of horror. Still, as argued in Chapter Four, Eliot’s early work focuses 
predominately on the mutually constitutive dialectical interrelation between subjects and 
objects. Inwardness develops when individuals perceive themselves as selves through 
their own self-objectification. His later work, on the other hand, goes on to emphasize the 
inherent instability of the subjects and objects generated out of this dialectical matrix. 
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Indeed, beginning with Sweeney Agonistes, Eliot emphasizes the de-constitution of the 
self, whether figured as subject or object. 
 As Russell Elliott Murphy points out, Eliot originally intended Sweeney Agonistes 
as a kind of “successor” work to The Waste Land (380). Following the success of the 
latter, he sought a new direction for his poetry, and turned to verse drama as a “suitable” 
vehicle (380). Indeed, in a conversation with Arnold Bennett in 1924, Eliot confessed that 
“he had definitely given up [the] form of writing” exhibited in The Waste Land, and that 
he now sought to “write a drama of modern life (furnished flat sort of people) in a 
rhythmic prose ‘perhaps with certain things in it accentuated by drum beats’” (qtd in 
Roby 22). Eliot began work on portions of Sweeney as early as 1923, only two years after 
the publication of The Waste Land (Murphy 380). But of course, as a character, Sweeney 
stems from much earlier in Eliot’s career, featuring in four other poems, “Sweeney 
among the Nightingales,” “Sweeney Erect,” “Mr. Eliot’s Sunday Morning Service,” and 
(however briefly) The Waste Land itself. As such, despite Eliot’s protestations to the 
contrary, Sweeney marks a continuation of his earlier projects, at least at one level, 
despite the variation to dramatic form. Indeed, Helen Gardner argues that not only the 
characters mark a continuation between the two periods, but that thematic similarities 
exist as well. What Sweeney reveals, for Gardner, “is the boredom and horror that lie 
beneath the commonplace and ugly” (129). But such is the theme, she suggests, of all 
Eliot’s early work. “The theme of Mr. Eliot’s early verse,” she affirms, “finds supreme 
expression in The Waste Land, to which Sweeney Agonistes appears a rather sterile 
appendix” (132). Murphy echoes this when he claims that Sweeney “strikes a ponderous 
 
 
218 
 
tone sufficient to make it seem now, with the possible exception of ‘The Hollow Men,’ 
the last gasp of The Waste Land’s more despairing and depressing aspects, revealing the 
mordantly savage quality of verse that had become virtually a hallmark of Eliot’s poetry 
by this point in time” (380).     
 But Gardner overlooks the profound differences that the dramatic form of the play 
introduces. Drama places individuals in confrontation with one another in a way that 
highlights their ontological distinctness from each other. It thus allows for a more distinct 
portrayal of subject/object relations in that individuals speak out of their own subjective 
centers while at the same time engaging others as objects of attention. Speakers constitute 
themselves in relation to one another in the very act of engaging with one another. On the 
other hand, the dramatic monologue (such as “Portrait” or “Prufrock”) necessarily 
privileges the perspective of a single subjective persona. What the speaker of a dramatic 
monologue perceives is necessarily constrained by the epistemological frame intrinsic to 
the speaker’s own subjective position. Even The Waste Land, which (strictly speaking) is 
not a dramatic monologue (contrary to what Grover Smith may suggest),95 privileges the 
subjective perspective, in that it works to convey the same sense of self-enclosure and 
entrapment (the gap that divides the subject from the object or the inner from the outer) 
that characterizes poems such as “Prufrock” or even “Convictions.”  
 What Sweeney’s dramatic form offers, then, is a new method for positing 
subject/object relations. It allows Eliot to continue to explore the inner/outer binary in a 
way his earlier work would no longer allow, despite the fact that he left the play 
                                                          
95 For Smith, as noted in Chapter Four, Tiresias is The Waste Land’s speaker.  
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uncompleted (although, as Kinley Roby notes, “with the passage of time” the play 
“appears increasingly . . . to be . . . a finished work” [22]). For indeed, Sweeney 
dramatizes the same concern with the relation between the internal and the external that 
characterizes much of Eliot’s work, as he continues to emphasize the fundamental 
instability of both terms of the binary (of both subject and object). But in Sweeney he no 
longer dwells solely on the emergence of an inwardness predicated on the experience of 
self-objectification, but focuses rather on the desire for self-dissolution, although he does 
so by first emphasizing the same sense of isolation and epistemological limitation that 
characterizes much of his earlier work. In this sense, Gardner is right to claim that the 
poem dwells on the self-imprisoning “boredom and horror” that underlies social reality. 
And yet, she overlooks the poem’s deeper dialectical impulses. In short, what Sweeney 
dramatizes is the individuals’ inner experience of itself as an isolated subject 
oppositionally opposed to the object of the other, and the concomitant desire to overcome 
that status through self-dissolution into the other.  
 
Sweeney and Oppositional Relations  
Sweeney Agonistes consists of two “fragments,” both of which take place in what 
appears to be a brothel (or flat-turned-brothel). As such, from the beginning, the play 
hints at a model of human relations characterized by objectification and opposition. In 
this, the play also channels the relational dysfunction and sexual objectification that 
characterizes a number of crucial passages in The Waste Land (e.g., the clerk and the 
typist, the wealthy couple in “A Game of Chess,” Lil and Albert). And as in The Waste 
Land, Sweeney also presents individuals largely devoid of any sense of substantive 
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interiority or self-awareness. Indeed, as in his work ranging from “Convictions” to The 
Waste Land, in Sweeney Eliot collapses the gap between inner and outer, reduces the 
inward to its outer expressions. Individuals exist only as the series of shifting outer 
surfaces they present to others. Shortly after the play opens, for example, Dusty and 
Doris play at cards, identifying others according to particular cards drawn from the deck: 
 
Dusty:                               First is. What is? 
Doris: The King of Clubs 
Dusty:                               That’s Pereira 
Doris: It might be Sweeney 
Dusty:                                It’s Pereira 
Doris: It might just as well be Sweeney 
………………………………………. 
Doris: Here’s the three. What’s that mean? 
Dusty: ‘News of an absent friend’. —Pereira 
Doris: The Queen of Hearts!—Mrs. Porter! 
Dusty: Or it might be you 
Doris:                                Or it might be you  
………………………………………. 
Dusty: The Knave of Spades 
Doris:                                That’ll be Snow 
………………………………………. 
Doris: Of course, the Knave of Hearts is Sam! (117-118) 
 
They link Pereira here to the “King of Clubs,” Mrs. Porter to the “Queen of Hearts,” and 
Sam Wauchope to the “Knave of Hearts. (117, 118). The play configures these 
individuals as repeatable, predictable types. They lack depth, individuality, or even 
specificity (e.g., they identify both Sweeney and Pereira with the “King of Clubs,” for 
instance). Each corresponds with a card which in some significant way seems to 
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encapsulate their persona or essence. The inward (what exists of it) literally corresponds 
with an externalized marker.96   
 Grover Smith makes a superficially similar argument when he points out that the 
play presents characters in pairs, one female and three male: Doris and Dusty, Sweeney 
and Pereira, Sam and Horsfall, Klipstein and Krumpacker. He goes on to argue that each 
of these pairs “suggests opposed personalities,” although he admits that “the rudimentary 
dramatic construction makes the matter uncertain” (“T.S. Eliot” 432). He argues further 
that this “pervasive doubling denot[es] perhaps dark and light sides to the self, as in 
Yeats” (433). That is to say, Smith sees Sweeney’s characters essentially as types, as 
opposed elements of a generic binary rather than as complex, unrepeatable, singular 
individuals. He privileges their oppositional status, views them simply as partial persons, 
lacking individual self-coherency or substantiality. They exist only insofar as they exist 
relationally and superficially. But Smith’s binary involves a kind of pseudo-Jungian 
psychology that ignores the tension generated by the oppositional relations he 
emphasizes. He takes for granted their typological status while overlooking the very 
antagonisms encoded in the binary that characterizes their relations. In other words, he 
ignores the subject/object binary that necessarily complicates the reductionist 
oppositional (and psychological) binary he constructs. And in overlooking the 
subject/object binary, he misrepresents the mode of typological flattening which the play 
dramatizes. 
                                                          
96 In a sense, Eliot revisits in Sweeney the marionette trope prevalent in his Laforguian-era poetry. These 
characters lack any sense of themselves as selves. They perform together, blindly enact certain roles. 
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 For the play indeed portrays individuals as half-formed, flattened, marionette-
figures (i.e., types), but it also places individuals in generative, antagonistic tension with 
one another, and in doing so, creates the conditions of possibility by which individuals 
come reflexively to experience themselves as experiencers, and thus to a nascent sense of 
inwardness. Indeed, the play’s first epigraph (of two) comes from Aeschylus’ 
Choephoroi (The Libation Bearers), and points towards a theme Eliot will explore in 
more detail in The Family Reunion. In the epigraph, Eliot quotes one of Orestes’ lines: 
“You don’t see them, you don’t—but I see them: they are hunting me down, I must move 
on” (115). As in both “Portrait” and “Prufrock,” Eliot introduces here at the very 
beginning of the play the notion of the self-destructive and yet self-generative gaze. 
Referring to the Furies that pursue Orestes for avenging his father’s death by slaying his 
mother, the passage suggests both a threat to the self as well as an identity generated out 
of the protagonist’s relation to the gaze. The individual encounters an externalized 
otherness, which works to position the individual as a subject subject to the antagonizing 
gaze. Thus, the play opens with an epigraph that suggests a certain notion of 
subject/object relations out of which a degree of tenuous inwardness emerges (i.e., that 
the self knows itself as that which the furies pursue).    
In fact, the opening lines between Dusty and Doris only reiterate the binary 
suggested by the initial epigraph. In the first line of the play, Dusty says to Doris, “How 
about Pereira,” to which Doris responds, “He’s no gentleman, Pereira: / You can’t trust 
him” (115). In turn, Dusty reflects, “And if you can’t trust him— / Then you never know 
what he’s going to do” (115). The conversation is not an accidental one. As they 
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converse, the two women await Pereira’s expected call, but remain apprehensive about 
what to say to him when he finally phones: 
         
Dusty: Sam’s all right 
Doris:                                  But Pereira won’t do. 
 We can’t have Pereira 
 Dusty:                                 Well what you going to do? 
 Telephone: Ting a ling ling 
         Ting a ling ling 
 Dusty:                                 That’s Pereira 
 Doris: Yes, that’s Pereira 
 Dusty:                                 Well what you going to do?  
Telephone: Ting a ling ling 
         Ting a ling ling 
 Dusty:                                 That’s Pereira 
 Doris:  Well can’t you stop that horrible noise? 
  Pick up the receiver 
 Dusty:                                 What’ll I say? 
 Doris:  Say what you like: say I’m ill 
  Say I broke my leg on the stairs 
  Say we’ve had a fire. (116) 
 
 
They seem to view him as a kind of threat, although they remain unable to fully articulate 
the nature of the threat he embodies. He simply hovers over them as a vague menace, 
suggested in part through the phone’s insistent “Ting a ling ling,” which foreshadows, 
too, the clamorous “knocking” which concludes both this scene as well as the second 
“fragment.” As Rick de Villiers also points out, they associate him with the “King of 
Clubs,” “a card emblematic of violence and brute, primitive force” (23). In this sense, 
Pereira possesses some of the same spiritual power and purpose as do the Furies. Doris 
and Dusty perceive him as pursuing them, and thus recapitulate (however ambiguously) 
the same subject/object binary that delineates the relation between Orestes and the Furies. 
Indeed, Carol Smith argues that Pereira “represents a positive spiritual force who keeps 
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insistently calling and who must some day be reckoned with, even if not now. . . . The 
pursuing spiritual force is no ‘gentleman’ both because he is unpredictable and relentless 
and because he demands the agony of purgation” (24). While it may be premature to 
claim, as Smith does, that Pereira embodies a “positive” force, she is right to point out 
that he demands from Dusty and Doris (and others, perhaps) a reckoning of sorts, in a 
similar way the Furies demand of Orestes.  
Of course, the play never suggests that either Doris or Dusty achieve any 
substantive sense of interiority. They remain largely unconscious of themselves as selves 
(or of others as others), as do most of the play’s other figures, with the exception, 
perhaps, of Sweeney. Of all the individuals in the play, Sweeney corresponds most with 
the Orestes of the epigraph. For of all the play’s figures, Sweeney reveals a degree of 
self-awareness that in fact separates him from the other figures, and the knowledge 
haunts him, as the Furies do Orestes. Sweeney is the play’s Prufrock, the one who has 
come to some cognizance of himself as a self, as distinct from a mere role or social 
persona. “I’ve been born, and once is enough,” he declares to Doris, “You don’t 
remember, but I remember, / Once is enough” (122). None of the play’s other figures is 
capable of making such a remark. It denotes not only Sweeney’s distance from them, but 
Sweeney’s own sense of his distance from them.  
Indeed, as the verse drama progresses, he sets himself up in opposition to the 
others, antagonizes them, attempts to provoke them, thus further demonstrating his 
essential difference from them. Consider this exchange between Sweeney and Doris:  
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Sweeney: Birth, and copulation, and death.   
That’s all, that’s all, that’s all, that’s all, 
Birth, copulation, and death. 
 Doris: I’d be bored. 
 Sweeney:                             You’d be bored. 
  Birth, copulation and death. 
 Doris: I’d be bored. 
 Sweeney:                             You’d be bored. 
  Birth, copulation, and death. 
  That’s all the facts when you come to brass tacks: 
  Birth, copulation, and death. (122) 
 
 
Functioning here as a foil, and in a sense standing in for the other characters (who remain 
silent during this exchange), Doris seems unable to comprehend Sweeney’s negative 
vision of human relations and purposes. What for Sweeney constitutes his chief 
existential horror is for Doris simply “boring.” As such, Doris helps illustrate through 
contrast Sweeney’s fundamental difference from the other characters. He grasps the 
supposed “facts” in ways that they do not. They remain existentially oblivious, objects 
devoid of knowledge of themselves as subjects, whereas Sweeney understands himself in 
part in relation to his own existential finitude. He self-consciously perceives his own 
materially objective self-delineation. He perceives himself (as a self) in perceiving his 
own external limitations, however negatively construed. That is to say, he perceives 
himself as an object subject to external forces and constraints. In contrast, the other 
characters in the verse drama appear to lack the self-reflexive capacity to experience 
themselves as objects to themselves. They remain unable to perceive themselves 
externalized to themselves, and thus lack the consequent inwardness such experience 
provides. 
 
 
226 
 
More importantly, as Villiers argues, what differentiates Sweeney from the others 
is his “aware[ness] of sin,” an awareness that “makes his companions uncomfortable by 
drawing their attention to the spiritual wasteland in which they reside” (23). Sweeney 
expresses this sense of sin through his story of the “man [who] once did a girl in,” a man 
the text clearly identifies with Sweeney, figuratively if not literally (124). A crime of this 
magnitude places the perpetrator in a spiritual, emotional, and psychological category all 
to himself. As Eliot notes in a remarkably anticipatory passage from 1917’s “Eeldrop and 
Appleplex,” “In Gopsum Street a man murders his mistress. The important fact is that for 
the man the act is eternal, and for that brief space he has to live, he is already dead. He is 
already in a different world from ours. He has crossed the frontier” (Complete 527). 
William Spanos notes the similarities between Eliot’s reflections in “Eeldrop,” the 
psychological portraiture in Sweeney, and Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment. Through 
his monstrous transgression, the spiritually sensitive criminal (Raskolnikov, Sweeney, 
etc.) “discovers another dimension of reality that transfigures his earlier perspective on 
life and death” (11-12). The world no longer appears as it once did to such an individual. 
Between the criminal and the normative community now yawns an impassable void.  
Both Villiers and Spanos are correct to point to the notion of sin and the 
“phenomenology of alienation” (as Spanos puts it) that stems from it as crucial concepts 
for comprehending Sweeney’s spiritual condition (12). Indeed, Eliot himself writes in 
1930’s “Baudelaire” that “the recognition of the reality of Sin is a New Life; and the 
possibility of damnation is so immense a relief in a world of electoral reform, plebiscites, 
sex reform and dress reform, that damnation itself is an immediate form of salvation—of 
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salvation from the ennui of modern life, because it at last gives some significance to 
living” (Selected 235). But Sweeney’s sense of sin only makes sense if understood within 
a particular dialectical framework. Sweeney must feel not only that his crime (or the 
crime that he recounts) is constitutively self-alienating (i.e., that it functionally excludes 
him from the community whose social norms he violates), but that in some sense his 
crime is in itself already known by another, even if the crime remains a secret.  
That is to say, what drives the development of self-consciousness in him (i.e., of 
guilt, and thus of interiority), is the sense that he is subject to judgement, that some 
objective, perceiving, externalized otherness will in some sense call him to account. As 
the chorus chants at the play’s end (in an immediate response to Sweeney’s macabre 
tale):  
 
When you’re alone in the middle of the night and  
       you wake in a sweat and a hell of a fright 
When you’re alone in the middle of the bed and 
       you wake like someone hit you in the head 
…………………………………………………. 
And you wait for a knock and the turning of a lock   
       for you know the hangman’s waiting for you. (126)  
 
 
In this, Sweeney’s situation indeed mirrors Orestes’. Both protagonists feel pursued, both 
sense the penetrating gaze of some externalized (though undefined) other. The sensation 
of guilt thus effects a self-doubling, whereby the self experiences itself externalized to 
itself. Sweeney (like Prufrock, to an extent) encounters himself as a stranger to himself, 
undergoes a profound decentering, which he experiences as an awakening of sorts. 
Significantly, Sweeney attempts to duplicate the experience of self-externalization 
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through the veiled attempts at confession he engages in with the others, but their deafness 
rebuffs him, and thus further isolates him, thereby intensifying the experience of self that 
has given rise to his sense of inwardness. His inability to communicate his inner 
experience further heightens his sense of himself as a self, since it amplifies the 
oppositional relation between Sweeney and the others. He senses his difference, even as 
he attempts to overcome it through confession (of a sort).      
Thus, on one level, Sweeney recapitulates much of what Eliot explores in his 
earlier poetry. It portrays the marionette consciousness characteristic of individuals in 
many of Eliot’s earlier poems, while at the same time dramatizing the emergence of a 
sense of interiority out of individuals’ experience of self-externalization. In this, it 
rearticulates the dialectical relation between interiority and exteriority also prevalent in 
his earlier work. Sweeney develops a definitive sense of interiority only when he 
experiences himself externalized from (or to) himself. The experience of self-inwardness 
depends upon the experience of self-externalization. Both events remain inextricably 
bound up with one another, arise (as experiential events) concurrently. To this extent, 
Helen Gardner is correct. Sweeney in some sense does offer a “rather sterile appendix” to 
Eliot’s previous efforts. Indeed, Gardner, too, points to an inner/out binary that provides 
the play thematic structure, although for her the binary is not essentially dialectical and 
involves rather the opposition between the “outer life of parties which tries to keep 
boredom at bay” and the “inner life of nightmare” (130).      
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Sweeney and Self-Dissolution  
But what Gardner misses, and what fundamentally separates the play from what 
comes before is the play’s unrelenting emphasis on self-dissolution and dissociation. 
Indeed, what separates Sweeney, say, from Prufrock is in fact what separates Sweeney 
from “Prufrock.” Whereas “Prufrock” (or “Portrait” or even The Waste Land) 
emphasized primarily the dialectical development of a tenuous inwardness out of the 
experience of semi-violent self-externalization, Sweeney moves a step beyond this and 
dramatizes the subsequent experience of the dissolubility of this new sense of self. In 
other words, the play dramatizes the instability of the very inner/outer binary it implicitly 
constructs. The self (as inwardly experienced through its own self-externalization) retains 
a tenuousness that defies its own nascent sense of self-substantiality. Indeed, individuals 
experience inwardness as such as a traumatic encounter. The experience of self-
objectification which renders individuals apparent to themselves at the same time marks 
an experience of self-sundering, by which the self experiences itself as doubled or 
internally ruptured. The boundary between inner and outer becomes subsequently 
unstable.   
Examples abound. For instance, when Sweeney first appears (at the beginning of 
the second fragment), his first lines involve images of consumption and bodily 
disintegration. “I’ll carry you off / To a cannibal isle,” he says to Doris. To which she 
responds, “You’ll be the cannibal” (121). Cannibalism immediately suggests not only 
bodily decomposition, but the disintegration of one individual into another. It involves, in 
other words, the dissolution of an object into a subject, the collapse of the space between 
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the two, in that the internal incorporates the external into itself. It reflects the subject’s 
desire to violently overcome the distance between itself and that external to itself by 
literally devouring the external object. Sweeney’s first words express a desire (however 
ironically or comically intended) to consume Doris, to dissolve her into himself. “I’ll 
gobble you up,” he exclaims, “I’ll be the cannibal / . . . . I’ll convert you! / Into a stew. / 
A nice little, white little, missionary stew” (121). For Sweeney, this cannibalistic impulse 
stems not (necessarily) from some dehumanizing misogynistic masculine ideology which 
sees the female simply as an object to consume for the sake of bodily gratification (i.e., 
the female as the site for the exercise of male power), but from a desire to bridge the gap 
that marks him to himself as a consciousness internally aware of itself as an object 
distinct from other external objects. That is to say, Sweeney’s (ironic, comic, 
nightmarish) desire to consume Doris marks a concurrent desire to lose himself in the act 
of consumption. He seeks to close the gap between himself and the other (the inner and 
the outer), a necessarily violent act which conforms to the violent act that first gives rise 
to the self’s inward sense of itself as a self in contradistinction to others. 
Sweeney’s story of the “man [who] once did a girl in” only reiterates and deepens 
the emphasis on the dissolution of the distinction between subject and object (and thus of 
the instability of the self). His grotesque story involves a man who dissolves a woman in 
a bath of lysol. But the line between the literal and the figurative blurs, for Sweeney 
seems less interested in the factuality of the account than in its allegorical, psychological, 
or spiritual import. Indeed, the tale involves not only the woman’s bodily dissolution but 
the man’s psychological disintegration. That is, the woman’s decomposition correlates 
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with the perpetrator’s own self-decomposition as well. The disintegration of the external 
mirrors the disintegration of the internal. Both events necessarily, dialectically intertwine 
with one another. As Sweeney explains, the man loses the capacity to distinguish 
between his fate and the woman’s (or between his identity and hers): “He didn’t know if 
he was alive / and the girl was dead / He didn’t know if the girl was alive / and he was 
dead / He didn’t know if they were both alive / or both were dead” (125). These syntactic 
permutations suggest Sweeney’s own sense of the binary relation between the inner and 
the outer (or the subject and the object). Who here is the subject and who the object, he 
seems to ask? Who in fact has been decomposed? Where is the line that distinguishes 
between the two individuals or states-of-being?97 His violent act thus defines him to 
himself even as it deconstructs him as a self. In this, the lines suggest, too, that the sense 
of interiority generated through the self-doubling (or self-externalizing) his crime 
enables, remains subject to degeneration even in the moment of its initial self-
constitution. 
This sense of self-dissolution (or of the collapse between inner and outer) is not 
merely some incidental element tangential to the play’s other interests. As noted above, 
the very first epigraph hints at themes of pursuit and self-destruction. The Furies pursue 
Orestes in order to rend him apart, even as Sweeney (it seems) feels similarly pursued. 
And indeed, the play’s final lines, too, suggest such an image. In the final song, as quoted 
above, Wauchope, Horsfall, Klipstein, and Krumpacker sing, “You dreamt you waked up 
                                                          
97 Wauchope and Horsfall reiterate this ambiguity when they sing, “Under the bamboo tree / Two live as 
one / One live as two / Two live as three” (122). 
 
 
232 
 
at seven o’clock and it’s / foggy and it’s damp and it’s dawn and it’s dark / And you wait 
for a knock and the turning of a lock / for you know the hangman’s waiting for you. / 
And perhaps you’re alive / And perhaps you’re dead” (126). The same themes of pursuit 
and bodily threat reappear here in the final lines, as, too, does the ambiguity over the 
distinction between life and death (or self-constitution and self-dissolution). Indeed, the 
play ends with a series of “knocks”:  
 
KNOCK KNOCK KNOCK   
KNOCK KNOCK KNOCK   
KNOCK   
KNOCK   
KNOCK (126)  
 
 
Such knocking (in insistent capitals, no less) implicitly suggests someone’s arrival and 
thus some imminent confrontation, consummation, or final deconstruction. That is to say, 
the play concludes by hinting at the arrival of the “hangman.” In a sense, Orestes 
(Sweeney) can no longer evade his pursuers.          
 What the play dramatizes, then, is not only the development of an inwardly-
oriented self-awareness (as “Prufrock” and other poems similarly portray), but the 
impermanence and essential insubstantiality of the self constituted through that 
awareness. The self remains bound, the play suggests, to that which it experiences as 
external to itself. Alternations to the external produce alternations to the internal. But 
more than this, the play appears to suggest the self’s desire for self-dissolution. It 
dramatizes Sweeney’s quest to dissolve the boundary that separates him (or his internal 
spaces) from others. It dramatizes, in other words, Sweeney’s desire to dissolve the 
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subject into the object, the inner into the outer. In this sense, the play portrays a process 
of purgation (or of the desire for purgation), i.e., of a burning away of the self. But in 
Sweeney, purgation, the loss of the self, remains an emotionally and psychologically 
horrifying experience. In Eliot’s later work, from “Ash Wednesday” onwards, this sense 
of purgation obtains a less negative (though still ambivalent) valence.         
Thus, in certain ways, Sweeney functions as a transitional work. It links together 
the earlier work with the later. Like “Prufrock,” for instance, it dramatizes the emergence 
of self-consciousness out of the experience of self-externalization. But like the poems 
that follow it, it also dramatizes the insubstantiality and instability of the self so 
generated. “Ash Wednesday,” then, marks a fundamental turn in Eliot’s poetry, which 
Sweeney Agonistes first inaugurates.    
 
Affirmation and Dissociation in “Ash Wednesday”  
Eliot published “Ash Wednesday” in 1930, although various sections of the poem 
had appeared as early as 1927, the year of Eliot’s conversion.98 As others have noted, the 
poem in many ways represents a break with what had come before. Balachandra Rajan, 
for instance, notes that for many the poem “marks a decisive turn in Eliot’s poetry and for 
some of them it is . . . a turn for the worse” (55). Similarly, Helen Gardner reflects on the 
“new style” of the poem, “which shows an extraordinary relaxation” in its “force of 
expression” when compared to the “extreme power of condensation” characteristic of his 
                                                          
98 Eliot published Part II in 1927 as “Salutation,” Part I in 1928 as “Perch’ io non spero,” and Part III as “Al 
som de l’escalina” in 1929 (Murphy 55). Murphy makes the point that as with “The Hollow Men,” “there is 
no reason to conclude that Eliot was not conceiving of the three separately published poems to begin with 
as pieces of a larger whole, just as there is no reason to conclude that he was” (54).  
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earlier work (101). And A.G. George suggests that beginning roughly with “Ash 
Wednesday,” Eliot abandons the use of irony as a poetic device, implying a break with 
his previous practices (121).99 At the very least, “Ash Wednesday” is distinct in that it is 
neither a play like Sweeney nor a dramatic monologue like “Prufrock,” nor does it 
possess the fractured multiplicity of voices characteristic of The Waste Land. Instead, in 
“Ash Wednesday,” Eliot offers an extended lyric meditation grounded in a singular 
speaking “I” that provides the poem a sense of structural and emotive coherence. 
Whereas “Prufrock” (or “Portrait,” etc.) presents a fictive character, “Ash Wednesday” 
immerses its readers in the consciousness of a speaker easily conflated with the author 
(and thus manifesting a degree of reality denied Prufrock). And whereas The Waste Land 
offers a series of structurally disconnected voices and vignettes (or as in Sweeney a 
chorus of contending, splintered voices), “Ash Wednesday” coheres around the 
utterances and ruminations of a single self-reflective speaker. 
Still, similarities persist. Indeed, David Spurr notes that “In terms of poetic style, 
[the poem] departs less radically from the earlier works than the newly Christian theme 
has led most commentators to suppose” (60). He argues that Eliot had employed the 
“techniques of negation and repetition” since at least The Waste Land, and that its 
“syntactical formality” and “liturgical style” echoes that of “The Hollow Men” (60). 
Similarly, Russell Elliott Murphy observes that “the poem is not any break from but a 
continuance of issues and themes that Eliot had been essaying in his poetry all along” 
                                                          
99 Russell Elliott Murphy also observes that “the suspicion persists that “Ash-Wednesday” is quite different 
from anything that had come from [Eliot’s] pen before” (55).   
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(58). For Murphy, Eliot’s “turn” in “Ash Wednesday” “is into a poem, and a poetry, that 
is, rather than a lament . . . an expression of acceptance and communion with what vision 
there is that is available” (57). That is to say, for Murphy, Eliot had exhausted the theme 
of spiritual wasteland characteristic of his earlier work, and was ready now to explore in 
verse the process of “acceptance and [limited] communion” with a vision beyond that 
wasteland. Or, as Eliot himself puts it in the first part of “Ash Wednesday,” he was now 
ready “to construct something / Upon which to rejoice” (89). For these critics, then, the 
poem marks a break with Eliot’s earlier work only inasmuch as it marks his process of 
development as a poet. But, as Murphy suggests, such development remains necessarily 
predicated on what came before. In short, “Ash Wednesday” continues Eliot’s project 
rather than interrupts it; it simply changes its key, as it were. 
Both positions possess merit, for the poem marks both a break from and a 
continuation of Eliot’s earlier work, but so, too, does every poem Eliot writes. In terms of 
genre and structure, “Prufrock,” say, differs from “Convictions” to the same degree that 
The Waste Land differs from “Prufrock.” And Sweeney, certainly, differs from all of 
them. Yet each of these poems nonetheless exhibits a shared constellation of themes, 
underlying assumptions, and intellectual preoccupations which structural variations 
cannot efface. I want to suggest that what links “Ash Wednesday” to Eliot’s earlier work 
is a continued emphasis on and subversion of the inner/outer binary. In the same way that 
his other work posits (and undercuts) an opposition between interiority and exteriority 
(i.e., by suggesting the constitutive interrelation between the two terms), so, too, does 
“Ash Wednesday.” But I want to argue, too, that what separates the poem from its 
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predecessors is not only an increased emphasis on disintegrative processes (as seen in 
Sweeney and hinted at in “Prufrock”) but an affirmation of these processes coupled, too, 
with the suggestion of their necessity.  
 
The Dialectics of Self-Construction 
In her discussion of “Ash Wednesday,” Gardner claims that “Instead of looking 
out upon the world and seeing sharply defined and various manifestations of the same 
desolation and emptiness, the poet turns away from the outer world of men to ponder 
over certain intimate personal experiences” (100). Eliot, that is, moves from a 
dramatization of the experience of desolation in others to a dramatization of his own 
individual spiritual struggle. In making this claim, Gardner expresses an understanding of 
the poem in terms of an inner/outer binary which (for her) lends the poem its structural 
and thematic coherence. Indeed, she adds that the “intensity of apprehension in the earlier 
poetry is replaced by an intensity of meditation,” suggesting that in “Ash Wednesday” 
Eliot turns from an externally oriented “apprehension” towards an internally oriented 
“meditation” (100). Fayek Ishak also draws attention to this “theme of ‘inwardness,’” but 
links it, too, to Eliot’s “preoccupation with the purgatorial efficacy of the soul,” as well as 
“the mysticism of the Dark Night expounded by St. John of the Cross, and the spiral 
ascent in Dante’s Mount of Purgation” (87). For Ishak, Eliot dramatizes anew “the 
spiritual drama of the soul” by employing the traditional language of Christian mysticism 
(106). Similarly, Audrey Rodgers argues that “Ash Wednesday” recapitulates the 
underlying psychological framework of Dante’s Purgatorio, in that it “emphasize[s] the 
formula of doing-suffering-understanding” (97). For Rodgers, Eliot’s poem, like Dante’s, 
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traces the “progressions and regressions of the soul . . . through the images of light and 
darkness, descent and ascent, death and rebirth” (111). For Rodgers, though, as for 
Gardner and Ishak, this process remains fundamentally (and necessarily) inwardly 
oriented.   
Each of these critics (Gardner, Ishak, Rodgers) sees the poem as a record of the 
speaker’s own psychological or spiritual struggle. For them, “Ash Wednesday” maps out 
the inner landscape of the poet’s own “dark night of the soul.” Yet in emphasizing this 
inward experience, each of these critics in effect constructs a binary (explicitly so in 
Gardner) which too neatly divides the inward from the outward. Indeed, in drawing such 
a stark distinction between the inner and the outer, these critics foreclose the possibility 
of a more complex understanding of the relation between the two terms. Moreover, each 
of these critics posits (implicitly) that the poem represents interiority in itself as both self-
contained and self-substantial. They inadvertently suggest a model of self characterized 
by that self’s own utter self-absorption. They suggest, in other words, that the speaker of 
the poem embodies an entirely self-directed, rational project of self-improvement through 
the process of purgation and renunciation. They posit an “I” implicitly in full command 
of itself, unified in purpose and effort, no matter the “progressions and regressions” that 
characterize its self-experience. They posit an ontologically stable, self-persisting “I” that 
endeavors to undertake a self-transformative process, for the “I,” of course, both precedes 
and succeeds the transformations by which it defines itself. It exists in itself as a stable 
ontological reality. Neither Gardner, Ishak, nor Rodgers acknowledges the possibility of a 
constitutive dialectical relation between interiority and exteriority which might call into 
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question the metaphysical reality of that “I.” In short, they inadvertently overstate the 
degree of unity and self-substantiality implied in the poem’s representation of 
subjectivity.     
Still, the poem certainly dramatizes an inward turn, an exploration of the 
speaker’s own reflections and emotions, in distinction from an exploration of the minds 
or actions of others. The very first lines herald such a turn in their repeated use of the first 
person personal pronoun: 
 
Because I do not hope to turn again   
Because I do not hope  
Because I do not hope to turn 
Desiring this man’s gift and that man’s scope 
I no longer strive to strive towards such things. (89)  
 
 
The opening lines immediately reveal an inner landscape of contemplative self-reflection 
centered on a singular, pondering, persisting “I.” Certainly, in dramatizing a singular self-
persisting speaker, the poem suggests for that speaker a degree of self-substantiality and 
inner-coherence. Indeed, the persistent continuity (whether structural or thematic) of the 
poem’s lyric “I” might be seen to imply a metaphysical unity to that “I” as well. Yet the 
“I” of the poem implicitly constitutes itself in agonistic relation with a world it posits 
external to itself. That is, in turning inwards, the “I” implicitly turns inward away from a 
perceived external reality. As the speaker confesses, he no longer “Desir[es] this man’s 
gift and that man’s scope / I no longer strive to strive towards such things” (89). But in 
seeking to renounce “such things,” he implicitly defines himself in terms of that which he 
rejects. He experiences the pressure of that externality even as he attempts to distance 
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himself from it. In other words, from the poem’s very first lines, interiority appears 
bound up with the experience of exteriority. The internal derives its intensity from its 
rejection of the external, even as the external exists (for the speaker) only as that which 
powers the oppositional emergence of the internal.   
The poem dramatizes this underlying dialectical tension in yet another, more 
fundamental manner as well. For not only does the poem suggest an implicit relation 
between the self’s own inner experiential reality and a material reality perceived as 
external to itself (the concrete quotidian world), but it also places the self in relation to a 
trans-material reality it perceives as external to itself. The poem, that is, not only stages 
the poet’s exploration of his own inner spiritual struggle (i.e., his effort to “construct 
something / Upon which to rejoice,” as he puts it in the second stanza [89]), but it frames 
that exploration in terms of an appeal to some felt self-transcendent external reality. Thus 
the act of supplication that concludes Part I:  
 
Teach us to care and not to care   
Teach us to sit still. 
 
Pray for us sinners now and at hour of our death 
Pray for us now and at the hour of our death. (90, spacing in original)  
 
 
The speaker pleads in this passage with a transcendent Other he perceives as utterly self-
exterior. He subordinates himself to that which he perceives as outside himself, positions 
himself in relation to some self-transcendent power, thus defining himself in terms of that 
relation. 
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Echoing these lines, the poem concludes with an evocation of and appeal to the 
ambiguous and multivalent “Lady of Silences” (91):  
 
Blessed sister, holy mother, spirit of the fountain, spirit of the garden, 
Suffer us not to mock ourselves with falsehood 
Teach us to care and not to care 
Teach us to sit still 
Even among these rocks, 
Our peace in His will 
And even among these rocks 
Sister, mother   
And spirit of the river, spirit of the sea   
Suffer me not to be separated 
 
 
And let my cry come unto Thee. (99, spacing in original)  
 
 
The act of supplication and petition reveals the speaker’s sense of his own self-limits. 
Again, the speaker places himself in subordinate relation to a reality he perceives as 
ontologically transcendent. The Lady exists outside him, beyond him, and as such 
delineates him to himself as a finite self. She functions as a kind of existential foil. 
Indeed, the Lady appears in almost every section of the poem, either implicitly (as in 
Section I, as quoted above), or explicitly, as in the later sections. She appears, for 
instance, in Section II as the “Lady of Silences,” in Section IV as the “silent sister,” in 
Section V as the “veiled sister,” and in Section VI as the “Blessed sister” (91, 94, 97, 98). 
And each time she appears, he praises or petitions her, each time subordinates himself to 
her, thus privileging her as the medium of his own self-articulation. It seems, then, as if 
the speaker can only encounter himself as a self through the mediating presence of some 
already externalized other. To perceive himself requires the presence of a gaze capable of 
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sustaining him as an object to himself, or at least of validating his own reflexive self-
objectifying gaze (i.e., by reference to a presence outside of himself). 
In short, the Lady provides the point of attention that renders him apparent to 
himself, draws him together as a self. As such, the poet-speaker turns outwards at least as 
much as he appears to turn inwards, addressing that which he perceives as external to 
himself, even as he articulates the vicissitudes of his own self-experience. As Eliot argues 
in his 1913 essay “Report on the Relation of Kant’s Criticism to Agnosticism” (discussed 
in Chapter Three), “in order to know, we must begin with . . . the conception of an 
external relation, a real which is ‘outside of ourselves’” (44). The Lady seems to stand in 
for that “real which is ‘outside’” the speaker, which provides the dialectical counterpoint 
that powers his own emergent sense of self. In 1914’s “Objects: Real, Unreal, Ideal, and 
Imaginary” (also discussed in Chapter Three), Eliot affirms, too, that “in becoming aware 
that [an object] is an object, I become aware that I am a subject” (169). In acknowledging 
the Lady as an object external to himself, he acknowledges himself as a subject in 
relation to the Lady. But paradoxically, in acknowledging himself as a subject in relation 
to the Lady, he acknowledges himself as an object as well. The polarities coincide.   
In turning towards a transcendent (or even quotidian) other, the poet turns 
outwards, away from himself as the center of his own self-experience. Dennis Brown 
argues that rather than the “monological, prophetic declaration[s]” of Eliot’s earlier work, 
“Ash Wednesday” presents “the voice of a dialogical confidante” (3). The turn outwards 
(for Brown) is thus a turn to the other. But this suggests a relation between equals 
(“confidantes”), when the poem in fact suggests the speaker’s sense of his own self-
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insufficiency. Contra Brown, then, the outward turn implies that the inward lacks the 
capacity for its own self-constitutive fullness (thus the poet entreats the Lady, “suffer me 
not to be separated”). The speaker, that is, suggests that the inward in fact requires the 
outward. Indeed, the poem suggests paradoxically that a more intensified experience of 
inwardness consists precisely in the self orienting itself towards that which it identifies as 
extrinsic to itself. Not to do so would bind the speaker to the solipsistic confines of his 
own inner experiential realities. Such, after all, was Prufrock’s fate. As J. Hillis Miller 
puts it, in “Prufrock,” “the reader is plunged with the first words into the spherical 
enclosure of Prufrock’s mind. . . . and the bubble of his thought is never broken” (137). 
Certainly, “Ash Wednesday” thrusts readers into the “enclosure” of the speaker’s mind. 
His thoughts and emotions do indeed constitute the poem’s content. But the poem also 
reveals the dialectical engine that helps power the emergence of a self capable of such 
self-articulation, and as such, contests the very notion of such enclosure. For the self, the 
poet suggests, exists in generative tension with that which it perceives as external to 
itself.  
 
Dismembering the Self  
However, as with “Prufrock” or Sweeney, “Ash Wednesday” dramatizes the 
disintegration of the self inasmuch as it also dramatizes its dialectically emergent 
constitution. Even as the speaker defines himself in relation to that which he experiences 
as extrinsic to himself, he discovers the insubstantiality of the self thus constituted. For 
instance, one of the poem’s most arresting passages centers on an image of self-
dissolution, on the puncturing of the self and thus the idea of the self as a self-contained 
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unit or unity. In Part II, the speaker describes being devoured by “three white leopards,” 
who feast upon him until all that remains are his bones:  
  
Lady, three white leopards sat under a juniper-tree 
 In the cool of the day, having fed to satiety 
 On my legs my heart my liver and that which had been contained 
 In the hollow round of my skull. And God said 
 Shall these bones live? Shall these 
 Bones live? (61) 
 
 
The speaker coolly recounts his evisceration and dismemberment by the leopards, the 
violence of the imagery only slightly lessened by the distanced tone he takes in 
describing the events. Crucially, the speaker does not inflict this dismemberment on 
himself, but rather experiences it originating in a source outside of himself. The leopards 
rend him apart, reconfiguring his sense of self such that it now includes his own self-
rending. The experience of interiority here involves the violent intrusion of the external, 
to the point that the internal loses its own sense of self-coherency. Thus the passage 
portrays interiority as opened up to a reality it perceives as extrinsic to itself and capable 
of radically intervening in the self’s sense of self-constitution. That is, not only does the 
self posit itself as subordinate to some externally perceived reality, but it encounters that 
reality as a deconstructive force. In this, the poem dramatizes the relationship between 
the internal and the external as profoundly dynamic. The inner is not closed in on itself as 
if it were some solipsistic self-circumscribing sphere, but remains vulnerable, open to 
intrusion, violation, and the possibility of disintegration. The self exists in tension with 
that which it experiences as external to itself, subject to its dissipating, attenuating forces 
(even as it defines itself in relation to those external forces).     
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 Moreover, the speaker’s experience of his own dismemberment dramatizes an 
experience of self-dissociation. He perceives his mutilation from the outside, rather than 
the inside, as if he was simply an object of study to himself. Indeed the poem seems to 
suggest that self-perception entails self-dissociation, that to perceive the self involves a 
rending of that self, further undercutting any notion of an ontologically stable self as 
implied by Gardner, Ishak, and others. In a sense, then, just as Prufrock experienced his 
own self-objectification (which then reflexively generated a sense of interiority), so, too, 
does the speaker in “Ash Wednesday.” Both poems present speakers who undergo a 
process of self-distantiation, and experience it as a rupturing of their former senses of 
self. Both poems, too, present speakers who experience self-objectification through the 
agency of external forces. For Prufrock, these forces manifest through the (hostile, 
pinning) gaze of the other. For the speaker in “Ash Wednesday,” they manifest both 
through the leopards themselves as well as the Lady who seems to preside over the act of 
dismemberment. In both cases, the self becomes aware of itself as a self only when thrust 
into an encounter with that which it perceives as external to itself. Recall, too, the 
sensation of pursuit and threat of destruction that frames Sweeney. From the epigraph in 
which Orestes exclaims, “You don’t see them, you don’t—but I see them: they are 
hunting me down” to the final ominous “knock” which signals (perhaps) the arrival of the 
“hangman,” the play dramatizes the presence of a menace presented not only as external 
to Sweeney himself, but to the play itself (i.e., since that which seems to threaten the 
characters never fully materializes).  
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 But what separates “Ash Wednesday” from these earlier parallels is its attitude 
towards the events it portrays. For Eliot’s earlier work dramatizes the encounter with the 
other and the concurrent process of self-externalization (and subsequent self-dissolution) 
it initiates as a violent, destructive, fearful event in the inner life of the self. As discussed 
above, for Prufrock, the sound of “human voices” awakens him only to “drown” him 
(17). He experiences his own self-objectification as a violently intrusive act. Sweeney, 
too, experiences others as vaguely threatening, even as he seems vaguely threatening to 
them. But at least he seeks to efface the gap that separates him from them through veiled 
confession, and thus to dissolve the boundary between inner and outer, subject and 
object. And yet at the same time, he feels harried, exposed, as if teetering on the edge of 
his own destruction, though at the hand of some external force, which fills him with 
dread. The Waste Land, too, portrays the encounter between self and other (or inner and 
outer) as deeply antagonistic. This is most evident in Tiresias, who perceives himself 
refracted through all the other personages of the poem, and unites in himself their 
division and strife (i.e., he internalizes the external, and, conversely, externalizes the 
internal). He suffers with them, indeed for them, since they seem incapable of registering 
the pain they experience (or inflict). And yet, the experience disperses him. Others may 
unify in him, but they do not unify him: he “throb[s] between two lives” (68). Each of 
these three key works, then, in one way or another, portrays the encounter with the other 
as an experience which threatens the integrity of the self. Each portrays the constitutive 
dialectical relation between the inward and the outward as a profoundly self-enervating 
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experience. The speakers or actors in these works dread the dissolution of the self, or at 
best evince a profound ambivalence towards it.  
“Ash Wednesday,” on the other hand, reverses the emotional valance of these 
earlier works, rendering self-disintegration a positive or even necessary experience in the 
inner life of the individual. In the leopard passage, for instance, the speaker chooses to 
focus not on the feast itself, but on its aftermath, when the moment of violence has 
passed. When the section opens, the leopards have already “fed to satiety” on him, and 
now recline “under a juniper-tree / In the cool of the day” (as quoted above) (91). In 
choosing not to focus on the act of violence, the speaker shifts the emphasis of the 
passage from one potentially characterized by terror (or horror) to one of relief and 
release. The speaker seems as relaxed and sated as do the leopards. Indeed, the presence 
of the Lady in the scene further defuses the sense of horror that might otherwise 
accompany such a description of evisceration:  
  
Because of the goodness of this Lady 
 And because of her loveliness, and because 
 She honours the Virgin in meditation, 
 We shine with brightness. And I who am here dissembled 
Proffer my deeds to oblivion, and my love 
To the posterity of the desert and the fruit of the gourd. 
 It is this which recovers 
My guts the strings of my eyes and the indigestible portions 
Which the leopards reject. The Lady is withdrawn 
 In a white gown, to contemplation, in a white gown.  
Let the whiteness of bones atone to forgetfulness. (91) 
 
 
Silent, “withdrawn” in “contemplation,” she serves as a pacifying counterpoint to the 
scene’s violence (91). Her “goodness” and “loveliness” contrasts with the grotesque 
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image of loose “guts” and plucked eyes, such that she softens the lurid effect such an 
image would otherwise convey. More importantly, she serves, too, as a point of attention 
that draws the speaker further outside of himself. Rather than lamenting his own 
dismemberment, the speaker treats it as an occasion to address the enigmatic Lady. In a 
sense, she sanctifies the process for him, gives it purpose, redeems it in some sense, such 
that the self-scattering seems to the speaker somehow necessary or purposeful (e.g., 
“Because of the goodness of this Lady” the bones can “shine in brightness”).  
Indeed, this section concludes with the speaker (or rather his bones) expressing 
satisfaction over his own dismemberment. Rather than lamenting his condition, the 
speaker in fact celebrates it:   
 
Under a juniper-tree the bones sang, scattered and shining 
We are glad to be scattered, we did little good to each other, 
Under a tree in the cool of the day, with the blessing of sand, 
Forgetting themselves and each other, united 
In the quiet of the desert. (92) 
 
 
“We are glad to be scattered,” his bones sing, “we did little good to each other” (92). His 
self-annihilation pleases him, as does the promise of forgetfulness such annihilation 
implies. For he seeks through such self-disintegration his own utter “oblivion,” desiring 
only the “quiet of the desert.” As he exclaims to the Lady, “I who am here dissembled, / 
Proffer my deeds to oblivion, and my love / To the posterity of the desert and the fruit of 
the gourd” (91). He embraces his own dissolution, seizes upon its emancipatory potential, 
its capacity (paradoxically) to free him from himself. “As I am forgotten / And would be 
forgotten, so I would forget,” he elsewhere declares (91). The speaker thus codes the self 
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as fundamentally insufficient to itself, as incomplete when rendered a totality in itself. It 
lacks “metaphysical unity,” as he puts it in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” and 
obtains coherence (again, paradoxically) only when dissolved into its external relations 
(whether figured through the leopards or the Lady). In discussing the portrayal of 
subjectivity in The Waste Land, Robert Langbaum argues that Eliot imagines individuals 
as locked within their own “prison-house[s] of self” (109). If that is so, then “Ash 
Wednesday” imagines individuals as escaping that prison-house through a near cheerful 
act of self-obliteration. More to the point, however, “Ash Wednesday” exposes the 
inadequacy of the self as a foundation for the self. The self exists, the poem suggests, not 
only in tension with external forces, but in constitutive subordination to those forces.     
Kinereth Meyer rightly notes that “[t]hrough their ability to empty the subject of 
its (his?) contents, the leopards appear to be agents both of physical destruction and of 
possible spiritual regeneration” (441). But the same might be said, too, of the Furies (or 
“hangman”) in Sweeney or the “pinning” eyes in “Prufrock” or the sense of destitution 
that characterizes The Waste Land in general. Meyer never takes note of the way in which 
“Ash Wednesday” echoes these earlier works, and consequently never comments on the 
tonal differences that differentiate them. But whereas these earlier works clearly portray 
self-dissolution as a horrific experience, “Ash Wednesday” affirms it. Of course, to note 
that the poem in some sense affirms such an experience is not, in itself, new. Others have 
pointed to the poem as a dramatization of regenerative purgation, in which the newly 
converted Eliot appropriates Dante in order to convey the process of his own (positive) 
self-transformation. Lyndall Gordon, for instance, argues that “Ash Wednesday” “revives 
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[Eliot’s] ‘turning’ towards the religious life” (153). For Gordon, in the “purgatory” of the 
poem, the “penitent [Eliot] sheds his past with his flesh . . . [and] breaks himself down to 
the bare bones of a rudimentary existence” for the purpose of self-renewal (294, 237). 
Similarly, Audrey Rodgers observes that Eliot employed Dante’s Purgatorio as a 
structural and thematic “scaffold” for “Ash Wednesday” (98). Both poems detail the 
“steps of the journey of gradual and painful regeneration” (100). And George Williamson 
argues that “Ash Wednesday” “draws inspiration, both generally and particularly, from . . 
. the Purgatorio” (as well as Dante’s Vita Nuova) (169). In shedding himself of himself, 
Williamson suggests, Eliot “pass[es] beyond despair” and obtains a “renewed sense of 
direction” (175, 184). 
Certainly, these critics are correct to point to the poem’s dramatization of 
(Dantean) purgation and renewal. Still, each of these critics overlooks the underlying 
dialectic that informs Eliot’s dramatization of this purgative process, and in so doing 
neglects the conceptual continuity that links his early work (both poetic and 
philosophical) with his later. For inasmuch as his previous work dramatized subjectivity 
as dialectically constituted, so, too, does “Ash Wednesday.” Interiority depends as much 
upon exteriority for its self-constitution as exteriority depends upon interiority for its 
experiential consistency. The self constitutes itself in terms of that which it locates 
outside of itself, and experiences its own self-dissolution as an act visited upon it by 
external (and self-externalizing) forces to which it necessarily submits (as a consequence 
of the self’s dialectical structure). Thus, while well over a decade separates “Ash 
Wednesday” from his earliest published work, the particular relation between inner and 
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outer (or subject and object, surface and depth) he affirmed then continues to inform his 
representation of human subjectivity.    
Of course, “Ash Wednesday” ends inconclusively. The speaker has not quite 
obtained the renewal or self-reconstruction he seems to seek (despite the insinuations of 
Williamson, Gordon, or Rodgers). Indeed, his final words entail a lament for himself and 
an appeal to the Lady: “Suffer me not to be separated / And let my cry come unto Thee” 
(99). As a self, he remains de-constituted, incompleted, and thus vulnerable and exposed 
(like Prufrock), even though he seems to affirm the necessity of this condition (e.g., 
“Although I do not hope to turn again”). Like Tiresias, he seems to “throb between two 
lives.” Or as he writes in Section VI, “This is the time of tension between dying and 
birth” (98). He seems, that is, to await further (self) developments, a waiting which again 
suggests a dialectical conception of subjectivity. Thus, “Ash Wednesday” concludes with 
a subtle reiteration of its speaker’s substantive incoherence and self-insufficiency. The 
sense of interiority he experiences depends upon an objectified view of himself as 
dissociated from himself (witnessing his own dismemberment), which in turn undermines 
any notion of a self-constitutive substantive inwardness. In the end, he remains torn 
between the inner and the outer, the substantial and the insubstantial, “dying and birth.” 
He experiences his own self-disintegration, even as he awaits some new mode of 
integration. Only in Four Quartets, however, does Eliot begin to move beyond this 
impasse. For while Four Quartets continues to dramatize the dialectic that (implicitly or 
explicitly) informs the conception of subjectivity present in all his work, the poem 
introduces a new mediating concept into that dialectic in the image of incarnation.  
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Four Quartets and the Dialectics of Transcendence 
  Eliot originally published Four Quartets as four separate poems over the course 
of several years. As Russell Elliott Murphy points out, “Burnt Norton” first came out in 
1938’s Collected Poems, having grown out of some discarded lines from Murder in the 
Cathedral (189-190). In 1940, Eliot went on to publish “East Coker,” followed in 1941 
by “The Dry Salvages,” and in 1942 “Little Gidding” (all published in the New English 
Weekly) (190-191). Finally, in 1943, at the height of the war, Eliot published all four 
quartets in a single volume (187). Like “Ash Wednesday,” Four Quartets is a meditative 
poem, grounded in the voice of a single contemplative speaker, presumably Eliot. 
Accordingly, many critics view the poem biographically. Dennis Brown, for instance, 
calls it “confessional poetry,” implying that the poem functions essentially as semi-veiled 
emotional or spiritual memoir (1). Lyndall Gordon echoes Brown, when she asserts that 
the quartets “recount Eliot’s [personal] struggle to recast his lot” (338).100 George 
Williamson, too, makes a similar claim, affirming that the poem “make[s] a great lyric of 
history, personal but [also] representative” (205). Eliot, he claims, “attempts to recover 
the meaning of time” by focusing on places and times significant to him (207).101 
                                                          
100 For Gordon, all of Eliot’s poetry is autobiographical in some way. Gordon argues that Eliot “devised his 
own biography, enlarging poem after poem on the character of a man who conceives of his life as a 
spiritual quest despite the anti-religious mood of his age” (1).  
101 Williams goes on to argue that the quartets in fact rearticulate the view of the relationship between time 
(or history) and the individual already present in Eliot’s 1917 “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (205). 
In “Tradition,” Eliot had affirmed that the “historical sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness 
of the past, but of its presence,” and that the individual poet has “his complete meaning” only in “relation to 
the dead poets and artists” that precede him or her (38). Similarly, Four Quartets maps the relation of the 
speaker to the past in terms of place. Indeed, for Williamson, “it is in [particular] places that you enter into 
history and escape from it” (206). 
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 Certainly, Four Quartets contains strong autobiographical elements. As both 
Gordon and Williamson remind readers, the titles of the quartets themselves largely refer 
to places personally significant to Eliot. Burnt Norton, for instance, is the name of a 
manor house Eliot visited around 1934 with Emily Hale, and East Coker the name of a 
village to which Eliot traces his ancestry (Gordon 266, 346). The Dry Salvages are an 
actually existing group of “treacherous rocks . . . off the coast of Cape Ann,” which Eliot 
used as a landmark when sailing in his youth (Gordon 336). And while Little Gidding is a 
village with no immediate biographical significance for Eliot, it nonetheless 
emblematizes for Eliot the idea of a “devotional life” associated with a committed 
religious community (Gordon 371). For Williamson, “[t]hese titles make the circle of 
[Eliot’s] beginning and end, from point of family origin in England to America and 
return” (207). That is, the titles map Eliot’s own personal biographical journey. Just as 
“England and America meet in ‘Burnt Norton,’” Williamson observes, so, too, do 
“Missouri and Massachusetts appear in ‘The Dry Salvages’” (207). More significantly, 
Eliot employs these places in order to speak to his own inner spiritual development. 
“Moments of time must be in places,” Williamson comments, “and the spiritual, though 
not of time or place, is known in time and place” (206).   
But to view the poem exclusively as Eliot’s biographically inflected attempt to 
map his own inner spaces or as his own personal version of a “talking cure” (as Brown 
sees it), is to inadvertently reduce the poem to an exercise in expressive self-absorption 
(13). It suggests a speaker concerned largely with his own self-development, and thus 
essentially disconnected from others, since his focus remains primarily upon his own 
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inner experiences. That is to say, in focusing on the poem’s autobiographical elements, 
and thus on the poem as an expression of the poet’s own inner life, these critics suggest 
that the poem implicitly posits a model of self predicated on a monadic vision of human 
interiority (i.e., the individual as self-relating, self-contained, and self-substantial). In 
other words, these critics make the same mistake that critics of Eliot’s earlier work make 
when they similarly read his poetry simply as an expression of personal disgruntlement, 
as when A. David Moody calls The Waste Land a portrait of Eliot’s own “inward 
desolation” (116).102 They present the self as enclosed in its own unbroken “bubble of 
thought,” as J. Hillis Miller says of Prufrock (137).  
 I want to argue that Eliot’s self-dramatization in Four Quartets proves more 
complicated than these critics suggest, since the model of self the poem affirms proves in 
fact more complicated. As in his earlier work, Eliot (I claim) constructs a model of 
subjectivity in Four Quartets predicated on a particular notion of the relation between 
interiority and exteriority. The self does not exist in isolation from that which it 
encounters outside of itself (and which it perceives as a traumatic intrusion upon its inner 
reality), but rather arises only in context of its relation to that outer reality. The poem 
voices the speaker’s sense of his own immersion in a contextualizing objective reality 
that provides the generative tension out of which his own sense of self emerges. That is to 
                                                          
102 In contrast, consider Eliot’s own reflections on Dante. In the Vita Nuova, Eliot argues, Dante offers a 
“mixture of biography and allegory . . . according to a recipe not available to the modern mind” (232). 
Dante attached importance to certain events that occurred to him not because those events were “important 
in themselves,” but because “they seemed to him to have some philosophical and impersonal value” (233). 
In other words, biography is only important to the extent that it translates into a significance beyond itself. 
Compare this vision (from 1929) to the similar view of impersonality expressed in 1919’s “Tradition and 
the Individual Talent.”   
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say, his particular experiential sense of interiority arises out of his encounter with an 
external reality he perceives as utterly self-circumscribing and ultimately self-negating. 
More than this, though, the poem posits the mutually constitutive interpenetration of the 
internal and the external. As in “Prufrock,” Sweeney, or “Ash Wednesday,” the poem 
presents the individual as profoundly unstable, prone to disintegration or rupture (the 
internal riven by the external). But unlike these earlier poems, Four Quartets ultimately 
affirms the dialectical coincidence of opposites (i.e., of coherence and flux, and thus the 
internal and external) through the culminating image of “incarnation.”   
 
Heraclitean Purgations 
 Eliot prefaces “Burnt Norton” (and thus Four Quartets as a whole) with a set of 
epigraphs drawn from the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus, famous (in part) for the 
idea that “all is in flux” (Hussey 54).103 The second of the two epigraphs, translated by 
Guy Davenport, reads, “The way up and the way down are one and the same” (Servotte 
10). In his study of the poem, Grover Smith argues that this fragment refers (for 
Heraclitus) “to the transmutation of the elements, the cycle of earth, water, air, and fire, 
for which later philosophers cited Heraclitus as an authority” (256). For Heraclitus, Smith 
suggests, this “cycle proceeds everlastingly,” and “since for Heraclitus the primary 
substance is fire, fire motivates the cycle” (256). Of course, as other critics note, 
Heraclitus remains notoriously “obscure” and subject to variant, often conflicting 
interpretations (Osborne 81). Mary Ann Gillies, for instance, reads this quotation simply 
                                                          
103 As Frederick Copleston argues, Heraclitus seems to “proclaim the unreality of ‘Reality,’” for “nothing is 
stable, nothing abides” (39). 
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as implying “that all time is the same” (98). Even more prosaically, Anthony Gottlieb 
suggests the passage refers “straightforward[ly]” to the fact that “a path going up a hill is 
also a path going down a hill, just as an entrance is also usually an exit” (48). Still, all 
three of these critics would agree that the fragment suggests the ultimate unity of opposed 
polarities, the eternal (dialectical?) transmutation of certain states into their opposites 
(water into fire, or up into down). Indeed, as Edward Hussey argues, the unity of 
opposites suggested in the fragment implies the “mutual interdependence” of opposed 
states (42). Or, as Frederick Copleston puts it, “the conflict of opposites” in fact implies a 
deeper underlying unity or collective order: “the One only exists in the tension of 
opposites: this tension is essential to the unity of the One” (40). That the “way up and the 
way down are the same,” then, suggests a non-binary view of otherwise diametrically 
opposed conceptual realities, a perspective fully in line with Eliot’s own views as 
explicitly expressed in his earlier graduate work.   
Significantly, the first of the two fragments also invokes the concept of a 
universal order, although much more directly. As J.M. Mitchell translates it, “The law of 
things is a law of Reason Universal, but most men live as though they had a wisdom of 
their own” (Servotte 10). Smith interprets the “universal law” or “logos” here as the fire 
or “flux itself” (256). Catherine Osborne, on the other hand, suggests that “it seems 
wrong to take Heraclitus’s recurrent fire as an underlying element [as such], and better to 
treat it as a model for [the] radical discontinuity of matter” (89). That is to say, for 
Osborne, the image of fire suggests a cosmos characterized by unending transformative 
conflagration (i.e., its “law”). No substance exists simply (ontologically) in itself, but 
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only as part of a process of exchange, alteration, perpetual reconstitution, and ultimate 
disintegration. As Copleston argues, fire “is . . . all things that are, but it is these things in 
a constant state of tension, of strife, of consuming, of kindling and of going out” (41). In 
short, the “law of things” is that persistent process of consumption and transfiguration 
which makes and unmakes the “world.” 
Thus, before the poem even begins, Eliot sets forth a set of philosophical 
propositions that helps establish a certain theme (i.e., the law of disintegrative flux and its 
corollary the coincidence of opposites).104 And indeed, the poem goes on to explore this 
theme at some length. In Section III of “East Coker,” for instance, Eliot provides a near 
Heraclitean image of cosmic negation:  
 
O dark dark dark. They all go into the dark, 
The vacant interstellar spaces, the vacant into the vacant, 
The captains, merchant bankers, eminent men of letters, 
The generous patrons of art, the statesmen and the rulers, 
Distinguished civil servants, chairmen of many committees, 
Industrial lords and petty contractors, all go into the dark 
And dark the Sun and Moon . . . (180). 
 
 
The dominant image here is of an abysmal and eternal night, of a starless (“vacant”), 
endless reach of sky engulfing all within its impenetrable expanse. Harry Blamires rightly 
argues that this passage points to the “ultimate impermanence” of all human realities 
(ambitions, valuations, concerns, projects) (60). Human social reality as well as 
individual identity (“captains, merchant bankers,” etc.) fades into utter insignificance. But 
                                                          
104 John Bradbury goes so far as to suggest that “the spirit presiding over the poems as a whole is that of 
Heraclitus” (256). 
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the passage points beyond this as well, to the annihilation even of the “Sun and Moon.” 
The conflagration proves total. All of material creation, Eliot seems to suggest, remains 
subject to some encompassing, consuming darkness. Nor does he exclude himself: “I said 
to my soul, be still, and let the dark come upon you” (180). As in “Ash Wednesday,” the 
speaker experiences (even invites) self-disintegration, but now the experience of 
annihilation reaches beyond himself as well, to encompass the cosmos as a whole. 
Nothing, Eliot suggests, escapes dissolution. Nothing possesses innate self-sufficiency, 
substantiality, or stability.  
Indeed, in Section II of “East Coker,” Eliot relies on Heraclitean imagery in order 
to convey an even bleaker vision of cosmic negation:  
 
Scorpion fights against the Sun   
Until the Sun and Moon go down  
Comets weep and Leonids fly   
Hunt the heavens and the plains   
Whirled in a vortex that shall bring   
The world to that destructive fire   
Which burns before the ice-cap reigns (178-79).   
 
 
Here Eliot offers not only the image of an unending “vortex” (which in itself suggests 
interminable movement or change), but suggests that the vortex culminates in a 
transfiguring fire, which in turn “burns” itself into frigid self-annihilation. As Derek 
Traversi rightly notes of this section, the “emphasis is [clearly] upon images of disorder 
covering nature and the universe” (132). The fire purges away all prior forms of material 
reality, leaves in its wake only its own act of consumption. Again, Eliot offers a vision of 
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total cosmic obliteration. He denies objects ontological continuity (i.e., their being), 
prioritizing instead disintegrative processes as such.  
In both of these passages, Eliot offers a metaphysics that clearly privileges 
“becoming” over “being.” Objects lack essences in themselves, in that they remain 
constitutively unstable, incapable of maintaining their own self-continuance. Indeed, 
Eliot’s vision of perpetual “becoming” entails reality’s utter material decomposition. 
Nothing survives the “vortex” or “destructive fire.” But this vision of destruction entails, 
too, (necessarily) the speaker’s own dissolution. And in fact, the destruction he envisions 
can be seen to function as a kind of objective correlative for describing such an 
experience. As noted above, he acknowledges his own subordination to the embracing 
“darkness” that consumes even the “Sun and Moon”: “I said to my soul, be still, and let 
the dark come upon you.” And in “Burnt Norton,” too, he traces a similar moment. In 
Part III, the speaker narrates a purgative descent in which the self experiences its own 
decomposition via the loss of all sense of identity: “Internal darkness, deprivation / And 
destitution of all property, / Desiccation of the world of sense, / Evacuation of the world 
of fancy, / Inoperancy of the world of spirit” (174). He dramatizes the inner experience of 
his own self-emptying, an utter “detachment / From self and from things and from 
persons,” as he puts it in “Little Gidding” (195). The self ceases to exist either as a self in 
itself or as known to itself. It lacks discernable content, as well as the capacity for 
connection with a world perceived as external to itself. Indeed, the self seems to have 
been emptied out into that world, dissolved into it, leaving behind only a blankness (or 
“darkness”).  
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Eliot offers in this passage an image of the self as void of substance, stripped of 
its (self) determining coordinates. As Kenneth Paul Kramer rightly reminds his readers, 
Eliot draws on “the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Aquinas, and 
especially St. John of the Cross” in order to dramatize this purgative process (both here 
and elsewhere in the poem) (53).105 He proposes in this passage the “via negative” (or St. 
John of the Cross’ “dark night of the soul”) as a means for conceptualizing the utter 
withering away of the self he envisions. Kramer notes that for St. John of the Cross, “the 
negative way of ‘deprivations’ and ‘internal darkness’ . . . involves becoming reduced to 
a state of emptiness, poverty, and abandonment, for the sensual part is purified in 
emptiness and the spirit is purified in darkness” (54). Eliot certainly conveys a similar 
process of self reduction (both here and in “Ash Wednesday”), as suggested through his 
language of negation (“deprivation,” “destitution,” “Desiccation,” “Evacuation”). The 
self stripped of itself enters into a darkness that appears to subsist beneath that self. But, 
the “Internal darkness” Eliot imagines as the end-result of this series of self-purgations 
aligns, too, with the sun-devouring external darkness he posits as the end-result of cosmic 
purgation. The two states mirror each other, and in effect reproduce the same experience. 
Inner content has been purged away, leaving nothing behind but the (implicitly 
exteriorized and exteriorizing) process of purgation and negation itself. Suggestively, 
then, Eliot offers a model of self according to which the self itself (like the material 
cosmos) lacks any inner or core substantiality. No self-subsisting inner content exists 
                                                          
105 Or, as Ronald Schuchard puts it, “By the mid-1930s Donne and Ignatius, Crashaw and Theresa, had 
gradually been displaced in Eliot’s mind by an English contemplative, George Herbert, and a Spanish 
mystic, St. John of the Cross. These two had become his companions, Herbert’s The Temple and St. John’s 
Ascent of Mount Carmel his handbooks, as he moved into Four Quartets” (174).  
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capable of resisting its own decomposition. The inner here appears to remain subject to 
corrosive external forces. And once those forces have completed their operation, 
inwardness itself ceases to have determinate meaning.   
In other words, in Four Quartets, Eliot would seem at first glance to construct a 
binary relation between the inner and the outer which unambiguously privileges the 
outward. Inwardness remains fundamentally subordinated to exteriorized pressures or 
processes, lacking ontological substantiality (or coherence) in itself. Thus his lament in 
“The Dry Salvages”: “Where is there an end of it, the soundless wailing, / The silent 
withering of autumn flowers / Dropping their petals and remaining motionless; / Where is 
there an end to the drifting wreckage” (185). The flowers here remain subject to 
persistent disintegrative processes which would seem to act on the flowers from the 
outside. Indeed, in the above quoted “O dark dark dark” passage, Eliot dramatizes the 
experience of self-dissolution itself as originating ultimately in a source outside the self: 
“let the dark come upon you.” He places himself in passive relation to that perceived as 
external to himself. He is that to be acted upon, rather than that which is empowered to 
act. The “wounded surgeon” who “plies the steel” and “questions the distempered part” 
works upon him, cuts into him (in yet another image of bodily disruption), rather than the 
reverse (181). In short, as in Sweeney and “Ash Wednesday,” the self encounters external 
reality as a violently intrusive force, always threatening and ultimately succeeding in 
rupturing the individual’s sense of self-coherence. But of course, Four Quartets goes far 
beyond either Sweeney or “Ash Wednesday” in its dramatizations of negation, for the 
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poem negates not only the individual self but the entire social and physical cosmos along 
with it. 
 
Incarnation and Resolution 
Thus, whereas “Ash Wednesday” concludes with the two terms (inner and outer) 
in dialectical tension with one another, Four Quartets seems ultimately to privilege the 
external. And yet not quite. At the very least, the poem suggests that individuals define 
themselves precisely in terms of those oppositional energies which they encounter as 
emanating from outside themselves. The individual’s encounter with a hostile external 
reality provides the boundaries by which the self comes to understand itself as a finite 
self. The self defines itself precisely in terms of its subordinated relation to an 
incomprehensible external, self-delimiting reality. It seems less an isolated entity than as 
an exposed one, whose limitations and vulnerabilities prove constitutively formative of 
the individual’s sense of self. And these limitations and vulnerabilities emerge most 
starkly in those places in the poem where the narrator contrasts the human self and its 
egoistic pretensions with the profound and alien otherness of the non-human world, what 
C.O. Gardner refers to as the “grim realities” of a “mechanical universe” (327), and 
Harry Blamires as simply “nature” (79). What the self is becomes apparent only when 
seen against the backdrop of this contextualizing inhuman order—indeed the self that 
emerges is precisely a product of the contrasted relation between the two (i.e., self and 
“nature”). The poem portrays the self as blasted away, utterly negated by “the dark cold 
and the empty desolation” of the outer world (183).  
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However, the poem suggests much more than merely the oppositional identity of 
the inner and the outer (i.e., that the self defines itself in terms of its oppositional relation 
to an externally perceived reality). Rather, it suggests that the internal and external in fact 
ontologically interpenetrate one another. That is, inasmuch as the poem posits that the 
self lacks any substantive content, so, too, does it suggest that those external forces which 
rend the self apart in fact remain as much internal to the self as external to it. In “The Dry 
Salvages,” for instance, Eliot offers an image of nature which at first he represents as a 
destructive power purely external to individuals. Reflecting on the Mississippi,106 he 
writes, “I think that the river / Is a strong brown god—sullen, tamed and intractable, / 
Patient to some degree, at first recognised as a frontier.” And yet, he continues, although 
“the brown god is almost forgotten / By the dwellers in cities,” it remains “ever . . . 
implacable, / Keeping his seasons and rages, destroyer, reminder / Of what men choose to 
forget. Unhonoured, unpropitiated / By worshippers of the machine, but waiting, 
watching and waiting (184). The river is a “destroyer.” Eliot portrays it as that which 
delimits the human, exposes the vanity of human endeavors, as well as of human self-
complacency. The river marks humanity’s limit-point, and exists as a reminder of its 
(humanity’s) transience, despite human efforts to “tame” or control it or mask its force.107 
                                                          
106 In his annotations to “The Dry Salvages,” Servotte writes, “The river here is the Mississippi, which runs 
along the city of St. Louis where Eliot grew up; except for summers which his family always spent in New 
England on the Massachusetts seacoast” (35).  
107 Harry Blamires comments that the “river represents the flow of nature . . . which man has to subdue in 
civilizing himself and his world” (79). But the river undercuts these “civilizing” efforts, indeed undercuts 
all human pretensions to distinction and stability, its “seasons and rages” indicative of some absolute and 
alien otherness whose contours utterly resist comprehension. As Staffan Bergsten notes, the “river” in “The 
Dry Salvages” is as much as “symbol of the onward and irrevocable movement of time” as it is of nature 
and nature’s raw physical power (220). 
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In other words, he represents it as an external force that intrudes upon human social and 
psychological realities.   
And yet, at the exact same time, Eliot suggests that “the river is within us,” that 
the external and the internal in fact in some deeper sense coincide with one another (184). 
Rather than maintaining the opposition between the two terms, Eliot goes on to suggest 
their ultimate identity.108 In a lyrical passage which immediately follows the image of the 
Mississippi as a destructive “strong brown god,” Eliot writes:  
 
The river is within us, the sea is all about us; 
The sea is the land’s edge also, the granite 
Into which it reaches, the beaches where it tosses 
Its hints of earlier and other creation: 
The starfish, the horseshoe crab, the whale’s backbone; 
The pools where it offers to our curiosity   
The more delicate algae and the sea anemone. (184)    
 
 
Eliot offers an image here of deeply interwoven spiritual, biological, and temporal 
realities, in what Ronald Moore interprets as a “reconciliation of the particular with the 
absolute” (51).109 Those very forces which work to undermine and negate human activity 
and which seem to stand in an oppositional relation to human consciousness, in fact 
penetrate the human, thus not only circumscribing individuals’ phenomenological 
realities but informing them as well. Human beings participate in the same order of being 
(putatively “nature”) from which they feel alienated. Indeed, the passage also places 
human beings in an ontological continuum with other creatures (i.e., “The starfish, the 
                                                          
108 In positing the identity of the inner and the outer, he echoes the Heraclitean dictum regarding the unity 
of opposites from the poem’s second epigraph: “The way up and the way down are one and the same.” 
109 Moore goes on to argue that this “reconciliation” is the “core of Eliot’s metaphysic” as expressed in the 
poem (51).  
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horseshoe crab”), suggesting not only shared origins but a shared existential status as 
well. In so doing, Eliot essentially dissolves the distinction between the internal and the 
external, thereby complicating his earlier dramatization of interiority as utterly 
subordinated to self-annihilating external forces.  
Indeed, elsewhere in the poem, Eliot expresses a similar sense of the fundamental 
reflexive identity of the self and that which the self perceives as supposedly external to 
itself. In “Burnt Norton,” for instance, he suggests that “The dance along the artery / The 
circulation of the lymph / Are figured in the drift of stars” (172), again suggesting a 
correlation between different, otherwise incommensurate orders of being (the human and 
the natural/cosmic). He links the body itself, its rhythms and visceral materiality, to the 
alien realities of the whirling constellations. As David Ward puts it, “the circling motion 
of the world is reflected in the circulatory processes of the body, and both . . . are 
reflected in the . . . motion of the stars” (237). The same energies and impulses, Eliot 
suggests, inform them all. Taken as whole (he seems to imply), the cosmos reveals 
underlying patterns and coherencies which resist binary formulation. The internal and the 
external ultimately coincide, overlap, or interpenetrate one another, such that to 
distinguish either from the other disrupts the conceptual coherence of both.            
But Eliot goes even further than this, and through the use of the image of 
incarnation, offers a means for resolving the inner/outer binary that ultimately transcends 
any ontological or conceptual distinction between the two terms. This image finds its 
most significant articulation at the end of “The Dry Salvages,” where Eliot writes that, 
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The hint half guessed, the gift half understood, is Incarnation. 
Here the impossible union 
Of spheres of existence is actual, 
Here the past and future  
Are conquered, and reconciled (190) 
 
 
Eliot here deconstructs, as it were, the Cartesian binaries that structure Western 
epistemological and ontological perspectives. Through the image of “Incarnation,” he 
suggests a means by which modernity’s paralyzing dualisms may be overcome, a point 
Ward makes as well, calling “Incarnation” here the moment of the “resolution of the 
problem of duality” (263). “Incarnation” suggests a recognition of the interpenetration of 
the “spheres of existence,” of an underlying coherency structuring creation, in both its 
temporal (“past and future”) and bodily (material, fleshly “incarnation”) manifestations. 
It thus suggests a reorientation of the relation between (the interior) self and (external) 
nature as well. “Incarnation” provides an image through which the mind grasps and 
affirms its own immersion in the world of flux. That flux no longer manifests as a violent, 
threatening external presence, which the self confronts and resists, though eventually 
succumbs to. Rather, the idea of “Incarnation” enables a relaxation of the oppositional 
tension formally characteristic of the relation between the self and the external world, for 
it acknowledges the mysterious union between the two.110  
                                                          
110 The image clearly has its Christian overtones as well. Eliot was a practicing Anglo-Catholic, having 
converted to Christianity in June of 1927, and so it is certainly tempting to read “Incarnation” here 
specifically in terms of its Christian resonances. And yet, as Staffan Bergsten points out, “Incarnation” 
appears in the text without the definite article which would denote it unambiguously as the Incarnation of 
Christian faith (228). Similarly, Cleo McNelly Kearns remarks that the term “is never . . . further specified 
or directly associated with any familiar Christian imagery” (252). Indeed, earlier in this section of the 
poem, Eliot mentions Krishna (40), an incarnation (or avatar) of the Hindu deity Vishnu. Given this, 
Kearns remarks that “the term ‘Incarnation’ . . . comes to seem less a signifier for a predetermined doctrinal 
content than a ‘half-object,’ a truth half-glimpsed in the interstices between an Indic and a Christian point 
of view” (252, emphasis in original). Servotte makes a similar point, arguing that the “use of ‘Incarnation’ 
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Thus, despite the poem’s apparent dramatization of a strictly binary relation 
between the inner and the outer (in which the inner remains subordinate to the outer), the 
poem also offers an image of the ultimate unity of the two terms. “[Y]ou are the music / 
While the music lasts,” Eliot affirms, again suggesting the mutually constitutive relation 
between the self and the external realities it perceives or experiences (190). Human 
beings themselves, he suggests, in a sense “incarnate” those deeper rhythms and powers 
that structure reality, despite their own temporal materiality. They mark the convergence 
of the internal and the external (or the subjective and the objective). For in the end, Eliot 
affirms a view of the self as an embodied self—fleshly incarnations of “the music,” living 
embodiments of some “impossible union.” The self, Eliot seems to insist, exists 
indivisibly from those immensities figured in the “drift of stars.” Each element remains 
indivisible from the other, each implicated in the others’ existence—or dissolution. 
I do not intend to draw attention to the unitive vision implicit in Four Quartets for 
the sake of illuminating that vision. Many critics, of course, have already performed that 
operation. Fayek Ishak, for instance, notes at the beginning of his study of the poem that 
Eliot “gives a glimpse of reality” in the Quartets, “a mystical moment of peeping into the 
‘heart of light’” (107). Derek Traversi writes of the essentially “‘religious’ affirmation” at 
the heart of the poem (88). A. David Moody argues that the poem encapsulates an 
“eternal note of desire that will not be content, and which equates rest and motion, silence 
and utterance, fulfillment and annihilation” (181). And Ronald Schuchard similarly notes 
                                                          
instead of ‘the Incarnation’ seems to universalize the notion, i.e. not to limit it to Christ, but to apply it to 
many more cases and situations” (377).    
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that “In each quartet the eternal stillness of a divine pattern of reality is set against the 
endless movement of a temporal pattern, a patter characterized by action and appetency, 
desire and knowledge, hope and despair, and . . . sin and error” (188). My goal, on the 
other hand, has been to trace out a certain dialectical procedure operative in the work, 
which in fact (as I argue) reaches back throughout Eliot’s career. As I see it, the 
importance of Eliot’s use of the image of “incarnation” lies in its logical and conceptual 
connection to a view of the relation between the inner and outer that well predates Four 
Quartets.   
Recall Eliot’s dissertation work on F.H. Bradley years before (1916). As detailed 
in Chapter Three, Eliot develops a view of subject/object relations in his dissertation (as 
well as in his previous graduate work) which ultimately dispenses with the distinction 
between subjects and objects (or the inner and outer). “The object qua object,” he insists 
in his dissertation, “would not exist without this bundle of [subjective] experiences, but 
the bundle would not be a bundle unless it were held together by the moment of 
objectivity” (133). Or, more directly: “The self . . . seems to depend upon a world which 
in turn depends upon it; and nowhere . . . can we find anything original or ultimate” 
(146). The internal and the external intertwine. Each remains constitutively present in the 
other. Each dialectically entails the other. Objectivity implies subjectivity, even as 
subjectivity implies objectivity. Jewel Spears Brooker rightly calls this Eliot’s “revolt 
against dualism,” which she goes on to position as a rejection of Cartesian metaphysics 
(172, 173). But Brooker also goes on to argue that Eliot’s Bradleyian inflected “revolt 
against dualism” permeates his thinking over the course of his career, and indeed that 
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Four Quartets itself remains “deeply indebted to Bradley’s ideas” (Mastery 206). While 
Brooker does not speak specifically about the inner/outer binary present in Eliot’s work, 
her observations serve to corroborate my view that Eliot remains preoccupied with 
certain philosophical concerns throughout his life, notably anti-dualism.  
Ultimately, I want to suggest that Four Quartets marks the culmination of a series 
of reflections that stretches back to Eliot’s earliest work, completing an arc begun as 
early as 1909’s “Convictions.” In Four Quartets, he offers a view of the relation between 
inner and outer that in many ways recapitulates the view propounded in all of his earlier 
work.111 He portrays the two opposed terms as inextricably interlinked, reflexively 
grounded in one another, and thus denies either term ontological or conceptual priority 
over the other. He suggests that the exterior literally informs the interior (that the “river is 
within us”), even as the interior itself remains paradoxically subject to the rending forces 
of the external. In short, he turns the two terms inside out, placing the external within the 
internal and thus the internal within the external, thereby collapsing any essential 
distinction between the two. Four Quartets, then, posits a model of self in which the self 
(the subjective or internal) remains constitutively intertwined with the not-self (the 
objective or external). Contra those critics who would view the poem merely as an 
expression of the poet’s own unbroken “bubble of thought” (to allude again to Miller), 
                                                          
111 Even in Eliot’s plays, he continues to explore this dialectic, although he never approaches the clarity of 
vision expressed in Four Quartets. In 1935’s Murder in the Cathedral, for instance, Eliot portrays 
individuals as most internally ramified only when subjected to their own external dismemberment (i.e., 
Thomas’ impending execution and the intense self-reflection it spurs). And in 1939’s The Family Reunion, 
Eliot revisits the themes of guilt and pursuit he first dramatized in Sweeney. Harry feels haunted (and 
hunted) by the avenging Furies. Their ceaseless, piercing gaze externalizes him to himself, renders him 
visible to himself as a self (i.e., their gaze generates his mode of inwardness). 
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Eliot in fact challenges any notion of self that would define that self as a self-enclosed 
bubble. As such, Four Quartets continues that “attack” on the “metaphysical theory of 
the substantial unity of the soul” famously alluded to in “Tradition and the Individual 
Talent,” developed at length in his graduate work, and dramatized throughout his poetry, 
both early and late.  
 
Conclusion: Eliot and Modernism  
From 1909’s “Convictions” to 1942’s “Little Gidding,” Eliot demonstrates a 
continual fascination with the relation between interiority and exteriority. In a sense, he 
dramatizes in his poetry what he explores discursively in his philosophical and critical 
work. As I have tried to make clear, Eliot posits a relation between the two terms (inner 
and outer) that prioritizes neither. Rather, he seeks to demonstrate how the two terms 
remain inextricably bound together. Each remains mutually implicated in the other. In his 
earliest unpublished work, Eliot offers a portrait of individuals as utterly exteriorized, 
depthless creatures. The inner collapses into the outer, as it were. Interiority as such 
emerges only when individuals encounter themselves reflected to themselves in the gaze 
of the other (as in “Portrait” or “Prufrock”). The self’s sense of itself relies upon an event 
of self-exteriorization. Inwardness derives dialectically from the interplay between 
surface and depth. But this means, too, that interiority remains provisional (i.e., 
ontologically unstable), subject to further destabilizing acts of self-objectification. As 
F.H. Bradley puts it in Appearance and Reality, the self “cannot . . . maintain itself 
against external relations. For these will enter its essence, and so ruin its independency” 
(119). The self never obtains self-unity, never congeals into some self-enclosed, self-
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persisting monadic sphere. Thus, rather than affirming inwardness as a self-constitutive, 
autonomous state, Eliot in fact questions the very notion of interiority in his work. The 
self as such is an ongoing process (rather than a substance), continually made and 
unmade, never at rest. It exists as a function of the relation between the inner and the 
outer.  
Early in his career, Eliot portrays this process negatively. The self encounters 
itself as a disturbing presence to itself, and perceives the process of self-externalization 
(or self-objectification) as a violent, intrusive experience which it both resists and resents, 
as seen both in “Portrait” and “Prufrock” (or even Sweeney, although with certain 
variations). But by the time of “Ash Wednesday,” Eliot comes to dramatize this 
dialectical procedure less as a negative experience than a necessary and even positive 
one, despite the poem’s tentative, inconclusive ending. And finally, in Four Quartets, 
Eliot offers a vision of the self at peace (in a sense) with its own contingency. While 
Eliot’s 1927 conversion to Christianity undoubtedly contributed to the evolution of the 
emotional valence attached to the model of self he forwards in his work (as it 
undoubtedly affected his choice of tropes and images), the basic framework or dialectical 
procedure of that model remains largely intact throughout his career. Even as early as 
1913’s “Degrees of Reality,” Eliot is already denying “any absolute distinction between 
perception, image and judgement, between real and unreal, between real and ideal, or 
between true and false, or between truth and fact” (57).  
Of course, as argued throughout Chapter Three, Eliot continuously attacks binary 
metaphysics in his philosophical and critical essays. Indeed, the year before his 
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conversion, in his 1926 Clark Lectures, he condemns Descartes himself as the source of 
modern binary modes of thought.112 For Eliot, Descartes inaugurates a philosophical 
tradition which culminates with Kant and then Nietzsche. Each of these figures in their 
various ways introduces and perpetuates an inner/outer distinction. Each draws a line 
between the mind and the world it perceives. With Descartes, Eliot argues, “[i]nstead of 
having ideas as meanings, as references to an outside world, you have suddenly a new 
world coming into existence, inside your own mind and therefore by the usual 
implication inside your own head” (80). Descartes signals for Eliot the move from 
“ontologism to psychologism,” i.e., from a conception of the mind in generative tension 
with the external world to the construction of a sharp division between world and self (or 
inner and outer, self and other, subject and object) (83).113 Such was precisely his critique 
of romantic and Victorian poetry, which overemphasized (Eliot argued) the inner (self) 
over the outer (object-world). Even his early doctrine of “impersonality” captures 
something of this critique. As discussed in the Introduction, Eliot’s notion of 
“impersonality” stems from his belief that “the poet has, not a ‘personality’ to express, 
but a particular medium . . . in which impressions and experiences combine in peculiar 
and unexpected ways” (“Tradition” 42). Eliot posits the self encountering itself as an 
object to itself, as a complex of “impressions and experiences,” which the poet then 
externalizes in verse. He suggests that the internal does not exist in itself, but only in the 
awareness of the self’s immersion in its own self-constitutive external contexts, a 
                                                          
112 These lectures were first published as The Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry in 1993. Also included in 
the volume are Eliot’s 1933 Turnbull Lectures.   
113 Eliot makes much the same point in 1921’s “The Metaphysical Poets” with his well-known reflections 
on the “dissociation of sensibility.”  
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conclusion obviously antithetical to the binary formulations of Descartes and his modern 
successors.114  
Thus, as I have repeatedly sought to emphasize, Eliot is a dialectical thinker. He 
resists easy binaries, and seeks instead to expose how conceptual polarities in fact inhere 
together as a unity. Jeffrey Perl rightly argues that, for Eliot, “subject and object, known 
and knower, are aspects of the total situation and can be distinguished only for practical 
purposes” (70). Such, too, is Bradley’s position, for whom “Reality is one” (519). In the 
“Absolute,” Bradley contends, “predicate and subject, and subject and object, and in short 
the whole relational form, must be merged” (172). And as Eliot himself puts it in his 
dissertation on Bradley, the “fact that we can think only in terms of things does not 
compel us to the conclusion that reality consists of things. We have found from the first 
that the thing is thoroughly relative, that it exists only in a context of experience, of 
experience with which it is continuous” (165). That is, Eliot denies any ontological 
distinction between “things” and their contexts. “I am only I in relation to objects,” he 
concludes, but adds that an object is only “a complex of experiences with a reference, and 
the reference itself is an experience” (158). The two poles of the binary intertwine, the 
subject existing only in relation to external objects, but those external objects existing 
paradoxically only in context of a perceiving subject. In short, in his prose and poetry 
(both early and late), Eliot propounds a non-dualist metaphysics in which he continuously 
critiques all binary modes of thought.  
                                                          
114 Thus his famous claim, too, that “No poet, nor artist of any art has his complete meaning alone,” but 
rather only in context of and connection with the tradition that precedes that poet (38). 
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As a dialectical thinker, then, Eliot emerges as a unique modernist figure, whose 
work remains grounded as much in a particular mode of Idealist philosophy as in a 
reaction against his Victorian precursors. Indeed, seeing Eliot as a dialectical thinker 
allows not only for a more nuanced understanding of Eliot, but suggests an alternative 
understanding of modernism itself (i.e., of its roots, influences, and varied aims). How is 
the movement typically defined? For many critics, modernism (as a culturally distinct 
though polytomous phenomenon) entails an increasingly radical departure from 
normative modes of representation and inherited formal conventions as a result of 
radically altered sociohistorical circumstances. New socio-ideological and material 
conditions require proportionately new representational and formal strategies.  
For example, as Pericles Lewis defines it, modernism involves the “tendency of 
experimental literature of the early twentieth century to break away from traditional verse 
forms, narrative techniques, and generic conventions in order to seek new methods of 
representation appropriate to life in an urban, industrial, mass-oriented age” (xvii). For 
Lewis, modernism consists of a series of responses to disorienting historical, social, and 
economic developments. It constitutes an aesthetic reaction of sorts, an attempt to capture 
(or mirror) in art the “essence” of the age. Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane 
make a similar argument when they claim that modernism “is the one art that responds to 
the scenario of our [modern] chaos” (27). “It is the art,” they argue, “consequent on 
Heisenberg’s ‘Uncertainty Principle’, of the destruction of civilization and reason in the 
First World War, of the world changed and reinterpreted by Marx, Freud, and Darwin, of 
capitalism and constant industrial acceleration, [and] of existential exposure to 
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meaninglessness or absurdity” (27). Or, as Michael Whitworth succinctly puts it, 
“‘Modernism’ is not so much a thing as a set of responses to problems posed by the 
conditions of modernity” (3).  
Other critics define modernism in terms of its increased emphasis on 
consciousness and phenomenological reality, while nonetheless continuing to ground it in 
its proper historical matrix. Peter Childs, for instance, emphasizes modernism’s turn 
towards and attempts to adequately represent subjective experience. For Childs, 
modernism, in prose at least, “is associated with attempts to render human subjectivity in 
ways more real than [traditional Victorian] realism” (3). He goes on to argue that 
modernists seek “to represent consciousness, perception, emotion, meaning and the 
individual’s relation to society” in a manner that better “express[es] the new sensibilities 
of their time” (3). Similarly, Dennis Brown argues that modernism “in literature was a 
movement that radically probed the nature of selfhood and problematised the means 
whereby ‘self’ could be expressed” (1). As with Childs, Brown positions this reimaging 
of the self as a response to the “general diffusion of social alienation, the rise of the 
psychoanalytic movement, the disorientation brought about by the shock of the Great 
War and the increasing experimentalism of almost all the contemporary artistic 
movements.” (1). Charles Taylor, too, argues that in response to an increasingly 
urbanized, mechanized, and industrialized social reality, modernist “art has gone more 
inward, has tended to explore, even to celebrate subjectivity” (456). 
Each of these critics defines modernism as a reaction response to contemporary 
sociocultural developments. Each suggests that modernists rejected traditional 
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representational strategies and genres in favor of novel techniques better able to mirror 
modernity’s new social, ideological, and experiential realities. Eliot emerges for such 
critics as a zeitgeist poet, capturing in his work contemporary phenomenological 
experience. The fragmentation of The Waste Land, for instance, captures the 
fragmentation of modern social reality. As Brown puts it, “In so far as the poem speaks 
the Western mind of the twenties, it expresses it as heterogeneity, contradiction and 
multilayered multiplicity—in short, as a species of chaos” (91). Or, as Peter Childs 
argues, The Waste Land’s “dissonances, sudden transitions, shifts in rhythm and 
characteristically Modernist obsession with language has often been seen as indicative of 
an alienation from life and from history” (99). For both Brown and Childs, Eliot’s poetry 
reflects its social conditions, translates those conditions into aestheticized form.115 In 
other words, these critics see Eliot’s work as a reaction to modern social experience. In a 
sense, his is a passive endeavor. He merely mirrors social and psychological reality in his 
work, although he does so in technically novel ways (though only to better capture 
modernity’s own particular novelties).    
 Thus, on this reading, Eliot emerges as a reactional poet of existentialist angst or 
even nihilistic despair (at least in his early and mid-career work). He reacts to the 
conditions he observes, and encodes those conditions in his poetry in a form he feels best 
reflects them. Such is J. Hillis Miller’s reading of Eliot. For Miller, Eliot portrays 
individuals whose lived experience reflects the social, cultural, and ideological 
                                                          
115 Similarly, for Richard Lehan, The Waste Land “depict[s] the decay of an industrial society” (132). “Like 
Baudelaire’s Paris,” he argues, “Eliot’s London is a city of the walking dead—the spiritually dead in life, 
the mechanized dead in a commercial/industrial world” (132). 
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dislocations of modernity. “The quality of the life of the mind of Europe,” Miller writes, 
“is exactly the same as the experience of the solitary ego” in Eliot’s work (178). Both 
world and individual remain “characterized by fragmentation, aimless motion, 
lovelessness, [and] frustrated longing” (178). Miller argues that Eliot’s later work, too, 
encodes this same basic formula (i.e., mimetic correspondence), only now in a 
specifically Christian register. He seeks now to “recover the divine pattern,” i.e., to 
recover an “objective rather than subjective” understanding of history (187). Robert 
Langbaum makes a similar point, arguing that in The Waste Land (for instance) the 
“protagonist’s consciousness emerges from the collective consciousness of the time as 
another nameless, faceless modern voice” (97). The poem presents, Langbaum suggests, 
“where Western culture has come to . . . as of 1920” (97). In short, for these critics, 
Eliot’s work embodies a passive reflexive response to modernity. He reacts rather than 
intervenes, reflects rather than interrogates, mirrors rather than interprets. He represents, 
in other words, the standard definition of modernism as the “style of an age,” expressing 
in his work the period’s particular emotions, subjectively experienced realities, and 
common metaphysical assumptions (Bradbury 24). 
 Of course, these critics are absolutely correct in their assessment, at least to an 
extent. For Eliot’s work certainly develops out of and responds to his sociocultural and 
literary matrix. He responds to the particularities of his cultural moment, and necessarily 
operates within a conceptual framework determined entirely by his historical placement. 
Not only does he dramatize then-contemporary social and cultural conditions in his work, 
both directly and indirectly, but he actively resists prior modes of representation as 
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aesthetically insufficient (e.g., his early resistance to romantic poetics). That is, the very 
form his poetry takes encodes his historical position. And indeed, many critics emphasize 
the degree to which Eliot’s poems (as formal experiments) operate within a historical 
continuum.116 
 But I want to point out the insufficiency of seeing Eliot only as a poet of reaction, 
who merely embodies his historical moment and its cultural complexities. I want to resist 
seeing Eliot as a proto-existentialist, pseudo-nihilist (at least in his early work), or poet of 
“pessimistic recoil,” as Raymond Williams puts it (43). I want to resist, too, seeing Eliot 
as simply setting out “to modernize literature in the English language,” as Suman Gupta 
argues, as if he were trying solely to update nineteenth-century aesthetics for twentieth- 
century sensibilities (227). Worse yet, I want to avoid the all-too-easy division between 
“two Eliots, a liberal younger one and a conservative older one,” for whom his early 
work “was indeed experimental, adventurous and anti-establishment in a manner that 
showed an open mind,” while his older work reveals a more “rigid” aesthetic and 
ideological disposition (Gupta 272). While accurate to an extent, these descriptions tend 
to overly simplify Eliot, dissolving him neatly into his background, and thereby masking 
or distorting the distinctiveness of his project as well as his philosophical and aesthetic 
commitments. Instead, I want to emphasize the degree to which Eliot intervenes in his 
moment, interrogating received (Cartesian) metaphysics by questioning reigning 
                                                          
116 For instance, as Carol Christ argues, “Despite their anti-Victorianism, Modernist poets explore ways of 
objectifying poetry that show striking continuities with Victorian poetics” (3). In particular, she observes 
that “like the Victorians, [Eliot] uses the dramatic monologue extensively, and he seeks first in myth, then 
in orthodox Christianity, an objective means of structuring and evaluating the particulars of history,” just 
as, say, Arnold and Tennyson “use myth and legend to attain a resonance and objectivity greater than mere 
personal emotion could offer” (3). 
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ontological, epistemological, and anthropological ideologies. That is to say, I want to 
reposition Eliot, stressing his singularity and the uniqueness of his mode of modernism.     
 For as I have argued throughout this project, Eliot disavows binary modes of 
thought in favor of an epistemological skepticism and metaphysical pragmatism (i.e., 
whatever theory works, works). His poetics and criticism stem directly from his 
philosophical orientation. To understand Eliot as dialectical poet means, then, to see him 
questioning inherited metaphysical dispositions in art and philosophy. It means seeing his 
mode of modernism as a critique of the modern project and the particular mode of 
aesthetics it supports (i.e., one reliant upon a conceptually inadequate binary 
metaphysics). It means seeing Eliot not as a poet of modern malaise, proto-existential 
angst, nihilistic despair, or supposed doctrinal quietism, but rather as a cultural 
interventionist and philosophical iconoclast (of sorts). Finally, it means reconsidering 
those definitions of modernism that present it solely as an existential response to the 
cultural and existential crisis of modernity. Such a definition suggests an acceptance of 
modernity’s conceptual framework, in that it implicitly constructs individuals as passive 
subjects confronting a hostile, indifferent, bewildering object-world. It pits the inner 
against the outer, the self against the other. It suggests, too, a model of self that 
essentializes the self, construes it as an autonomous ontological given distinct from the 
world within which it moves and acts. As I have repeatedly sought to show, Eliot contests 
such binary formulations in his work.  
Indeed, the philosophy he propounds in his graduate work or dramatizes in his 
poetry reflects in fact a profound epistemological skepticism more indicative of 
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postmodern than modernist thought.117 With Jean-Francois Lyotard, for instance, Eliot 
rejects meta-narratives (as seen in his rejection of various early twentieth-century 
totalizing anthropological theories). With Richard Rorty, he espouses a version of anti-
essentialism or anti-foundationalism in favor of a thorough-going philosophical 
pragmatism. As he concludes on the final page of his dissertation, for instance, “an 
‘objective’ truth is a relative truth: all that we care about is how it works; it makes no 
difference whether a thing really is green or blue, so long as everyone behaves towards it 
on the belief that it is green or blue” (169). With the deconstructionists he dismantles 
conceptual binaries and affirms the determining power of language to construct and 
delimit social and subjective reality (as seen in his refusal to ontologically differentiate 
objects from subjects or subject from objects). And with Lacan he understands 
subjectivity as dialectically grounded in an act of self-reflection (i.e., Lacan’s mirror 
stage). For Eliot as for Lacan, there is no essential, stable self.  
What accounts for these apparent parallels between Eliot’s thought and late 
twentieth-century critical and social theory? I would suggest a shared philosophical 
provenance. As I have argued, Eliot descends from that tradition of thought, stemming 
largely from Hegel, which maintains that the fundamental structure of reality is 
dialectical (and thus unceasingly transitional). Indeed, as Jewel Spears Brooker notes, 
Bradley himself has often been called a “neo-Hegelian,” with his emphasis on the 
“Absolute” and on the dialectical relations that he feels constitute it (Mastery 176). As a 
                                                          
117 Although I lack the space here to unpack these correlations (to do so would require a book in itself), the 
few examples I provide should at least help support the general point.  
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student of Bradley, Eliot, too, emerges as a kind of neo-Hegelian, although, like Bradley, 
he propounds an epistemological skepticism utterly lacking in Hegel. All three figures, 
however, privilege dialectic. All three complicate all-too-easy binary distinctions. And in 
the end, all three affirm the unity of opposites as an axiomatic element of their 
philosophies. Eliot’s proto-postmodernism, then, finds its source (I argue) in a dialectical 
conception of reality which for Eliot necessitates a rigorous epistemological suspicion of 
all essentializing ontological distinctions. Accordingly, to see Eliot as a poet rooted in the 
Hegelian tradition suggests not only a broader understanding of Eliot’s work but a richer 
understanding of modernism itself, particularly given Eliot’s standing in the period. For 
seen in this light, modernism entails not only a response to modernity as articulated 
within a largely uncontested Cartesian conceptual framework, but a challenge to that 
framework stemming from an alternate metaphysics.  
Thus, Eliot emerges as a powerful intellectual skeptic who interrogates the 
metaphysical presuppositions of his age, even as he dramatizes its felt existential realities. 
Of course, Eliot was not alone in exploring the relation between the inner and the outer. 
Indeed, a number of Eliot’s fellow modernists, too, dramatized this same binary in their 
work, although with certain key differences from Eliot. In order to better understand 
Eliot’s project and his position in literary history as I am attempting to define it (i.e., Eliot 
as a dialectician), it becomes necessary to explore the ways his contemporaries 
approached this issue as well. Accordingly, in Chapter Six, I will offer brief readings of a 
number of modernist novelists and poets, and will suggest that each in varying ways 
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maintains the binary distinction between inner and outer that Eliot in his work labors to 
deconstruct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
282 
 
CHAPTER VI 
INTERIORITY AND EXTERIORITY IN  
ELIOT’S MODERNIST CONTEMPORARIES 
 
  Throughout this study, I have argued against those critics who describe Eliot as a 
“poet of interiority.” A. David Moody, Lyndall Gordon, and J. Hillis Miller, for instance, 
all argue (with slight variations in emphasis) that Eliot’s poetry expresses his inner 
experience. For them, Eliot’s poetry functions as veiled autobiography, as a way of 
articulating his inmost emotions and self-perceptions. Eliot confesses himself, as it were, 
through his poems. As Gordon argues, “To know the man, we must follow the poem. . . . 
We must venture . . . into the morass of the manuscript to determine the chronology of 
accretions and then . . . we may perceive the shaping pattern of the private life” (147). To 
read the poems, then, is to read the man, just as to know the man is to read the poems. 
But this means, too, that the inward precedes its dramatic portrayal. Inwardness proves 
primary. Eliot only translates inner content into outward form. In making this 
assumption, these critics erect a binary that all-too-neatly divides the inner from the 
outer. They imply that individuals possess an ontologically stable and conceptually 
comprehensible core self that exists in itself apart from the world it encounters. The self 
(and its inner complexities) and the external world remain categorically distinct from one 
another. They exist on divergent planes.  
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 But as I have argued, Eliot vigorously resists this view of the relation between 
inner and outer in both his prose and poetry. As I pointed out above, even as early as 
1919’s “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Eliot “struggles to attack . . . the 
metaphysical theory of the substantial unity of the soul” (42). Indeed, as he points out in 
that essay, his theory of impersonality itself derives from his refusal to affirm any such 
“unity.”118 And of course, his graduate work involves an ongoing strenuous critique of 
binary conceptualizations of subject/object or inner/outer relations, whether in philosophy 
or anthropology. Nevertheless, critics such as Moody or Gordon (or Langbaum and 
Miller) continue to read Eliot as a dualist who affirms interiority as a stable, self-
sustaining ontological reality. They see him as privileging inwardness and promoting an 
aesthetic vision that seeks to illuminate inner experience in stylistically novel ways. For 
these critics, Eliot participates in a literary cultural moment characterized by a general 
emphasis on interiority. That is, nothing distinguishes Eliot metaphysically from his 
contemporaries. Just as he prioritizes inner subjective realities, so, too, do they. For these 
critics, then, Eliot merely articulates in his own register the same concerns with 
inwardness or self-experience that marks the work of his fellow modernists.   
Indeed, Langbaum states quite explicitly that the self has emerged as the primary 
focus of all post-Kantian thought. Kant severed the subjective from the objective, 
Langbaum points out, leaving in place of the previous unity “an abyss . . . the yawning 
question of whether things outside” the individual “were real” or simply the individual’s 
                                                          
118 As he famously writes, “for my meaning is, that the poet has, not a personality to express, but a 
particular medium, which is only a medium and not a personality, in which impressions and experiences 
combine in peculiar and unexpected ways” (42).  
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own subjective construction (6). Miller, too, argues that modern art and philosophy 
generally emphasize a “spiritual power . . . within things and people,” rather than one 
external to them (11). He points to individuals’ “experience of existence” as modernity’s 
chief existential concern. He stresses the phenomenological over the ontological, the 
psychological over the externally objective. Dennis Brown, in The Modernist Self, makes 
much the same claim, when he suggests that modern literature remains concerned 
primarily with “new ways of representing self-experience” (1). In essence, each of these 
critics variously echoes cultural historian Erick Kahler, who argues in The Inward Turn 
of Narrative that modern Western literature and social thought share in general a 
commonly expressed “move inward” away from supposedly objective surface realities 
(227).119  
These critics are right to note the increased emphasis on inwardness characteristic 
of much modern thought, even if, as I have sought to explain, they present an 
unproblematized notion of interiority. They are right, too, to implicitly posit as a feature 
of modernism a relational opposition between inwardness and exteriority (or subjects and 
objects), even if they do not perceive how Eliot contests this opposition. Building on 
these claims, then, I want to turn away from Eliot in this chapter in order to explore how 
his contemporaries present this binary. For just as Eliot works out of a philosophical and 
                                                          
119 Eliot himself makes a similar claim. In his 1926 Clark Lectures (later published in 1993 as The Varieties 
of Metaphysical Poetry), he argues that a deep cultural shift occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. In the early modern period, Eliot suggests, “human inquiry” became less interested in ontological 
questions and more interested in psychological ones (79). For Eliot, the view of the world as consisting of 
real and existing outer objects gave way to a view of the world as produced by the mind alone. Eliot calls 
this the “true Copernican revolution,” and points to Descartes’ philosophical formulations as evidence (80). 
For Descartes, Eliot suggests, “what we know is not the world of objects, but our own ideas of these 
objects” (80). In contrast, as I argue, Eliot vehemently rejects this psychologizing of reality.  
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literary tradition that relies on inner/outer distinctions, so, too, do they. In Chapter Two, I 
provided brief discussions of a number of key nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
figures whose understanding of interiority and exteriority provides the context for Eliot’s 
own formulations. Similarly, this chapter will sketch out how certain early twentieth 
century novelists and poets treat this persistent binary. However, my ultimate goal is to 
demonstrate Eliot’s fundamental difference from his literary contemporaries. For while 
Eliot shares a concern with this binary with them, he ultimately rejects their pervasive 
dualism and implicit ontological essentialisms. Eliot explores the binary in order to 
subvert it, whereas others affirm it as a metaphysical given (with variations in emphasis, 
of course). In short, I want to explore Eliot’s contemporaries’ treatment of this binary in 
order to illustrate what most distinguishes Eliot from them. I want to show how Eliot 
stands out, rather than blends in, despite any stylistic similarities, shared (social and 
aesthetic) iconoclastic impulses, or overlapping subject matter.   
The first sections of this chapter examine those modernist writers who privilege 
interiority over exteriority. In section one, I explore the complexities of Virginia Woolf’s 
understanding of human subjectivity, and I argue that while Woolf’s work suggests the 
malleability and contingency of selfhood, she nonetheless affirms the existence of a 
definitive inviolable core self. Similarly, as I go on to argue, D.H. Lawrence also affirms 
a core “authentic” self, which he distinguishes from individuals’ superficial social 
identities. Indeed, both Woolf and Lawrence reveal an epistemological confidence in the 
metaphysical notion of self in their work which Eliot would categorically reject. In 
contrast to both these novelists, however, Joseph Conrad denies the self originary 
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content. While Conrad continues to privilege the inner over the outer (consider his 
literary “impressionism”), he views the self (I argue) only as a void whose content 
derives from contingent conditions, but whose essence derives from the individual’s own 
self-referential self-experience.  
Other writers of the period reject this emphasis on interiority. Instead, they 
consciously privilege surfaces, appearances, and concrete images. Despite their 
differences, Gertrude Stein, Ezra Pound, William Carlos Williams, and Wyndham Lewis 
all variously stress externality in their work. Each rejects as an unwanted vestige of 
romanticism and Victorianism any substantive emphasis on internality. Lewis, for 
instance, explicitly rejects the “naked pulsing and moving . . . soft inside of life,” as he 
puts it in Tarr (265). For Lewis, “good art must have no inside” (265). What matters is 
the image itself, an argument which Pound famously makes in his early Imagist work as 
well. Stein, too, I’ll argue, privileges externality through her emphasis on form and 
repetition. And Williams, I contend, offers an entire metaphysics in his poetry and 
criticism predicated on isolating objects as ontologically sufficient in themselves. Indeed, 
each of these writers implicitly advances a metaphysical project, whether they privilege 
internality or externality. And each of them, in one way or another, affirms the binary 
which I argue Eliot labors throughout his career to dissolve.         
In short, to understand the particularity of Eliot’s position requires an examination 
of the ways in which other novelists and poets approach this binary. How novel is Eliot’s 
approach? To what extent does he differ from his contemporaries? To what extent do 
they differ from each other? I hope to offer in this chapter some tentative responses to 
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each of these questions. For I claim that Eliot differs from his contemporaries far more 
than they differ from one another, whatever side of the binary they affirm. However, in 
order to clarify and streamline my discussion, especially given my space constraints, I 
intend to focus less on Eliot in this chapter than on his contemporaries, a strategy I 
adopted in Chapter Two as well. Also, my discussion of each of these figures will 
necessarily be brief. However, I hope to demonstrate general tendencies in their thought 
and work and thus general tendencies in modernist poetry and prose as well. To grasp 
these tendencies, however tentatively, allows a better understanding of Eliot’s own 
project and position in relation to his contemporaries.  
 
Woolf and the Inviolable Inner Self 
 In his study of modernism, Peter Childs reiterates the truism that modernist 
novelists represent inner experience in ways (seemingly) far more complex than their 
Realist predecessors (3). The modernist novel, he notes, attempts “to represent 
consciousness, perception, emotion, meaning and the individual’s relation to society” 
through relatively innovative techniques, such as “interior monologue, stream of 
consciousness, tunneling, defamiliarisation, rhythm, [and] irresolution” (3). Of course, 
since its emergence in the eighteenth century, the novel has always lent itself towards 
psychological portraiture. Indeed, Nancy Armstrong argues that the development of the 
novel helped to produce modern subjectivity itself. As she rather unambiguously puts it, 
“the history of the novel and the history of the modern subject are, quite literally, one and 
the same” (3). But the modernist novel intensifies its focus on the subject (however 
socially construed) by intensifying its focus on the subject’s experience of her or his own 
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inner phenomenological realities. Consciousness as such becomes central. Inwardness 
assumes priority over mere surface externalities.  
As John Fletcher and Malcolm Bradbury put it, modernist novelists sought “to 
probe more freely and intensely the fact of life and the orders of modern consciousness” 
(408). Indeed, they point to Virginia Woolf as the paradigmatic expression of this 
impulse, as revealed not only in her novels, but in her essays as well (408). For Fletcher 
and Bradbury, Woolf seeks to “situate fiction within the flow of human consciousness” 
and thus “escape the conventions of [mere] fact-giving and story-telling” (408). I agree 
and want to extend their argument. I want to claim that Woolf indeed privileges 
interiority, in particular by affirming the existence of a core self. She posits the self as the 
locus of meaning in her work, and often places that self in opposition to that which it 
perceives as external to itself. Thus I want to claim that Woolf constructs an inner/outer 
binary that prioritizes the inner over the outer, even as it reveals, too, a constructive 
tension between the two terms.   
In “Modern Fiction” (1925), which Julia Briggs refers to as a “manifesto for 
modernism,” Woolf sets forth her vision of the novel (51).120 She castigates those writers 
(e.g., H.G. Wells, Arnold Bennett, John Galsworthy) who attempt to reproduce only the 
surface details of material reality. This “form of fiction,” she argues, in fact “more often 
misses than secures the thing we seek” (287). It insufficiently captures the complexity 
and nuance of human existence. “Life escapes,” as she puts it, for the “essential thing, has 
moved off, or on, and refuses to be contained any longer in such ill-fitting vestments” 
                                                          
120 First published in 1919 as “Modern Novels” in the Times Literary Supplement (Leaska 283).  
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(286). Against these authors, Woolf privileges inner experiential reality over superficial 
material (or physical) details. In a sense, the novelists she critiques are not realist enough. 
They miss the human “essence” of that which they aim to represent. As she puts it in one 
of the most well-known passages from the essay, “Look within and life, it seems, is very 
far from being ‘like this.’ Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. 
The mind receives a myriad impressions. . . . From all sides they come, an incessant 
shower of innumberable atoms; and as they fall, as they shape themselves into the life of 
Monday or Tuesday, the accent falls differently from of old” (287). That is to say, Woolf 
suggests that human consciousness consists of its own incessant inner fluctuation, as 
experience impresses itself onto the individual in unceasingly diverse ways. Thus, those 
modes of representation which present the relation between individuals and their external 
realities as a mere accumulation of external details in fact misrepresent human subjective 
experience. For Woolf, experiential reality is far more complex and inwardly oriented 
than these writers suggest.  
Indeed, in another passage from the same essay, Woolf writes, “Life is not a 
series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged, but a luminous halo, a semi-transparent 
envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end” (287-88). The 
true “task” of the novelist, she argues, is to “convey this varying, this unknown and 
uncircumscribed spirit, whatever aberration or complexity it may display” (288). Woolf, 
then, prioritizes consciousness itself as the proper subject of representation. External, 
merely quotidian details matter only inasmuch as they effect alterations in the perceiving 
mind; for Woolf seeks to delineate subjective effects much more so than objective causes. 
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“Let us trace the pattern,” Woolf declares, “however disconnected and incoherent in 
appearance, which each sight or incident scores upon the consciousness” (288). And she 
concludes that novelists should “draw upon” “every feeling, every thought, every quality 
of brain and spirit . . . no perception comes amiss” (291).Woolf thus decisively turns 
inward in her work. But the turn inwards implies, too, a turn away from the external. 
Indeed, it implies deemphasizing the external as a subject of representation in itself. The 
external exists only as construed through subjective representations of it. As such, in this 
pivotal essay, Woolf implicitly erects a binary in which the inner obtains primacy over 
the outer. While she never denies externality ontological reality, as might some 
Berkeleyan subjective idealist, she nonetheless subordinates it to its subjective effects. 
And in so doing, she creates the very tension which works to support and perpetuate the 
binary.  
Woolf’s turn inwards implies a turn towards the self and thus a particular 
conceptualization of the self. Louise Poresky argues that the “heart of Virginia Woolf’s 
work is her search for the Self” (15). Indeed, in “Letter to a Young Poet” (1932),121 
Woolf observes that the key “problem” is “to find the right relationship  . . . between the 
self that you know and the world outside,” a problem which “no living poet has . . . 
altogether solved” (271). The self, she suggests, exists in tension with the world it 
confronts as external to itself. And this implies that the self possesses an ontological 
distinctness by which it distinguishes itself from the “world outside.” The “problem” she 
refers to is the gap that exists between the “self that sits alone in the room at night with 
                                                          
121 Woolf first published this “letter” in the Yale Review (Leaska 260).  
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the blinds drawn” immersed in its own “private universe” and that reality experienced as 
external to the self (269). “[H]ow are you going to get out,” she asks, “into the world of 
other people?” (271). How does one bridge the gap between the inner and the outer or the 
self and the other? But by posing the question like this (i.e., oppositionally), she 
acknowledges a particular conceptualization of the relation between the internal and the 
external. She constructs the two in binary opposition to one another, even as she suggests 
the necessity for overcoming that opposition (or at least attempting to overcome it).  
Woolf’s emphasis on interiority in general and the self in particular permeates her 
work, as Poresky rightly suggests. In one way or another, each of her major novels 
focuses on the gap between the individual and the world that the individual perceives as 
external to itself, although she attempts to envision means by which individuals might 
(possibly) overcome that gap. In To the Lighthouse (1927), for example, Woolf offers a 
vision of the individual as largely self-circumscribed. In one of the novel’s most famous 
passages, Woolf describes Mrs. Ramsey’s sense of herself when alone: “To be silent; to 
be alone. All the being and the doing, expansive, glittering, vocal, evaporated; and one 
shrunk . . . to being oneself, a wedge-shaped core of darkness, something invisible to 
others” (62). Woolf not only emphasizes a radically solitary notion of self-experience, but 
suggests that that self remains absolutely inaccessible to others. In themselves, 
individuals remain cut off from one another, isolated monads incapable of 
communicating their inmost self-essences. “Now and again,” she continues, “we rise to 
the surface and that is what you see us by,” but beneath the surface, individuals remain 
inviolably self-contained (62).  
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In another passage which further illuminates this particular monadic 
conceptualization of interiority and the self, Woolf presents Lily desiring complete union 
with Mrs. Ramsey. Remembering a moment when she had sat with her arms wrapped 
about Mrs. Ramsey’s knees in an effort to feel as close as possible to her, Lily asks 
herself, “Could loving, as people called it, make her and Mrs. Ramsey one? for it was not 
knowledge but unity that she desired . . . intimacy itself, which is knowledge” (51). But 
as she sat there (in her memory), embracing Mrs. Ramsey, she lamented, “Nothing [had] 
happened, Nothing! Nothing! As she leant her head against Mrs. Ramsey’s knee. . . . 
How then, she had asked herself, did one know one thing or another about people, sealed 
as they were?” (51). Desiring yet denied ontological union with the other, Lily also 
realizes the epistemological barriers that separate individuals from one another. She can 
neither blend into Mrs. Ramsey nor grasp her essence in its authentic native profundity. 
“Only like a bee,” she tells herself, “ranging the wastes of the air . . . alone,” scenting out 
hives, can individuals get a hint of the essence of the other (51, emphasis added).  
To the Lighthouse repeatedly stages attempts like Lily’s to overcome this gap 
between self and other (and thus between the inner and the outer). Indeed, it remains one 
of the novel’s chief concerns. Mrs. Ramsey’s dinner provides perhaps the most famous 
example. At the beginning of the dinner, a gulf seems to divide each of the guests from 
one another. Mrs. Ramsey senses the magnitude of that gulf, and laments, “Nothing 
seems to have merged. They all sat separate” (83). The first half of the dinner consists of 
her efforts to draw her guests out of their native isolation and into some self-transcendent 
spiritual communion with one another. She seeks through the aesthetic form of the dinner 
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party to overcome individuals’ existential alienation. And by the time she lights the 
candles, she seems to have succeeded: “Now all the candles were lit up, and the faces on 
both sides of the table were brought nearer by the candlelight, and composed, as they had 
not been in the twilight, into a party round a table” (97). The candles unite the dinner 
guests in their glow, draws them out of their individual isolation, “shuts off” the “outside 
world” (97). “Some change went through them all,” the narrator explains, and “they were 
all conscious of making a party together in a hollow, on an island; had their common 
cause against that fluidity out there” (97). Their sense of themselves as utterly self-
enclosed, monadic individuals recedes. In its place, a new sense of communal identity 
emerges. No longer do they sit separate. They have now “merged” together. What Lily 
feels she could not accomplish on Mrs. Ramsey’s knee, Mrs. Ramsey seems to have 
accomplished through her dinner.     
Kristina Groover suggests that “Woolf’s language” in this scene “signals a 
metamorphosis that surpasses mere social harmony” (221). Woolf portrays, she argues, a 
“transfiguration” of sorts, as she “break[s] down barriers between her characters” (222). 
Heidi Storl agrees, but goes further. For Storl, Woolf dramatizes in the candlelight scene 
the “collapse” of the subject/object distinction (306). She argues that “Woolf here 
characterizes the convergence of beings,” rather than a “traditionally construed . . . 
collection of independently existing subjects and objects” (306). In other words, for both 
Groover and Storl, Woolf dissolves the distinctions between individuals, and thus the 
distinctions between the inner and the outer (or self and other). It would seem that, like 
Eliot, Woolf here manages not only to call into question the legitimacy of the 
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subject/object binary, but to dramatize its dissolution through its incorporation into a 
higher dialectical harmony. Subject/object distinctions exist, she suggests, only on lower 
planes of self conceptualization. Through the medium of cooperative aesthetic experience 
(i.e., the dinner), individuals can overcome their seemingly self-constitutive existential 
alienation from one another.  
While Woolf certainly stages moments of apparent self-transcendence in which 
individuals step out of themselves as isolated subjects, these moments remain tenuous, 
temporary, and exceedingly rare. As such, they seem less authentically ontological in 
nature than emotional or psychological. Individuals may feel a sense of self-transcendent 
connection with others, but that does not necessarily make it so ontologically. Consider 
the end of the dinner. Watching Mrs. Ramsey leave the dining room, Lily reflects to 
herself “And directly she went a sort of disintegration set in; they [all] wavered about, 
went different ways” (112). They splinter off, retreat back into themselves. The moment 
has passed. Individuals remain constitutively individual, the novel implicitly suggests 
(perhaps despite itself). The dinner may have provided a reprieve of sorts, but it did not 
accomplish the mode of self-merging that Lily, for example, had sought. Indeed, Part III 
of the novel concerns itself largely with Lily’s feelings of alienation (in general) and 
separation from Mrs. Ramsey (in particular). However, more to the point, the novel 
stages the impressions generated during the dinner as subjectively oriented. That is to 
say, the dinner guests feel themselves harmonizing around the table. The text emphasizes 
the inner sensation characteristic of this brief moment of self-transcendence, as it 
dramatizes each characters’ self-awareness of their participation in the event (e.g., “they 
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were all conscious of making a party together”). Thus, rather than dissolving characters 
into each other, as Groover and Storl argue, Woolf sustains the notion of individuality 
even as she provides an image suggestive of its transcendence. She prioritizes inwardness 
even as she stages the complex ways inwardness can perceive itself in transcendent 
harmony with other selves.  
Moreover, despite Storl’s claims to the contrary, the novel continues to maintain 
subject/object distinctions even at the very moment it would appear to undercut them. 
Specifically, during the dinner, the novel relies on binary language in order to present its 
vision of a non-binary transpersonal unity. The text contrasts the sense of unity 
developing within the room to the “fluidity” outside (97). “Inside the room,” the narrator 
observes, “seemed to be order and dry land; there, outside, a reflection in which things 
wavered and vanished, waterily” (97). Even as the narrator appears to break down the 
distinctions between subjects and objects (between the self and other), she erects a new 
enframing binary that contextualizes their collective experience. The dinner guests 
together comprise an “inside” constitutively opposed to the world “outside” their 
immediate shared intimacy. Thus the text does not dissolve binaries so much as simply 
alter their coordinates. Rather than erasing the distinction between the inner and the 
outer, it only expands (temporarily) what constitutes the inner (i.e., the dinner party). But 
the outer as such remains outer. Moreover, the world outside the dining room windows 
appears distorted to the guests, suggesting their own subjective epistemological 
limitations: “for the night was now shut off by panes of glass, which, far from giving any 
accurate view of the outside world, rippled it . . . strangely” (97). The guests may have 
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“common cause against that fluidity out there,” but the world “out there” remains 
existentially othered and ontologically inaccessible (97). Inwardness (however construed) 
remains primary, while the outward proves shadowy and insubstantial. 
Thus Woolf dramatizes the tension between the inner and the outer. She portrays 
individuals as constitutively self-delineated, although desirous to surmount their own 
subjective horizons. Other novels reveal a similar metaphysic. Consider, for example, 
Mrs. Dalloway (1925). Sarah Hardy argues that Woolf presents in this novel a vision of 
self characterized less by existential isolation than transpersonal connection (402). 
Individuals, she suggests, possess “mysterious and permeable boundaries,” despite 
superficial divisions (403). And certainly, the novel would appear to support this 
argument. At the very beginning of the novel, as Clarissa walks the London streets, she 
ponders the extent to which she feels a “part” of her surroundings: “somehow in the 
streets of London, on the ebb and flow of things, here, there, she survived, Peter survived, 
lived in each other, she being part, she was positive, of the trees at home; of the house 
there, ugly, rambling all to bits and pieces as it was; part of people she had never met; 
being laid out like a mist between people she knew best . . . spread ever so far, her life, 
herself” (8). Similarly, Septimus, sitting in the park, senses the very life in the trees 
around him, and feels “connected” to their leaves “by millions of fibres” (19). Both 
Clarissa and Septimus express a sense of profound union with the external world. Both 
turn themselves inside out, as it were. The subjective overlaps with the objective, as the 
inner and the outer appear to converge. Woolf would seem here to dissolve the 
distinctions between interiority and exteriority.  
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But the novel offers a counter-vision, too, repeatedly complicating this notion of 
self (i.e., self as diffuse or interconnected). Even as Septimus, for example, sits in his 
reverie on the park bench, an insuperable gulf divides his consciousness from Rezia’s. 
His vision remains incommunicable and private. Similarly, Peter Walsh feels Clarissa is 
“impenetrable” (52). And indeed, Clarissa chose to marry Richard over Peter because she 
felt Richard respected the inviolability of her inmost private self (6-7). As she muses 
later, “there is a dignity in people; a solitude; even between husband and wife a gulf; and 
that one must respect” (101). Moreover, looking out her window at an old lady in an 
apartment opposite to hers, Clarissa contemplates the “privacy of the soul,” and reflects 
on the “supreme mystery” of isolate consciousnesses and individual subjective self-
presence: “here was one room; there another. Did religion solve that,” she asks, “or 
love?” (108). Individuals remain mysteries to one another, she suggests. As Louise 
Poresky puts it, Clarissa desires people to “relate to her as a totality unto herself” (105). 
Later in the novel, Peter, too, reflects on “the truth about our soul . . . our self” (136). In a 
passage which directly anticipates Lucy Swithin’s revelation in Between the Acts,122 Peter 
likens the self to a fish, which “inhabits deep seas and plies among obscurities threading 
her way between the boles of giant weeds, over sun-flickered spaces and on and on into 
gloom, cold, deep, inscrutable” (136). The self remains a mystery for itself, hidden from 
                                                          
122 One of the novel’s last scenes involves Lucy’s sense of individuals’ inescapable interiority and private 
inviolability (which she celebrates). Walking past a pond of carp, Lucy watches the fish flicker around each 
other, “in and out between the stalks, silver; pink; gold; splashed; streaked; pied” (139). She reflects, too, 
on how “seldom” the “great carp himself . . . came to the surface” (139). And she goes on to liken 
individuals to these flitting, semi-secretive fish: “Ourselves, she murmured,” looking at the fish, and saw 
“in that vision beauty, power, and glory” (139). She concludes her reverie with the realization that her 
brother (Bart) would never understand this insight, that it remains only her own “private vision” (139).    
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view, “obscure” and “inscrutable.” Even as the novel gestures towards moments of self-
transcendence, it also suggests that an ontological and epistemological chasm divides 
individuals from one another. Indeed, I would argue that the novel prioritizes the gap that 
divides individuals over those tenuous moments of self-dissolution, inasmuch as it 
affirms the inviolable “dignity” of individuals as individuals.  
As in “Letter to a Young Poet,” then, Woolf stages in both Mrs. Dalloway and To 
the Lighthouse the “problem . . . between the self that you know and the world outside.” 
She dramatizes the tension between interiority and exteriority, positing the problematic 
distinction between these two terms as one of the chief concerns of her fiction. And in 
posing this tension, she implicitly essentializes the self. She suggests the self exists as an 
ontological given in contradistinction to an external reality which, too, remains an 
ontological given (i.e., a distinct essence in itself). Even in Orlando, where the self 
appears maximally fluid, it continues to function as the stable locus of subjective self-
presence. The self, that is, possesses determinate form even if not determinate content. It 
remains a reality in itself, the “core or center of the human psyche,” as Poresky puts it 
(15). Woolf, then, demonstrates in her fiction an understanding of the self predicated on a 
binary metaphysics which distinguishes between the interior and the exterior. Even when 
the line between the two poles blurs, the subjective obtains primacy over the objective, in 
that she privileges inner sensation, impression, and response—what she calls in “Modern 
Fiction” that “pattern, however disconnected and incoherent in appearance, which each 
sight or incident scores upon the consciousness” (288).  
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Lawrence and the Subterranean Self 
Woolf is not alone among her peers in privileging interiority (however construed), 
although she is perhaps one of its most articulate dramatists. Other modernist novelists, 
too, propound an interiorized (and essentialized) notion of self in their fiction in ways 
that both echo and contrast with Woolf’s formulations. D.H. Lawrence, for instance, 
affirms a similar tension between interiority and exteriority in his work. For Lawrence, 
the “true” self lies not on the surface, not in an individual’s quotidian identity or fleeting 
sensations and emotions, but somewhere in the depths below. Like Woolf, he affirms a 
core self, but he locates that self in a deeper substratum of consciousness. Like Woolf, 
Lawrence also relies upon an implicit inner/outer binary in his work that underlies his 
conceptualizations of human subjectivity. But unlike Woolf, Lawrence not only 
juxtaposes the self against those forces which the self identifies as external to itself, but 
also against perceived inauthentic versions of itself (i.e., what he deprecates as the 
common ego-self). In short, I want to argue that like Woolf, Lawrence promulgates an 
essentialist metaphysics which sees the self as ultimately self-grounded. I see Lawrence 
as a kind of philosophical dualist, whose vision of human subjectivity relies on a clearly 
evident affirmation of the binary relation between interiority and exteriority.  
From early in his career, Lawrence promoted a particular notion of self that not 
only emphasized interiority as such but affirmed a bifurcated model of subjective self-
experience. In a 1914 letter to Edward Garnett, Lawrence famously writes that “[you] 
mustn’t look in my novel for the old stable ego of the character. There is another ego, 
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according to whose action the individual is unrecognisable” (78).123 This other “ego” lies 
deeper within the individual than the transient, socially inflected surface-self, and it 
constitutes a more authentic identity. Indeed, Lawrence goes on to argue that the 
“ordinary novel . . . trace[s]” individuals’ superficial personalities. These novels posit a 
“diamond” core to individuals, and then plot out the history of its material development. 
Lawrence, however, seeks to dramatize the “carbon” beneath the diamond, the “single 
radically unchanged element” that persists beneath the flux of episodes and events that 
comprise any individual’s daily existence (78). In essence, he seeks to portray in his work 
the chthonic self that for Lawrence constitutes the source of individuals’ “authentic” 
being.  
But as Richard Lehan rightly notes, Lawrence aligns his notion of the “inner self” 
with a particular understanding of human “sexual consciousness” (52). Self and sexuality 
overlap in that through sexual expression and experience the individual accesses or 
activates forces that precede normative social consciousness and self-identity. Authentic 
selfhood involves a particularized expression of universal (pro)creative energies which 
ruptures normative self-perceptions. In Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence explains 
this notion of subjectivity by distinguishing between a “night-self” and a “day-self.” The 
                                                          
123 Indeed, Lawrence places his understanding of the self in direct opposition to his literary contemporaries. 
Typical modern novels, for Lawrence, remain all too subjectively-oriented. They focus uselessly on 
characters’ ultimately meaningless (because utterly temporal) psychological impressions. Contra Woolf, 
Lawrence argues against “self-consciousness” in the novel (“Future” 143). Specifically critiquing Joyce 
and Richardson (but by extension Woolf), Lawrence claims that the “people in the serious novels are [too] 
absorbedly concerned with themselves and what they feel and don’t feel, and how they react to every 
mortal button” (143). He calls this mode of fiction “childish,” and strenuously attacks those novelists who 
spend “thousands and thousands of pages” obsessively analyzing characters’ “reactions” and “feelings” 
(143). 
 
 
301 
 
“night-self,” he asserts, “is the very basis of the dynamic self. The blood consciousness 
and the blood passion is the very source and origin of us” (210). In contrast, the “day-
self” constitutes a kind of crust that encloses individuals, imprisons them within 
themselves, cutting them off from their own authentic source of self-being. The true self, 
for Lawrence, consists of those welling energies which disrupt the encrustations of 
quotidian consciousness. In drawing these distinctions, Lawrence relies on a binary 
surface/depth logic. The “true” self lies in the depths, and aligns with individuals’ deepest 
bodily instincts, whereas the “false” self functions only as an enclosing, life-diminishing 
shell.  
Lawrence illustrates this highly binary conceptualization of human subjectivity as 
early as 1913’s Sons and Lovers, in his dramatization of Paul’s developing sexuality. 
Lawrence portrays Paul experiencing a gap between two opposed notions of self: the 
deep self of transcendent sexual energies and the ego-self of everyday social existence. In 
his interactions with Miriam, the sexual self (or deep self) remains largely subordinate to 
normative modes of consciousness and human relations. Miriam insists on the “littleness” 
of a “personal relationship” with Paul, which he resents (322). Instead, he seeks the 
dissolution of superficial identity (and the personal relations that entails) in the oceanic 
depths of sexual release, a goal he seemingly achieves with Clara. Late in the novel, for 
instance, Paul reflects that with Clara he “became, not a man with a mind, but a great 
instinct. His hands were like creatures, living; his limbs, his body, were all life and 
consciousness, subject to no will of his, but living in themselves” (410). He channels 
energies which he perceives as preceding social relational consciousness, and which he 
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experiences as shattering received modes of self-understanding. The passage concludes, 
“Just as he was, so it seemed the vigorous, wintry stars were strong also with life. He and 
they struck with the same pulse of fire. . . . It was as if he, and the stars . . . and Clara 
were licked up in an immense tongue of flame, which tore onwards and upwards” (410). 
He feels in the act of consummation that he expresses or participates even in the same 
energies that underlie and motivate the cosmos itself.  
During these intimate moments, however transitory, Paul descends into himself 
(turning away from external quotidian realities) in order to transcend himself. He 
dissolves into that which he perceives as his essential being, indeed into what Lawrence 
goes on to present as the energies and forces of “life” itself. Of course, Sons and Lovers 
appears to portray this inner self merely as some transpersonal cosmic impulse which 
individuals participate in only at the expense of their own distinct individuality. 
Individuals, that is, lose themselves (as selves) in the cosmic flux of blind, impersonal 
impulse and instinct. In essence, Lawrence would seem to transcend any binary he 
initially constructs between inner and outer selves, as he dramatizes inwardness as union 
with external, trans-human life forces. And yet, in other contexts, the novel portrays Paul 
(and others, like Clara) repeatedly resisting any such mode of absolute dissolution. 
Indeed, at its most basic level, the novel plots out Paul’s attempts to carve out an identity 
for himself separate from that of others, particularly his mother (often despite himself).  
Barbara Shapiro rightly observes that “Lawrence’s descriptions of Paul’s 
relationship with his mother reveals a merged identity, a lack of separation and 
individuation that extends well into Paul’s adolescence and adulthood” (350). 
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Throughout much of the novel, they remain tightly interwoven into one another’s lives. 
Each constitutes the other’s center of self. Each remains grounded in the life-experience 
of the other; twin stars in mutual orbit, as it were. And yet the novel goes on to portray 
Paul’s ambivalent resistance to this dependent condition. His mother “loved him first,” 
the narrator explains, even as “he loved her first. And yet it was not enough. His new 
young life . . . was urged to something else. It made him mad with restlessness. . . . He 
fought against his mother almost as he fought against Miriam” (253-54). Some inner 
consciousness within Paul makes him aware of the need to distance himself from his 
mother, to distinguish his life and identity from hers. As Shapiro again notes, “his mother 
is for him both the source of all reality, of meaning, and of a suffocating bondage” (350). 
And their distorted relationship distorts Paul’s relationship with other women in his life, 
too, notably Miriam. 
Indeed, more so than even with his mother, he resists what he perceives as 
Miriam’s attempts to appropriate him. As Paul’s mother complains, “She’s not like an 
ordinary woman, who can leave me my share in him. She wants to absorb him. She wants 
to draw him out and absorb him till there is nothing left of him, even for himself” (221). 
And as Paul reflects, Miriam “did not want to meet him, so that there were two of them, 
man and woman together. She wanted to draw all of him into her” (222). He feels she 
seeks to appropriate him in his totality, rather than acknowledging the inviolability of his 
own self-essence. Paul feels the same at times with Clara, too. At one point he reflects, 
“She made him feel imprisoned when she was there, as if he could not get a free deep 
breath, as if there were something on top of him” (405). Thus, even as he seems at times 
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to embrace the experience of oceanic self-dissolution through sexual union, he 
nonetheless attempts to preserve some deep sense of autonomous individuality.  
An apparent tension, then, emerges in Lawrence’s formulations in which he 
seems to both affirm and contest binary notions of human subjectivity. On the one hand, 
he suggests the convergence of the inner and the outer in the convergence of the personal 
self (i.e., the “day-self”) with impersonal cosmic forces (the “night-self”). When 
individuals give themselves over to these forces, they pierce the “crusts” of their own 
inauthentic social identities, transcending the limited ego-self for participation in the life 
forces that constitute the basis for their very being. On the other hand, Lawrence seeks to 
preserve space for the individual to exist as an individual distinct from others. Paul seeks 
his own self-possession in Sons and Lovers. He seeks to distinguish himself as a self, to 
define himself in contradistinction to others’ attitudes towards him. Still, both of these 
models privilege interiority as such. Both affirm the priority of inner experiential realities 
over external. Even when Lawrence appears to dissolve the binary, he in fact reinforces 
it, insofar as he dramatizes oceanic consciousness as a turn inwards or downwards into 
the self. For the turn inwards necessarily suggests a turn away from the outer. Nor is this 
dynamic limited to Sons and Lovers. As Calvin Bedient argues, Sons and Lovers may be 
Lawrence’s first novel, but it presents in nascent form his entire “aesthetic metaphysical 
vision” (118).  
 In 1915’s The Rainbow, Lawrence extends and elaborates on this contradictory 
vision of self first presented in Sons and Lovers. As Kate Flint rightly argues, in The 
Rainbow Lawrence “dramatizes two conflicting, irresolvable human drives—on the one 
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hand towards merging with others, and on the other towards independence, towards the 
establishment of a belief in one’s unique selfhood” (vii). He traces out the same tension, 
she suggests, between two seemingly incompatible modes of self (i.e., the oceanic versus 
the nodal or monadic). When Ursula, for instance, looks through her microscope in her 
botany classroom, she experiences a revelation concerning the nature of the self. “It was a 
consummation,” she exclaimed, “a being infinite. Self was a oneness with the infinite. To 
be oneself was a supreme, gleaming triumph of infinity” (439). Ursula perceives the self 
as most itself when subjected to its own immediate dissolution. She draws an implicit 
distinction between the self as it appears (a concrete substance) and the self as it is 
(dissolved in the totality of some cosmic reality). And yet she also draws a distinction 
between her “everyday self” and some deeper, more authentic core self which remains 
inaccessible to others: “Her soul was sure and indifferent of the opinion of the world of 
artificial light. As they went up the steps of the foot-bridge over the railway, and met the 
train-passengers, she felt herself belonging to another world . . . a whole darkness 
dividing her from them” (450). Feeling herself “separate,” she reflects that she “had 
never been more herself” (450). She affirms her “permanent self” here over her 
“temporal, social self,” but this “permanent self” remains inviolably her own (450). It 
seems distinct both from her “social self” and the “cosmic self” which she had earlier 
affirmed.  
In other words, in The Rainbow Lawrence constructs a binary in which the 
individual envisions herself in oppositional contrast to both external, social reality and 
(paradoxically) transpersonal cosmic energies. Ursula conceives of her essential self as a 
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substantive self which exists in contrast to “the world of artificial light.” And yet at the 
same time, she suggests the lack of any substantive self by affirming its fundamental 
ontological insubstantiality. Nevertheless, by positing a “permanent self” she positions 
herself in opposition to that very cosmic “infinity” which she also privileges. The two 
states stand irreconcilably logically opposed to one another. Of course, a number of 
scholars variously argue that Lawrence forwards a bifurcated model of self in his work. 
Richard Lehan, for instance, argues that “Two selves are always at work in Lawrence: an 
inner self [which] approximates the intuitional realm of Bergsonian being, and an 
external self [which] participates in mechanical relationships and the routine of 
everydayness” (53). Similarly, Calvin Bedient notes the “apparent contradiction” 
between Lawrence’s “insistence on being ‘single’ and ‘integral’ and, on the other hand, 
on ‘melting out’” (122). And Diane Bonds suggests, too, that Lawrence proffers two 
variant notions of self: the self as both a definitive “center of personal identity” as well as 
an “illusion, an effect or product of differentiating relations with the other” (21).  
But I want to claim that Lawrence’s bifurcated model of self itself is predicated 
on a binary logic that none of these critics observe. Not only does Lawrence rely on a 
conceptual polarity in order to draw his distinction between the chthonic “night-self” and 
the “day-self” of ordinary ego-consciousness (or between the “carbon” and the 
“diamond”), but he implicitly relies on an inner/outer distinction as well. For Lawrence, 
the self (however defined) remains ever in tension with forces it perceives as external to 
itself. The split within the self (between the supposedly authentic “carbon” and the 
inauthentic “diamond”) in fact reflects a particular relation between the interior and the 
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exterior. The inauthentic self in Lawrence emerges as a self in contestation with an 
external environment which that self encounters as a hostile force but to which it 
capitulates. For instance, in her efforts at self-definition, Ursula struggles against the 
“old, hard barren form of bygone living” (493). She seeks to pierce the “husk of an old 
fruition” to better actualize the living energies of her own self-essence (492). Even when 
she seems to identify her struggle as a struggle towards transpersonal realities (the 
“Eternity to which she herself belonged”), she nonetheless perceives this as a struggle 
against deadening superficial externalities in favor of an openness to more authentic 
modes of self presence (492). As she reflects in the last pages of the novel, she looks 
forward to a time when individuals (herself included) “would cast off their horny 
covering of disintegration” so that “new, clean, naked bodies would issue to a new 
germination . . . a new growth, rising to the light and wind and the clean rain of heaven” 
(494). In a passage which itself relies on externalizing imagery, Ursula posits not the 
dissolution of the individual, but the emergence of a freshened self. That is, Lawrence 
dramatizes the individual inwardly resisting corrupting external realities.  
And even when Lawrence presents individuals experiencing moments of apparent 
self-dissolution, he presents this, too, as a contrast between inner experiential realities 
and external, impersonal (or trans-human) realities. The internal encounters itself 
dissolved into a reality it perceives as external to itself, which is to say that the self 
nonetheless defines itself in contradistinction to those external realties. The self desires 
dissolution, a desire which in itself necessarily indicates an ontological distinction 
between the two modes of being (i.e., the substantive self versus the soluble self). As 
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Lawrence argues in “Morality and the Novel” (1925), “life consists in this achieving of a 
pure relationship between ourselves and the living universe” (174). But the effort to align 
“ourselves” (the inward) with the “living universe” (the outward) only underscores the 
gap between the two. Indeed, the very notion of a “relation” between the two terms (self 
and universe) suggests their ontological distinction from one another, a point that he 
seems to concede in his discussion of painting from the same essay: “When van Gogh 
paints sunflowers, he reveals, or achieves, the vivid relation between himself, as man, and 
the sunflower, as sunflower, at that quick moment of time. His painting does not 
represent the sunflower itself. We shall never know what the sunflower itself is” (173). In 
a rather Kantian formulation, Lawrence suggests that the sunflower as such remains 
ultimately inaccessible to the painter. Individuals may open themselves up to the 
phenomenological experience of the sunflower, but its noumenal essence eludes them. 
The two remain distinct substances in themselves, capable of relation, yes, but ultimately 
singularly self-unitive. 
In other words, Lawrentian self-dissolution entails the self’s transcendence of 
itself for its own sake. Or, to draw from Lawrence’s own imagery, it entails a tunneling 
down to the carbon beneath the diamond, and thus an affirmation of a core inwardness 
that defies ultimate dissolution. In a 1914 letter to Edward Garnett regarding The 
Rainbow and Women in Love, Lawrence argues that he wants to dramatize “woman 
becoming individual, self-responsible, taking her own initiative” (165). That is, he 
intends to portray the process of individualization, of the individual coming into an 
awareness of herself as a distinct, autonomous self-knowing self. And this implies a 
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particular focus on the self as a self. Thus, even as he dramatizes the dissolution of binary 
distinctions, Lawrence paradoxically predicates his metaphysics on maintaining those 
distinctions. Like Woolf, then, he acknowledges certain ontological tensions between the 
inner and the outer (or the “self” and the “universe”), for like Woolf, he affirms a 
constitutive distinction between the two terms. Both writers affirm inwardness as such. 
They posit a self which exists substantively distinct from that which it identifies as 
external to itself. Such a self may undergo a great deal of alteration (consider Woolf’s 
Orlando or Ursula’s unfolding in The Rainbow), but ultimately this entails the unfolding 
of potentialities already implicit in the self.  
Still, despite these similarities, both writers conceptualize the particular relation 
between the internal and external in unique ways. In a sense, Lawrence presents the two 
in vertical relation to one another, inasmuch as he presents the self as turning inwards and 
then tunneling downwards (to the carbon beneath the diamond). For Lawrence, the true 
self lies beneath surface realities, and individuation requires a kind of repudiation. Woolf, 
on the other hand, seems to envision a horizontal relation, in that she presents individuals 
who seek to overcome their isolate individuality through connection/unification with 
others. She portrays individuals who actively seek to bridge the gap that divides them 
from others (a horizontal movement), even as she affirms the self’s inviolable singularity. 
In contrast to both these pivotal figures stands Joseph Conrad, who forwards a model of 
interiority that denies the self any originary content or substantive essence, even as he 
continues to maintain the same binary logic that both Woolf and Lawrence employ. 
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Conrad and the Abyss of the Self  
 As a novelist, Conrad of course chronologically precedes both Woolf and 
Lawrence, but his concerns and interests foreshadow and mirror many of their own. Like 
his later contemporaries, Conrad remains focused on questions of narrative form and 
representational strategy. Like them, too, he emphasizes individual subjective experience. 
Yet Conrad’s portrayal of subjectivity proves more radical than either Woolf or 
Lawrence’s in that Conrad comes to question not only the intelligibility of the objective 
world beyond the individual but the substantiality of the self as such. For Conrad, I want 
to argue, individuals remains ontologically and epistemologically severed from external 
reality. The self perceives the “world” through its own cognitive and emotive apparatus, 
rather than perceiving the world in itself. But Conrad goes on to suggest that the self 
remains a fiction for itself as well, the self positing itself, as it were. Thus Conrad reduces 
the external to the internal, even as he negates the internal.  
Conrad is often understood as a transitional figure, who drew on nineteenth- 
century aesthetic theory, while at the same time pointing forward to the experimental 
forms of early twentieth-century high modernist fiction. Richard Lehan makes the 
standard claim that early modernist writers (such as Conrad) attempted to move beyond 
nineteenth-century naturalism and realism in order to better “accommodate a modernist 
reality” (47). For Lehan, this “accommodation” involved an “inward turn” built in part on 
the “theory of [subjective] impressionism” stemming from Walter Pater (47). He goes on 
rightly to point to Conrad as one of the inaugural figures of this inward turn. Conrad, 
Lehan suggests, emphasizes “sensation” or impression in his work (23). He dramatizes 
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individuals’ inner experience, prioritizing the subjective over the merely objective. 
Indeed, for Conrad, the objective exists only as an impression interpreted (or narrated) 
through the subjective. As Robert Baker puts it, Conrad’s impressionism “was a 
technique that endeavored to fix and shape randomly flowing experience according to 
Jamesian formal standards . . . where scene and sensation were skillfully blended” (116). 
He sought to illuminate inner experience by developing a narrative structure or 
representational form that itself might express that experience. 
 Conrad laid forth this aesthetic project in his oft-referenced 1897 Preface to The 
Nigger of the “Narcissus,” in which he claims that the “task” of the artist “is to hold up 
unquestioningly” a “passing phase of life . . . in the light of a sincere mood” (49). 
“Fiction,” he declares, “appeals to temperament,” and entails the artist’s attempt to 
convey to the reader “a moment of vision” otherwise “obscured by mists” (48, 51, 50). 
Conrad describes the writer’s project largely as a subjective endeavor. He highlights the 
importance of “mood,” stresses “temperament,” and affirms art as the revelation of a 
“vision.” Art is less an ontological project, then, than an epistemological one. Artists 
attempt to make their readers see the reality that they (the authors) perceive. And indeed, 
in perhaps the Preface’s most famous passage, Conrad declares that his “task . . . is, by 
the power of the written word, to make you hear, to make you feel—it is, before all, to 
make you see. That—and no more, and it is everything” (49, emphasis in original). In 
other words, for Conrad, the artist endeavors to convey a particular set of perceptions to 
the reader, to unveil a palpably felt “vision” of reality.  
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He goes on to suggest that objective reality exists only as inflected through 
individuals’ subjective dispositions. Art is an “appeal,” he exclaims, “of one temperament 
to all the other innumerable temperaments whose subtle and resistless power endows 
passing events with their true meaning, and creates the moral, the emotional atmosphere 
of the place and time” (48). Conrad suggests that the “truth” art conveys remains bound 
up with the “temperament” of the individual dramatizing that truth. The “true meaning” 
of an event rests in the individual’s particular perception of that meaning. As Michael 
Levenson rightly notes, the “central notion here is that of temperament ‘endowing’ events 
with their ‘true meaning.’ The implication, of course, is that such meaning is not intrinsic, 
that the significance of events remains incomplete without further adumbration” (2). 
External reality in itself proves inaccessible to human knowing for Conrad. Instead, 
individuals (or artists) translate external perceptions through the lens of their own 
emotive consciousnesses. The internal processes the external, so to speak, producing a 
particularized, contingent truth. As Conrad puts it at the beginning of the Preface, the 
individual (or artist) “descends within himself, and in that lonely region of stress and 
strife . . . finds the terms of his appeal” (47). Thus, Conrad positions the inwardly-
oriented individual against an external reality which the individual proceeds to interpret. 
And for Conrad, both the individual and the external world remain ontologically distinct 
from one another. The world presses in upon the individual, and in turn, the individual 
subjectively structures those impressions via a descent into the self.  
With few exceptions, Conrad avoided aesthetic/metaphysical manifestoes. As Ian 
Watt notes, other than the Preface, Conrad “wrote no other equally inward account of his 
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creative aspiration” (103). Indeed, on the whole, he doubted even “his capacity for 
writing literary criticism” (102). Still, his novels implicitly reveal his views, and in places 
explicitly restate them. In Heart of Darkness (1899), for instance, Conrad offers both an 
indirect dramatization of his binary ontology and skeptical epistemology as well as a 
series of direct statements that corroborate his views as expressed in the Preface.124 Near 
the beginning of the novel, the initial narrator reflects on Marlow’s “inconclusive” mode 
of storytelling (8). For Marlow, the narrator explains, the “meaning of an episode” lies on 
the surface of an event rather than in its depths. Events in themselves lack any definitive 
essentialized core meaning. Their particular significance derives from the atmosphere 
lent it by the perceiver’s perspective. As the narrator puts it, “to him [Marlow] the 
meaning of an episode was not inside like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale which 
brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze, in the likeness of one of these misty halos 
that, sometimes, are made visible by the spectral illumination of moonshine” (6). Marlow 
values impressions, sensations, and feeling. Mood trumps bare fact. Meaning lies not at 
the center of an event, but at its edges, in the way individuals perceive circumstances.125 
In short, the subjective experience of an “episode” matters more than the objective 
episode itself. As Marlow says, he cares more about conveying to his listeners “the effect 
of it on me” rather than a mere recitation of details (8).126  
                                                          
124 I want to focus on Heart of Darkness here because, as Kenneth Graham rightly notes, this novel 
“represents what is strongest and most characteristic in Conrad” (214).  
125 As Michael Levenson puts it, for Conrad, “the meaning of a phenomenon is its presence to a mind” (20).  
126 Compare with a similar reflection the narrator makes of Marlow in Lord Jim: “They wanted facts. Facts! 
They demanded facts of him, as if facts could explain anything!” (31).   
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To suggest that events derive their essential meaning solely from an observer’s 
perspective implicitly suggests a monadic model of self. Individuals remain confined to 
their own impressionistic frames, and communication proves vexed if not impossible. At 
one point, for example, Marlow laments his inability to communicate the inner essence of 
his vision. He asks his listeners, “Do you see the story? Do you see anything? It seems to 
me I am trying to tell you a dream—making a vain attempt, because no relation of a 
dream can convey the dream-sensation, that commingling of absurdity, surprise, and 
bewilderment” (32). He feels unable to adequately express the exact nature of his 
experience in the Congo. It remains an essentially private experience, ultimately (he 
fears) incommunicable. Indeed, immediately following these reflections, Marlow 
famously exclaims, “it is impossible to convey the life-sensation of any given epoch of 
one’s existence—that which makes its truth, its meaning—its subtle and penetrating 
essence. . . . We live, as we dream—alone” (33). The novel thus posits an ontological gap 
dividing individuals from one another. In contrast to relational or non-binary models of 
subjectivity, Conrad presents individuals as radically, almost solipsistically self-
isolated.127 In addition, then, to introducing a distinction between individual perceivers 
and the external world as it exists in itself, Conrad also postulates a constitutive gap 
between individuals. He presents a radically atomized world, composed of isolated 
subjective centers of consciousness.  
                                                          
127 Consider, too, the presentation of social relations in The Secret Agent. Individuals remain cut off from 
one another as well as from any sense of coherent community.    
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In presenting a monadic model of subjectivity which privileges inwardness, 
Conrad at first glance might appear also to suggest that individuals possess some core 
authentic self definitively differentiating them from others. Levenson argues, for 
instance, that in Conrad “the sovereign subject has not disappeared; it has only retreated 
to safer, if more narrow, ground” (35). Conrad, he concludes, “shares [Walter] Pater’s 
conviction that [individual] consciousness is the source of meaning and value” (35). After 
all, as Conrad himself puts it in the Preface, the artist must “descend within himself” in 
order to uncover the truth of “his” vision (47). And to descend within the self implies the 
existence of some core, essential self. Yet Conrad goes on to challenge this formulation. 
In Heart of Darkness, for example, Conrad presents human subjectivity ultimately as an 
empty abyss, devoid of content or substantive ontological grounding. Consider Marlow’s 
epistemological uncertainties.128 Not only does he lament the difficulty he has 
communicating his vision, but he also remains unclear as to the nature of his experience. 
As they head up river, shortly before encountering the dense fog, Marlow declares that 
the “essentials of this affair lay deep under the surface, beyond my reach, and beyond my 
power of meddling” (47). The fog that subsequently engulfs the steamer only reiterates 
Marlow’s observation. Its density and impenetrability mirrors his own experience of 
reality. Indeed, he presents nature in itself as “hopeless,” “dark,” and “impenetrable to 
human thought,” a surface masking inaccessible depths (69). And of course, the narrative 
as a whole consists of Marlow’s attempt to “account to myself for—for—Mr. Kurtz—for 
                                                          
128 Kenneth Graham observes that “the epistemological ambiguity of ‘Heart of Darkness’” remains one of 
the novels most distinctive elements (213).  
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the shade of Mr. Kurtz” (61). His tale reflects his attempt to interpret his experience, an 
experience whose ultimate essence he fears eludes him. In other words, Conrad presents 
Marlow as a figure dangling in space, grounded neither in some mutually constitutive 
dialectical relation with his external environment, nor grounded in himself as a figure 
whose own self-substantiality provides ontological or existential fixity. Certainties elude 
him. Uncertainties define him. 
Conrad’s portrayal of Kurtz only reinforces this model of self. The novel presents 
Kurtz as a self without a center, an unfathomable void or negation. Trying to make sense 
of Kurtz, Marlow reflects, “I think it [the wilderness] had whispered to him things about 
himself which he did not know . . . and the whisper had proved irresistibly fascinating. It 
echoed loudly within him because he was hollow at the core” (72).129 Marlow suggests 
that Kurtz lacked any substantive, core self capable of preserving itself (as a self) when 
separated from familiarizing cultural supports. Thus, Conrad offers in Kurtz a 
representation of self devoid of any essentialized, self-authenticating kernel. Beneath the 
veneer lies only the titular “darkness,” and the self experiences itself severed from any 
sense of fixed identity or self-substantiality. Kenneth Graham argues that Kurtz functions 
as Marlow’s double, his “unacknowledged other self” (211). And indeed, like Marlow, 
Kurtz dangles in midair, but in a much more radicalized sense. As Marlow puts it, “There 
was nothing either above or below him. . . . He had kicked himself loose of the earth” 
                                                          
129 Compare, too, with Marlow’s description of Kurtz as the pilgrims carry him to the steamer: “I saw him 
open his mouth wide—it gave him a weirdly voracious aspect, as though he had wanted to swallow all the 
air, all the earth, all the men before him” (74). Kurtz’ yawning mouth and “voracious aspect” reveal Kurtz 
as a kind of human black hole, a singularity lacking positive substance, consisting instead of an all-
consuming vacancy.    
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(82). In Kurtz, Marlow “saw the inconceivable mystery of a soul that knew no restraint, 
no faith, and no fear” (83). But in Kurtz, Marlow also saw “[a]ll Europe,” and by 
extrapolation, then, a universal notion of self (61). Thus, even as he unambiguously 
privileges interiority, Conrad denies the self ontological actuality or epistemological 
certainty.  
Nor does Conrad limit this vision of the self to Heart of Darkness. In an 1896 
letter to Edward Garnett, Conrad writes that “one’s own personality is only a ridiculous 
and aimless masquerade of something hopelessly unknown” (Garnett 45). Individuals’ 
relation to themselves remain characterized by their own self-ignorance. Lacking 
knowledge of themselves, they consequently lack grounding in themselves, dangling, like 
Kurtz or Marlow, in midair. In The Secret Agent (1907), too, Conrad portrays individuals 
as isolated monads, blind to themselves as well as to others. He presents London as 
anonymous, fragmented, and labyrinthine, rather than as a community of mutually 
reciprocating, constitutively interconnected individuals (231).130 He portrays the 
revolutionaries as self-deluded ideologues (or clowns), while at the same time satirizing 
bourgeois self-complacency. In doing so, he suggests that identity inevitably reduces to 
pretension. As the novel’s “professor” puts it, “character is built upon conventional 
morality. It leans on the social order,” an argument he applies both to the bourgeoisie and 
the revolutionaries (51, 52). Without realizing it, individuals lack any substantive 
identity. They exist simply as social cyphers, hollow, like Kurtz. John Lyon rightly 
                                                          
130 In his “Author’s Note” to the novel, he writes that he saw London as a “monstrous town . . . a cruel 
devourer of the world’s light. . . . darkness enough to bury five millions of lives” (231). 
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argues that “This is a novel of fools . . . a novel that sees folly as a defining characteristic 
of humanity” (xiii). And indeed, the individuals in the novel know neither themselves (in 
themselves) nor their neighbors. As in Heart of Darkness, Conrad denies individuals both 
definitive ontological self-substantiality and epistemological clarity. 
In short, Conrad offers a model of subjectivity that prioritizes inner experience. 
He privileges the self and its perspectival impressions over the concrete material realities 
that otherwise contextualize the self. Consequently, he suggests an oppositional relation 
between the two terms (inner and outer), in that neither derives from the other. The 
inward exists in itself for itself, even as the external remains inaccessible to human 
knowing. Contra Eliot, then, Conrad denies individuals and their worlds any mutually 
constitutive relational ontology. Rather, like Woolf and Lawrence, he affirms a binary 
metaphysics (however implicit). Yet at the same time, Conrad evacuates inwardness of 
definitive content. Unlike Woolf or Lawrence, Conrad affirms no self-authenticating core 
self, nor a self that evolves from one mode of self-presence to another (which, as in 
Woolf, remains nonetheless predicated on an underlying stability). Instead, Conrad 
presents subjectivity as an undifferentiated inwardness, a void ultimately devoid of 
delineation or unitive coherence. In a sense, in place of the self, he substitutes primordial 
will.   
Still, a slight counter impulse exists in Conrad, which lends some tension to this 
formulation. While Conrad (I argue) unambiguously privileges subjectivity, he also 
emphasizes the importance of surface sensory impressions. Recall the key line from his 
Preface, “My task which I am trying to achieve is . . . to make you hear, to make you 
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feel—it is, before all, to make you see” (49). In other words, Conrad seeks to appeal to 
his readers’ senses in his narratives. He wants his readers to “hear,” “feel,” and “see” the 
subtle (subjectively inflected) realities he seeks to convey.131 This minor tension in 
Conrad marks a major tension running through modernist aesthetics in general. While 
writers such as Woolf, Lawrence, and Conrad focus primarily on inner subjective realities 
(however variously), others, such as Gertrude Stein, the early Ezra Pound, Wyndham 
Lewis, and William Carlos Williams emphasize external, objective, material reality. 
Broadly understood, these two sets of writers demonstrate in their work an opposed 
metaphysical understanding of the relation between the internal and the external. 
Whereas the first set largely privilege interiority and subordinate the external, the second 
set largely prioritize the external and subordinate the internal. The first locate meaning on 
the inside, as it were, the second on the outside. However, both groups I argue maintain 
the essential binary distinction between the two terms. Both groups privilege one term 
over the other, rather than unambiguously dissolving the binary. In the following 
sections, I want to focus on those modernists who emphasize surfaces. I want to argue 
that these writers in various ways offer a metaphysics that assumes the transparent self-
appearance of the external world as a given. I want to argue as well, that each of these 
writers implicitly affirms a self-substantiating “I” that defines itself in opposition to that 
external reality.         
 
 
                                                          
131 Michael Levenson traces out this tension between subjectivism and sensory materiality, or the conflict 
between the “registering of fact and the recording of consciousness, physis and psyche,” as he puts it (35).    
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Prioritizing the External  
Discussing the modernist novel, John Fletcher and Malcolm Bradbury make the 
familiar observation that modernism involves a “crisis of presentation” (395). They argue 
that modernism consists of a self-reflexive aesthetics that mirrors artists’ increasing 
impatience with inherited representational forms and narratological techniques (394). 
Writers became ever more “concerned with . . . texture and form,” Fletcher and Bradbury 
suggest, such that the novel transitioned from “an art of adventures” “into an art of 
figures” (394, 396).132 In other words, a new aesthetic emerged in the early twentieth 
century in which artists self-consciously accentuated formal elements (such as “language 
and design”) rather than unconsciously assuming a simplistic correspondence between 
content and form (i.e., the represented and the representation itself) (394). In a sense, 
then, many writers began quite consciously privileging surfaces, whether linguistic or 
structural, over representational content as such. The aesthetic exterior came to matter at 
least as much as the “reality” under representation. Indeed, as then contemporary 
philosopher José Ortega y Gasset observes, such writers “dehumanize” art (i.e., strip it of 
its quotidian referential function). Form itself matters more than the correspondence 
between form and human phenomenological realities. The “modern artist,” Ortega 
claims, seeks “to paint a man who resembles a man as little as possible; a house that 
preserves of a house exactly what is needed to reveal the metamorphosis [of house to 
abstract shape]” (23). He concludes that for modern artists “aesthetic pleasure derives 
from . . . a triumph over human matter,” or what he later calls the “will to style” (23, 25). 
                                                          
132 Fletcher and Bradbury gloss Ortega y Gasset here. See Ortega’s “Notes on the Novel” (67). 
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In short, inasmuch as modernism entails an inward turn (as seen in Woolf, Lawrence, 
Conrad, etc.), so, too, it would seem to entail a turn outwards, towards surfaces.  
 
Ezra Pound and Imagism  
What Fletcher and Bradbury argue of the novel applies equally as well to certain 
poetry of the period. The Imagists, for instance, while their “movement” lasted, almost 
uniformly privileged materially substantive concrete images in their work. Famously, 
Ezra Pound (with F.S. Flint) formulated in 1913 a creedal affirmation of Imagist 
aesthetics. Pound calls for the “Direct treatment” of objects of representation, the use of 
words that specifically “contribute to the presentation” of those objects, and the use of a 
more organic rhythm that presumably would capture the contours of the object in a less 
artificial manner (“Imagisme” 209-210). But beneath these general guidelines lies a 
particular ontology and epistemology, as Pound both prioritizes exteriority and 
essentializes objects (or “things,” as he calls them). In so doing, Pound erects and affirms 
a subject/object and inner/outer binary that underlies his work and thought.   
Pound grounds his early aesthetics (1913) in a “certain ‘Doctrine of the Image,’ as 
he calls it in “Imagisme” (210). For Pound, the image “is that which presents an 
intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time” (“Retrospect” 253). The image, 
that is, exists in isolation from the mind observing it. The mind arrests the image (or 
“complex”) and attempts to freeze it in language, thus implicitly positing itself in 
oppositional relation to the image. Indeed, Pound distinguishes between presentation and 
representation in his theory. Imagists present images in their putative manifest 
substantiality rather than as objects subject to rhetorical embellishment or imaginative 
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reconstitution. As he argues in 1914’s “Vorticism,” the “‘image’ is the furthest possible 
remove from rhetoric” (280). Referencing Aristotle, Pound notes that rhetoric entails 
“dressing up some unimportant matter so as to fool the audience for the time being,” 
whereas Imagism provides an “examination of truth” (280). In other words, the image 
marks an objective reality distinct from the poet’s own subjectively grounded 
perspective, yet which the poet can nonetheless perceive and translate into language. The 
poet stands apart from the image, even as the image stands apart from the poet.  
But Pound goes further. He likens the “image” to a mathematical formula, 
drawing an exact analogy between Imagist poetry and analytical geometry. Both entail 
novel methods of “dealing with form,” and the difference between the two “is the 
difference of subject-matter only” (“Vorticism” 289). Whereas analytical equations 
concern the relationship between particular variables and corresponding geometrical 
forms, so, too, do images involve the relation between particular (yet variable) emotions 
and corresponding visual forms. Both conflate content with form. Both align variables 
and their relations with certain determining forms. Pound argues, “By the ‘image’ I mean 
such an equation; not an equation of mathematics, not something about a, b, and c, 
having something to do with form, but about sea, cliffs, night, having something to do 
with mood” (289). Image equates with mood inasmuch as a particular mood equates with 
a particular image. Pound affirms a shared identity between the two elements. As he 
asserts elsewhere in the essay, “Every concept, every emotion, presents itself to the vivid 
consciousness in some primary form” (285). Nor, Pound insists, is the “image” an 
“ornament,” a superfluous addition to the poem, but rather the “speech” itself (285). The 
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“image” is what the poem says; it “is the word beyond formulated language” (285). It is a 
thing-in-itself, an exact presentation of an objective reality. As Frank Kermode rightly 
notes, “For Pound, the problem begins and ends with the establishing of the genuine 
thing-ness of the image; he wants things, not ideas” (161).  Or, as Rebecca Beasley puts 
it, Pound insists on the “primacy of ‘the real’” (51).  
Pound thus implicitly affirms an essentialist ontology, in that he posits the 
substantiality of image-objects as objects in themselves, independent of the poet’s own 
subjective relation to them. The poet seizes upon an image that adequately corresponds to 
a perceived emotional state, then attempts to chisel that image into words. The poet, that 
is, works upon the image, uses it as a kind of language by which to convey an objective 
aesthetic impression. “The image is the poet’s pigment,” Pound claims in 1914’s 
“Vorticism” (283). It is an object over which the poet exercises control. But again this 
lends the image-object an ontological reality distinct from the poet’s own subjective 
reality. Like the mathematician, the poet discovers image correspondences (i.e., 
correspondences between the image and the emotion or energy implied in the image). 
They exist independently of the poet, even as the poet exists independently of them.   
In affirming objects, Pound privileges the surfaces that constitute the material 
presence of those objects. Supplementing his original definition of the image, Pound 
argues in 1915’s “Affirmations” that images consist of formal manifestations of “energy 
or emotion” which often “find adequate expression in words” (rather than a static 
“complex” frozen in an “instant of time”) (295). The poet’s task entails properly 
channeling the image into a corresponding linguistic medium without compromising the 
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ontological integrity of the image itself. Strong poems possess the capacity to accurately 
convey the “energy or emotion” inherent in the image. “The better the [poem] 
machinery,” Pound concludes, “the more precise, the stronger, the more exact will be the 
record of the voltage and of the various currents which have passed through it” (295). 
That is to say, the more precise the material presentation of the image, the more precise 
the relation of the emotion or idea embedded in the image. Thus, Pound affirms the co-
inherence of form and content. But the communicability of content necessarily remains 
subordinate to the proper presentation of the image. As such, Pound implicitly 
subordinates content to form. He privileges the image over that which the image 
potentially signifies. Surfaces matter most. Or, to put it another way, meaning inheres in 
the surface. And for Pound, those surfaces must consist of concrete, clearly delineated 
images in order to best channel the image’s inherent significance. In short, for the image 
to function properly (i.e., for it to adequately convey a particular “energy or emotion”), 
the poet must present it with precision and clarity.133       
Thus, Pound affirms subject/object binary relations. For in prioritizing exteriority 
(i.e., image as surface), Pound implicitly advances a metaphysics characterized by the 
ontological irreducibility of both subject and object. Moreover, he assumes a stable 
subject capable of knowing and translating existent image objects. For Pound, the subject 
perceives an image and then proceeds to translate that image into an appropriate 
                                                          
133 Pound generally affirms a poetics of precision. In 1918’s “A Retrospect,” Pound famously complains 
that the nineteenth century proved a “blurry, messy sort of a period, a rather sentimentalistic, mannerish 
sort of period” (262). He found nineteenth-century writers too linguistically ornamental, mawkishly 
emotional, and didactic. They lacked “precision” or “explicit rendering, be it of external nature, or of 
emotion” (261). In contrast, Pound affirms a poetics of “granite” (262). The new poetry’s power “lie[s] in 
its truth,” he claims (262). It is “austere, direct, [and] free from emotional slither” (262). 
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linguistic register. While the crafting of the poem may prove difficult (thus Pound’s 
aesthetic guidelines), the perception of the image in itself does not. As he argues in 
“Vorticism,” the “image . . . is real because we know it directly” (283). In its essence, it 
remains “beyond formulated language” (285). 
 
T.E. Hulme and the Poetics of Objectivity 
Pound’s views grew out of matrix of contending perspectives and schools 
(Impressionists, Symbolists, Futurists, Cubists, etc.), new philosophies (notably Bergson, 
however derivatively), and a semi-reactionary anti-Victorianism. Still, he does serve as a 
representative figure for this period, particularly given the extent to which many of his 
contemporaries shared his emphasis on exteriority. T.E. Hulme, for instance, whose 
aesthetic formulations influenced both Pound and Eliot, also developed a theory of the 
image.134 Indeed, Leigh Wilson notes that “Hulme’s theories provided Pound with a solid 
foundation from which to launch his own assault on [contemporary, derivative] ‘dead 
poetry’” (103).135 Both writers famously rejected what they perceived as Victorian and 
romantic excesses. And just as famously, both championed a new poetics of precision. In 
the well-known lecture/essay “Romanticism and Classicism” (1911-12), Hulme predicts 
the coming arrival of “a period of dry, hard, classical verse” (79). This new verse will 
supplant inherited forms of “romantic” poetry. Rather than obsessing with “infinity . . . 
                                                          
134 Regarding Hulme’s influence on other writers of the period Patrick McGuinness writes, “Depending on 
where one derives one’s information, depending on whose narrative of Modernism one is reading, and on 
which Modernism(s) are being written about, the image of Hulme—the idea of Hulme—shuttles back and 
forth along the same line, between the same points: was he modernism’s back-seat driver, or its noisiest 
passenger?” (viii).  
135 Still, Wilson reminds her readers that while Hulme influenced Pound, Pound nonetheless “was already 
thinking along the same lines” as Hulme prior to their first meeting in 1909 (103).   
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mystery or . . . emotions” (as Hulme claims romantic poets and their inheritors do), the 
new poetry will concern itself with “small, dry things” (78). In “Modern Art and its 
Philosophy” (1914), Hulme argues further that the emerging “new art is geometrical in 
character,” classifying it as “austere, mechanical, clear cut, and bare” (95, 105). He 
observes in the “new art” a “striving towards structure . . . away from the [supposedly 
romantic] messiness and confusion of nature and natural things” (106). In other words, 
like Pound, Hulme stresses the significance of concrete exterior aesthetic form.   
Indeed, like Pound, Hulme grounds this new “austere” poetics on a particular 
theory of the image.136 As Frank Kermode rightly notes, for Hulme, “precision” in poetry 
entails primarily “the recording of images,” which Kermode calls the “core” aspect of 
“Hulmian aesthetics” (150). In “Romanticism and Classicism,” Hulme famously argues 
that “Images in verse are not mere decoration, but the very essence of an intuitive 
language” (80). As Pound similarly suggests, Hulme argues that images constitute a 
language “beyond formulated language” (in Pound’s words). They comprise a “visual 
concrete” language which delivers to readers a sensuous experience virtually immediately 
(i.e., it avoids the conceptually mediating abstractions of prose) (80). He goes on to argue 
that “Plain speech is essentially inaccurate. It is only by new metaphors [or images] . . . 
that it can be made precise” (81). But to emphasize the image is to emphasize as well the 
materially concrete nature of the image. As Kermode puts it, the image “is concrete, 
because [it] can be represented only as concrete, and [is] entirely devoid of discursive 
                                                          
136 However, Patrick McGuinness points out that Pound later sought to distance himself from Hulme. In 
1939, McGuinness notes, Pound “claimed that Ford Maddox Ford rather than Hulme had been the 
motivating force behind his own Imagist enterprise (and by implication therefore, behind Imagism)” (ix-x).   
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meanings and appeals to the intellect” (151). The meaning of the image exists solely on 
the surface of the image. It lacks any inward, “discursive” segmentation, constituting 
rather a “direct representation” (Kermode 151). Accordingly, it affects its audience 
intuitively, Hulme suggests, by circumventing individuals’ analytical faculties (80). Thus 
it constitutes a more epistemologically “authentic” mode of communication, translating 
experience directly, as it were, into a language of immediate perception. The poet 
perceives and communicates a materially concrete reality, which the audience receives 
and intuitively understands.137  
Like Pound, then, Hulme, too, emphasizes surfaces. And like Pound, Hulme’s 
aesthetics necessarily imply a particular metaphysics. Wallace Martin rightly argues that 
“Imagism, rather than transmitting an etiolated romanticism, initiated a new movement 
towards objectification, toward ‘presentation’” (204). And indeed, both Pound and 
Hulme offer a poetics of objective presentation. For both, images constitute objects 
ontologically distinct from the individual who presents the image. Properly construed, the 
image captures and conveys the poet’s intuition of an objective reality. It is a presentation 
of that objective reality, rather than a subjective construction of it. In other words, both 
Hulme and Pound expound and practice a kind of empiricist poetics. The poet observes 
and records images as they transparently (non-conceptually) present themselves to the 
poet. Thus, both writers express an epistemological faith in the capacity of the poet to 
                                                          
137 In “A Lecture on Modern Poetry,” Hulme argues that “there are, roughly speaking, two methods of 
communication, a direct, and a conventional language. The direct language is poetry, it is direct because it 
deals in images. The indirect language is prose, because it uses images that have died and become figures 
of speech. The difference between the two is . . .this: that while one arrests your mind all the time with a 
picture, the other allows the mind to run along with the least possible effort to a conclusion” (65).  
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objectively perceive reality as it materially manifests itself. As Sanford Schwartz rightly 
argues, for Hulme the “artist recovers not the individual’s unique stream of 
consciousness, but a publically identifiable element of experience that others have simply 
failed to notice” (53). Rather than offering some private subjective interpretation of 
reality, the poet instead presents some overlooked element in a mutually perceived, 
mutually accessible objective reality.    
As Kermode notes, both Pound and Hulme “wish that poetry could be written 
with something other than words” (161).138 Both sought to transcend the limitations of 
conceptual language by affirming the immediacy of the image. Both advance a poetics 
that favors the “direct treatment of the ‘thing’” over abstraction-laden ruminative verse. 
And as such, both propound an empiricist ontology that affirms the distinction between 
subject and object, in that they affirm the distinct reality of the “thing” perceived. Pound 
and Hulme, then, each embrace a subject/object binary as a foundational element of their 
thought. In affirming this binary, they also necessarily affirm an inner/outer binary. For 
they predicate their (implicit) empiricist ontology on a poetics of exteriority which values 
image surfaces. Rather than focusing on subjective inner experience (as do Woolf, 
Lawrence, and Conrad), they advocate the direct material presentation of a mutually 
experienced, objectively real psychological, social, or material reality. In short, Pound 
and Hulme help further exemplify a modernism at variance with itself. Like Woolf, 
Lawrence, and Conrad, their work relies on both a subject/object and inner/outer binary 
                                                          
138 Martin, too, writes that both Hulme and Pound “emphasize a mode of creation that eschews explicit 
conceptual content” (204).  
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metaphysics. However, unlike them, they largely prioritize objectivity and exteriority in 
their work rather than subjectivity and interiority.   
This is not to say, of course, that Woolf, Lawrence, and Conrad do not value 
form. Indeed, Woolf’s formalist experimentations remain central to her project (consider 
The Waves, for instance). The issue involves the ends to which these writers subject their 
formalist experiments. Woolf and Conrad, for instance, employ form as a means for 
conveying inner states of consciousness. Form remains a means to an end, and for these 
writers, that end involves an affective rendering of human phenomenological reality. 
Rather than ontologically correlating with the object of representation, form instead 
serves as a means for revealing the object of representation. Stream of consciousness, 
divergent points of view, temporal disjunction, narrative fragmentation (for example), all 
function as tools by which the writer communicates their particular notion of human 
experience. Pound and Hulme, on the other hand, view form (construed as image) as a 
presentational language in itself. The image correlates precisely with that which it 
presents. It constitutes its own representation, and thus remains an end in itself rather than 
a means to an end. To put it another way, the image reflects its own surface. It means that 
which it presents, and presents that which it already is. It points to itself as its own 
ontological reality. Thus, despite a broadly shared interest in form as such, these two sets 
of modernists view its function in philosophically divergent ways.  
 
Gertrude Stein and the Word as Object 
Gertrude Stein serves as a useful counterpoint to both Pound and Hulme, 
affirming their essentialist metaphysics and prioritization of exteriority even as she 
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challenges their poetics. Like both of her contemporaries, Stein practiced and promoted 
novel forms of poetry (in addition to novel forms of prose). And like them, she drew on 
recent developments in visual art in formulating her own aesthetic theory.139 But most 
importantly, like Pound and Hulme, Stein privileges exteriority over interiority. She 
emphasizes linguistic surfaces in her work, and draws attention, too, to the 
constructedness of her texts through her use of repetition and syntactical, grammatical, 
and punctuation irregularities. Words matter more to her than narratological coherence or 
conceptual clarity. Indeed, by so radically emphasizing form, she challenges normative 
notions of coherence and clarity. Reflecting on Tender Buttons, for instance, Paul Peppis 
argues that Stein seems “more concerned to analyse the linguistic medium than to 
‘describe’ the things it allegedly represents” (38). Tender Buttons, he continues, 
“relentlessly interrogates language and its conventions, tinkering with sentences, 
violating grammatical rules, playing with sound” (38). Or, as William Carlos Williams 
notes in a 1930 essay on Stein, she “completely unlink[s]” words “from their former 
relationships in the sentence” (349). To concentrate on form as such is to sever (or at 
least attenuate) the connection between words in themselves from words in their 
referential capacity.  
Consider, for example, this passage from her 1912 “portrait” of Picasso: “One 
whom some were certainly following was one who was completely charming. One whom 
                                                          
139 In Blast, for instance, Pound claimed Picasso and Kandinski as the “father and mother” of Vorticism 
(154). And Hulme’s theories touch on all expression of modern art, not just poetry. Indeed, in “A Lecture 
on Modern Art,” he directly links visual and literary art, arguing that the “new verse resembles sculpture 
rather than music; it appeals to the eye rather than to the ear. It has to mould images, a kind of spiritual 
clay, into definite shapes” (66).   
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some were certainly following was one who was charming. One whom some were 
following was one who was completely charming. One whom some were following was 
one who was certainly completely charming” (333). The representational content of the 
passage recedes behind the linguistic façade. Repetition, syntactic variation, and a 
metrically suggestive rhythm contribute to an overall aesthetic impression rather than a 
representational one.140 Language (as such) and aesthetic structure supersede 
referentiality, as Stein challenges her readers’ conventional expectations for a 
biographical sketch. Her putative subject (Picasso) matters less than do the words Stein 
chooses to employ in representing her subject.  
Consider, too, 1914’s Tender Buttons, in which Stein offers a series of what seem 
at first to be still-lifes. Very quickly, readers discover a representational gap between the 
object she ostensibly describes and the description she gives of it. For instance, in her 
portrait of “An Umbrella” she writes, “Coloring high means that the strange reason is in 
front not more in front behind. Not more in front in peace of the dot” (471). And in “A 
Handkerchief” she writes, “A winning of all the blessings, a sample not a sample because 
there is no worry” (472). These are not anomalous examples. Both capture the formal 
pattern characteristic of the other “still-lifes” Stein produces in the collection. In these as 
in the others, she presents descriptions that appear to lack any representationally 
transparent correspondence with the items they supposedly describe. Peter Howarth 
argues that these “prose-poems” consist of “sliced-up sentences whose pattern and 
                                                          
140 Carl Van Vechten notes that the editor of Camera Work (in which this piece was first published) 
“accepted [it] . . . principally because he did not immediately understand” it (328). 
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meaning seem to be generated spontaneously in the writing” (153). Certainly, “pattern 
and meaning” here appear to derive from the deliberate arrangement of the formal 
elements rather than from the inner content to which those elements might otherwise 
refer.      
Thus, as with Pound and Hulme, Stein presents an aesthetics that prioritizes the 
“stylistic surface” of language (Kley 519). She views language as an object distinct in 
itself and capable of structural or formal manipulation. She appears to value the “play” of 
language over its referential capacities. William Carlos Williams rightly points out that 
“Stein’s theme is writing,” and that she “has placed writing on a plane where it may deal 
unhampered with its own affairs” (note the exteriorizing spatial metaphor “plane”) (349). 
For Stein, language exists substantively in itself, possessing an objective materiality 
independent of its normative functioning. And indeed, she desires precisely to undermine 
the normative function of language in her work. As Antje Kely points out, in “place of 
the tired dream of exact mimetic representation, Stein’s prose poems support the pursuit 
of an intimate comprehension of both the limiting and enabling laws of language” (523).  
Still, Stein’s aesthetics differ from her literary contemporaries in a number of 
significant ways. For instance, unlike Pound and Hulme, Stein does not value the “direct” 
use of words nor the clear delineation of images (or at least defines such usage 
differently). Indeed, despite consisting (ostensibly) of a series of still-lifes, Tender Button 
refuses to present objects using normative representational strategies. Rather than 
presenting portraitures, Stein presents instead word manipulations. She values repetition, 
semantic and syntactic disjunction, and juxtaposition. She works to disrupt the process of 
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representationally coherent image formation. Instead of precision, Stein offers repetition. 
Instead of semantic and syntactic specificity, she offers novel juxtapositions of verbs, 
nouns, and prepositional phrases.141 She seeks to distance herself from what she terms in 
a poem of the same name “Patriarchal Poetry.” In that 1927 poem she declares, 
“Patriarchal Poetry not to try. Patriarchal poetry and lullaby. Patriarchal Poetry not to try 
Patriarchal poetry at once” (242). Neil Schmitz notes that “Patriarchal Poetry” “exactly 
measures [Stein’s] distance from the canon,” that is, from normative representational and 
formalist strategies (126). But it measures her distance from Pound and Hulme, too, in 
that taken altogether the poem exhibits the same stylistic features found in her earlier 
work (i.e., the use of repetition, syntactical variation, etc.).   
Thus, unlike Pound and Hulme (or even Woolf, Lawrence, or Conrad), Stein 
values language for language’s sake, and as such would seem to sever language from the 
reality it purports to represent. However, Stein goes on to argue that she seeks in fact a 
more exact representation of reality through her aesthetic experimentation than so-called 
“patriarchal poetry” allows (and that her own prose-poetry at first suggests). That is to 
say, rather than driving a wedge between language and its referential meaning, she seeks 
to intensify the connection. In Lectures in America (1935), for instance, Stein affirms that 
“the problem of poetry was and it began with Tender Buttons [sic] to constantly realize 
the thing anything so that I could recreate that thing. I struggled desperately with the 
recreation and the avoidance of nouns as nouns” (238). She sought to “recreate” the 
                                                          
141 Consider the first two lines of her portrait of “Sugar”: “A violent luck and a whole sample and even then 
quiet. Water is squeezing, water is almost squeezing on lard” (485).  
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observed “thing” in her poetry in a way she felt more accurately captured the essence of 
the object. She drew inspiration from the visual arts, notably cubism, but also the cinema: 
“I was doing what the cinema was doing, I was making a continuous succession of the 
statement of what that person was until I had not many things but one thing” (176-77). 
Repetition with variation served to draw out the complex layers of being embedded in the 
object of representation. A simple statement of description for Stein in fact entails a 
distortion, since it flattens the object along a single representational axis. She sought, like 
the Cubists, to multiply the planes of representation, so as to capture the object as it exists 
in its greater complexity.142 Her “portrait” of Picasso, then, entails for Stein a more 
accurate portrayal of Picasso than any normative biographical description, in that she 
uses repetition and subtle variation to capture representational nuances unavailable to 
more prosaic character sketches. Although her “Cubist” efforts appear to accentuate 
formal elements over representational, her ultimate goal entails heightened attention to 
the objects of representation. It entails, too, belief in and attention to real objects capable 
of objective depiction. In essence, she intends a kind of hyper-realism in her art.   
Like Pound and Hulme, then, Stein emphasizes exteriority, both in her aesthetics 
and in her affirmation of objective reality (i.e., that real objects exist and are subject to 
representational embodiment, however complex or non-normative). She affirms the 
material objectivity of language, and thus implicitly posits the mind as that which freely 
apprehends and manipulates it. And she also promulgates a belief in the power of 
                                                          
142 For a discussion of Stein’s relation to Cubism, see Antje Kley’s “‘keeping pace with the visual 
revolution’: Intermediary Reference in Gertrude Stein’s Prose Poems Tender Buttons and Wyndham 
Lewis’ Novel Tarr.” See, too, Paul Peppis’ “Schools, movements, manifestoes” chapter in the Cambridge 
Companion to Modernist Poetry (28-50). 
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language to capture complex objective realities. In affirming the existence of an objective 
reality ontologically distinct from the subjective observer, Stein reveals a metaphysics 
characterized by the same subject/object binary that underlies Pound and Hulme’s work. 
And in privileging exteriority, she affirms the same inner/outer binary they propound as 
well. Thus, despite her superficial differences from these two seminal figures, she 
implicitly affirms many of the same philosophical positions exhibited in their work and 
theory. In various ways, each presumes from the outset a constitutive distinction between 
autonomous subjects and authentically self-present (and self-presenting) objects. 
 
Wyndham Lewis: “Good art must have no inside”  
Like Eliot, each of these three figures reacts against previous modes of 
representation. Each sees normative nineteenth-century realism and traditionalist verse as 
insufficiently theorized and thus misrepresentative of social and material reality. Indeed, 
in their work, they each point beyond themselves towards the crisis of representation that 
famously affects all the arts of the period, not just poetry. In Reconfiguring Modernism, 
for instance, Daniel Schwarz argues that the “experiments in technique and theme” of 
modernist writers such as Woolf, Conrad, and Joyce “parallel[s] the challenges to 
mimesis” seen in the work of early twentieth-century painters such as Matisse, Picasso, 
and Paul Klee (1). He adds that these painters’ “experiments in color, line, space, and 
abandonment of representation provided a model for writers, who challenged traditional 
narrative linearity” (1). The same can be said, too, of Pound, Hulme, and Stein. To 
varying degrees each of these three figures draws on then-contemporary visual arts for 
confirmation and inspiration. As noted above in a footnote, Pound drew on Picasso and 
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Wassily Kandinski (again, claiming them as the father and mother of Vorticism), while 
Stein looked to Paul Cezanne, going so far as to claim that she “began to write Three 
Lives,” her earliest published work (1909), under his influence (502).143 Hulme went 
further, perceiving a common impulse underlying all modern art, which he termed the 
“tendency to abstraction,” most notably expressed in Cubism and the post-impressionism 
of Cezanne, but also in the new kinds of verse he both prophesied and championed (109). 
Hulme characterizes this “tendency to abstraction” as a renewed interest in structural 
form or surfaces. The new art, he argues in 1914’s “Modern Art and Its Philosophy,” 
“will culminate not so much in the simple geometrical forms found in archaic art, but in 
the more complicated ones associated in our minds with the idea of machinery” (110). He 
suggests, for instance, that Picasso’s paintings “at bottom” function as “studies of a 
special kind of machinery” (111).  
Painter, novelist, and co-founder of Vorticism Wyndham Lewis makes a nearly 
identical claim in the July, 1914 volume of the Vorticist manifesto Blast. “Most of 
Picasso’s latest work,” he asserts, “is a sort of machinery. Yet these machines neither 
propel nor make any known thing: they are machines without a purpose” (140). And he 
says in 1914’s “The Cubist Room” that “all revolutionary painting to-day has in common 
the rigid reflections of steel and stone . . . that desire for stability as though a machine 
were being built to fly or kill with” (201). Like Hulme, Pound, and Stein (in her 
commitment to form), Lewis affirms this new “tendency to [geometric] abstraction” in 
                                                          
143 Stein was frank about these influences. For instance, in a 1946 interview, Stein noted that “everything” 
she has ever “done has been influenced by Flaubert and Cezanne” (502).   
 
 
337 
 
both the visual arts and literature. Like them, he prioritizes the material surface of 
language, pigment, and of form as such. And like them, he affirms an objectivist 
metaphysics that presupposes the ontological self-substantiality of objects in the world. 
But Lewis articulates this new aesthetic with a vehemence and clarity that his 
contemporaries lack, and as such a brief glance at his formulations might prove useful.  
In 1918’s Tarr, for example, Lewis’ eponymous anti-hero argues that only 
geometrically “dead” things constitute true art. A “statue is art,” Frederick Tarr claims, 
because it “is a dead thing, a lump of stone or wood. Its lines and proportions are its soul. 
Anything living, quick and changing is bad art always; naked men and women are the 
worst art of all” (264). In fact, for Tarr (and I would claim, too, for Lewis) “deadness is 
the first condition of art,” followed by the “absence of soul” (265).144 In other words, 
Lewis values the objective over the subjective, surface over depth, the outward over the 
inward. Indeed, not only does he subordinate the inward to the outward, but he empties it 
of any determinate conceptual content whatsoever. Whereas Pound, say, collapses the 
inner onto the outer, thereby privileging the outer as the primary locus of meaning, for 
Lewis, the “true” work of art literally “has no inside” (265, emphasis in original). Its 
outer form constitutes its sole and singular essence. It is its own exteriority: “With the 
statue [for example] its lines and masses are its soul, no restless inflammable ego is 
imagined for its interior” (265).  
                                                          
144 As Scott Klein argues, “Many of Tarr’s ideas are identifiably the same as those of the Blast manifestos: 
his programmatic and egoistic opposition to the conflation of ‘art’ and ‘life’, his vaunting of paradox above 
consistency, and his preference for art that emphasized exteriors and stable objects rather than interiors and 
the behavior of objects in time” (xix-xx).  
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If “good art” consists only in the presentation of exteriority, then the artist 
becomes a kind of engineer, manipulating surface features so as to obtain the proper 
aesthetic effect. As Lewis writes in the first volume of Blast, as art develops in the future, 
“Engineer or artist might conceivably become transposable terms, or one, at least imply 
the other” (135). No longer the romantic or Victorian subjectivist, the new engineer-artist 
instead (for Lewis) embodies an objectivist aesthetic that values objects over emotions, 
details over impressions, and structure over function. Rather than subordinating form to 
teleology, Lewis makes form an end in itself, and in so doing elevates the static over the 
dynamic, or fixity over flux. As Lewis puts it in Tarr, he values the  “armoured hide of 
the hippopotamus, the shell of the tortoise, feathers and machinery” over the “naked 
pulsing and moving of the soft inside of life—along with elasticity or movement and 
consciousness” (265).145 But this means, too, that Lewis opposes the observer against the 
observed. The two (subject and object) exist in diametric tension with one another, each 
self-existent in itself, but each confronting the other as exterior surface. As Geoffrey 
Wagner argues, Lewis affirms “that the artistic apprehension of reality is best 
accomplished by the intellect, working from outside on a field of static matter” (1). The 
artist-engineer stands outside that which she or he “apprehends,” confronts it as an object 
external to the self, yet nonetheless subject to manipulation.  
Thus, Lewis amplifies Pound, Hulme, and Stein, affirming their essential 
aesthetics and underlying metaphysics, yet doing so with a sharpness and vehemence 
                                                          
145 Indeed, compare Lewis’ condemnation of the “naked pulsing and moving of the soft inside of life” with 
Lawrence’s contrary view. Lawrence seeks to reproduce in his work “the shimmering protoplasm in the 
leaves and everywhere, and not the stiffness of the shape.” Mere exteriority “seems dead” to him. “Only 
this shimmeriness is the real living. The shape is a dead crust. The shimmer is inside really” (176). 
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they lack, despite Pound’s oftentimes assertive polemics or Hulme’s influential talks. 
These figures stand in direct opposition to Woolf, Lawrence, and Conrad, who in their 
work emphasize precisely that “soft inside of life—along with . . . movement and 
consciousness” which Lewis so forcefully rejects. And of course, each of these figures 
stands in opposition to Eliot (as I’ve presented him throughout this dissertation). Eliot 
rejects the binaries these authors variously erect, strenuously arguing against the very 
legitimacy of the metaphysics these authors affirm in their work and theory. However, 
none of these authors directly (or publically) grapples with Eliot’s aesthetics. Not one 
engages him in any extended critique, excepting Pound, who praises his work, writing in 
a 1917 review of Prufrock and Other Observations that “it is a comfort to come upon 
complete art, naïve despite its intellectual subtlety, lacking all pretence [sic]” (418).146 
The other figures here mention Eliot only in passing or not at all. Woolf seems to indicate 
her respect for his work and opinions, but only in her diary, recounting, for example, their 
engaging discussions over Joyce’s Ulysses (a novel she disliked immensely) (49). Hulme, 
of course, died too early to comment on Eliot. Lawrence mentions him in his letters only 
to reflect on Eliot’s own dislike of him.147 Similarly, Stein mentions Eliot briefly in The 
                                                          
146 Pound concludes, Eliot’s “book is the best thing in poetry since . . . (for the sake of peace I will leave 
that date to the imagination)” (422).  
147 In a May 20, 1929 letter to John Middleton Murry, Lawrence writes, “the animal that I am you 
instinctively dislike—just as all the Lynds and Squires and Eliots and Goulds instinctively dislike it” (451). 
Michael Herbert notes that Eliot “is in many ways the polar opposite of Lawrence as both critic and artist. 
Eliot is formal, impersonal, and grandly authoritative where Lawrence is informal, personal, passionate, 
and very ungrand, though he can be assertive, even dogmatic” (ix).  
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Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, but only apparently to suggest her utter lack of interest 
in him or his work.148 William Carlos Williams, however, proves a notable exception.  
 
William Carlos Williams: The World as Ontological Given 
Williams makes numerous references to Eliot throughout his work, most of it 
highly negative. In Prologue to Kora in Hell (1920), Williams blasts Eliot as a derivative, 
imitative poet, whose work remains slavishly indebted to his predecessors. Eliot’s most 
“exquisite work is rehash, repetition in another way of Verlaine, Baudelaire, 
Maeterlinck—conscious or unconscious” (21). Eliot contributes nothing new, Williams 
asserts. He merely copies and then rearranges what has come before. For Williams, Eliot 
“is a subtle conformist,” an “archbishop of procurers to a lecherous antiquity” (21). 
Williams maintains this complaint against Eliot throughout his career, arguing as late as 
1948’s “The Poem as a Field of Action,” that Eliot’s “rehash of rehash of hash of rehash 
is not the business” of poetry (291). In a highly ironic passage from the same essay, 
Williams observes that Eliot has produced “a few poems beautifully phrased—in his 
longest effort thirty-five quotations in seven languages” (285). Williams disliked Eliot so 
much that in 1940’s “A Letter,” he declares that the “concepts that walk around as T.S. 
Eliot . . . are completely worthless” (237). For Williams, Eliot is less a person than a 
desiccated compendium of useless theories (“concepts”) and borrowed phrases. 
                                                          
148 Stein writes (in the voice of Toklas), “Gertrude Stein was not particularly anxious to go to Lady 
Rothermere’s and meet T.S. Eliot, but we all insisted she should, and she gave a doubtful yes.” Once there, 
“Eliot and Gertrude Stein had a solemn conversation, mostly about split infinitives and other grammatical 
solecisms and why Gertrude Stein used them” (189).  
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Of course, Williams’s distaste for Eliot is well known. Lisa Steinman, for 
instance, notes (rather mildly) that Williams “generally took issue” with Eliot (163), 
while Stephen Fredman more forthrightly calls them “arch-rivals” (241). For Williams, 
ultimately, Eliot exemplifies certain aesthetic and philosophical positions that he found 
both demoralizing and regressive.149 Indeed, in his autobiography, Williams famously 
writes that Eliot had set him (and modern poetry in general) “back twenty years.” He felt 
that Eliot had “returned us to the classroom just at the moment when [Williams] felt we 
were on the point of an escape to matters much closer to the essence of a new art form” 
(174). Williams sought to establish a poetics “rooted in the locality which would give it 
fruit,” a poetics of place and particularity, and thus of a perpetual newness (174). Eliot, 
on the other hand, merely paraphrases his predecessors, and offers no new ways of seeing 
the world or the objects that populate it. “At most,” Williams confesses in a 1930 essay, 
“we can admire Eliot’s distinguished use of sentences and words and the tenor of his 
mind, but as for substance—he is for us a cipher” (“Caviar” 103). In short, Eliot only 
repeats where Williams seeks to renew.   
It seems, then, that Williams resists what he perceives in Eliot as a fundamentally 
different notion of poetry (i.e., its purpose, scope, and essence). And of course, he is 
correct, for the two poets practice a profoundly divergent poetics. But the differences 
between Eliot and Williams stem primarily from their opposed philosophical positions.150 
Unlike Eliot, but like Pound, Hulme, or Stein, Williams implicitly affirms an objectivist 
                                                          
149 Williams sees Eliot as a kind of traitor. “He might have become our adviser, even our hero,” he 
confesses, but instead “turned his back” on the mode of poetics Williams sought to inaugurate (174).    
150 Ironically, Williams once remarked (in 1944) that the “arts have nothing to do” with philosophy: “Let 
the metaphysical take care of itself,” he declares (“Author’s” 256).  
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metaphysics in his poetry and prose. He posits a self-subsisting world of material objects 
that exist substantively in themselves. As such, he affirms, too, the same essential 
subject/object or inner/outer binary that these other figures articulate in their work, both 
implicitly and explicitly (recall Lewis). For like them, Williams privileges surface over 
depth, the outward over the inward, and the object over the subject. Unlike them, 
however, he consciously positions his project in direct opposition to Eliot’s own, thereby 
clarifying the distinctions that separate Eliot from each of these figures.   
Williams states his position most clearly in Book I of Paterson (1946), where he 
exclaims, “no ideas but in things— / nothing but the blank faces of the houses / and 
cylindrical trees” (6). For Williams, meaning resides in the “things” themselves rather 
than in the idiosyncratic meaning that the poet imposes on the “thing.” That is, Williams 
sees meaning as intrinsic to the object, independent of the perceiving (or projecting) 
subject. Objects possess their own distinguishing and distinctive realities, which the poet 
reveals. As he argues in Prologue to Kora in Hell, the “true value is that peculiarity which 
gives an object a character by itself. The associational or sentimental value is the false” 
(11). Accordingly, poets should resist foisting emotional connotations on objects, and 
instead allow those objects to manifest through their poems in all their singular 
particularity. Thus Williams resists traditional symbolism, since it artificially connects 
and thus distorts what otherwise remains ontologically distinct (e.g., individual objects, 
emotions, ideas, themes). As he puts it in 1923’s Spring and All, “Crude symbolism is to 
associate emotions with natural phenomena such as anger with lightning, flowers with 
love. . . . Such work is empty” (100).   
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Even similes and metaphors (and other tropes of comparative relation) distort the 
objects they relate. Rather, the poet should present the object as it exists putatively in 
itself, without disruptive conceptual mediation. Again, as he puts it in Prologue to Kora 
in Hell, “this loose linking of one thing with another has effects of a destructive power 
little to be guessed at: all manner of things are thrown out of key so that it approaches the 
impossible to arrive at an understanding of anything” (16). To understand an object as it 
exists in itself requires observing that object in its own supposed self-substantiating 
isolation rather than juxtaposing it against some other object. Comparative juxtapositions 
confuse rather than clarify, obscure rather than illuminate. In Spring and All, he offers a 
fragment of verse as an illustration: “and the late, high growing red rose / it is their time / 
of a small garden.” Pointing to these lines, he argues that “poetry should strive for 
nothing else, [but] this vividness alone, per se, for itself. The realization of this [i.e., the 
image in the poem] has its own internal fire that is ‘like’ nothing. Therefore the bastardy 
of the simile. . . . There is no need to explain or compare” (247). For Williams, then, 
poetry should affirm objects rather than interfere with them. In this sense, poets should 
efface themselves from their poems, allowing objects to emerge as they transparently 
present themselves to the observer. As J. Hillis Miller puts it, the “aim of the poem” for 
Williams “is to make it [the object] stand there for the reader in its separateness, as the 
words of the poem stand on the page” (307).   
Williams thus propounds an objectivist ontology according to which objects exist 
as singular self-totalities. They exist independently from other objects, requiring neither 
relation nor observation for their substantiation. Poets merely affirm or freshen. As Peter 
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Howarth puts it, Williams “encouraged his readers to see him as a poet committed to 
objects, and to a form which would present things directly without tidying them up or 
smearing them with emotional jam” (110-111). For Williams, poetry (re)presents reality, 
and the poet simply assumes the existence of a concrete, material world towards which 
the poem gestures. In a review of a collection of Charles Henri Ford’s verse Williams 
remarks, the “effect [of Ford’s poems] is to revive the senses and force them to re-see, re-
hear, re-taste, re-smell and generally revalue all that it was believed had been seen, heard, 
smelled and generally valued. By this means poetry has always in the past put a finger 
upon reality” (235). And of course, if poetry illuminates reality, then the poet necessarily 
possesses the capacity to perceive social and material reality objectively, independent of 
her or his own subjective position. This suggests that for Williams, the world is its 
surface appearance. Objects are as they transparently present themselves. This suggests, 
too, that Williams thinks in terms of theoretical binaries: objects versus subjects, surfaces 
versus depths. The poet stands apart from that which she or he objectively observes, 
conceptually masters it, and then translates it into word images.  
Like Pound, Hulme, or Stein, Williams privileges exteriorities. He privileges 
concrete details, material images, and appearances in themselves, at least in his mature 
poetry. For instance, Williams’ famous “red wheelbarrow” (from Spring and All), 
presents itself to the reader as it is in itself: a simple red wheelbarrow extracted from the 
panoply of other potential objects of attention. Consider, too, “The Pot of Flowers” (from 
the same collection), in which Williams attends closely to the flowers’ color, surface 
designs, and particular arrangement: “red where in whorls / petal lays its glow upon petal 
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/ round flamegreen throats” (40). As with the wheelbarrow, he presents this pot of 
flowers as an object complete in itself, a manifestation of its own distinct self-presence. It 
is as it appears; its value rooted precisely in its surface materiality. In this sense, Williams 
follows in the imagist tradition of Pound and Hulme, Indeed, as is well-known, he knew 
and worked with Pound.151  
Thus Williams aligns himself with Pound, Hulme, and Stein (and against Woolf, 
Lawrence, and Conrad) in his general adherence to an essentialist ontology and 
prioritization of exteriority. They each share certain core philosophical assumptions, 
however implicitly. As Williams argues in Spring and All, “reality needs no personal 
support but exists free from human action” (an assertion entirely alien to Eliot’s thought) 
(150). The world as such exists apart from human perception. It possesses its own 
internal coherence and facticity. Williams, like these other writers, conceives subjects and 
objects as constitutively opposed. Objects exist, as do perceiving subjects, but the two 
remain ontologically distinct from one another. Indeed, he presupposes, too, the 
possibility of unproblematically apprehending objects of perception. Subjects perceive 
objects as if they were transparently intelligible (a pot of flowers, a wheelbarrow, etc.). 
That is, he propounds a kind of epistemological positivism, where what subjects perceive 
(or presume to know) reflects what in fact exists (or can be positively known). Again, the 
world is as it appears, and can be known in itself as its own appearance. Poetry, as he 
                                                          
151 As Christopher Beach notes that Williams “was receptive to the ideas of the Imagist movement,” and 
that indeed Pound helped publish Williams’ second volume of poetry (The Tempers) in 1913, despite the 
somewhat derivative nature of these early poems (95). Reflecting on these early poems, Williams later 
remarked that he “should have writer about things around me . . . but I just didn’t know how” at the time 
(Beach 95).  
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argues in Spring and All, “affirms reality” as it appears to the perceiver (149).152 Or, as he 
puts it in 1941’s “Midas: A Proposal for a Magazine,” the “poem alone focuses the 
world” (242). The point is this: Williams presumes an independent world which the poet 
independently knows. In making this assumption, Williams implicitly endorses the same 
subject/object or inner/outer binary that characterizes the work of so many of his 
contemporaries, and which Eliot so strenuously resisted.  
    
Conclusion 
 From Woolf to Williams, then, each of these figures (all pivotal to the period) in 
one way or another relies on a shared set of binaries that shapes their thought and work. 
Each of these writers affirms a conceptual distinction between subjects and objects. Each, 
too, distinguishes between the internal and the external, privileging either one or the other 
depending upon their philosophical predispositions. Woolf, Lawrence, and Conrad, for 
instance, in various, differing ways prioritize interiority. For Woolf and Lawrence, 
interiority exists substantively in itself. They posit an inner self, whose essence consists 
in its own ontological differentiation from an objectively existing external reality. Woolf 
emphasizes individuals’ subjectively-inflected self-experience, while Lawrence stresses 
the existence of a self beneath the self, a core self whose value lies in its transgressive 
authenticity. On the other hand, Conrad suggests that the self as such lacks definitive 
content. It exists, but only as a medium of expression. Still, for each, the self exists in 
                                                          
152 As Mark Scroggins argues, “Williams . . . celebrates the power of the imagination to effect a spring-like 
resurrection, to bring the particulars of existence, like Demeter bringing Persephone (Kora) out of Hades, 
out of the hell of muteness” (183, emphasis added).   
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itself distinct from its contexts. It remains ontologically inviolable, an essence in itself. 
Thus, Woolf, Lawrence, and Conrad each propound a metaphysical dualism ultimately 
rooted in a Cartesian model of human subjectivity. They erect a stable (though varyingly 
complex) binary between the self and the world, subjects and objects, the inner and the 
outer.  
These three authors stand in contrast to those modernists who minimize interiority 
in favor of an emphasis on exteriority. Pound, Hulme, Stein, Lewis, and Williams each in 
various ways stress the need for a meticulous representational objectivity in their work. 
Each advocates a kind of de-subjectification or depersonalization of art. Rather than 
representing objects as subjectively (and thus idiosyncratically) perceived, they seek an 
ontological exactitude in their work. In other words, they reverse the binary that Woolf, 
Lawrence, and Conrad propound. Rather than the interior, they privilege the exterior. 
And rather than the subject (or subjective), they privilege the object (or objective). Pound 
and Hulme, for instance, in their theories of the image, offer a poetics of empirical 
precision. The image should present that which the image in itself constitutively (and 
transparently) is. But this presumes an intelligible, stable, mutually perceived objective 
reality, which the poet unproblematically renders into objectively precise verse. Stein 
also presumes an objectively existing external reality (whether of language or things-in-
themselves), despite her differences from Pound and Hulme. Indeed, all three affirm 
external object reality over any mode of semi-solipsistic subjectivism. Of course, so, too, 
does Williams, who affirms in his work a real world of distinct self-substantiating 
objects, which exists independently of the individuals’ subjective reality. But of all these 
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figures, Lewis perhaps provides the clearest (or at least sharpest) articulation of the 
binary underlying their shared metaphysics. As Tarr puts it, “The armoured hide of the 
hippopotamus, the shell of the tortoise . . . you may put in one camp; naked pulsing and 
moving of the soft inside of life—along with elasticity of movement and consciousness—
that goes in the opposite camp” (265). In short, Lewis directly juxtaposes an aesthetics of 
exteriority against an aesthetics of interiority, privileging the former over the latter, and 
thereby conceptually codifying the binary.   
Thus, despite their many, often subtle differences, each of the authors in this 
chapter accepts and presents the same set of binaries in their work, regardless of which 
term they prioritize. In various ways, they each pit the inward against the outward, 
always emphasizing one or the other. Each assumes a constitutive gap dividing subject 
and object, and each assumes, too, the existence of ontological essences (whether the 
inner self itself or individual objects within an external objective material reality). In 
other words, each of these authors variously endorses a metaphysical dualism. Each of 
them advocates (however implicitly) a metaphysics which assumes a stable reality 
amenable to representation (whether from the outside or the inside). Accordingly, at the 
most fundamental level, much more unites these writers than separates them. They each 
conceptualize reality through a shared metaphysical lens, rooted, as noted above, in the 
Cartesian vision of the relation between subjects and objects. Emphases may differ and 
practices diverge, but each of these authors situates their work within the same 
philosophical framework. They share a common conceptual horizon. If, as Malcolm 
Bradbury and James McFarlane argue, modernism constitutes a response to the “crisis” 
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of modernity, then each of these authors offers a response predicated on a shared set of 
assumptions, despite the profound differences that mark their individual projects (27).       
I want to make the bold claim that Eliot differs from every one of these writers. I 
want to claim that far more connects them together as individual authors than connects 
him to any one of them, despite his early connection with Pound, his friendship with 
Woolf, or his praise for Lewis, and despite the typically modernist stylistic similarities 
that he shares with many of these figures (e.g., the use of disjunction, juxtaposition, 
montage, intertextuality, irony, associative logic, etc.).153 In short, I claim that Eliot’s 
motivating ontology and epistemology stem from a singularly unique philosophical 
perspective which ultimately separates his work from that of his literary contemporaries. 
Whereas these other authors affirm an essentially dualist metaphysics, rooted in a 
traditional binary understanding of the relationship between subjects and objects, Eliot 
offers a dialectical metaphysics which denies originary content to either subjects or 
objects. For Eliot, subjects and objects exist in a mutually constitutive dialectical relation. 
Neither of the terms obtains priority over the other. Indeed, taken in isolation, each term 
in effect constitutes a conceptual fiction. As Eliot succinctly puts it in his dissertation, the 
“object qua object would not exist without this bundle of [subjective] experiences, but the 
bundle would not be a bundle unless it were held together by the moment of objectivity” 
(133). As I argued in Chapter Three, for Eliot, each of these two term implies the other; 
neither exists in isolation from the other. The subjective and the objective (or the inner 
                                                          
153 In his 1918 second review of Tarr, for instance, Eliot reflects that Lewis “is a magician who compels 
our interest in himself; he is the most fascinating personality of our time” (“Tarr” 747).  
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and the outer) constitute two modes of the same unified experiential moment, abstracted 
only after the fact as distinct conceptions or ontological essences. In other words, for 
Eliot, there is no inner or outer, self or object, knower or known. There is only the 
comprehensive trans-conceptual situation, at least from an ontological perspective.  
Thus, Eliot denies the existence of any authentic self-substantiating inner self, as 
well as the existence of “objects qua objects” independent of the subjective (and thus 
objectifying) gaze. In fact, as delineated in Chapter Three, Eliot goes so far as to argue 
against the “assumption that there is one world of external reality which is consistent and 
complete” (112). For Eliot, “reality” consists of mutually self-constituting relations. 
Objects do not exist in ontological isolation as objects in themselves, but only within a 
weave of ever-shifting contexts. For Eliot, there is only relationality (rather than stable 
substances). Contrast this with Williams, for instance, who affirms (with Pound, etc.) the 
existence of a stable self-constituting world of external objects. As a consequence of his 
metaphysical position, Williams goes on to reject the use of comparative analogies, 
emotional association, and “crude” symbolism in his work, whereas Eliot does not. For 
whereas Eliot locates “truth” in associations and relations, Williams locates it in the 
putatively individually existing objects themselves. Thus his distaste for Eliot’s poetry, 
which he views only as a “reinflation” of the past and therefore a distortion of the 
immediately present (“Caviar” 103).      
Eliot, then, forwards a mode of modernism unique to himself. He stands apart not 
only from Williams, but from each of these figures inasmuch as they promote what Eliot 
would consider an insufficiently developed metaphysics. He offers a model of human 
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subjectivity based on a dialectical notion of the relation between the inward and the 
outward, subjects and objects. Just as for Williams (or any of these figures) aesthetic 
follows metaphysics, so, too, for Eliot. Convergences in technique prove ultimately 
superficial, given the opposed visions these authors advance. For Eliot offers a vision of 
human experience grounded in a neo-Hegelian dialectic which understands subjective 
and objective realities as relationally constituted. His literary peers, on the other hand, 
perceive subjects and objects as more or less distinct realities in themselves. As I have 
sought to affirm throughout this project, Eliot is neither a poet of interiority nor 
exteriority, but rather a strenuous opponent of all dualistic modes of thought and 
aesthetics. He challenges inherited literary practices not so much as an iconoclast, but as 
a kind of metaphysician concerned to correct what he perceives as flawed 
representational strategies. To understand Eliot in these terms is to understand him in an 
alternate relation to his contemporaries. For whereas they, too, challenge accepted 
representational norms, they do so in a way that tends to reinforce a traditionalist, 
Cartesian metaphysics. They draw on the same set of binaries that informs not only their 
literary predecessors, but the philosophers, anthropologists, and psychologists who 
provide the intellect impetus for much of their work (e.g., Bergson, Frazer, Freud). In 
contrast, Eliot challenges not only inherited aesthetics, but also the philosophical 
foundations on which they rely for their coherence.  
In short, Eliot emerges as a singular figure in the history of modernism, more so 
than previous estimations of him allow. He represents an alternative intellectual 
trajectory, rooted in part in Bradley, but stemming ultimately from Hegel (recall 
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Bradley’s reputation as a neo-Hegelian). He is a dialectician rather than a dualist, an 
epistemological skeptic rather than an objectivist. He resists definitive ontological claims 
and conceptual categories, as well as theoretical schemas and untenable philosophical 
suppositions. He questions the existence of the self in itself every bit as much as he 
questions the existence of objects in themselves. Accordingly, the modernism he 
embodies contrasts with those alternate modes exemplified by his various literary 
contemporaries. Indeed, Pound himself early on seemed to recognize Eliot’s 
uniqueness.154 To understand Eliot’s difference from his contemporaries provides a more 
nuanced understanding not only of Eliot but of his contemporaries as well. In a sense, he 
serves as a kind of foil: by offering an alternative metaphysics, he demonstrates the 
underlying ontological and epistemological agreement that links together their varied 
projects. Perceiving these broad convergences (due to Eliot’s universal divergence) 
allows new constellations of authors to emerge (i.e., those who privilege interiority 
versus those who privilege exteriority), which productively supplements preexisting 
alternative groupings (i.e., groupings via schools, regions, ideological dispositions, 
aesthetic techniques, etc.). Thus, to better understand Eliot is to better understand his 
contemporaries, thereby providing a more comprehensive understanding of modernism 
itself. For inasmuch as modernism constitutes an aesthetic, social, political, and 
ideological phenomenon, it also entails a philosophical project, however implicit.   
 
                                                          
154 In a 1914 letter to Harriet Monroe, he famously affirmed that Eliot had “actually trained . . . and 
modernized himself on his own” (Paige 80). 
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